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ABSTRACT 
The South China Sea is a semi-enclosed sea covering an area of approximately 
3.5 million square kilometres and bordering China, Taiwan, and a number of other 
Southeast Asian States. As one of the busiest international sea lanes linking North East 
Asia with the rest of the world, securing maritime safety and the freedom of navigation 
in the South China Sea is essential for global trade. The region is also important from a 
military perspective. Military vessels and aircraft of regional and extra-regional 
countries transit through this maritime region, from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian 
Ocean and the Middle East. However, clashes between littoral States over territorial 
sovereignty and associated maritime claims in the South China Sea have become 
commonplace. So too have disputes over differing interpretations of international law 
provisions relating to navigation and maritime safety in various maritime jurisdictional 
zones. Indeed, these factors mean that the South China Sea ―ranks among the most 
geographically and geopolitically complex ocean spaces in the world.‖
1
  
All States surrounding the South China Sea (except Taiwan) are parties to the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC). However, despite the LOSC 
having entered into force in 1994, many regional disputes remain unresolved, making 
the South China Sea ripe for potential conflicts. Apart from the LOSC, there are a 
number of international conventions governing the safe passage of vessels and aircraft 
on and over the sea. These include the International Regulations for Preventing 
Collisions at Sea, the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, and the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation. Nevertheless, in an effort to protect their 
interests and strengthen their maritime claims in the region, littoral and non-littoral 
                                                 
1
 Clive Schofield, 'What's at stake in the South China Sea? Geographical and geopolitical considerations' 
in Robert Beckman et al (eds), Beyond Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: Legal Frameworks 
for the Joint Development of Hydrocarbon Resources (Edward Elgar, 2013) , 11. 
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States have strengthened the presence of their military and law enforcement vessels and 
aircraft (sovereign immune vessels and aircraft). In doing so, multiple clashes have 
occurred over the past 20 years, with such clashes showing no sign of abatement. 
Sovereign immune vessels and aircraft operating at sea should act in accordance 
with the international law of the sea and air. However, inconsistencies and ambiguities 
exist in the navigational regimes of the LOSC, the practice of States, as well as in the 
prevailing international law. Due to the geopolitical complexity of the South China Sea, 
additional naval and law enforcement vessels including surface combatants, submarines, 
and aircraft are likely to be operating in this region in the near future. With this 
concentration of military and law enforcement assets, the potential for maritime 
incidents involving sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in the South China Sea will 
undoubtedly increase. 
To address the problems arising from the passage of these types of vessels and 
aircraft, a number of solutions have been devised. They include binding and non-
binding regional instruments, bilateral agreements, unilateral initiatives, as well as 
guidelines proposed by regional governments and academic and policy forums. 
However, these efforts have had very limited success. 
This thesis provides an analysis of the international legal regime and geopolitical 
issues surrounding the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in the South 
China Sea. International law principles, regional efforts, and the practice of South China 
Sea littoral States regarding the passage of such vessels and aircraft in different 
maritime zones of jurisdiction are critically analysed. Following on from this, 
ambiguities and gaps in the current international legal framework and regional efforts 
are identified. The thesis then provides potential options for clearer, more responsible 
navigational regimes for sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in the South China Sea. 
 
vii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This work is the culmination of my many years working as a Vietnamese naval 
officer and three years of passionate research and writing. However, this thesis could 
not have been written without the support of many people - both in Australia and 
Vietnam - whose guidance, inspiration and encouragement helped me complete the 
voyage. I will be forever grateful to all of you for making this journey such a rewarding 
experience.  
 To my supervisors, Professor Robin Warner and Associate Professor Chris 
Rahman, thank you for your constant support, incisive comments, wise guidance and 
encouragement during my PhD journey. Without your input and assistance I would not 
have been able complete this thesis. 
 I would like to extend my heartfelt thanks to Professor Martin Tsamenyi, who 
encouraged me to enrol in a PhD whilst I was completing my Masters degree at the 
University of Wollongong and during my time at the Australian Command and Staff 
College. Professor Tsamenyi inspired me to improve my academic knowledge, and for 
that I am sincerely grateful. I would also like to thank Professor Clive Schofield for 
helping me find the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security 
(ANCORS), and for introducing me to my fantastic supervisors.  
 ANCORS has been a wonderful place to study. First and foremost, I would like 
to thank Professor Stuart Kaye. As the Director of ANCORS, his support has been of 
inestimable value. I would also like to offer a special note of thanks to Dr. Lowell 
Bautista for his comments regarding the maritime law and Constitution of the 
Philippines. Special thanks must also go out to all the other ANCORS staff for helping 
me during my PhD journey. I would also like to express my sincere thanks and 
appreciation to Mr Leonardo Pedavoli for editing my thesis, and Mrs Myree Mitchell, 
 
viii 
 
the Mother of the Centre, for her unwavering kindness and support since I arrived at 
ANCORS.  
 I am indebted to the Vietnam Ministry of Education and Training and the 
Vietnam Ministry of National Defence for giving me the opportunity to attend the 
University of Wollongong, and for providing me with full financial support. I also 
would like to thank the University of Wollongong for providing me with the 
International Postgraduate Tuition Award. 
 To my fellow students at ANCORS, thank you for the friendship, support and 
camaraderie you have shown towards me. To Dr. Yubing Shi, Ms Dazhen (Daisy) 
Zhang and Ms Huey-Shian (Elly) Chung – thank you for your discussions and 
consultations regarding Chinese and Taiwanese maritime law and regulations. A note of 
thanks must also be extended to Mr Ahmad Almaududy Amri (Dudy), for providing me 
with invaluable information about Indonesian and Malaysian maritime law and 
regulations. To Dr. Carole Durussel, Dr. Shaun Lin, Mr Leonardo Bernard, Ms Brooke 
Campbell, Mr Shishir Upadhyaya, Ms Candice Visser, Ms Harriet Harden-Davies and 
Mrs Constance Johnson, thank you all for the fun, laughter and good times we shared. It 
certainly ‗lightened the research load‘ and gave me much-needed perspective. 
Finally, I am deeply thankful and indebted to my family - my wife Ha Pham and 
my children Chau Ton and Long Ton, who have provided me with constant support and 
encouragement whilst I have undertaken this study. I am also grateful to my parents and 
my brothers back in Vietnam, who have silently supported me throughout the process. 
  
 
ix 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
CERTIFICATION ........................................................................................................... iii 
ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................... v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................ vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................. ix 
TABLES AND FIGURES .............................................................................................. xv 
LIST OF ACRONYMS ................................................................................................ xvii 
1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 International law and regional initiatives to address the passage of sovereign 
immune vessels and aircraft at sea ................................................................................ 3 
1.3 Unresolved maritime disputes in the South China Sea ......................................... 5 
1.4 Incidents to date and the potential for future incidents ......................................... 9 
1.5 Scope, objectives and significance of the thesis ................................................. 12 
1.6 Research Questions ............................................................................................. 14 
1.7 Methodology ....................................................................................................... 17 
1.8 Thesis structure ................................................................................................... 18 
2 GEOPOLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA .................. 21 
2.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 21 
2.2 Geographical limits and the significance of the South China Sea ...................... 22 
2.2.1 Geographical limits of the South China Sea ............................................... 22 
2.2.2 The significance of the South China Sea .................................................... 26 
2.3 Maritime disputes in the South China Sea .......................................................... 31 
2.3.1 Disputes over offshore territorial claims in the South China Sea ............... 31 
2.3.2 Disputes over maritime boundaries ............................................................. 41 
2.3.3 Disputes over access to resources ............................................................... 46 
2.3.4 Foreign military activities in the maritime zones of coastal States ............. 50 
2.4 The growth of naval powers and maritime law enforcement capabilities .......... 52 
 
x 
 
2.4.1 Rise of China‘s naval and maritime law enforcement capabilities in the 
South China Sea ...................................................................................................... 52 
2.4.2 Responses from other littoral states ............................................................ 57 
2.4.3 Potential maritime incidents in the South China Sea .................................. 63 
2.5 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 65 
3 STRATEGIC CONTEXT OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA......................................... 67 
3.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 67 
3.2 Interests and strategies of South China Sea littoral States .................................. 68 
3.2.1 China‘s interests and strategies in the South China Sea ............................. 68 
3.2.2 Interests and strategies of smaller littoral States ......................................... 77 
3.3 Interests and strategies of extra-regional powers ................................................ 84 
3.3.1 The United States ........................................................................................ 84 
3.3.2 Japan............................................................................................................ 94 
3.3.3 India ............................................................................................................ 97 
3.3.4 Australia ...................................................................................................... 99 
3.4 The Arbitral Tribunal‘s ruling and strategic implications for the South China Sea 
  ........................................................................................................................... 102 
3.5 Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 105 
4 INTERNATIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE PASSAGE OF 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNE VESSELS AND AIRCRAFT .............................................. 107 
4.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 107 
4.2 The concept of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft under international law .... 
  ........................................................................................................................... 108 
4.2.1 Principle of sovereign immunity ............................................................... 108 
4.2.2 The concept of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft under international 
law  ................................................................................................................... 109 
4.3 International law principles applicable to the passage of sovereign immune 
vessels and aircraft at sea .......................................................................................... 111 
4.3.1 The Law of the Sea Convention ................................................................ 111 
4.3.2 Other international laws related to the navigation of sovereign immune 
vessels and aircraft at sea ...................................................................................... 142 
4.4 Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 146 
 
xi 
 
5 COASTAL STATE PRACTICE IN IMPLEMENTING THE INNOCENT PASSAGE 
REGIME ....................................................................................................................... 149 
5.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 149 
5.2 Domestic legislation and the practice of coastal States regarding the innocent 
passage regime .......................................................................................................... 150 
5.2.1 China ......................................................................................................... 150 
5.2.2 Taiwan ....................................................................................................... 158 
5.2.3 Vietnam ..................................................................................................... 161 
5.2.4 Indonesia ................................................................................................... 165 
5.2.5 The Philippines ......................................................................................... 170 
5.2.6 Malaysia .................................................................................................... 176 
5.2.7 Brunei ........................................................................................................ 179 
5.3 Political security and strategic factors that have influenced State practice ...... 180 
5.4 Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 187 
6 COASTAL STATE PRACTICE IN IMPLEMENTING NAVIGATIONAL 
REGIMES IN THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE .............................................. 191 
6.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 191 
6.2 The practice of coastal States ............................................................................ 192 
6.2.1 China ......................................................................................................... 192 
6.2.2 Taiwan ....................................................................................................... 203 
6.2.3 Vietnam ..................................................................................................... 206 
6.2.4 Indonesia ................................................................................................... 208 
6.2.5 The Philippines ......................................................................................... 209 
6.2.6 Malaysia .................................................................................................... 211 
6.2.7 Brunei ........................................................................................................ 213 
6.3 The uncertain EEZ boundary ............................................................................ 213 
6.4 Future prospects ................................................................................................ 218 
6.5 Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 221 
7 INCIDENTS INVOLVING SOUTH CHINA SEA LITTORAL STATES .............. 225 
7.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 225 
 
xii 
 
7.2 Incidents involving the passage of sovereign immune vessels in the territorial 
sea  ........................................................................................................................... 226 
7.2.1 The ―ANZAC Day incident‖..................................................................... 226 
7.2.2 The ―Han incident‖ 2004 .......................................................................... 230 
7.3 Incidents involving the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in the 
EEZ  ........................................................................................................................... 236 
7.3.1 The EP-3 incident...................................................................................... 237 
7.3.2 The Impeccable incident ........................................................................... 246 
7.3.3 Haiyang Shiyou-981 Oil Rig Crisis 2014 ................................................. 254 
7.4 Other incidents in the South China Sea involving sovereign immune vessels and 
aircraft ....................................................................................................................... 262 
7.5 Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 272 
8 REGIONAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE PASSAGE OF SOVEREIGN 
IMMUNE VESSELS AND AIRCRAFT ...................................................................... 275 
8.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 275 
8.2 Regional efforts to develop guidelines for the passage of sovereign immune 
vessels and aircraft .................................................................................................... 275 
8.2.1 ASEAN and the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea 
(DOC)  ................................................................................................................... 275 
8.2.2 Western Pacific Naval Symposium and the Code for Unplanned Encounters 
at Sea  ................................................................................................................... 286 
8.2.3 Bilateral agreements for confidence building measures ........................... 296 
8.2.4 Track II level efforts ................................................................................. 303 
8.2.5 The U.S. Freedom of Navigation Program ............................................... 310 
8.3 Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 315 
9 CHALLENGES AND THE WAY FORWARD ....................................................... 317 
9.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 317 
9.2 Uncertain issues in international law ................................................................ 318 
9.3 Key drivers behind state practice ...................................................................... 323 
9.4 Regional initiatives have been ineffective ........................................................ 325 
9.5 Maritime disputes are unlikely to be resolved .................................................. 330 
9.6 Existing political and strategic mistrust between States concerned .................. 332 
 
xiii 
 
9.6.1 Vietnam-China relations ........................................................................... 333 
9.6.2 Philippines-China relations ....................................................................... 335 
9.6.3 United States-China relations .................................................................... 337 
9.6.4 United States relations with The Philippines and Vietnam ....................... 340 
9.7 Implications for the future security, safety and freedom of navigation and 
overflight ................................................................................................................... 342 
9.8 The way forward ............................................................................................... 345 
9.9 Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 354 
10 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 357 
10.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 357 
10.2 Key findings and policy recommendations ....................................................... 357 
10.3 Recommended areas for further research .......................................................... 362 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................... 365 
 
  
 
xiv 
 
  
 
xv 
 
TABLES AND FIGURES 
TABLES 
Table 2.1 Estimated conventional hydrocarbon production in the South China Sea by 
littoral States in 2011 .............................................................................................. 28 
Table 2.2 Number of Chinese Navy ships from 2005 to 2015........................................ 55 
Table 5.1 Innocent Passage of Foreign Warships: the Practice of South China Sea 
littoral States ......................................................................................................... 188 
Table 6.1 The Practice of South China Sea Littoral States in relation to Foreign Military 
Activities in the EEZ ............................................................................................. 222 
Table 7.1 Maritime incidents involving South China Sea littoral States ...................... 271 
Table 8.1 Contents of the Guidelines and the Principles .............................................. 310 
 
Figure 2.1 Limits of the South China Sea ....................................................................... 23 
Figure 2.2 New Limits of the South China Sea (draft 4
th
 edition of IHO S23) .............. 24 
Figure 2.3 Bathymetric map of the South China Sea ...................................................... 24 
Figure 2.4 Islands in the South China Sea ...................................................................... 32 
Figure 2.5 Maritime boundaries in the South China Sea ................................................ 44 
Figure 5.1 Boundary of the Philippine Treaty Limits ................................................... 174 
Figure 6.1 Vietnam-Malaysia Joint Submission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf-
2009 ....................................................................................................................... 215 
  
 
xvi 
 
  
 
xvii 
 
LIST OF ACRONYMS 
ADIZ Air Defence Identification Zone 
ADMM ASEAN Defence Minister Meeting 
ARF Asian Regional Forum 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
CAFTA China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement 
CLCS Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
COC Code of Conduct in the South China Sea 
COLREGs International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 
CSCAP Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific 
CUES Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea 
DOC Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea 
EAS East Asian Summit 
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone 
FON Freedom of Navigation 
FSF Fisheries Surveillance Force 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 
ICJ International Court of Justice 
IFC International Fusion Centre 
IHO International Hydrographic Organization 
ILC International Law Commission of the United Nations 
IMO International Maritime Organization 
INCSEA Incidents at Sea Agreement 
ITLOS International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea 
LCS Littoral Combat Ship 
 
xviii 
 
LOSC Law of the Sea Convention 
MALINDO Incidents at Sea Agreement between Indonesia and Malaysia 
MARPOL International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
MMCA Military Maritime Consultative Agreement 
MOU Memorandum of Understanding 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NPCF North Pacific Coast Guard Forum 
OPRF Ocean Policy Research Foundation 
SLOC Sea Lanes of Communication 
SOLAS International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
TWG Technical Working Group 
UNCLOS United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
WPNS Western Pacific Naval Symposium 
 
 
1 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Security tensions in the South China Sea caused by maritime disputes and 
complex strategic relations have increased. One important aspect of maritime security in 
the South China Sea is tensions generated by differences over the operation of vessels 
and aircraft from navies and law enforcement services in waters under the jurisdiction, 
or claimed jurisdiction, of littoral States. There have thus been numerous incidents in 
the South China Sea involving these types of vessels and aircraft, and with rising 
tensions and the proliferation of forces operating in the area, the potential for further 
incidents is likely to grow. The risk of a major war in the South China Sea is low; 
however, rising political temperatures mean that maritime conflicts might still occur. 
The South China Sea is a semi-enclosed sea surrounded by seven littoral States 
and territories, Vietnam, China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and 
Indonesia.
1
 This region is not only a fertile fishing ground,
2
 but also rich in hydrocarbon 
deposits.
3
 Apart from natural resources, the South China Sea is the world‘s second 
busiest international sea lane, linking the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean. However, 
maritime disputes in the South China Sea are very complex and difficult to resolve. 
These disputes concern territorial sovereignty and maritime boundary claims, and can 
be bilateral, trilateral or multilateral in nature. In addition, disputes exist between littoral 
                                                 
1
 Thailand and Cambodia are not considered South China Sea littoral States as the Gulf of Thailand does 
not form part of the South China Sea. Singapore is not considered a State bordering the South China Sea, 
as for the purpose of this thesis, the limits of the South China Sea are based on the 4
th
 draft of the 
International Hydrographic Organization Publication S-23 (see Chapter two for more details). 
2
 UNEP, 'Procedure for Establishing a Regional System of Fisheries Refugia in the South China Sea and 
Gulf of Thailand in the context of the UNEP/GEF project titled ―Reserving Environmental Degradation 
Trends in the South China Sea and Gulf of Thailand" in South China Sea Knowledge Document (UNEP, 
2007) , 1. It is also worth noting that the South China Sea‘s fisheries have been severely over-exploited 
and the depletion of fish stocks in this area due to overfishing and pollution is a really big concern,  see 
Sumaila, Rashid and William Cheung, ‗Boom or Bust: the Future of Fish in the South China Sea‘ (2015) 
<http://www.admcf.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/FishSCSea03_11-FINAL-FINAL.pdf>. 
3
 U.S. Energy Information Administration, 'South China Sea' (7 February 2013). 
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States and extra-regional powers over the freedom of navigation and overflight in 
various maritime zones.  
In order to strengthen their territorial sovereignty and maritime claims, the 
States concerned have employed different approaches. These approaches include the 
construction of artificial islands- on disputed offshore features, deploying naval and 
maritime law enforcement personnel to assert their claims, applying restrictive views on 
the freedoms of navigation and overflight in various maritime jurisdiction zones, as well 
as using coercive power to further advance their claims. 
The international law of the sea has played a vital role in promoting global peace 
and preventing air and sea incidents. However, the law of the sea cannot help to solve 
sovereignty disputes over land features. Moreover, as international treaties are 
invariably the product of compromise, there are always gaps and ambiguities in their 
provisions. As a result, States have adopted conflicting interpretations of international 
law provisions – interpretations which suit their own vested interests. Due to existing 
gaps and ambiguities in the international legal regime, and the geopolitical complexity 
of the South China Sea, there have been many incidents involving the passage of naval 
and law enforcement vessels and aircraft in this region.  
Apart from international law, there have been a number of regional initiatives to 
address safe navigation and overflight at sea, including bilateral and multilateral 
agreements advocated by regional institutions, as well as guidelines and principles 
proposed by regional academic and policy forums. However, these initiatives have had 
limited success.  
As territorial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea are unlikely to be 
resolved in the near future, concerned States have responded by modernising their 
maritime forces, including naval, coastguard and other types of civilian law 
 
3 
 
enforcement assets. The increasing presence of naval and maritime law enforcement 
vessels and aircraft (sovereign immune vessels and aircraft) from littoral states, and the 
presence of vessels and aircraft of extra-regional powers in this confined and congested 
region, will continue to create high tensions and the potential for maritime incidents in 
the South China Sea. 
This thesis uses the term ―sovereign immune vessels and aircraft‖ to refer to all 
vessels and aircraft owned or operated by a State and used, for the time being, only on 
government non-commercial service.
4
 These types of vessels and aircraft include, but 
are not limited to, vessels and aircraft of navies, coast guards, fisheries agencies and 
border protection agencies. This thesis aims to analyse this problem and identify ways 
to reduce the likelihood of future potential incidents by providing a number of 
recommendations based on the existing international law and the geopolitical contexts 
of the South China Sea.  
1.2  International law and regional initiatives to address the passage of sovereign 
immune vessels and aircraft at sea 
There are a number of international conventions addressing the passage of 
sovereign immune vessels and aircraft at sea. These include the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC);
5
 the International Regulations for 
Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs);
6
 the International Convention for the Safety 
of Life at Sea (SOLAS);
7
 and the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago 
                                                 
4
 See Chapter Four for a detailed definition of ―sovereign immune vessels and aircraft.‖ 
5
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982 (entered into 
force 16 November 1994), [hereafter LOSC]. 
6
 International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, adopted 20 October 1972 (entered into force 
15 July 1977) [hereafter COLREGs], rule 1. 
7
 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, adopted 1 November 1974 (entered into force 25 
May 1980) [hereafter SOLAS]. 
 
4 
 
Convention).
8
 However, due to existing gaps and ambiguities in these conventions, the 
passage of these types of vessels and aircraft is not clearly addressed. In the South 
China Sea, state practice regarding the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft 
is also divergent. As a result, there have been frequent incidents in the region involving 
sovereign immune vessels and aircraft of littoral States and extra-regional players.  
In an effort to fill the gaps and ambiguities in the existing international law, a 
number of regional initiatives addressing the passage of sovereign immune vessels and 
aircraft in the South China Sea have been devised. These include: (i) the Declaration on 
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea signed by ASEAN member states and China 
in 2002; (ii) the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea adopted by the Western Pacific 
Naval Symposium in 2014; (iii) the Guidelines for Navigation and Overflight in the 
Exclusive Economic Zone, as well as its revision initiated by a group of academic and 
policy experts and titled Principles for Building Confidence and Security in the 
Exclusive Economic Zone of the Asia-Pacific; (iv) policy recommendations proposed 
by the South China Sea Workshop Process initiated by Indonesia in 1989 and the 
Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) established in 1993; and 
(v) other maritime cooperative and confidence building measures between littoral States 
of the South China Sea.
9
 There have been a number of bilateral agreements for 
managing incidents at sea in other contexts which could also be applied to the South 
China Sea region. The Incidents at Sea Agreement signed by the United States and the 
former Soviet Union in 1972 (INCSEA 1972),
10
 and the Incidents at Sea Agreement 
                                                 
8
 Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed 7 December 1944 (entered into force 4 April 1947), 
art 3. 
9
 See Chapter 7 of the thesis for a detailed discussion. 
10
 Agreement Between the Government of The United States of America and the Government of The 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas, signed 25 
May 1972 (entered into force 25 May 1972). 
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between Indonesia and Malaysia (MALINDO) signed in 2001, are examples of bilateral 
agreements for managing incidents at sea.
11
 In 1979 the United States launched the U.S. 
Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program to oppose excessive maritime claims through ―a 
peaceful exercise of the rights and freedoms of navigation and overflight recognized 
under international law.‖
12
 Indeed, a number of operational assertions have been 
conducted under the FON Program to challenge the excessive maritime claims of South 
China Sea littoral States.
13
 However, these efforts have had little success in preventing 
contentious incidents involving the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in 
the region.  
1.3 Unresolved maritime disputes in the South China Sea 
 Maritime disputes in the South China Sea have resisted easy resolution. These 
disputes concern territorial sovereignty and associated maritime claims, access to 
resources, the legal status of islands under the LOSC, as well as navigational regimes in 
the LOSC, particularly the innocent passage of foreign warships and the freedoms of 
navigation and overflight in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of coastal States. 
 There are more than 250 small offshore features located in the middle of the 
South China Sea, including islands, rocks, reefs, shoals, and atolls.
14
 The exact number 
of these features is not available as most of them are submerged at high tide, and only 
                                                 
11
 MALINDO Prevention of Sea Incident Cooperative Guidelines (Jakarta 18 January 2001). 
12
 Department of State, Limits of the Seas: United States Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims (United 
States Department of State, 1992), 6. 
13
 DoD Annual Freedom of Navigation (FON) Reports (15 February 2016) U.S. Department of Defense < 
http://policy.defense.gov/OUSDP-Offices/FON>; see also Marcus Weisgerber, Annual DoD Report 
Claims Steady Chinese Military Expansion (6 May 2013) Defense News 
<http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130506/DEFREG02/305060008/>. 
14
 Sonika Gupta, 'Emerging Security Architecture in Southeast & East Asia: Growing Tensions in the 
South China Sea' (2013) 213 ISPS Issue Brief 1, 2. 
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some of them may be classified as islands under the LOSC.
15
 Sovereignty claims over 
these offshore features by States surrounding the South China Sea are overlapping and 
difficult to resolve. Indeed, there are five offshore groups of features in the South China 
Sea which are claimed by more than one State. These include the Pratas Islands, the 
Paracel Islands, Scarborough Shoal, Macclesfield Bank, and the Spratly Islands. The 
Pratas Islands are located in the north-eastern part of the South China Sea and cover an 
ocean space of approximately 45 square kilometres. Although currently occupied by 
Taiwan, the Pratas Islands have also been claimed by China.
16
 The Paracel Islands are 
located in the north-western part of the South China Sea and cover an ocean surface 
area of more than 16,000 square kilometres. These islands are subject to overlapping 
territorial claims by China, Taiwan and Vietnam, but are currently under Chinese 
control.
17
 Scarborough Shoal is located approximately 124 nautical miles from 
Zambales Province in the Philippines and within the Philippines‘ claimed EEZ.
18
 This 
feature is claimed by China, Taiwan and the Philippines, but since the maritime standoff 
between the two States in 2012, China appears to have taken effective control of the 
Shoal.
19
 Macclesfield Bank consists of a group of entirely submerged shoals and reefs 
located in the centre of the South China Sea, between the Paracel Islands and 
Scarborough Shoal.
20
 This Bank is claimed by China and Taiwan; however, as this 
                                                 
15
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982 (entered 
into force 16 November 1994), Art 121. Article 121 of the LOSC defines an island as ―a naturally formed 
area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide‖. 
16
 National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, 'South China Sea and the Gulf of Thailand' in Sailing 
Direction (National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, 13th ed, 2011) , 4. 
17
 Hong Thao Nguyen, 'Vietnam‘s Position on the Sovereignty over the Paracels and the Spratlys: Its 
Maritime Claims' (2012) 1 Journal of East Asia and International Law 165, 167. 
18
 Robert Beckman, 'Scarborough Shoal: Flashpoint for Confrontation or Opportunity for Cooperation?' 
(2012) (7/2012) RSIS Commentaries 1, 2. 
19
 M. Taylor Fravel, China's Island Strategy: "Redefine the Status Quo." (1 November 2012) The 
Diplomat <http://thediplomat.com/2012/11/chinas-island-strategy-redefine-the-status-quo/>. 
20
 Ronald O'Rourke, 'Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving 
China: Issues for Congress' (Congressional Research Service, 5 August 2014), 3. 
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feature is totally submerged, no State can effectively occupy it. The Spratly Islands are 
located in the south-eastern part of the South China Sea and cover an ocean surface area 
of approximately 240,000 square kilometres.
21
 China, Taiwan and Vietnam claim the 
whole archipelago, while Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei claim certain parts of it. 
All claimants, with the exception of Brunei, have military or maritime forces present in 
the archipelago. Over the past few years, China has conducted an extensive artificial 
island-building program on a number of its occupied features in the Spratlys, ignoring 
protests from other claimant States and concerned countries.
22
 
 Under the LOSC, an island may have its own territorial sea, contiguous zone, 
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. However, ―rocks which cannot sustain 
human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone 
or continental shelf.‖
23
 To date, only China has claimed that the Spratly Islands are 
entitled to a territorial sea, an EEZ and a continental shelf.
24
 Other claimants have not 
officially stated whether they share China‘s view with regard to the Spratly Islands, or 
whether these islands should all be regarded as ―rocks‖ under Article 121 of the LOSC. 
On 12 July 2016, an arbitral tribunal established as a result of a case brought by the 
Philippines under Annex VII of the LOSC issued an award in the South China Sea 
dispute between China and the Philippines. The arbitral tribunal ruled that none of the 
                                                 
21
 Clive H Schofield, 'Island disputes and the "oil factor" in the South China Sea disputes' (2012) 4 
Current Intelligence 3, 3. 
22
 See Greg Torode, China to project power from artificial islands in South China Sea (19 February 2015) 
Reuters <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/19/us-southchinasea-reefs-china-
idUSKBN0LN0J820150219>; see also Senators McCain, Reed, Corker, and Menendez Send Letter on 
Chinese Maritime Strategy (19 March 2015 ) United States Senate Committee on Armed Services 
<http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/press-releases/senators-mccain-reed-corker-and-menendez-send-
letter-on-chinese-maritime-strategy>.  
23
 LOSC, art 121. 
24
 See Communication dated 14 April 2011 on the CLCS 
<https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_mysvnm_33_2009.htm>. 
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features in the Spratly Islands are capable of generating an EEZ or a continental shelf.
25
 
Although the arbitral tribunal‘s award is legally binding on all the parties to the 
arbitration, it is unenforceable. In fact, China has rejected the arbitral tribunal‘s ruling 
outright.  
In addition to territorial sovereignty disputes and associated maritime claims 
over offshore features in the South China Sea, China and Taiwan‘s ambiguous nine-
dash line claim which covers almost the whole South China Sea area has created 
confusion and tension among littoral States and extra-regional players.
26
 Vietnam, 
Indonesia and the United States have rejected China‘s nine-dash line claim as having no 
international legal basis, while the Philippines took the step of referring the matter to 
arbitration, requesting an award to the effect that China‘s claim is contrary to the 
LOSC.
27
 Many commentators have disputed the legal and technical basis for the nine-
dash line, and it continues to prove a major obstacle to dispute resolution in the South 
China Sea.
28
 In its final award, the arbitral tribunal ruled that the nine-dash line claimed 
by China has no legal basis. This is indeed a landmark ruling, but enforcing the decision 
and establishing its validity under customary international law will be challenging, not 
the least because China has rejected the ruling and will thus continue to assert the claim. 
                                                 
25
 South China Sea Arbitration (The Philippines v People's Republic of China) (Case  No. 2013-19) 
(Award) (Permanent Court of Arbitration, 12 July 2016) [646]. 
26
 China introduced the so-called nine dash-line in 2009 in response to joint submissions by Vietnam and 
Malaysia on their extended continental shelves to the CLCS. See Notes Verbal CML/18/2009 (7 May 
2009) < http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/vnm37_09/chn_2009re_vnm.pdf>. 
27
 See United States Department of State Limits in the Seas: China's Maritime Claims in the South China 
Sea (5 December 2014); Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines, Notification and 
Statement of Claim, Manila 22 January 2013; See Vietnam Notes < 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/vnm_chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.p
df>; Indonesia Notes < 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/idn_2010re_mys_vnm_e.pdf>. 
28
 Melek has commented that the nine dash-line map ―has little or no legal value for China to establish its 
sovereignty or historic right claim.‖ See Melda Malek, 'A Legal Assessment of China's historic claims in 
the South China Sea' (2013) 5(1) Australian Journal of Maritime and Oceans Affairs 28, 34; Florian 
Dupuy and Pierre Marie Dupuy, 'A Legal Analysis of China's Historic Rights Claim in the South China 
Sea' (2013) 107 American Journal of International Law 124, 131-36; see also Francois Xavier Bonnet, 
'Geopolitics of Scarborough Shoal' 2012 14 Irasec's Discussion Papers 1, 23. 
 
9 
 
1.4 Incidents to date and the potential for future incidents 
 There have been two prominent incidents between sovereign immune vessels 
and aircraft in the South China Sea in recent times. The first took place in 2001 and 
involved a collision between a Chinese F-8II fighter and a U.S. EP-3 maritime 
reconnaissance aircraft. The second incident occurred in 2009 and involved a U.S. 
ocean surveillance ship, the USNS Impeccable, and a group of five Chinese law 
enforcement and fishing vessels.
29
 In both cases, the United States argued that military 
surveying, hydrographic surveying and intelligence collection by military vessels and 
aircraft in a foreign State‘s EEZ are part of the normal high seas freedoms of navigation 
and overflight granted under the LOSC. Meanwhile, China argued that unauthorised 
military data collection in its EEZ violates the principle of the peaceful use of the sea set 
out in the LOSC.
30
 In June 2009, a Chinese navy submarine hit the sonar array towed by 
the destroyer USS John McCain near Subic Bay, approximately 144 miles off the coast 
of the Philippines.
31
 On 5 December 2013, a Chinese amphibious ship encountered the 
USS Cowpens in the South China Sea at a distance of less than 500 yards, forcing the 
Cowpens to take evasive action to avoid a collision.
32
 On 19 August 2014, a Chinese 
Shenyang J-11B fighter intercepted a U.S. Navy P-8 marine patrol and surveillance 
aircraft in international airspace over the South China Sea. The incident occurred 
approximately 135 miles east of China‘s Hainan Island and within China‘s claimed 
                                                 
29
 See Chapter seven of this thesis for details. 
30
 Shirley A Kan, 'China-U.S. Aircraft Collision Incident of April 2001: Assessments and Policy 
Implications' (Congressional Research Service, October 2001), 20. 
31
 David Carter and Erik Slavin, USS McCain arrives at Sasebo after suffering damage to sonar array (17 
June 2009) Stars and Stripes <http://www.stripes.com/news/uss-mccain-arrives-at-sasebo-after-suffering-
damage-to-sonar-array-1.92521>. 
32
 See Chapter seven of the thesis for further details. 
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EEZ.
33
 According to Pentagon spokesman Rear Admiral John Kirby, the interception 
was ―very close, very dangerous... pretty aggressive and very unprofessional.‖
34
 As 
China and the United States have conflicting views over what types of military activities 
can be conducted in the EEZ of coastal States, further incidents involving the navigation 
of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in the South China Sea are likely to occur in 
the future.  
 Incidents involving law enforcement vessels of South China Sea littoral States 
have also increased in recent years. In June 2010, a standoff occurred when the 
Indonesian navy seized a Chinese fishing vessel operating in the waters north of Natuna 
Island in Indonesia‘s claimed EEZ. A Chinese maritime surveillance vessel arrived on 
the scene and pointed its large-calibre machine gun at the Indonesian naval vessel and 
threatened to fire if the Indonesian vessel did not release the Chinese fishing boat.
35
 On 
2 March 2011, two Chinese patrol boats manoeuvred close to and threatened to ram the 
MV Veritas Voyager, a Philippine survey vessel operating in the Reed Bank area off 
Palawan Island in the Philippines. The actions of the Chinese patrol boats ultimately 
forced the MV Veritas Voyager to leave the area.
36
 On 26 May 2011, a Chinese 
maritime surveillance vessel intentionally cut the cable towed by the Binh Minh 02, a 
vessel operated by PetroVietnam well within Vietnam‘s claimed EEZ.
37
 In 2012, China 
and the Philippines were involved in a two month standoff at Scarborough Shoal – a 
feature over which both countries claim sovereignty. The standoff was sparked by two 
                                                 
33
 Christopher P. Cavas, Chinese Fighter Buzzes US Patrol Aircraft (22 August 2014) Defense News 
<http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20140822/DEFREG02/308220025/Chinese-Fighter-Buzzes-US-
Patrol-Aircraft>. 
34
 Quoted in ibid. 
35
 Kelly Currie, Why is China Picking Fights with Indonesia? (6 August 2010) Weekly Standard 
<http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/why-china-picking-fights-indonesia>. 
36
 Philippines halts tests after China patrol challenge (8 March 2011) Bristish Broastcasting Corporation 
(BBC) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12672889>. 
37
 James Kraska and Raul Pedrozo, International Maritime Security Law (Koninklijke Brill NV, 2013), 
323. 
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Chinese marine surveillance vessels preventing a Philippine warship, the BRP Gregorio 
del Pilar, from arresting eight Chinese fishing vessels engaged in alleged illegal fishing 
in the Shoal.
38
 On 9 May 2013, a Taiwanese fisherman was shot dead by a Philippine 
patrol craft in an area where the EEZs claimed by Taiwan and the Philippines overlap.
39
 
In 2014, tensions escalated in the South China Sea when China placed the Haiyang 
Shiyou 981 (HYSY 981) oil rig in Vietnam‘s claimed EEZ and deployed approximately 
80 escort vessels, including seven military ships and a number of military aircraft, to 
protect the oil rig.
40
 In response, Vietnam dispatched a number of law enforcement 
vessels to the area in order to issue warnings to the Chinese vessels and demand that the 
rig be removed from Vietnam‘s EEZ and continental shelf.
41
 During this maritime 
standoff, Vietnam accused Chinese Coast Guard ships of aggressively firing high-
powered water cannons at, and intentionally ramming, Vietnam‘s maritime law 
enforcement ships while Chinese aircraft circled above them.
42
 It is important to note 
that Chinese Coast Guard ships deliberately used the high-powered water cannons not 
                                                 
38
 Renato Cruz De Castro, 'China‘s Realpolitik Approach in the South China Sea Dispute: The Case of the 
2012 Scarborough Shoal Standoff' (Paper presented at the Conference for the Managing Tensions in the 
South China Sea, CSIS 5-6 June 2013), 5. 
39
 Shih Hsiu-chuan and Jake Chung, Fisherman killed in disputed waters (10 May 2013) Taipei Times 
<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2013/05/10/2003561896>. 
40
 Ernest Z Bower and Gregory B Poling, China-Vietnam Tensions High over Drilling Rig in Disputed 
Waters (7 May 2014) Center for Strategic & International Studies <http://csis.org/publication/critical-
questions-china-vietnam-tensions-high-over-drilling-rig-disputed-waters>; see also Position paper of Viet 
Nam on China‟s illegal placement of Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig in the Exclusive Economic Zone and 
Continental Shelf of Viet Nam,  Position paper of Viet Nam on China‟s illegal placement of Haiyang 
Shiyou 981 oil rig in the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf of Viet Nam (7 July 2014) 
Consulate of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in New York, The United States of America 
<http://vietnamconsulate-ny.org/news/2014/07/position-paper-viet-nam-chinas-illegal-placement-
haiyang-shiyou-981-oil-rig-exclusive>. 
41
 See Bower and Poling, above n 147; see also Tomotaka Shoji, Vietnam and China over the South 
China Sea: The confrontation proceeds towards a new phase (2 July 2014) World Affairs 
<http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/content/vietnam-and-china-over-south-china-sea-confrontation-
proceeds-towards-new-phase>. 
42
 Chinese aircraft intimidate Vietnam‟s law enforcement vessels (21 June 2014) Vietnamnet 
<http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/government/105605/chinese-aircraft-intimidate-vietnam-s-law-
enforcement-vessels.html>; see also Chinese ships ram Vietnamese vessels in latest oil rig row: officials 
(7 May 2014) Thanhnien News <http://www.thanhniennews.com/politics/chinese-ships-ram-vietnamese-
vessels-in-latest-oil-rig-row-officials-26069.html>. 
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only to damage communication systems of Vietnamese vessels but also cause injuries to 
the crew on board these vessels.
43
 
The Chinese navy‘s South Sea Fleet and the fleets of other navies operating in 
the South China Sea currently comprise approximately 40 submarines, 85 principal 
surface combatants and 390 patrol and coastal combatants, while the vessels belonging 
to the law enforcement agencies of these States comprise roughly 1150 patrol vessels.
44
 
Moreover, these numbers are expected to increase in the coming years. Due to the 
overlapping maritime claims, and the increasing presence of naval and law enforcement 
vessels and aircraft, incidents involving sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in the 
region are unlikely to reduce in frequency. 
1.5 Scope, objectives and significance of the thesis 
This thesis focuses on the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in 
the South China Sea. The geographic scope of the South China Sea which this thesis 
will use is the area designated in the draft 4
th
 edition of the International Hydrographic 
Organization (IHO) Publication S-23, which was submitted to the IHO in 2002
45
. The 
reason for selecting this particular geographic scope for the South China Sea is 
explained in Chapter two of the thesis.  
The research seeks to analyse international law, regional efforts and political 
issues surrounding the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in the South 
China Sea. Based on these analyses, the existing gaps and ambiguities in the 
                                                 
43
 Chinese vessels keep firing water at Vietnamese ships in Vietnam's seas (13 March 2014 ) Tuoitrenews 
<http://tuoitrenews.vn/society/19615/chinese-vessels-continue-to-fire-water-at-vietnamese-ships-in-its-
waters>. 
44
 'Chapter Six: Asia' (2013) 113(1) Military Balance 245, 245-352; 'Chapter Six: Asia' (2016) 116 (1) 
Military Balance 211, 211-306. The number of vessels stated above has been adapted by the author from 
data provided in this document. 
45
 The draft 4
th
 edition of S-23 has not yet been approved. However, as the limits of the South China Sea 
defined in the 1953 special publication ‗Limits of Ocean and Seas‘(also  known as IHO S-23) include the 
Strait of Taiwan, the Gulf of Tonkin and the Natuna Sea, the author does not consider these limits to be 
appropriate. See Chapter Two of this thesis for additional details. 
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international legal regime and regional efforts will be identified and critically evaluated. 
Moreover, by examining the geopolitical and geostrategic importance of the South 
China Sea, the thesis will identify key challenges in addressing these gaps and 
ambiguities with the objective of preventing maritime incidents in the South China Sea 
involving sovereign immune vessels and aircraft. Finally, the thesis highlights 
implications for the future security, safety and freedom of navigation and overflight in 
the South China Sea, and provides a number of legal and policy recommendations for 
addressing these challenges. 
 There have been a number of legal studies focusing on South China Sea issues. 
However, most of this research has concentrated on areas such as territorial sovereignty 
claims and associated maritime disputes;
46
 conflict management;
47
 maritime confidence 
building measures;
48
 joint development;
49
 and foreign military activities in the exclusive 
                                                 
46
 Leszek Buszynski and Christopher B Robert (eds), The South China Sea Maritime Disputes: Political, 
Legal and Regional Perspectives (Routledge, 2015); Dong Manh Nguyen, 'Settlement of Disputes under 
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: The Case of the South China Sea Disputes' 
(2006) 25(1) University of Queensland Law Journal 145; Robert Beckman, 'The UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea and the Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea' (2013) 107 American Journal of 
International Law 142; Robert Beckman, 'The South China Sea: the evolving dispute between China and 
her maritime neighbours' (2013) 21(3) Geomatics World 17; Nick A Owen and Clive H Schofield, 
'Disputed South China Sea hydrocarbons in perspective' (2012) 36(3) Maritime Policy 809; Gregory B 
Poling, 'The South China Sea in Focus: Clarifying the Limits of Maritime Dispute' (CSIS Report, July 
2013); Robert C. Beckman and Clive H. Schofield, 'Defining EEZ Claims from Islands: A Potential South 
China Sea Change' (2014) 29(2) The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 193. 
47
 Munmun Majumdar, 'The ASEAN Way of Conflict Management in the South China Sea' (2015) 39(1) 
Strategic Analysis 73; Hasjim Djalal, 'Conflict Management Experiences in Southeast Asia: Lessons and 
Implications for the South China Sea Disputes' (2011) 3(4) Asian Politics and Policy 627; Sheldon W 
Simon, 'Conflict and Diplomacy in the South China Sea: The View from Washington' (2012) 52(2) Asian 
Survey 995; Gupta, above n 14.  
48
 Sam Bateman, 'Confidence-Building Measures for the South China Sea' in Euan Graham and Henrick 
Z. Tsjeng (eds), Navigating the Indo-Pacific Arc (Nanyang Technological University, 2014) ; Christopher 
C Joyner, 'The Spratly Islands Disputes: Legal Issues and Prospect for Diplomatic Accommodation' in 
Baker John C and Wiencek David G (eds), Cooperative Monitoring in the South China Sea: Satellite 
Imagery, Confidence Building Measures, and the Spratly Islands Disputes (Greenwood Press, 2002) ; 
Justin Jones, 'Background paper: A naval perspective of maritime confidence building measures' (ASPI 
Special Report, September 2013); Sam Bateman, 'Background paper: Existing and previous maritime 
cooperative arrangements in the South China Sea' (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 11-13 August 
2013 2013); 
49
 Robert Beckman et al (eds), Beyond Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea : Legal Frameworks 
for the Joint Development of Hydrocarbon Resources (Edward Elgar, 2013); Leszek Buszynski, 'The 
South China Sea: Avenues Towards a Resolution of the Issue' in Tran Thuy Truong (ed), The South 
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economic zone.
50
 There have been multiple incidents in the South China Sea involving 
vessels and aircraft of navies, coast guards and civilian law enforcement agencies of 
littoral States and extra-regional players. However, to date, there have been no 
comprehensive studies focusing on the international legal regime governing the passage 
of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft. Nor have there been any regional studies 
evaluating the relevant international law or grass-roots initiatives regulating the passage 
of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in the South China Sea. This thesis provides a 
comprehensive study on the international legal regime and geopolitical issues 
surrounding the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in the South China 
Sea. Accordingly, it seeks to contribute an understanding of the range of measures 
aimed at minimising maritime incidents in the South China Sea while strengthening the 
peace, security and freedom of navigation and overflight in the maritime region.  
1.6 Research Questions 
 The research focuses on the following key questions: 
 First, what are the current geopolitical considerations in the South China Sea? 
Understanding the geographical and geopolitical situation in the South China Sea is an 
essential preliminary step. Key factors to be addressed include territorial sovereignty 
disputes and associated maritime claims between littoral States; disputes over access to 
resources; differing interpretations of navigational regimes under the LOSC by littoral 
                                                                                                                                               
China Sea: Cooperation for Regional Security and Development (Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, 
2010) . 
50
 Raul Pedrozo, 'Preserving Navigational Rights and Freedoms: The Right to Conduct Military Activities 
in China‘s Exclusive Economic Zone' (2010) 9(1) Chinese Journal of International Law 9; Yu Zhirong, 
'Jurisprudential Analysis of the U.S. Navy‘s Military Surveys in the Exclusive Economic Zones of 
Coastal Countries' in Peter Dutton (ed), Military Activities in the EEZ: A U.S.-China Dialogue on Security 
and International Law in the Maritime Commons (U.S. Naval War College, 2010) vol 7, ; Andrew S 
Williams, 'Aerial Reconnaissance by Military Aircraft in the Exclusive Economic Zone' in Peter Dutton 
(ed), Military Activities in the EEZ: A U.S.-China Dialogue on Security and International Law in the 
Maritime Commons (U.S. Naval War College, 2010) ; Jon M. Van Dyke, 'Military ships and planes 
operating in the exclusive economic zone of another country' (2004) 28 Marine Policy 29. 
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States (and between littoral States and external players); the strategic and economic 
significance of the South China Sea region; and the burgeoning growth of naval powers 
and maritime law enforcement capabilities, as well as the increased potential for 
maritime incidents in the region. 
 Second, what is the strategic context of the South China Sea? To address this 
question, the interests and strategies of littoral States and external players in the South 
China Sea will be explored. In addition, the strategic implications of the recent arbitral 
award in the Philippines-China case will be critically analysed. 
Third, what are the relevant international legal principles applicable to the 
passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in different maritime zones of 
jurisdiction? The LOSC is popularly considered the ―Constitution for the Oceans‖, and 
its success lies in the fact that it ―establishes a legal framework to govern all uses of the 
oceans.‖
51
 Apart from the regime of deep seabed mining and the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment and marine scientific research, most of the 
provisions of the LOSC directly or indirectly address the issue of freedom of navigation 
and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to navigation.
52
 Apart from the 
LOSC, there are other international treaties containing provisions related to the 
navigation of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft at sea. These include COLREGs, 
the SOLAS Convention and the Chicago Convention. However, as international treaties 
are the product of compromise, there are bound to be gaps and ambiguities in their 
provisions. These gaps and ambiguities can be intentional or unintentional, and arise 
                                                 
51
 Beckman, above n 49, 142. 
52
 Thomas A Mensah, 'Foreward' in Donald R Rothwell and Sam Bateman (eds), Navigational Rights and 
Freedoms and the New Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhoff, 2000) , Viii. 
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due to a lack of agreement between State parties.
53
 It is therefore necessary to analyse 
the international legal regimes governing navigation and overflight at sea.  
 Fourth, what do the national legislation and practices of littoral States of the 
South China Sea indicate about the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in 
different maritime zones of jurisdiction? As international law is not free from 
ambiguities, States have interpreted and implemented the provisions of the LOSC and 
other relevant instruments differently to suit their own national and strategic interests. 
All South China Sea littoral States are parties to the above-mentioned international 
treaties; however, they have interpreted the provisions of these conventions in different 
ways. For this reason, it is necessary to examine their domestic legislation and practices 
to gain a better understanding of how the relevant international legal provisions have 
been implemented with regard to the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft. 
 Fifth, what role are regional efforts playing in promoting the safety of 
navigation and overflight of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in the South China 
Sea? A number of regional initiatives have been devised to address the passage of 
sovereign immune vessel and aircraft in the South China Sea. These include binding 
and non-binding regional instruments, bilateral agreements, unilateral initiatives, as well 
as guidelines proposed by academic and policy forums. It is critically important to 
examine current regional initiatives to determine their effectiveness in promoting the 
safety of navigation and overflight of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in the 
region. 
 Sixth, what are the remaining challenges in addressing the passage of sovereign 
immune vessels and aircraft in the South China Sea? To answer this question, the 
                                                 
53
 See Dennis Mandsager, 'The U.S. Freedom of Navigation Program: Policy, Procedure, and Future' in 
Michael N. Schmitt (ed), The Law of Military Operations (Naval War College Press, 1998) , 124. 
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remaining uncertainties in the international legal regime will be explored. The shortfalls 
that exist in relation to regional efforts will also be evaluated, as will the unresolved 
maritime disputes and the political and strategic mistrust that exists between States. 
 Seventh, what are the possible options for implementing more responsible 
navigation behaviours for sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in the South China 
Sea? Based on the critical analyses conducted in the previous chapters of the thesis, a 
number of legal and policy recommendations will be made with the objective of 
minimising maritime incidents involving sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in the 
South China Sea. Provided these recommendations are adopted by a majority of States, 
the result should be the promotion of peace, security, and the freedom of navigation and 
overflight in the region. 
1.7 Methodology 
 The methodology used in this thesis is a combination of systematic 
identification, collection and analysis of related documents, as well as the personal 
experience of the author. The documents used in the preparation of this thesis include 
primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include international legal 
materials such as binding and non-binding regional agreements and related instruments, 
the national legislation and subordinate legislation of States, as well as the practice of 
individual States (as evidenced by governmental policy documents). The secondary 
sources include books, journal articles, academic presentations, conference papers, 
informal interviews conducted by the author, relevant textbooks, and other online data. 
With reference to the above sources, the gaps and ambiguities which exist in 
international law, and the adequacy of regional efforts in addressing the passage of 
sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in the South China Sea (as well as political issues 
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surrounding the passage of vessels and aircraft of this type) will be critically evaluated. 
Incidents involving the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft of South 
China Sea littoral States will also be examined. The remaining challenges will then be 
identified and recommendations made.  
 The author has been a member of the Vietnamese navy since 1992. As a 
navigation officer, the author has spent several years on board Vietnamese naval vessels 
and has been actively involved in various types of training and practical activities at sea, 
including combined maritime patrols, hydrographic surveying, as well as maritime 
search and rescue activities.
54
 The author‘s professional experiences and academic 
knowledge are reflected in this thesis.   
1.8 Thesis structure 
The thesis is structured in ten chapters, as follows: 
Chapter One is the introductory chapter.  
 Chapter Two discusses geopolitical considerations related to the South China 
Sea. It examines unresolved disputes over territorial sovereignty and associated 
maritime claims, evaluates the strategic and economic significance of the South China 
Sea, as well as the potential for maritime incidents and accidents involving the passage 
of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft.  
Chapter Three considers the strategic context of the South China Sea. This 
chapter critically analyses the interests and strategies of littoral States and extra-regional 
players in the South China Sea. Moreover, with the arbitral tribunal recently issuing its 
                                                 
54
 The author joined the Vietnamese Navy in 1992, obtained a Master‘s Degree in Maritime Policy from 
the University of Wollongong in 2003, completed a hydrographic survey course at the RAN 
Hydrographic School in 2006, graduated from the Australian Command and Staff College in 2010 and 
completed a Maritime Search and Rescue course in the United States in 2012. Currently, the author is a 
lecturer in the Faculty of Navigation at the Vietnamese Naval Academy. 
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landmark award in the Philippines-China arbitration, this chapter highlights the strategic 
implications of this award for the South China Sea area. 
Chapter Four discusses relevant international legal principles applicable to the 
passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in various maritime zones of 
jurisdiction. It examines the navigational regimes of the LOSC, with a particular focus 
on innocent passage in the territorial sea and the freedom of navigation and overflight in 
the EEZ. In addition, supplementary international treaties governing the safety of air 
and maritime encounters are critically analysed. 
Chapter Five examines the current domestic legislation and practices of South 
China Sea littoral States in implementing the LOSC innocent passage regime. It also 
highlights political, security and strategic factors that have influenced trends in State 
practice. 
Chapter Six examines the current national legislation and practices of South 
China Sea littoral States in implementing the LOSC EEZ regime. This chapter focuses 
on controversial issues arising from foreign military activities in the EEZs of coastal 
States, particularly hydrographic surveying, military surveying, as well as maritime 
surveillance conducted by military vessels and aircraft. In addition, the chapter 
highlights uncertain EEZ boundaries in the South China Sea that impact the 
implementation of the EEZ regime in the region. 
Chapter Seven examines specific incidents involving the passage of sovereign 
immune vessels and aircraft in various maritime jurisdictional zones in the South China 
Sea. The incidents under investigation fall into broad main categories: (i) incidents 
which have occurred due to differing interpretations by States of the innocent passage 
and EEZ regimes under the LOSC; (ii) disputes over access to resources; and (iii) 
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incidents arising from the unsafe or unprofessional conduct of vessels and aircraft of 
States. 
Chapter Eight evaluates regional efforts aimed at addressing the passage of 
sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in the South China Sea. Efforts initiated by 
regional institutions, academic and policy forums, as well as bilateral agreements and 
unilateral initiatives are critically examined and evaluated. 
Chapter Nine identifies the remaining challenges and key drivers behind the 
State practices. It highlights implications for the future security, safety and freedom of 
navigation and overflight in the South China Sea, canvassing a number of legal and 
policy recommendations to minimise potential incidents involving the passage of 
sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in the region. 
 Chapter Ten is the concluding chapter. It reiterates the key findings of the thesis 
and then recommends a number of areas that require further research in order to 
advance maritime safety and the freedoms of navigation and overflight, not only in the 
South China Sea region but in all ocean spaces.  
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2 GEOPOLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA  
2.1 Introduction 
The South China Sea is not only rich in living and non-living resources, but also 
connects to important Straits, particularly the Malacca and Singapore Straits. Indeed, 
more than half of the world‘s oil tankers and total cargo tonnage passes through these 
two Straits each year, making the South China Sea a critical international sea line of 
communication.
1
 In addition to commercial shipping, military vessels and aircraft of 
littoral and extra-regional States transit through and conduct military operations in this 
particular region. Therefore, maintaining stable security and freedom of navigation and 
overflight in and over the South China Sea is critical to the interests of many States. 
However, as a semi-enclosed sea which contains hundreds of small islands, rocks and 
submerged features (many of which are subject to sovereignty disputes between littoral 
States), coupled with unresolved, overlapping and legally questionable maritime claims 
by a number of littoral States, the South China Sea is ―among the most geographically 
and geopolitically complex ocean spaces in the world.‖
2
 Unfortunately, these 
longstanding maritime and territorial disputes, as well as conflicting interpretations of 
international law by certain States, have made the South China Sea vulnerable to 
maritime conflicts.  
This chapter will outline geopolitical considerations affecting the South China 
Sea. Particular attention will be given to: (i) the geographical limits of the South China 
                                                 
1
 David Rosenberg, 'Governing the South China Sea: from Freedom of the Seas to Ocean Enclosure 
Movements' (2010) XII(3&4) Harvard Asia Quarterly 4, 7; see also Nong Hong, 'Maritime Trade 
Development in Asia: A Need for Regional Maritime Security Cooperation in the South China Sea' in Wu 
Shicun and Zou Keyuan (eds), Maritime Security in the South China Sea: Regional Implications and 
International Cooperation (Ashgate, 2009) 42. 
2
 Clive Schofield, 'What's at stake in the South China Sea? Geographical and geopolitical considerations' 
in Robert Beckman et al (eds), Beyond Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: legal Frameworks for 
the Joint Development of Hydrocarbon Resources (Edward Elgar, 2013) 11. 
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Sea; (ii) the economic and strategic significance of the region, (iii) unresolved territorial 
disputes and associated maritime claims, including disputes over access to resources; 
and (iv) the different interpretations of international law regarding navigation and 
overflight by certain States. Moreover, the chapter will highlight the burgeoning growth 
of naval powers and maritime law enforcement capabilities, as well as the concomitant 
increase in the potential for maritime incidents. 
2.2 Geographical limits and the significance of the South China Sea 
2.2.1 Geographical limits of the South China Sea 
The South China Sea is a semi-enclosed sea
3
 surrounded by China, Taiwan and 
a number of Southeast Asian States. Located in the centre of East Asia, it is a vital sea 
lane that links much of East Asia to the rest of the world. The limits of the South China 
Sea are not well defined, being contested even today.
4
 The International Hydrographic 
Organization (IHO), in its 1953 special publication titled Limits of Ocean and Seas (also 
known as IHO S-23), defined the South China Sea as including the Strait of Taiwan, the 
Gulf of Tonkin and the Natuna Sea
5
 (see, for example, figure 2.1 for the limits of the 
South China Sea, cited in the U.S Energy Information Administration).  
The third and latest edition of IHO S-23 was published in 1953. Unsurprisingly, 
there have been many changes to areas indicated in the document since that time, as 
well as name changes to water bodies and their adjacent land features. Indeed, these 
changes have rendered the third edition somewhat antiquated. The draft 4
th
 edition of 
IHO S-23 was submitted to the IHO in 2002, but is yet to be approved. As IHO S-23 is 
                                                 
3
 Article 122 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (hereafter LOSC) defines 
enclosed or semi-enclosed seas as ―a gulf, basin or sea surrounded by two or more States and connected 
to another sea or the ocean by a narrow outlet or consisting entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and 
exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States.‖ 
4
 Chris Rahman and Martin Tsamenyi, 'A Strategic Perspective on Security and Naval Issues in the South 
China Sea' (2010) 41(4) Ocean Development & International Law 315, 316. 
5
 International Hydrographic Organization, Limits of Oceans and Seas (IHO, 3
rd
 ed, 1953) 30-31. 
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a purely technical publication, it cannot be used for legal purposes in any sovereignty 
dispute or in support of any maritime claim. In fact, the sensitivity of the subject is the 
major obstacle to the draft 4
th
 edition being approved.
6
 
 For the purposes of this research, the limits of the South China Sea are those 
designated in the draft 4
th
 edition of IHO S-23. As a result, the South China Sea is a 
semi-enclosed sea covering an area of almost three million square kilometres and 
surrounded by seven States and territories, China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, 
Brunei, Indonesia and Vietnam
7
 (Figure 2.2). 
Figure 2.1 Limits of the South China Sea 
 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration 
                                                 
6
 IHO Working Group, 'Final Report of S-23 Working Group to Member States' (June 2012). 
7
 Rahman and Tsamenyi, above n 4, 316. For the geographic limitation of the research area, the new limts 
of the South China Sea as designated in the 4th edition of IHO S-23 will be used; hence, Singapore is not 
included as a South China Sea littoral State. 
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Source: extracted from IHO S-23 (draft 4
th
 edition) 
Figure 2.3 Bathymetric map of the South China Sea 
 
Source: Wang, Pinxian and Li, Qianyu (eds), The South China Sea: Paleoceanography 
and Sedimentology (Springer, 2009), 506 
Figure 2.2 New Limits of the South China Sea (draft 4
th
 edition of IHO 
S23) 
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 Bathymetrically, the South China Sea can be divided into two portions: the deep 
sea basin in the north-east and the broad continental shelves in the north-western and 
southern sides. The deep sea basin covers approximately 52 per cent of the area, 
exhibits a confused topography and has an average water depth of 4300m. The broad 
continental shelves cover approximately 48 per cent of the area, and have a water depth 
of less than 200m (Figure 2.3).
8
 The vast majority of these broad shelves lie within the 
claimed exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of China, Vietnam, Malaysia, and the 
Philippines. 
 There are more than 250 small offshore features located in the middle of the 
South China Sea, including islands, rocks, reefs, shoals, and atolls.
9
 The total number of 
features in the region is unavailable, as most are submerged at high tide and only some 
are capable of being classified as islands under the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (LOSC).
10
 The majority of these offshore features are located in five 
groups: the Pratas Islands, the Scarborough Shoal, Macclesfield Bank, the Paracel 
Islands, and the Spratly Islands. Claims to territorial sovereignty over these five groups 
by States surrounding the South China Sea are overlapping and difficult to resolve. 
Moreover, along the coastlines of littoral States, there are many small uncontested 
islands which littoral States have used as basepoints to establish straight baselines, thus 
                                                 
8
 Mark J Valencia, 'The South China Sea: Prospects for Marine Regionalism' (1978) 2(2) Maritime Policy 
87, 87. 
9
 Sonika Gupta, 'Emerging Security Architecture in Southeast & East Asia: Growing Tensions in the 
South China Sea' (2013) (213) ISPS Issue Brief 1, 2. 
10
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982 (entered 
into force 16 November 1994), art 121. Article 121 of the LOSC defines an island as ―a naturally formed 
area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide‖. The status of these offshore 
features is discussed in the following sections of this Chapter. 
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extending their maritime claims. This practice has attracted international protests by a 
number of States.
11
  
 The geographical complexity of the South China Sea, coupled with the 
uncertainty in the international legal regime concerning islands, territorial sea baselines, 
historic waters and historic rights, and the freedom of navigation, constitute the main 
sources of tension and potential conflict between littoral States on the one hand, and 
between littoral States and extra-regional players on the other. 
2.2.2 The significance of the South China Sea 
2.2.2.1 The economic significance of the South China Sea 
The South China Sea provides approximately ten per cent of the world‘s 
fisheries catch, with fisheries production being an important source of revenue for 
littoral states.
12
 In 2010, China produced approximately 15.7 million tons of captured 
fish, which accounted for 32 per cent of the total catch production for the Asia Pacific 
region that year. To put that figure into perspective, the combined capture production of 
all Southeast Asian countries in 2010 was 17.3 million tons.
13
 More than 1.77 million 
fishing vessels operate in the South China Sea, with 3.73 million people being 
employed in the fisheries sector in the region.
14
 In 2010, the marine and brackish fish 
production of Southeast Asian countries reached a reported value of USD$11.8 billion, 
while China‘s aquaculture production reached 48 million tons, worth USD$63 billion 
                                                 
11
 Clive Schofield, 'Adrift on complex waters: Geographical, geopolitical and legal dimensions to the 
South China Sea disputes' in Leszek Buszynski and Christopher B Roberts (eds), The South China Sea 
Maritime Disputes: Political, Legal and Regional Perspectives (Routledge, 2015) 26. 
12
 UNEP, 'Procedure for Establishing a Regional System of Fisheries Refugia in the South China Sea and 
Gulf of Thailand in the context of the UNEP/GEF project entitled ―Reserving Environmental Degradation 
Trends in the South China Sea and Gulf of Thailand' in South China Sea Knowledge Document (UNEP, 
2007) 1. 
13
 Simon Funge Smith, Matthew Briggs and Weimin Miao, Refional Overview of Fisheries and 
Aquaculture in Asia and the Pacific 2012 (RAP Publication, 2012), 2-3. 
14
 Ibid 25-27. 
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(of which marine and brackish aquaculture accounted for USD$19 billion).
15
 According 
to the Agricultural Outlook 2013-2022 prepared by the United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO), China‘s capture and aquaculture fisheries production 
is expected to reach 69 million tons by 2022.
16
 As all the littoral states of the South 
China Sea are developing countries, fishing and aquaculture industries remain an 
important revenue source for their national economies.  
Besides living resources, the South China Sea is believed to be rich in 
hydrocarbon deposits, even though there is no precise evidence to support this claim. It 
is difficult to quantify the amount of oil and gas reserves in the South China Sea due to 
territorial disputes and technological limitations. Even so, the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration has estimated the amount of oil and natural gas reserves in the South 
China Sea to be approximately 11 billion barrels and 190 trillion cubic feet 
respectively.
17
 However, in 2010 the United States Geological Survey estimated that the 
South China Sea may contain between 5 and 22 billion barrels of oil and between 70 
and 290 trillion cubic feet of gas in undiscovered resources.
18
 The estimates proposed 
by the China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) in November 2012 exceed 
those of the two U.S. organisations, with the CNOOC proffering estimates of 125 
billion barrels of oil and 500 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in undiscovered 
resources.
19
 There is, of course, a difference between recoverable reserves and 
resources. The term resources refers to the total amount of hydrocarbons deposited in 
the region, while the recoverable reserves represent only a fraction of the resources that 
                                                 
15
 Ibid 110-115. 
16
 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 'Feeding China: Prospects and challenges in the next 
decade' in OECD-FAO Agriculture Outlook 2013: Highlights (OECD-FAO, 2013) , 80. 
17
 US Energy Information Administration, South China Sea (7 February 2013) 
<http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=SCS>. 
18
 Ibid.  
19
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are capable of being economically recovered using current technologies.
20
 Even though 
the amount of hydrocarbon reserves in the South China Sea is difficult to determine, the 
general consensus is that such reserves are significant. 
Conventional hydrocarbon production is an important contributor to the 
economies of littoral States. However, due to territorial disputes, geological challenges, 
technical limitations, as well as unfavourable meteorological and hydrographical 
conditions, the exploration of hydrocarbons in the South China Sea by littoral states has 
thus far been limited. The table below shows the oil and natural gas produced by littoral 
States in 2011 in the South China Sea. 
Table 2.1 Estimated conventional hydrocarbon production in the South China Sea by 
littoral States in 2011 
Countries Oil production 
(barrels/day) 
Natural gas production 
(billion cubic feet) 
Brunei 120,000 400 
China 250,000 600 
Indonesia 600,000 200 
Malaysia 500,000 1,800 
Philippines 25,000 100 
Vietnam 300,000 300 
Source: extracted from U.S. Energy Information Administration 
  Apart from its natural resources, the South China Sea is the world‘s second 
busiest international sea lane, linking the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean. The value 
of seaborne trade passing through the South China Sea is approximately USD$5.3 
trillion per year, of which the U.S. share is approximately USD$1.2 trillion.
21
 Of the top 
ten container ports in the world, eight are located in countries bordering the South China 
                                                 
20
 Nick A Owen and Clive H Schofield, 'Disputed South China Sea hydrocarbons in perspective' (2012) 
36(3) Maritime Policy 809, 813. 
21
 Vladimir Odintsov, American and Japanese military bases on the Phillipine soil (05 July 2013) New 
Eastern Outlook <http://journal-neo.org/2013/07/05/american-and-japanese-military-bases-on-the-
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Sea.
22
 Indeed, more than 60 per cent of Japan‘s oil imports transit through the region‘s 
waters,
23
 and nearly 15 per cent of South Korea‘s crude oil moves through the South 
China Sea in order to reach its final destination.
24
 In 2010, China imported 51.3 per cent 
of its oil consumption, with 77 per cent of this imported oil passing through the Strait of 
Malacca and then the South China Sea.
25
 The South China Sea is also used for trade 
between Southeast Asian countries, as well as for trade between Southeast Asian States 
and the rest of the world.  
In summary, as a semi-enclosed sea located in the centre of East Asia, the South 
China Sea represents an important fishing ground, a rich repository of hydrocarbon 
resources, and a vital sea lane that sustains regional and global trading relations.  
2.2.2.2 The strategic significance of the South China Sea 
The geographical location of the South China Sea also gives it special strategic 
significance. As many countries in the Asia-Pacific region rely heavily on seaborne 
trade, the security of South China Sea sea lines of communication (SLOC) is pivotal to 
the economies of littoral states as well as other maritime countries. Any disruption to 
seaborne trade would pose a significant threat to the region‘s economies. The South 
China Sea is not only important for merchant shipping, but also for military transits and 
operations. For many years, the United States Navy has utilised the South China Sea to 
transit forces between the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. Other 
regional States also use the South China Sea for their naval transits and operations.
26
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 Top 50 World Container Ports (12 October 2013) World Shipping Council 
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23
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 US Energy Information Administration, above n 17. 
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States in the region are interested in the security of South China Sea SLOC; however, 
they have different perceptions of its significance. Maintaining the safety and freedom 
of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea are key strategic interests for many 
maritime powers, especially the United States, Japan, Australia and India. China, on the 
other hand, is not only concerned about the security of its seaborne trade through the 
South China Sea, but also its military defence strategy. China can potentially assert its 
dominance in the region, as well as effectively support its strategy of ―offshore water 
defence‖ and ―open seas protection‖
27
, by controlling the South China Sea. Indeed, once 
China gains such control, it will be perfectly placed to use this maritime region as a 
secure operating environment for its submarines based at Hainan Island.
28
 
There are a number of offshore island groups, particularly the Paracel Islands, 
the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal, which are subject to sovereignty disputes 
between littoral States of the South China Sea. These tiny features are mainly 
uninhabited and difficult to defend; however, according to James Holmes, they could 
provide a ―sea-denial option vis-à vis passing merchant or naval traffic.‖
29
 China has 
strengthened its maritime forces, including naval and law enforcement vessels and 
aircraft, as well as civilian fishing vessels, in an effort to bolster its expansive maritime 
claims in the South China Sea. Other South China Sea littoral States have also increased 
                                                 
27
 Since 1980, China‘s naval strategy has shifted from limited coastal defensive operations to offshore 
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their defence spending, focusing on naval and coast guard assets in order to protect their 
maritime claims in the region.  
Due to the geostrategic complexity of the South China Sea, it seems that States 
are unlikely to reach a compromise with regard to their maritime claims. Indeed, the 
increase in the number of naval and law enforcement vessels and aircraft operating in 
the South China Sea is evidence of the desire of these States to strengthen their 
territorial sovereignty and associated maritime claims. However, the willingness of 
regional States to protect their interests has resulted in a number of maritime incidents. 
Unfortunately, no effective measures have been devised to address these issues. As 
Robert Kaplan has opined, the South China Sea is at the ―throat of global sea routes‖ 
but has ―increasingly become an armed camp.‖
30
  
2.3 Maritime disputes in the South China Sea  
2.3.1 Disputes over offshore territorial claims in the South China Sea 
Disputes over offshore territorial claims in the South China Sea are longstanding 
and complex. There are five major offshore features in the South China Sea. The 
designated groups of features are mostly composed of small islands, islets, rocks, cays, 
shoals and reefs, which make human habitation quite difficult (figure 2.4). However, 
their locations, combined with the maritime zones which they are potentially capable of 
generating, give them special economic and strategic importance.  
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Figure 2.4 Islands in the South China Sea 
 
Source: Arbitral Tribunal, Case Nº 2013-19 
2.3.1.1 The Pratas Islands 
The Pratas Islands are located in the northern part of the South China Sea. This 
group of features includes Pratas Island and two submerged coral reefs: North Vereker 
Bank and South Vereker Bank. The diameter of this ring-shaped reef is approximately 
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13 miles.
31
 Taiwan occupied Pratas Island in 1946, and thus claims sovereignty over the 
entire group of features. Although China has never occupied any of these features, this 
has not prevented it from laying claim to the group. Pratas Island is located 240 nautical 
miles southwest of the Taiwanese coastline and 170 nautical miles southeast of Hong 
Kong. It is the largest offshore island in the South China Sea covering an area of 
approximately 2.4 square kilometres.
32
 Located at the gateway to the Strait of Taiwan 
and the Luzon Strait, Pratas Island is strategically located for the monitoring and 
controlling of shipping routes from the South China Sea to the East China Sea. For 
many years, Pratas Island has been used as a military outpost for the Taiwanese navy in 
the South China Sea. A runway and a small airport have also been built on this island. 
However, in January 2000, Taiwan replaced naval personnel stationed on Pratas Island 
with coast guard personnel.
33
 In 2007, Taiwan designated Pratas Island as a national 
park, establishing an administrative office on the island in July 2010.
34
 
The dispute over the Pratas Islands involves only China and Taiwan. As China 
claims Taiwan as part of its territory, and Taiwan‘s sovereignty claims in the South 
China Sea are almost identical to those made by China, this overlapping claim is 
unlikely to result in conflict, at least for the time being.
35
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2.3.1.2 The Paracel Islands 
The Paracel Islands are located in the north-western part of the South China Sea, 
covering an ocean surface area of more than 16,000 square kilometres.
36
 The Paracels 
consist of two main groups of islands: the western group (Amphitrite group) and the 
eastern group (Crescent group). From the 1950s, the Republic of Vietnam (South 
Vietnam) occupied and exercised control over the western group, while China 
controlled the eastern group.
37
 However, in 1974 China forcibly seized the western 
group from South Vietnam, and has controlled all of the Paracels since that time.
38
 
Moreover, China has unilaterally applied straight baselines around the archipelago.
39
 
These straight baselines are totally inconsistent with international law, as under the 
LOSC only mid oceanic archipelagic States that fulfil specific criteria on land to water 
ratios can draw straight baselines (known as archipelagic baselines) around their 
islands.
40
 
 There are approximately 35 features in this archipelago, including islands, 
islets, reefs and cays.
41
 The largest island is Woody Island, which covers an area 
slightly larger than 2 square kilometres.
42
 China, Taiwan and Vietnam all claim 
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sovereignty over the Paracel Islands.
43
 Vietnam endorses the one-China policy, and thus 
does not recognise Taiwan as a State. For this reason, no formal diplomatic relations 
exist between Vietnam and Taiwan.
44
 Accordingly, Vietnam views the dispute over the 
Paracels as a bilateral dispute between Vietnam and China. Since its occupation, China 
has set about constructing and gradually upgrading its infrastructure on Woody Island, 
which includes a military airstrip over 2,500 metres in length to accommodate fighter 
aircraft operations.
45
 An artificial harbour which is capable of accommodating Chinese 
warships, including frigates and destroyers, has also been built on Woody Island.
46
 In 
2016, China deployed HQ-9 surface-to-air missiles and J-11 fighter jets to Woody 
Island, thereby allowing the State to ―bolster its strategic foothold in the Paracel 
Islands.‖
47
 This move was strongly protested by Vietnam. Indeed, Vietnam‘s Foreign 
Ministry spokesman, Le Hai Binh, branded China‘s actions as ―serious infringements of 
Vietnam's sovereignty over the Paracels, threatening peace and stability in the region as 
well as security, safety and freedom of navigation and flight.‖
48
 
2.3.1.3 Macclesfield Bank 
Macclesfield Bank consists of a group of submerged shoals and reefs located in 
the centre of the South China Sea, between the Paracel Islands and Scarborough 
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Shoal.
49
 As this feature is totally submerged, it cannot form the subject of any 
sovereignty claim under international law.
50
 Both China and Taiwan have claimed this 
bank, even though no country can effectively occupy it. Taiwan is neither a member of 
the United Nations nor a party to the LOSC. As such, Taiwan has not been invited to 
any official regional security forum, or formed part of any official regional effort to 
address maritime issues in the South China Sea. For this reason, it is difficult for 
Taiwan to assert any maritime claim in the region.
51
 Adding to this difficulty is China‘s 
claim that Taiwan has always formed part of its territory. However, in the context of the 
wider South China Sea disputes, the clash over Macclesfield Bank is unlikely to result 
in an escalation of tensions. 
2.3.1.4 Scarborough Shoal 
Scarborough Shoal is a large atoll surrounded by a reef and with an inner lagoon 
stretching 150 square kilometres.
52
 The largest rock located on this shoal is South Rock, 
which is 1.8 metres above water at high tide.
53
 Scarborough Shoal is located within the 
mainland EEZ claimed by the Philippines, approximately 124 nautical miles from 
Zambales Province in the Philippines and 472 nautical miles from the Chinese coast.
54
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There are five rocks in this area that are visible above the water at high tide.
55
 With 
regard to sovereignty, the Shoal has been claimed by China, Taiwan and the 
Philippines. The Philippines maintains that it has exercised jurisdiction over 
Scarborough Shoal since 1946, with such jurisdiction being confirmed by the 
construction of a lighthouse by the Philippine government in 1965.
56
 For China and 
Taiwan, Scarborough Shoal and Macclesfield Bank are parts of Zhongsha Qundao, even 
though these two groups of features are located more than 170 nautical miles apart from 
one another. Of all the features of Zhongsha Qundao, including Macclesfield Bank, 
Scarborough Shoal, Truro Shoal, Saint Esprit Shoal and Dreyer Shoal, only 
Scarborough Shoal is visible above water at high tide, and therefore this shoal is 
critically important to China‘s sovereignty claim over Zhongsha Qundao.
57
 
The waters around Scarborough Shoal, as well as those within the lagoon, are 
rich in marine living resources and constitute traditional fishing grounds for Chinese 
and Filipino fishermen. Besides these resources, Scarborough Shoal occupies a strategic 
location, as it sits in the vicinity of South China Sea SLOC. The dispute over 
Scarborough Shoal rose to prominence in 1997 when three Chinese fishing vessels were 
prevented from approaching the shoal by the Philippine Navy. In 2012, similar incidents 
between Chinese and Philippine vessels around the shoal intensified and persisted for 
several months. The shoal is currently controlled by China. On 23 January 2013, the 
Philippines requested that China bringing their dispute over the maritime jurisdiction in 
the South China Sea to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) for 
arbitration in accordance with the dispute settlement provisions of the LOSC. China, 
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however, rejected this proposal.
58
 In October 2015, an arbitral tribunal established in 
accordance with Annex VII of the LOSC, decided that it possessed the necessary 
jurisdiction to hear the matter without China needing to participate.
59
 However, it is 
important to note that the arbitral tribunal could only rule on maritime zones that are 
generated from disputed features; it could not resolve sovereignty disputes over the 
features themselves. On 12 July 2016, in its final decision, the arbitral tribunal declared 
that Scarborough Shoal is a ―rock‖ for the purpose of Article 121(3) of the LOSC.
60
 It 
follows from this decision, that this feature is only capable of generating a territorial sea 
and not an exclusive economic zone.   
2.3.1.5 The Spratly Islands 
The Spratly Islands are located in the south-eastern part of the South China Sea. 
This group of islands consists of more than 150 features, including islands, islets, rocks, 
reefs, and shoals; however, only 36 of them are above water at high tide.
61
 The total 
land area of this group of features is less than 8 square kilometres, with Itu Aba Island, 
the largest island in the group, covering an area of only half a square kilometre.
62
 
Although the total land area of the group is unremarkable, the ocean surface area of the 
entire archipelago is almost 240,000 square kilometres.
63
 So although the islands 
themselves are very small and unable to sustain human habitation, the maritime zones 
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that may potentially be generated from these islands are huge, making the Spratly 
Islands highly significant for littoral States. Located close to major sea lanes used for 
both commercial and military purposes, the Spratly archipelago holds a special strategic 
location in this particular maritime domain. During the Second World War, the 
Japanese effectively used Itu Aba Island as a submarine base and military outpost for 
monitoring and intercepting allied vessels passing through the South China Sea. 
 After the Second World War, and particularly after the San Francisco Treaty of 
Peace was signed in 1951, Japan renounced its sovereignty over a number of islands in 
the Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea, including the Spratly Islands.
64
 Indeed, 
post-World War II, China, Vietnam and the Philippines all claimed sovereignty over 
some or all of the Spratly islands. However, the San Francisco Treaty of Peace did not 
designate the Spratly Islands as belonging to any of these claimant States.
65
 
Currently, China, Taiwan and Vietnam claim the whole archipelago, while 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei claim certain parts of it. The legal bases for 
China‘s, Taiwan‘s and Vietnam‘s sovereignty claims over the Spratly Islands are based 
on historical evidence, while the Philippine claim is based on its discovery of certain 
islands within the Spratlys. Malaysia and Brunei have justified their claims based on the 
continental shelf provisions set out in the LOSC.
66
 With the exception of Brunei, which 
only claims Louisa Reef, all the claimant States have a military presence in the 
archipelago. Vietnam occupies a total of 21 islands, reefs and cays, China occupies 
eight reefs and rocks, Taiwan occupies Itu Aba Island, the Philippines occupies nine 
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islands, and Malaysia occupies three islands.
67
 Of these six claimant States, China is the 
only country that has asserted its control through the use of military force. In 1988, 
China attacked Vietnamese naval dispositions stationed on certain features of the 
Spratlys, killing 70 Vietnamese sailors and, for the first time, seizing control of these 
features.
68
 China recently carried out an extensive building program on its occupied 
features in the Spratly Islands – one which included the construction of artificial islands 
and airstrips. In doing so, China ignored the protests and warnings of several regional 
States.
69
 Moreover, in a Note Verbale to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 
14 April 2011, China stated that ―China‘s Nansha Islands (Spratly Islands) is fully 
entitled to Territorial Sea, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf.‖
70
 
Other claimant States have not provided any official statement regarding maritime 
zones which might be generated from the Spratly Islands. It is worth noting that on 12 
July 2016, in its South China Sea Arbitration Award, the arbitral tribunal declared that 
none of the features of the Spratly Islands are capable of sustaining human habitation or 
economic life of their own, and therefore such features are not entitled to an exclusive 
economic zone or continental shelf.
71
 China, however, rejected the arbitral tribunal‘s 
award, with the State‘s Foreign Minister Wang Yi propounding that ―the award is null 
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and void and has no binding force.‖
72
 
The unresolved sovereignty disputes over these offshore features, together with 
clashes over natural resources and overlapping maritime zones, constitute the main 
flashpoints for potential maritime conflict between the relevant States.  
2.3.2 Disputes over maritime boundaries  
In addition to their disputes over insular and other features in the South China 
Sea, most countries surrounding the South China Sea have overlapping maritime claims 
to offshore maritime zones.  
In the southern part of the South China Sea, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Brunei have overlapping EEZs and continental shelf claims. The majority of the 
overlapping continental shelves between Malaysia and Indonesia have been delimited.
73
 
Although the overlapping continental shelf claimed by Vietnam and Malaysia in the 
South China Sea has not yet been delimited, in 2009 the two countries made a joint 
submission to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
(CLCS) for the overlapping section.
74
 This joint submission was protested by China, 
Taiwan and the Philippines. In addition to its joint submission with Malaysia, Vietnam 
submitted its own extended continental shelf claim in the northern part of the South 
China Sea.
75
 China and the Philippines submitted Note Verbales to the CLCS in protest 
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of Vietnam‘s claim, while Taiwan, as a non-party to the LOSC, made a statement 
reiterating its territorial and maritime claims in the South China Sea.
76
 China and 
Taiwan argue that this area is within the infamous ―nine-dash line‖ claimed by China 
and Taiwan as ―historic waters‖, while the Philippines maintains that this area is in 
dispute and overlaps with the Philippine claim.
77
 The continental shelf boundary 
between Vietnam and Indonesia has already been delimited in an agreement signed by 
the two countries on 26 June 2003 (and which entered into force on 29 May 2007).
78
 In 
2009, Malaysia and Brunei reached an agreement in the form of an exchange of letters 
regarding maritime boundary delimitation.
79
 It is interesting to note that, even though 
Malaysia and Brunei have already agreed on their EEZ boundary, the joint submission 
on the extended continental shelf between Vietnam and Malaysia covers the extended 
continental shelf claim of Brunei.
80
 
In the south-eastern part of the South China Sea, the maritime boundaries 
between Malaysia and the Philippines have not yet been delimited. For many years the 
Philippines maintained its maritime claims based on the Treaty of Paris, which is not 
consistent with the LOSC. As a result, maritime boundaries between the Philippines and 
other States could not be resolved. However, in 2009 the Philippines passed its baseline 
law, declaring that its territorial sea and EEZ extend to 12 nautical miles and 200 
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nautical miles respectively from the straight baselines established by that law.
81
 By 
virtue of this enactment, the Philippines maritime claims in the South China Sea will 
likely have a sounder legal basis under international law, paving the way for maritime 
boundary agreements between the Philippines and its neighbours, particularly Malaysia 
and Taiwan. 
In the north part of the South China Sea, only one maritime boundary agreement 
has been reached. This agreement was signed between China and Vietnam in 2000, and 
focuses on the maritime boundary in the Gulf of Tonkin.
82
 Perhaps the main obstacle to 
other maritime boundaries being delimited in the region are the unresolved disputes 
between China and Vietnam over the Paracel Islands, as well as those between China, 
Taiwan and the Philippines over Scarborough Shoal as previously discussed. 
If States were prepared to ignore small offshore features when making maritime 
claims, and if littoral States agreed to delimit their maritime boundaries using the 
equidistance method, then maritime boundary delimitation would likely be a much 
simpler task. Indeed, if this were the case, there would be an area in the middle of the 
South China Sea that could be classified as high seas under the LOSC (see figure 2.5). 
Of course, it is highly unlikely that claimant States would be willing to relinquish their 
territorial claims over these small but strategically located offshore features. The 
situation would be further complicated if these small offshore features were treated as 
islands capable of generating their own territorial seas and EEZs. If so, all the waters of 
the South China Sea would be under the jurisdiction of littoral states, and there would 
be no high seas.  
                                                 
81
 Ibid 10. 
82
 Hong Thao Nguyen, 'Maritime Delimitation and Fishery Cooperation in the Tonkin Gulf of Tonkin' 
(2005) 36 Ocean Development & International Law 25, 25. 
 
44 
 
Figure 2.5 Maritime boundaries in the South China Sea 
 
Source: Andi Arsana and Clive Schofield, Australian National Centre for Ocean 
Resources and Security (ANCORS), University of Wollongong, Australia 
 
In addition to the above problems, China has complicated boundary delimitation 
in the South China Sea by introducing the so-called ―nine-dash line‖ - an area which 
covers almost the whole South China Sea area and over which China claims 
jurisdiction. The nine-dash line claim was officially made by China in 2009 in response 
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to a joint submission by Vietnam and Malaysia on their extended continental shelves.
83
 
Vietnam responded to China‘s claim by stating that the map ―has no legal, historical or 
factual basis, [and] therefore is null and void.‖
84
 Indonesia issued a statement saying 
that China‘s nine-dash line map ―clearly lacks international legal basis and is 
tantamount to upset the UNCLOS 1982.‖
85
 Meanwhile, the Philippines requested the 
arbitral tribunal established under Annex VII of the LOSC to issue an award to the 
effect that ―China‘s maritime claims in the SCS based on its so-called nine-dash line are 
contrary to UNCLOS and invalid.‖
86
 The original dashed line map contained 11 dashes 
and was published in 1947 by the Republic of China (Taiwan) under the title ―Map of 
South China Sea Islands.‖ However, two dashes within the Gulf of Tonkin were later 
removed from the map, hence its current name.
87
 It is important to note that China has 
never published the geographical coordinates of the dashes, nor has it provided any 
official explanation as to the implications or the nature of the nine dash-line map. Many 
analysts have disputed the legal and technical basis for the nine-dash line, and it 
continues to prove a major obstacle to dispute resolution in the South China Sea.
88
 On 
12 July 2016, in its South China Sea Arbitration Award, the arbitral tribunal declared 
that China has no legal basis to claim historic rights to resources within the nine-dash 
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line.
89
 The decision of the arbitral tribunal is legally binding
90
; however, as the tribunal 
does not have enforcement powers, it is unlikely that China will respect the ruling. 
In summary, the strategic locations and maritime zones that may potentially be 
generated from offshore features, as well as the excessive maritime claims of littoral 
states (particularly China and Taiwan), represent the main impediments to maritime 
boundary agreements being struck in the South China Sea.  
2.3.3 Disputes over access to resources 
The South China Sea is not only a productive fishing ground but also an area of 
abundant hydrocarbon resources. As the majority of maritime boundaries in this region 
are yet to be delimited, disputes between littoral States over access to resources are 
commonplace. 
In the southern part of the South China Sea, joint developments for the 
exploration of hydrocarbon resources by certain States have been achieved, and thus 
disputes over resources in this area are not as prevalent. However, in the northern and 
centre parts of the South China Sea, and particularly in those areas surrounding offshore 
features, consensus over boundary delimitation is unlikely. Disputes over access to 
resources in these overlapping maritime zones have created strained relations and flash 
points for potential maritime conflicts. In particular, with an increase in the number of 
incidents between Chinese law enforcement vessels and vessels of other littoral States, 
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China appears to be adopting a more aggressive stance when seeking to assert its 
control over such resources.
91
 
Since 1999, China has unilaterally instituted an annual fishing ban in the north-
western part the South China Sea for several months, even though this area 
encompasses some marine areas under claimed Vietnamese jurisdiction.
92
 China has 
claimed that the purpose of this ban is to conserve marine stocks.
93
 However, it could 
also be viewed as a strategic action by China to support its claims over these waters. 
The Vietnamese government has always regarded the Chinese unilateral fishing ban in 
the South China Sea as ―null and void‖,
94
 with the vast majority of Vietnamese 
fishermen ignoring the ban altogether.
95
 As a result, many Vietnamese fishing vessels 
have been arrested by Chinese patrol vessels. Indeed, between 2005 and 2012, more 
than 60 Vietnamese fishing boats were seized by Chinese law enforcement authorities 
in the South China Sea.
96
 In 2012, China and the Philippines became embroiled in a 
two-month maritime standoff in the waters surrounding Scarborough Shoal due to a 
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dispute over access to resources in this area.
97
 Even though tensions were diffused by 
both sides engaging in diplomatic talks,
98
  the risk of further confrontations remain, as 
the root causes of the disputes remain in place. Most recently, in March 2016 an 
Indonesian law enforcement vessel captured a Chinese fishing boat operating illegally 
in Indonesia‘s claimed EEZ within the South China Sea. A Chinese Coast Guard vessel 
arrived on the scene thereafter and rammed the fishing boat to free it from Indonesian 
authorities.
99
 Indonesia lodged a formal protest with China‘s Embassy in Jakarta, but 
China responded by saying that the area where the incident took place was ―traditional 
Chinese fishing grounds.‖
100
 Under international law Indonesia has sovereign rights 
over both living and non-living resources in its claimed EEZ, while China‘s claim of 
―traditional Chinese fishing grounds‖ in the South China Sea is legally questionable. 
Nevertheless, disputes over access to living resources in the South China Sea represent 
an emerging issue – one fraught with risk and which has already resulted in violent 
clashes between the States concerned. 
Access to oil and gas reserves is another aspect of the South China Sea disputes. 
Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines are currently developing oil and gas fields in 
their EEZs and on their continental shelves, but these fields also lie within the so-called 
―nine-dash line‖ area claimed by China. Recently, disputes over access to oil and gas 
resources have led to increased tensions between China and other littoral States. Since 
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2007, China has warned foreign oil and gas companies to cease their joint exploration 
activities with Vietnam or face adverse consequences in their business relations with 
China.
101
 On 26 May 2011, three Chinese patrol vessels harassed a Vietnamese seismic 
survey ship, the Binh Minh 02, with one of the Chinese vessels intentionally cutting a 
submerged cable being towed by the Binh Minh 02 in an area called Block 148, 
approximately 80 nautical miles from Vietnam‘s south-central coast and well within the 
State‘s claimed EEZ.
102
 On 9 June 2011, a Chinese fishing vessel backed by two 
Chinese patrol vessels rammed the survey cable of the Viking II, another Vietnamese 
seismic survey ship, 60 nautical miles off the south coast of Vietnam and more than 500 
nautical miles from China‘s Hainan Island.
103
 Vietnam asserted that the above actions 
seriously violated Vietnam‘s sovereign rights over its EEZ and continental shelf, as well 
as contravening the LOSC and the spirit of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in 
the South China Sea (DOC) signed by China and ASEAN in 2002.
104
 Chinese vessels 
have also harassed Philippine oil survey ships in the Reed Bank area, approximately 60 
miles west of Palawan and well within the Philippines claimed EEZ.
105
 In May 2014, 
China placed a large oil rig within the EEZ and on the continental shelf claimed by 
Vietnam, approximately 130-150 nautical miles off the Vietnamese coast.
106
 During this 
maritime standoff, Vietnam accused China Coast Guard ships of aggressively firing 
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high-powered water cannons at, and intentionally ramming, Vietnamese law 
enforcement ships while Chinese aircraft circled above Vietnamese vessels.
107
 The 75 
day maritime standoff between China and Vietnam ended on 16 July 2014 when China 
decided to withdraw the drilling rig from the contested area.
108
 
As the economies of littoral States rely heavily on the natural resources of the 
South China Sea, disputes over access to resources will persist unless the countries 
involved enter into compromise arrangements. 
2.3.4 Foreign military activities in the maritime zones of coastal States 
Disputes over foreign military activities in the maritime zones of coastal States 
in the South China Sea mainly involve the United States and China. Indeed, these two 
States hold contradictory views over foreign military activities in the EEZ and the 
passage of foreign warships through the territorial sea of coastal States.  
Under the LOSC, ―ships of all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the 
right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.‖
109
 China, however, applies a 
restrictive view on the innocent passage regime of the LOSC. While the United States 
and other maritime user States argue that foreign warships enjoy the right of innocent 
passage through the territorial sea of coastal States; China, on the other hand, requires 
prior authorisation for such passage.
110
 Other littoral States of the South China Sea, 
particularly Vietnam and Taiwan, require prior notification for the passage of foreign 
warships through their territorial seas, while the current domestic laws of Indonesia, 
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Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines do not address this issue.
111
 As the LOSC does not 
contain any specific provision regarding the innocent passage of warships, States 
continue to interpret the innocent passage regime of the LOSC in different ways and in 
accordance with their own vested interests. 
In addition to the innocent passage regime, the issue of foreign military activities 
in the EEZ of coastal States represents another controversial issue. As military activities 
in the EEZ are not clearly defined in the LOSC, China and the United States have 
adopted very different positions on this topic. For the United States, military surveying, 
hydrographic surveying, and the collection of intelligence by military vessels and 
aircraft in a foreign state‘s EEZ are normal activities that fall within the high seas 
freedoms of navigation and overflight granted by the LOSC.
112
 As Pentagon Press 
Secretary Geoff Morrell has stated: ―Coastal States do not have a right under 
international law to regulate foreign military activities in the EEZ.‖
113
 China, however, 
argues that military data collection violates the principle of peaceful use of the sea set 
out in the LOSC.
114
 In a statement concerning a joint naval exercise between the United 
States and South Korea in 2010, China‘s Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said: 
                                                 
111
 See Chapter 5 of this thesis for a detailed analysis of this topic. 
112
 LOSC arts 58(1) and 87. Article 58 of the LOSC states that all States enjoy ―the freedoms referred to 
in article 87 of navigation and overflight…and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these 
freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft [etc]‖. Article 87 of the LOSC 
recognises the high seas freedom of navigation and overflight for all States. 
113
 DoD News Briefing with Geoff Morrell from the Pentagon (March 11, 2009) U.S. Department of 
Defense <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4369>; the United States 
agrees that coastal States have the right to regulate and authorize marine scientific research in their EEZs. 
However, it has identified some marine data collection activities that are not marine scientific research. 
These include prospecting for and exploration of natural resources; hydrographic surveys (for enhancing 
the safety of navigation); military activities including military surveys; activities related to the laying and 
operation of submarine cables; environmental monitoring and assessment of marine pollution pursuant to 
section 4 of Part XII of the Convention; the collection of marine meteorological data and other routine 
ocean observations, see Marine Scientific Research Authorizations (25 November 2015) U.S. Department 
of State <http://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/rvc/>. 
114
 Art 88 of the LOSC states that ―the high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes‖,  while Art 300 
requires States to exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms in a manner which would not constitute an 
abuse of right; see Jing Geng, 'The Legality of Foreign Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic 
Zone under UNCLOS' (2012) 28(74) Merkourios 22, 23-28. 
 
52 
 
―We oppose any party to take any military acts in our exclusive economic zone without 
permission.‖
115
 Prominent incidents such as a collision between a U.S. reconnaissance 
aircraft and a Chinese fighter in 2001,
116
 an incident which occurred in 2009 involving 
USNS Impeccable,
117
 and a recent incident between a Chinese amphibious dock ship 
and USS Cowpens,
118
 will be discussed in Chapter Seven of the thesis.    
These incidents demonstrate that military activities in the EEZ of foreign States 
continue to be a controversial issue. Given that most waters in the South China Sea are 
within EEZs claimed by coastal States, conflicts of interest between coastal States and 
maritime powers over military activities in the EEZ represent potential flash points and 
need to be managed carefully. 
2.4 The growth of naval powers and maritime law enforcement capabilities  
2.4.1 Rise of China‘s naval and maritime law enforcement capabilities in the South 
China Sea 
To strengthen their maritime claims and protect their national interests in the 
South China Sea, all territorial claimants within the region have increased their defence 
budgets, expanding and upgrading their naval capabilities. However, the power of the 
Chinese Navy far exceeds the combined naval capability of all the other claimant States 
in the South China Sea. The rise of China‘s naval capabilities coincides with the 
modernisation of China‘s military – a process which started in the 1990s and was 
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spurred by the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis.
119
 These increased naval capabilities have 
allowed China to fiercely protect its interests in the South China Sea (among other 
things). For the past decade, and due to its stable economic growth, China‘s military 
spending has increased by double-digits. In 2012, China announced a defence budget of 
$114 billion. However, according to the U.S. Department of Defense, China‘s defence 
spending could well exceed the State‘s published figures, with a defence budget 
between $135 billion and $215 billion being more likely.
120
 With this defence budget, 
China is the world‘s second largest defence spender after the United States. Moreover, 
China‘s defence budget has continued to increase in recent years, with Defence News 
reporting a defence budget of $146 billion in 2016.
121
 Apart from its weapons 
acquisition program, which includes anti-ship ballistic missiles, anti-ship cruise 
missiles, manned and unmanned aircraft, submarines, as well as surface ships, China‘s 
naval modernisation also has led to the improvement of other defence areas, such as 
C4ISR (command, control, communications, computing, intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance), defence maintenance and logistics, military research projects, 
education and training, and military exercises.
122
 
According to a 2015 report by the U.S. Department of Defense on Military and 
Security Developments Involving China, the Chinese Navy possesses more than 300 
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vessels including surface ships, submarines, amphibious ships, and patrol vessels.
123
 
The U.S. Department of Defense also revealed that China is fielding a medium-range 
anti-ship ballistic missile, known as the DF-21D, which is capable of attacking aircraft 
carriers and other naval ships operating in the Western Pacific.
124
 Chinese naval 
aviation has also been equipped with modern aircraft such as the Su-30MK2 fighter, 
JH-7A fighter-bombers and the Y-8J airborne early warning aircraft.
125
 In 2015, China 
signed a contract with Russia for the construction of 24 Su-35 fighters which are 
scheduled for completion within the next three years.
126
 China has also expanded its 
submarine fleet with both modern indigenous-built and foreign-built submarines. 
China‘s navy has acquired various diesel-electric submarines, including 13 Type-039 
Song-class, 13 Type-039A Yuan-class, and 12 Kilo-class, as well as different classes of 
nuclear submarines, including five Han-class, four Type-094 Jin-class, and six Type-
093 Shang-class.
127
 Currently, the Chinese navy possesses 21 Destroyers, including six 
Luyang II-class (Type-052C), and three Luyang III-class guided missile destroyers 
(Type 052D), which are capable of launching multipurpose missiles.
128
 Most notably, in 
2012 the Chinese navy commissioned into service a refurbished aircraft carrier 
purchased from Ukraine in 1998. Although China requires more time to operate this 
aircraft carrier effectively, the entry into service of this carrier has helped China 
strengthen its image as a significant maritime power. Table 2.2 shows the number of 
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Chinese navy ships from 2005 to 2015 based on the U.S. Congress Research Service. 
The table does not indicate a large increase in total numbers of ships; however, many 
old ships have been replaced with newer and far more combat capable vessels.
129
  
Table 2.2 Number of Chinese Navy ships from 2005 to 2015 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Nuclear-
powered attack 
submarine 
6 5 5 5 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 
Diesel attack 
submarines 
51 50 53 54 54 54 49 49 49 51 53 
Aircraft carriers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Destroyers 21 25 25 29 27 25 26 26 23 24 21 
Frigates 43 45 47 45 48 49 53 53 52 49 52 
Corvettes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 15 
Missile-armed 
coastal patrol 
craft 
51 45 41 45 70 85 86 86 85 85 86 
Amphibious 
ships: LSTs 
and LPDs 
20 25 25 26 27 27 27 28 29 29 29 
Amphibious 
ships: LSMs 
23 25 25 28 28 28 28 23 26 28 28 
Source: extracted by the author from Ronald O'Rourke, ‗China Naval Modernization: 
Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress‘, 
Congress Research Service, September, 2015 
 
The South Sea Fleet, based in Zhanjiang, Guangdong, is now the most capable 
of China‘s three fleets. Indeed, over the past few decades, most of China‘s modern ships 
have been allocated to the South Sea Fleet, amid rising tensions in the South China Sea. 
These include four Luyang-class destroyers fitted with vertical launch surface to air 
missiles with a 100 km range, two Jiangkai-II class frigates equipped with surface to air 
missiles capable of cold launch, as well as different classes of new attack submarines, 
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among them four Kilo-class, two Shang-class, three Song-class, and one Yuan-class.
130
 
The South Sea Fleet has also received 24 Su-30MK2 fighters, together with a regiment 
of JH-7A fighter bombers based on Hainan Island. As a result, China‘s air power in the 
South China Sea has improved.
131
 With its increasing expansion of naval bases on 
Hainan Island, the construction of an airfield on Woody Island in the Paracel Islands, 
the deployment of surface-to-air missiles to Woody Island, and many hardened and 
concrete hangars capable of housing fighter and strategic bombers, as well as air-
refuelling aircraft, which have been built on various artificial islands built by China in 
the Spratly Islands, China‘s navy has strengthened its capability to pursue effective 
control of the entire South China Sea region.
132
 
Apart from naval modernisation, China‘s law enforcement capabilities have also 
been strengthened. For many years, China maintained five maritime law enforcement 
agencies, including the China Coast Guard under the Ministry of Public Security, the 
Maritime Safety Administration under the Ministry of Transport, China Marine 
Surveillance under the State Oceanic Administration, the Fisheries Law Enforcement 
Command under the Ministry of Agriculture, and the State and General Administration 
of Customs.
133
 These five law enforcement agencies, which were often referred to as the 
―Five Dragons‖, employed almost 40,000 people and boasted a fleet of roughly 480 
vessels, including 8 large cutters, 19 midsize cutters, 149 small cutters, and 304 small 
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boats.
134
 Of these vessels, more than 130 were allocated to patrolling the South China 
Sea, including 4 large cutters, 5 midsize cutters, 48 small cutters and 80 small boats.
135
 
As these five agencies were under different commands and had overlapping 
responsibilities, their performance was often criticised as being decentralised and 
ineffective. Thus, in order to strengthen its maritime law enforcement capacities, China 
established a unified coast guard in July 2013 – one which integrates the functions of 
the existing coast guard, chiefly marine surveillance, fisheries law enforcement and 
anti-smuggling.
136
 The new Coast Guard, which is administered under China‘s State 
Oceanic Administration, part of the Ministry of Land and Resources, possesses 11 
squadrons and more than 16,000 personnel, but retains the core mission of maintaining 
China‘s national maritime rights and interests, including enforcing the State‘s sovereign 
territorial claims.
137
 
With its increasing number of naval ships and maritime law enforcement vessels 
in the South China Sea, China will undoubtedly become more assertive over resources 
and its maritime territorial claims in the future. 
2.4.2 Responses from other littoral states 
In response to China‘s rise as a maritime power, other littoral states in the South 
China Sea have modernised their navies and strengthened their maritime law 
enforcement capabilities. 
According to the geographical limits of the South China Sea set out in this 
thesis, Singapore is not a South China Sea littoral State. Nor has Singapore made a 
                                                 
134
 Lyle J. Goldstein, Five Dragons Stirring Up the Sea: Challenge and Opportunity in China‟s 
Improving Maritime Enforcement Capabilities (China Maritime Studies Institute, US Naval War College, 
2010), 4-6. 
135
 Ibid. 
136
 Jianhua, above n 133. 
137
 New China Coast Guard expected to do more patrolling‟ (24 July 2013) Taipei Times 
<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2013/07/24/2003568020>. 
 
58 
 
claim to any territory or features in the region. However, as an island country that is 
heavily reliant on secure access to SLOCs, Singapore‘s national security interests in the 
South China Sea are mainly SLOC protection, seaward defence, and international 
security.
138
 Singapore‘s navy has undergone rapid development and modernisation over 
the past decade. Indeed, the State currently has six Formidable-class guided missile 
frigates with blue water combat capability, four Challenger-class conventional 
submarines, two Archer-class diesel-electric submarines equipped with air-independent 
propulsion, and four Endurance-class landing platform docks, each capable of carrying 
350 troops, 18 tanks, four helicopters and four landing craft.
139
 Singapore‘s air force has 
74 F-16s and 24 F-15SG fighters, nine air-to-air refuelling tanker aircraft, four 
Gulfstream G550s airborne early warning aircraft, and 20 AH-64D Apache Longbow 
attack helicopters. In the near future, a number of F-35 Joint Strike Fighters may be 
joining the fleet.
140
 With support from the State‘s air force, the Singapore navy is 
becoming a regional leader in terms of naval modernisation and three-dimensional 
combat capabilities.  
 Malaysia has also enhanced its naval capabilities, acquiring two Lekiu-class 
frigates in 1999, two Scorpene-class submarines in 2009, and six MEKO A100 offshore 
patrol vessels.
141
 Malaysia‘s air force has also been expanded, with the addition of 18 
Su-30MKM, eight F/A-18Ds, and 13 F-5E/Fs. Moreover, there are plans to acquire 
another 18 fighter aircraft and four airborne early warning aircraft over the next few 
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years.
142
 Malaysia established its coast guard in 2005 as the Maritime Enforcement 
Agency (MMEA). The coast guard currently possesses two amphibious aircraft, 50 
ships, and 76 fast boats ranging from 50 tons to 2000 tons.
143
 In 2015, Malaysia 
announced that it was allocating RM$31.2 billion to be spent across the Malaysian 
Armed Forces, the Royal Malaysian Police and the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement 
Agency.
144
 
 The Indonesian navy currently possesses two Type-209 submarines, four new 
Sigma-class corvettes and four Makassar-class landing platform docks. The State also 
plans to buy three Type-209 Chang Bogo submarines from South Korea to replace its 
existing Type-209s.
145
 The Indonesian air force has acquired ten Sukhois and plans to 
buy up to 40 of them over the next few years. In 2010, Indonesia negotiated an 
agreement with the United States for the supply of 24 F-16C/D combat aircraft.
146
 The 
Indonesian navy announced its plans for a ‗Green-Water Navy‘ in 2005, setting a goal 
of achieving a 274-ship force structure by 2024. This Green Water Navy will be 
composed of 110 strike ships, 66 patrolling ships, and 98 supporting ships.
147
 
Indonesia‘s defence budget has increased by 0.8 per cent annually over the last ten 
years, from US$2.4 billion in 2004 to US$8.3 billion in 2013.
148
 Currently, Indonesia‘s 
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maritime law enforcement capabilities are considered weak and insufficient.
149
 Indeed, 
according to Law No. 17/2008 on shipping, Indonesia should have an independent sea 
and coast guard. However, for many years the responsibility for maritime security and 
law enforcement in Indonesian waters has fallen to different ministries and 
institutions.
150
 In December 2014, Indonesian President Joko Widodo declared that an 
Indonesian Maritime Security Agency would be established to act as a coast guard for 
Indonesia.
151
 In 2015, the Indonesian government announced that it would increase 
military spending from 0.8 per cent to 1.5 per cent of GDP, bringing the State‘s total 
military expenditure to $15 billion by 2020.
152
 
 Vietnam has enhanced its naval and maritime capabilities, especially over the 
past five years. The State‘s defence budget has steadily increased from US$2.67 billion 
in 2011 to US$3.33 billion in 2012, reaching US$5.73 billion in 2014.
153
 The 
Vietnamese navy has received two Gepard-class guided missile frigates from Russia, 
and is anticipating the arrival of another two in a few years. Between 2010 and 2012, 20 
Su-30MK2V combat aircraft armed with anti-ship cruise missiles, and two batteries of 
the K-300P Bastion coastal defence missile system, were delivered by Russia.
154
 In 
2008, Vietnam ordered six Kilo-class submarines from Russia, with the first one having 
been delivered to the Vietnamese navy in January 2014. To date, the Vietnamese navy 
has four Kilo-class submarines as part of its fleet. In 2009, Vietnam established its naval 
air arm directly under Vietnamese naval command, with a number of aircraft transferred 
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from the air force and additional maritime surveillance aircraft acquired from various 
foreign countries. Vietnam has also engaged in on-going talks with the United States 
and European countries for the purchase of combat and maritime patrol aircraft.
155
 
Closer to home, Vietnam plans to buy the BrahMos supersonic anti-ship missile from 
India, which is capable of being fired from ships and aircraft.
156
 The combined effect of 
these new and incoming assets is that Vietnam has increased its self-reliance in terms of 
defence capabilities. The Vietnamese Marine Police Force, which was established in 
1998, was restructured in 2013 to form the Vietnamese Coast Guard, with the objective 
of improving capabilities as well as expanding cooperation with regional counterparts. 
With a number of offshore patrol vessels capable of carrying helicopters and three new 
C212-400 maritime patrol aircraft, the Vietnamese Coast Guard has enhanced its 
maritime law enforcement capabilities in the South China Sea. In April 2014, Vietnam 
officially established its Fisheries Surveillance Force (VFSF) under the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development. The construction of 32 patrol vessels and four 
large fisheries surveillance vessels capable of carrying helicopters was also approved by 
the Vietnamese Government in 2014.
157
 Vietnam‘s total expenditure on new coast guard 
vessels and associated equipment in 2014 was US$540 million.
158
 The government also 
allocated a further $US200 million to build four more large fisheries surveillance 
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vessels to work alongside the coast guard and counter China's increasing aggression in 
the South China Sea.
159
  
  Unlike Vietnam, the naval capability of the Philippines is very limited. Indeed, 
the State‘s main surface combatants include three Jacino-class corvettes and one Rajah 
Humabon destroyer escort without any cruise missiles.
160
 Recently, the Philippine navy 
acquired two renovated Hamilton-class cutters and 12 FA-50 light attack planes from 
South Korea. In July 2012, Philippine President Benigno Aquino announced that his 
government would allocate US$2.3 billion over five years to modernise the State‘s 
Armed Forces.
161
 With this level of defence spending, it is quite likely that the 
Philippine navy will acquire further major surface combatants in the coming years. The 
Philippine Coast Guard fleet has greatly expanded over the last five years, and there are 
plans for the service to acquire ten multi-role response vessels, one offshore patrol 
vessel, 24 fast patrol boats, and seven Bell helicopters in the near future.
162
  
 The Brunei navy is the smallest navy among the littoral states in the region. 
With only 1000 personnel, four landing craft and 11 patrol and coastal combatants, its 
ability to resist an outside aggressor is very limited.
163
 
China‘s naval modernisation has had a great impact on Taiwan. Taiwan is a 
South China Sea claimant but since the majority of States recognise the ―one China‖ 
policy, developing a naval force with asymmetric capabilities which can successfully 
defend the island from a seaward invasion has been difficult to achieve, despite the fact 
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that this is critical to Taiwanese national security. Taiwan has increased its defence 
budget from US$9.6 billion in 2009 to US$10.3 billion in 2015.
164
 A total of 31 fast 
attack boats equipped with anti-ship missiles have been provided to the Navy since 
2010. In addition, several Jinn Chiang-class patrol boats have been upgraded with 
super-sonic anti-ship missiles since 2011, and a new domestic submarine program is 
being considered for the Taiwanese navy.
165
 Taiwan has upgraded its E-2K Hawkeye 
early warning aircraft, acquired P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft, and hopes to buy 
several F-16s from the United States.
166
 The Taiwan Coast Guard (CCG) has also been 
expanded in terms of assets and capabilities. In 2004, it requested US$2.4 billion for the 
acquisition of fixed-wing aircraft and large ships capable of carrying helicopters for the 
next 15 years.
167
 In 2013, one 2,000-ton cutter and one 1,000-ton patrol boat were 
delivered to the CCG as part of a 37 ship building program.
168
 
2.4.3 Potential maritime incidents in the South China Sea 
 As previously discussed, there are many different types of surface vessels, 
aircraft and submarines operating in the South China Sea. Moreover, with States 
increasing their defence budgets, it is highly likely that additional vessels and aircraft 
will be added to existing fleets in the coming years. The Air Force and Naval Aviation 
commands in China‘s Guangzhou Military Region operate an impressive 322 aircraft of 
different types. Indeed, by comparison, the number of aircraft operated by other States 
in the region is meagre. Vietnam operates 101 aircraft, Malaysia operates 61 aircraft, 
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while the Philippines operates just 12 new FA-50 light attack planes.
169
 The South Sea 
Fleet of China‘s navy and the navies of all other littoral states surrounding the South 
China Sea currently comprise 38 submarines, 83 principal surface combatants and 381 
patrol and coastal combatants. Meanwhile, the law enforcement agencies of these States 
have roughly 1134 patrol vessels between them.
170
 The sheer number of State vessels 
operating in the South China Sea, together with various types of commercial vessels and 
the 1.77 million fishing vessels competing for space, make this maritime region 
crowded and vulnerable to maritime incidents. With multiple sovereign immune vessels 
including submarines, commercial vessels and fishing vessels operating in these 
confined and disputed waters, maritime incidents will be difficult to avoid altogether. 
Indeed, there have been a number of incidents in the South China Sea between various 
types of vessels, including: (i) military vessels and fishing vessels; (ii) military vessels 
and law enforcement vessels; (iii) law enforcement vessels and fishing vessels; and (iv) 
submarines and surface vessels.
171
 These incidents will be detailed in Chapter Seven. 
Since 2013, China has built artificial islands and airstrips capable of accommodating 
military aircraft on a number of disputed features in the Spratly Islands. In 2016, China 
deployed surface-to-air missiles to Woody Island in the Paracels.
172
 In the near future, it 
is expected that China could declare an Air Defence Identification Zone in the South 
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China Sea.
173
 If this transpires, then it is likely that China will intensify its air patrol in 
the region. As a result, incidents involving military and law enforcement aircraft over 
the South China Sea will be a critical concern. 
2.5 Conclusion 
The South China Sea is not only a critical waterway for merchant shipping and 
military transits and operations, but also contains rich fishing grounds and potential oil 
and gas reserves. However, maritime disputes in this region are quite common and 
highly complex. These disputes concern offshore sovereignty and maritime boundaries 
claims; access to resources; military navigation and activities in different maritime 
zones of coastal States, particularly the innocent passage of warships in the territorial 
sea, as well as military surveying, hydrographic surveying and intelligence collection in 
the EEZ. As the security concerns of coastal States in the South China Sea are 
escalating, concerned States have responded by increasing and modernizing their 
maritime forces. Indeed, increased naval and law enforcement surface vessels, 
submarines, and aircraft are being added to the region each year. Unfortunately, this 
means that the potential for maritime incidents between military and government 
vessels and aircraft of interested States is also likely to increase. For this reason, 
defining the international legal basis and geopolitical challenges associated with 
navigating the shoals of the South China Sea for sovereign immune vessels and aircraft 
is not only critical for individual States, but also for the security of the region as a 
whole. 
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3 STRATEGIC CONTEXT OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
3.1 Introduction 
 As discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis, the geopolitical interests in the South 
China Sea make the region significant to littoral States and external powers. However, 
the States concerned have different capacities and strategies to pursue their interests in 
the region. While access to resources and maintaining peace and security are key 
priorities for littoral States, external players are chiefly concerned with the freedom of 
navigation and overflight, as well as the safe and secure passage of shipping which rule-
based orders tend to promote. For China, resource security is a key strategic interest, but 
so too is the projection of power and the extension of its sphere of influence. The South 
China Sea policy of the United States centres on honouring commitments to regional 
allies and cooperating with China for its national interests. However, for smaller South 
China Sea claimant States, protecting territorial sovereignty and associated maritime 
claims in the region while avoiding military conflict with China are prime 
considerations. In light of the varying interests of the States concerned, the South China 
Sea is of high strategic significance, shaping relationships between States in the region 
and their interaction with extra-regional players. Moreover, on 12 July 2016, an arbitral 
tribunal established under Annex VII of the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) 
delivered a ruling in the China-Philippines South China Sea dispute. As briefly 
discussed in Chapter Two, this ruling has several strategic implications for the region, 
and as a result certain States may need adjust their national policies accordingly.  
 This chapter provides the strategic context of the South China Sea. With this 
objective, the interests and strategies of littoral States and external players in the South 
China Sea will be explored, as well as the strategic implications of the arbitral tribunal‘s 
award in the regional dispute between China and the Philippines. 
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3.2 Interests and strategies of South China Sea littoral States 
3.2.1 China‘s interests and strategies in the South China Sea 
3.2.1.1 China‘s interests in the South China Sea 
As the largest country in the world in terms of population, and the world‘s 
largest energy consumer, resource security is a major challenge for the Chinese 
government. Therefore, it is rather unsurprising that China has asserted its military 
might to ensure maximum access to living and non-living resources in the South China 
Sea. Besides access to food supplies to sustain its massive population, access to oil and 
gas resources in the South China Sea may help China reduce its dependence on energy 
supplies from Africa and the Persian Gulf - resources which must travel through the 
Strait of Malacca. This has been described as the ―Malacca Dilemma‖ by Chinese 
strategists.
1
 China claims almost all the waters of the South China Sea based on its 
nationalistic view of ―historic rights‖, and has utilised both law enforcement and 
military personnel to assert its claims. The concept of historic rights is not clearly 
defined in international law, and the LOSC ―does not recognize historic rights as a basis 
for claiming sovereignty over waters.‖
2
 However, China has been willing to use its 
maritime forces to oppose any action which violates its claimed sovereignty or historic 
rights in the South China Sea.  
China is heavily dependent on imported energy, with nearly 80 per cent of the 
State‘s imported crude oil passing through the South China Sea.
3
 For this reason, 
protecting sea lines of communication (SLOC) in the South China Sea is crucial for 
                                                 
1
 Michael McDevitt, 'The South China Sea and U.S. Policy Options' (2013) 35(4) (August) American 
Foreign Policy Interests 175, 181. 
2
 Florian Dupuy and Pierre Marie Dupuy, 'A Legal Analysis of China's Historic Rights Claim in the South 
China Sea' (2013) 107 American Journal of International Law 124, 138. 
3
 Robert D Kaplan, Why the South China Sea is so crucial (20 February 2015) Business Insider 
<http://www.businessinsider.com.au/why-the-south-china-sea-is-so-crucial-2015-2>. 
 
69 
 
China. If the region were to become blocked by an adversary due to a conflict, this 
would have a significant negative impact on China‘s economy. Moreover, by 
controlling the South China Sea, China would have the upper hand if it became 
embroiled in a conflict with Taiwan or Japan, as approximately 60 per cent of these 
States‘ energy supplies also pass through this region.
4
  
As China is in the process of building a global maritime power, naval training 
and exercises are of critical importance. However, even in peacetime and with strong, 
well-trained U.S. naval forces stationed in Japan and South Korea, the East China Sea is 
not conducive to China‘s navy conducting any type of covert training. Indeed, this 
makes the South China Sea an ideal maritime area for Chinese aircraft carriers and 
submarines to conduct training and exercises. Moreover, throughout China‘s modern 
history, most of its military threats have come from the sea. The Science of Military 
Strategy published by the Chinese Academy of Military Science in 2013 states that ―the 
threat of war in the east is more serious than the threat of war in the west, the threat of 
war from the sea exceeds that of the threat of war from the land.‖
5
 As a result, China 
considers the South China Sea a security ―buffer zone‖ which can protect its mainland 
from outside attacks.  
Furthermore, as a rising power seeking to extend its sphere of influence 
throughout the region, China has sought to push the United States away from the South 
China Sea. This strategy is designed to give China a free hand in shaping regional 
circumstances and dispositions. Indeed, an important part of the ―China Dream‖ is for 
China to become a global maritime power
6
. However, in order to achieve this status, 
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China must first be a well-recognised regional maritime power. It is for this reason that 
China so fiercely protects its maritime interests in the East and South China Seas. If one 
compares the two seas, it is clear that establishing a stronghold in the South China Sea, 
which is surrounded by small littoral States, is easier for China than achieving 
dominance in the East China Sea. Thus, the South China Sea is a more favourable area 
for China to gain increased status on its way towards becoming a global maritime 
power.
7
  
To further this goal, China has modernised its navy and expanded its naval bases 
in the region. The expansion of the Yulin naval base on Hainan Island has allowed it to 
house more submarines and surface vessels. Such expansion accomplishes three main 
goals: it strengthens China‘s nuclear deterrent, enhances its counter intervention 
strategy towards other maritime powers, and supports its law enforcement personnel 
and military forces in the South China Sea.
8
 
3.2.1.2 Chinese strategies in the South China Sea 
With the goal of controlling the South China Sea when circumstances permit, 
China has applied a variety of approaches and strategies to protect its interests in the 
region. 
Firstly, China has tried to integrate with the region to strengthen its regional 
influence. Cooperating with regional States in both economic and political aspects is a 
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vital strategy for China‘s ―Peaceful Rise.‖
9
 China has increased its economic relations 
with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) through trade and foreign 
investment. Indeed, China became ASEAN‘s largest trading partner in 2009, with the 
two-way trade reaching approximately USD$400 billion in 2014. Moreover, this figure 
is expected to reach USD$1 trillion by 2020.
10
 The ASEAN-China Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA), which came into effect on 1 January 2010, covers the largest free 
trade area in the world in terms of population (two billion people), and is the third 
largest in terms of nominal GDP, just after the European Economic Area and the North 
American Free Trade Area.
11
 China has also launched the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB), which all ASEAN States have joined, as well as advancing the 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which also includes all 
members of ASEAN, as well as Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand. 
Due to the importance of economic relations between ASEAN and China, it is unlikely 
that ASEAN States will take any action against China which would adversely affect 
their economies.
12
 China became a full dialogue partner with ASEAN in 1996, and has 
attempted to portray itself as the ultimate benefactor, thereby enhancing its influence in 
the region.
13
 However, China‘s behaviour in the South China Sea in recent years has 
deeply concerned many ASEAN States. China has also utilised ASEAN-driven forums 
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to consolidate its position and minimise ASEAN‘s collective power – a power which 
has the capacity to work against China‘s interests in the future, especially in the case of 
the South China Sea.
14
 China has always insisted that maritime territorial disputes and 
sovereignty claims in the South China Sea be resolved through bilateral approaches, 
rejecting multilateral approaches or any efforts to internationalise the issues. However, 
as the majority of disputes in the South China Sea involve more than two States, 
bilateral approaches are unlikely to be effective. By employing this delaying tactic, 
China gains more time to consolidate its claims and strengthen its control over disputed 
maritime areas in the region.
15
 China has certainly succeeded in dividing ASEAN 
members and weakening the consolidation of ASEAN.
16
 One such example was the 
failure of ASEAN to issue a joint statement on South China Sea issues at the Foreign 
Ministers Meeting in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, in 2012, which was perceived by some 
commentators as a Chinese proxy.
17
 A similar situation occurred in 2016, when ASEAN 
retracted its agreed press statement over rising tensions in the South China Sea only a 
few hours after it was released to the public. It was later suggested that China had 
pressured Laos, the ASEAN chair in 2016, to withdraw the statement.
18
 It is important 
to note that at the 49
th
 ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting held in 2016 in Vientiane, 
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Laos, ASEAN failed to reach a unified position on the South China Sea disputes, and 
made no specific mention of the recent ruling of the arbitral tribunal on these disputes. 
Cambodia was again alleged to have blocked any mention of the arbitral tribunal‘s 
ruling against China.
19
 It is clear that China has been successful in using its economic 
and military power to impose diplomatic pressure and even tacitly threaten States to 
further its own national interests and divide ASEAN member States when it comes to 
South China Sea issues.  
Secondly, China exploits loopholes in international law to justify its actions in 
the South China Sea. On the one hand, China claims almost all the South China Sea 
based on what it calls ―historical rights‖, and is willing to use hard power to enforce its 
claims in complete disregard of international law norms. As Isaac B Kardon has 
commented, for China, ―history is a superior consideration to law and can be deployed, 
loosely, to justify any claims and behaviours that appear to be prima facie illegal.‖
20
 On 
the other hand, China interprets international law provisions in ways which suit its own 
national interests. For many years, smaller littoral States have explored and exploited 
natural resources within their maritime zones in the South China Sea without dispute or 
disruption.
21
 However, by claiming almost all the waters of the South China Sea without 
legal entitlement, and using its power to strengthen its maritime claims, China has 
changed the status quo in the region, including increasing its maritime patrols. China 
has also enacted domestic laws and regulations to support the operations of its law 
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enforcement vessels in the South China Sea. Indeed, many Chinese law enforcement 
vessels have been used to harass fishing vessels of smaller littoral States and to prevent 
them from accessing waters claimed by China.
22
 It has also become apparent that China 
is using many of its fishing vessels as maritime militia to advance China‘s maritime 
claims and to support Chinese law enforcement agencies in disputed areas of the East 
and South China Seas.
23
 Furthermore, China has adopted a restrictive view on LOSC 
navigational regimes in order deter the United States from using the South China Sea. 
For example, while the United States and other maritime user States are of the view that 
the LOSC grants vessels and aircraft of foreign States the ability to conduct military 
activities in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of coastal States, China does not allow 
such activities in its own EEZ.
24
 With respect its historic water claim, it is not even 
clear what China is actually claiming. Instead, China interprets international law 
provisions narrowly to suit its own interests, and has evinced an intention to reject any 
decision or award by an international arbitral tribunal. This can be seen in China‘s 
response to the arbitral tribunal‘s recent ruling in the South China Sea dispute. Not only 
did China refuse to participate in this arbitration, it also ignored the arbitral tribunal‘s 
ultimate decision.
25
 To avoid being isolated from regional security fora, China is willing 
to participate in regional confidence building measures. However, when it comes to 
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agreements, China always prefers non-legally binding arrangements.
26
 This strategy 
gives China a certain flexibility to manoeuvre in accordance with its own interests.  
Thirdly, as smaller littoral States are reliant on foreign companies and 
governments to explore and exploit non-living resources, China uses diplomacy to 
prevent the development of any resource-related activities. Many diplomatic objections 
to hydrocarbon projects in the South China Sea have been made by China in order to 
deter foreign companies from cooperating with other claimant States on resource 
exploration.
27
 Moreover, China has increased oil and gas exploration and exploitation in 
disputed areas of the South China Sea, using its military and maritime law enforcement 
vessels and aircraft to threaten and harass vessels of other claimant States while 
protecting its own areas of operation.
28
 
Lastly, with its growing economic power, in addition to modernising its military 
forces and maritime law enforcement agencies, China continues to expand its footprint 
in the region. Since 2013, China has carried out an extensive artificial island-building 
program on its occupied features in the Spratly Islands that can be used as forward 
operating bases for its maritime forces. In 2016, China landed a number of civilian 
aircraft on artificial islands in the Spratlys,
29
 and deployed surface-to-air missiles to 
Woody Island in the Paracels.
30
 According to the Washington Times, many hardened 
and concrete hangars capable of housing fighter and strategic bombers, as well as air-
refuelling aircraft, have been built on various artificial islands built by China in the 
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Spratlys.
31
  
It is clear that China has adopted an assertive stance in extending its maritime 
security buffer zones, claiming living and non-living resources, as well as projecting its 
military footprint in the South China Sea. However, in order to avoid armed conflict, 
China has thus far applied the tactic of low-level coercion, using its maritime law 
enforcement and fishing vessels rather than military forces to assert its maritime 
claims.
32
 According to James Kraska, ―[b]y using asymmetric maritime forces – 
principally fishing vessels and coast guard ships – China is slowly but surely absorbing 
the South China Sea and East China Sea into its domain.‖
33
  
China‘s strategy in the South China Sea has been described as a ―salami slice‖ 
strategy, or as Ashley Townshend and Rory Medcalf have proposed, a ―passive 
assertive approach to consolidate its strategic gains in ways that reduce military risk.‖
34
 
On the one hand, China continues to assert its maritime claims in the South China Sea, 
using the tactic of low-level coercion to avoid military confrontations with other 
claimant States while gradually consolidating its claims and taking control of disputed 
areas. On the other hand, China uses its economic leverage to dampen responses from 
smaller South China Sea littoral States. Moreover, China understands the strategic and 
economic importance of maintaining a stable relationship with the United States, and 
has sought to restrain the U.S. response to its assertive behaviour in the region. With its 
burgeoning economic and military power, China will reject any legal resolutions and 
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prevent outside players, particularly the United States, India and Japan, from becoming 
involved in South China Sea issues.
35
 
3.2.2 Interests and strategies of smaller littoral States  
For smaller littoral States, protecting their maritime claims, having access to 
resources, as well as maintaining peace, stability and security in the South China Sea 
are prime considerations. Of the six smaller littoral States in the region, Vietnam, 
Indonesia and the Philippines are among the world's top ten seafood producers.
36
 
Maintaining access to living resources in the South China Sea is not only critically 
important to fishermen in Southeast Asia, but also a top policy priority for littoral 
States. Access to oil and gas in the South China Sea is also crucial to smaller South 
China Sea claimant States. As many of the oil and gas fields being developed by 
Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines are located on their continental shelves but lie 
within the so-called ―nine-dash line‖ claimed by China, securing access to these 
resources in accordance with international law is of paramount importance for these 
particular States. Ideally, preventing China from expanding its control over the area, 
while maintaining regional peace and stability through rule-based orders, is a clearly 
objective for all smaller littoral States. Moreover, for Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei, the South China Sea represents a security buffer zone - 
one which protects these States from an outside attack, particularly from China. For 
Vietnam specifically, if China were to block the South China Sea, there would be no 
alternative sea lane to sustain Vietnam‘s maritime trade, even with regional States. As a 
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result, maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea, and avoiding military 
confrontation with China, is critical to the Hanoi‘s security interests.
37
 
With the exception of China and Taiwan, all other littoral States are members of 
ASEAN, and therefore their security strategies have centred mainly on ASEAN 
frameworks. In order to mitigate China‘s military and economic power in the South 
China Sea disputes, Southeast Asian States have tried to engage China in a multi-
layered web of regional and international institutions, thereby incorporating China into 
their own security commitments.
38
 The ASEAN Dialogue Partnerships, the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Plus Three, the East Asian Summit (EAS), and the 
ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) are examples of multilateral 
forums which bring together ASEAN countries, China, as well as other powers to 
discuss regional security. All of these regional forums are centred on ASEAN, and thus 
ASEAN can set agendas and further its objectives in accordance with international law 
and universally acceptable norms. The signing of the Declaration on the Conduct of 
Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) between China and ASEAN in 2002 is 
considered one of ASEAN‘s successes as it directly engaged China in a regional 
cooperative process.
39
 Even though the DOC is a non-binding document, it was 
considered a significant achievement by ASEAN at the time.
40
 ASEAN countries have 
also welcomed extra-regional powers into the region, including the United States, 
Japan, India, Australia and South Korea. However, ASEAN members are not always 
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united when dealing with China in the South China Sea. Vietnam and the Philippines 
tend to be proactive in their dealings with China. Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, and 
Singapore have assumed a more abstemious attitude, while Cambodia, Laos, Thailand 
and Myanmar invariably try to accommodate China.
41
 Cambodia‘s willingness to defer 
to China was evident at the 45
th
 ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in 2012.
42
 As 
previously mentioned, this meeting, which was held under Cambodia‘s chairmanship, 
failed to issue a joint communiqu  for the first time in ASEAN‘s history due to 
disagreements over South China Sea issues. The third ADMM – Plus meeting held in 
Malaysia in 2015 also failed to issue a joint declaration due to a lack of consensus on 
the South China Sea disputes.
43
 
Littoral States within ASEAN have also tried to resolve their overlapping 
maritime boundaries in the South China Sea in accordance with international law, 
particularly the LOSC.
44
 The joint submission by Vietnam and Malaysia to the UN 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf clearly indicated that both States 
consider the disputed features in the Spratly Islands to be no more than ―rocks‖ under 
article 121 of the LOSC.
45
 This implies that Vietnam and Malaysia share the same view 
– that is, that none of the features in the Spratly Islands are entitled to an exclusive 
economic zone. This view echoes the arbitral tribunal‘s recent ruling that none of the 
high-tide features in the Spratly Islands ―generate entitlement to an exclusive economic 
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zone or continental shelf.‖
46
 This ruling, if fully respected, could help narrow down the 
disputed areas in the South China Sea. Some ASEAN States have even issued their own 
laws and regulations regarding their claims in the South China Sea. The Philippine 
Baseline Law 1999,
47
 and the Law of the Sea of Vietnam 2012,
48
 are examples of 
efforts by littoral States to more closely align their domestic laws with the LOSC.  
Apart from ASEAN, littoral States have enhanced their military and law 
enforcement capabilities in order to protect their sovereignty and interests in the region. 
Recognising that their military capabilities cannot match those of China, littoral States 
have directed their spending on sea denial capabilities within the South China Sea.
49
 
Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Taiwan and Brunei all plan to buy new 
military assets to enhance their military capabilities.
50
 Of the smaller claimant States, 
Vietnam and the Philippines have both reacted firmly and unequivocally to China‘s 
growing assertion. However, due to different political ideologies, foreign policies, as 
well as military and maritime capabilities, their strategies in the South China Sea are 
quite different. 
To counter China‘s ambition to dominate the South China Sea, Vietnam has 
pursued a number of strategies, including hard power and diplomatic approaches. On 
the one hand, with its ―Three-nos‖ defence policy (no military alliances, no foreign 
military bases on its territory, and no reliance on any country to fight against a third 
                                                 
46
 South China Sea Arbitration (The Philippines v People's Republic of China) (Case  No. 2013-19) 
(Award) (Permanent Court of Arbitration, 12 July 2016) [646]. The arbitral tribunal uses the term ―high-
tide features‖ for all features that are above water at high tide. 
47
 See An Act to Amend Certain Provisuions of Republic Act No. 3046, as Amended by Republic Act No. 
5446, to Define the Aechipelagic Baseline of The Philippines and for Other Purposes (Republic Act No. 
9522) approved 10 March 2009.   
48
 Sea The Law of the Sea of Vietnam, signed on 21 June 2012 (entered into force 1 January 2013).  
49
 For further information, see Davies, Andrew, 'Asian military trends and their implications for Australia' 
42 Strategic Insights 1, 1-25. 
50
 See Chapter Two of the thesis for further information. 
 
81 
 
country)
51
, Vietnam has strengthened its maritime forces, including naval, coast guard 
and fisheries surveillance forces.
52
 On the other hand, given that Vietnam‘s maritime 
forces cannot match China‘s military prowess, Vietnam has actively sought to 
internationalise the South China Sea disputes, garnering support from extra-regional 
players while simultaneously maintaining an open dialogue with China through 
different channels, including diplomatic, military and party-to-party channels.
53
 
Vietnam is open to external players, particularly the United States, Japan, India and 
Australia playing constructive roles in maintaining peace, security and freedom of 
navigation in the South China Sea in accordance with international law. However, 
Vietnam does try to avoid escalating tensions with China over the South China Sea 
issues.
54
 It is important to note that while the South China disputes represent a critical 
factor in the relationship between Vietnam and China, it is not the only factor. China is 
Vietnam‘s largest trading partner and shares Vietnam‘s nominal political ideology. As 
Carlyle Thayer has opined, Vietnam tries to manage its relationship with China - a 
much larger neighbour - ―under conditions of mature asymmetry‖, with ―Vietnam and 
China hav[ing] too much at stake to allow the present period of mature asymmetry to 
revert back to hostile asymmetry due to territorial disputes in the South China Sea.‖
55
 
As a result, balancing strategic re-alignment with China on the one hand, and other 
outside players (particularly the United States) on the other hand, is important to 
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Vietnam‘s foreign policy. Following the Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig incident, there have 
been no major maritime incidents between the vessels and aircraft of the two States in 
the South China Sea. Indeed, it could be argued that Vietnam has been successful in 
dissipating China‘s assertiveness in the region, and that China has shown signs of 
diffusing tensions with Vietnam over the South China Sea disputes. In April 2015, the 
General Secretary of Vietnam‘s Communist Party, Nguyen Phu Trong, visited China, 
and in November 2015 Chinese President Xi Jinping became the first Chinese president 
in ten years to visit Vietnam.
56
 These diplomatic visits indicate that the two sides are 
seeking to better manage their relations in the wake of the oil rig incident. 
Unlike Vietnam, the Philippines is a treaty ally of the United States, and has 
ramped up its defence cooperation with this powerful ally over disputes in the South 
China Sea. On 12 January 2016, the Philippine Supreme Court upheld the Enhanced 
Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) signed by the Philippines and the United 
States in 2014 - an agreement which grants U.S. forces a presence in selected Philippine 
military bases.
57
 The Philippines has also strengthened its defence relationship with 
Japan and India. In February 2015, Japan and the Philippines signed an agreement on 
defence equipment transfer.
58
 The signing of this agreement is a clear indication of the 
increasing defence cooperation between the two States. Accordingly, the Philippines 
expects to receive at least five TC-90s reconnaissance aircraft on loan from the Japanese 
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Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF), which will enable it to increase maritime 
patrols in the South China Sea.
59
 In 2015, Japan also provided the Philippines with a 
low-interest loan of US$150 million to buy ten patrol vessels from Japan. These vessels 
will be used to enhance the capability of the Philippine Coast Guard.
60
 The Philippines 
has also improved its defence cooperation with India. At the third Meeting of the India-
Philippines Joint Commission on Bilateral Cooperation held in New Delhi in October 
2015, the two States agreed ―to further strengthen defence and security cooperation in 
the areas of maritime domain awareness.‖
61
 
Moreover, as its military forces cannot match those of China, in 2013 the 
Philippines sought a legal resolution to its maritime disputes with China in the South 
China Sea as noted earlier. Although China refused to participate in the proceedings, the 
arbitral tribunal proceeded without China‘s involvement. On 12 July 2016, the arbitral 
tribunal issued its award in favour of the Philippines. In effect, the legal strategy 
adopted by the Philippines has forced China to choose between its maritime ambitions 
in the South China Sea and its reputation in the wider international community. The 
award of the arbitral tribunal is certainly considered a landmark win for the Philippines, 
but it remains to be seen how the award will affect China‘s dealings with other 
claimants in the South China Sea disputes.
62
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3.3 Interests and strategies of extra-regional powers 
The geographical position of the South China Sea gives it strategic significance 
not only for littoral States but also for extra-regional powers, including the United 
States, Japan, India and Australia. However, each of these States has different interests 
in the South China Sea, and as a result their strategies are also quite different. 
3.3.1 The United States 
Apart from the economic importance of the South China Sea (as discussed in 
Chapter two of the thesis), this region has been used by the U.S. Navy and Air Force as 
an operating area and as a transit point between its military bases in Asia and the Indian 
Ocean and Persian Gulf. Therefore, maintaining peace, safety and freedom of 
navigation and overflight in accordance with international law is of vital strategic 
interest to the United States.
63
 At an ARF meeting in July 2010, U.S. Secretary of State, 
Hillary Clinton, affirmed that: 
…As a Pacific nation and resident power, the United States has a national interest in 
freedom of navigation, the maintenance of peace and stability, respect for international 
law, and unimpeded lawful commerce in the South China Sea...
64
 
Although the United States does not take sides regarding territorial disputes, it 
does encourage claimants to resolve such disputes peacefully and in accordance with 
international law.
65
 In addition, the United States has rejected China‘s ―nine-dash line‖ 
claim, and has publically urged China to stop its extensive artificial island-building 
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program in the Spratlys.
66
 
Honouring its commitment to regional allies is another U.S. priority. The United 
States is a treaty ally of the Philippines under the 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty. Article 
IV of this Treaty provides that:  
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties 
would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet 
the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes…
67
 
Article V states that: 
For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on either of the Parties is deemed to 
include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the 
island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public 
vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.
68
 
There have been different interpretations of this Treaty regarding the response of 
the United States in the event of an armed attack on one of the offshore islands claimed 
by the Philippines in the South China Sea. To date, there has been no official 
declaration by either side on the level of commitment which would be made if such an 
attack were to occur. Even though the United States does not take sides in territorial 
disputes, it is clear from the text of the treaty that if an armed attack were to take place 
on the armed forces, public vessels or aircraft of the Philippines in the South China Sea, 
then the United States would be obliged to become consult. The scope of the U.S. 
involvement, however, would depend upon the diplomatic, political and security 
environment at the time. 
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 Strengthening its regional influence in the region is another strategic interest of 
the United States. Indeed, maintaining the presence and unhindered passage of U.S. 
military vessels and aircraft in the South China Sea to sustain its power projection in the 
region and around the globe is strategically important. With the increasing number of 
incidents between vessels and aircraft of China and those of the United States in the 
South China Sea, as well as the rapid modernisation of China‘s Navy, it appears that the 
future of U.S. leadership in the Asia-Pacific region could be affected by China‘s rising 
power.
69
 Ensuring a sustainable security environment in the South China Sea is 
therefore crucial to the U.S. rebalancing strategy towards the Asia-Pacific. Indeed, this 
will help the United States strengthen its political position in the region. 
In an effort to maintain its influence in the region, the United States has 
enhanced its diplomatic, economic and security relations with surrounding States. Since 
2009, the Obama Administration has adopted an engagement policy towards the Asia-
Pacific region. In July 2009, the United States acceded to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation,
70
 and in 2011, the U.S. President participated in the East Asia Summit 
for the first time. In his 2011 speech before the Australian Parliament, President Barack 
Obama stated that ―the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping 
this region and its future, by upholding core principles and in close partnership with our 
allies and friends.‖
71
 According to Tom Donilon, National Security Advisor to President 
Obama, the ultimate goal of the rebalancing policy toward the Asia-Pacific region is to 
ensure that ―international law and norms are respected, that commerce and freedom of 
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navigation are not impeded, that emerging powers build trust with their neighbours, and 
that disagreements are resolved peacefully without threats or coercion.‖
72
 Under this 
rebalancing policy, the United States has directed more resources toward the region, 
including military, diplomatic, economic and strategic support.
73
  
In relation to military resources, on 5 January 2012, President Obama announced 
a new Defense Strategic Guidance policy titled Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: 
Priorities for 21st Century Defense. This policy reaffirmed that ―while the U.S. military 
will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward 
the Asia-Pacific region.‖
74
 The Defense Strategic Guidance introduced a new ―Air-Sea 
Battle‖ concept, proposed a service collaboration to address anti-access and area denial 
challenges, and confirmed that ―the U.S. military will invest as required to ensure its 
ability to operate effectively in anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) environments.‖
75
 In 
his remarks at the Asia Society New York on 11 March 2013, Donilon stated that: 
[in] the coming years a higher proportion of our military assets will be in the Pacific. 
Sixty percent of our naval fleet will be based in the Pacific by 2020. Our Air Force is 
also shifting its weight to the Pacific over the next five years. We are adding capacity 
from both the Army and the Marines. The Pentagon is working to prioritize the Pacific 
Command for our most modern capabilities – including submarines, Fifth-Generation 
Fighters such as F-22s and F-35s, and reconnaissance platforms.
76
  
As an integral component of the U.S. Defence strategy, the ―Air-Sea Battle‖ concept 
provides the opportunity for the United States to ―maintain freedom of action in the 
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global commons, and secure operational access to enable concurrent or follow-on joint 
operations.‖
77
 Notionally, the concept does not seek to directly target any particular 
State. However, as Benjamin Schreer has observed, ―the US military‘s increased focus 
on China has given the concept much prominence in the strategic community.‖
78
 In 
April 2014, the United States and the Philippines signed the Enhanced Defense 
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which allows U.S. forces to use Philippines military 
bases on a rotational basis.
79
 According to Carlyle Thayer, this Agreement ―reflects the 
desire of the Philippines and the U.S. for a more comprehensive agreement that covers 
the full range of enhanced defense cooperation.‖
80
 In August 2014, the United States 
and Australia signed the Force Posture Agreement, which increases the annual rotation 
of U.S. Marine Corps members and U.S. airmen in Darwin, northern Australia.
81
  
The United States has also strengthened its defence relations with Singapore. In 
1990, the two States signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) Regarding United 
States Use of Facilities in Singapore. This MoU allows U.S. air and naval forces to 
expand their access to Singaporean facilities.
82
 In 2005, Singapore and the United States 
signed a Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) which seeks to ―expand the scope of 
defense and security cooperation‖ while affirming that ―[c]ooperation between like-
minded countries on defense and security issues is an essential part of effectively 
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responding to threats to peace and stability.‖
83
 The United States has deployed a number 
of Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) to Singapore as part of its commitment to strengthening 
its military engagement in the Southeast Asia region. The first seven-month deployment 
of LCS to Singapore has already been completed, with potentially another four 
deployments to take place by the end of 2016.
84
 Although Singapore is not a formal 
U.S. ally, Chris Rahman has commented that ―Singapore has become the most 
important partner in the U.S. Pacific Command security network after the three main 
formal allies – Japan, South Korea, and Australia.‖
85
 That LCS have already been 
deployed to Singapore (and with further deployments to come), demonstrates that the 
United States is keen to enhance its presence in the South China Sea.  
As part of its military rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, the United States has also 
strengthened its military presence in South Korea and Japan. Since 2009, the United 
States and South Korea have broadened their defence alliance ―from its primary purpose 
of defending against a North Korean attack to a regional and even global partnership.‖
86
 
In April 2015, the United States and Japan revised an existing agreement known as the 
Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. Under these Guidelines, the Japanese 
Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces ―will provide mutual 
protection of each other‘s assets, as appropriate, if engaged in activities that contribute 
to the defense of Japan in a cooperative manner.‖
87
 U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry 
also confirmed that ―Washington's commitment to Japan's security remains ironclad and 
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covers all territories under Japan's administration, including the Senkaku Islands.‖
88
 
This clear statement by the United States is qualitatively different from the situation 
with respect to disputed offshore features in the South China Sea (where the United 
States does not take sides). The Guidelines also enhance cooperation between the 
United States and Japan with regard to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in 
the maritime domain without geographical limitation.
89
 This will hopefully contribute to 
the protection of maritime security and the freedom of navigation in the Asia-Pacific 
region.  
The United States has also improved its relationship with Vietnam. The two 
States established a Comprehensive Partnership in July 2013, and in 2014 the U.S. 
removed part of its embargo on lethal weapon sales to Vietnam in order to help improve 
Vietnam‘s maritime security.
90
 In June 2015, U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter and 
Vietnamese Defence Minister Phung Quang Thanh signed the Joint Vision Statement on 
Defence Relations, with the two States committing to deepen their defence 
relationship.
91
 Carter also announced that Washington would provide $18 million to 
help Vietnam improve its maritime defence capabilities.
92
 In a meeting with U.S. 
President Obama during his visit to the United States in July 2015, Vietnamese 
Communist Party Leader Nguyen Phu Trong stated that ―we have been transformed 
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from former enemies to become friends, partners, and comprehensive partners. And I‘m 
convinced that our relationship will continue to grow in the future.‖
93
 In May 2016, 
during his official visit to Vietnam, President Obama announced that the United States 
would fully lift its embargo on lethal weapons sales to Vietnam in an effort to normalise 
relation between the two States.
94
  
In addition to sending military forces into the region and strengthening 
diplomatic and security cooperation with regional allies and friends, the United States 
has improved economic ties with regional States. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
Agreement - a proposed free trade agreement between the United States and 11 other 
States including Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Mexico, Peru, Chile, Singapore, 
Brunei, Malaysia, Japan and Vietnam, is one such example. Significantly, China has not 
been included among the TPP States. Speaking at the Nike factory in Oregon on 8 May 
2015, President Barack Obama stated that: 
We have to make sure America writes the rules of the global economy and we should 
do it today while our economy is in a position of global strength. If we don‘t write the 
rules for trade around the world, guess what, China will. And they‘ll write those rules in 
a way that gives Chinese workers and Chinese businessmen the upper hand.
95
 
As the 12 TPP States collectively make up almost 40 per cent of global gross domestic 
product (GDP), the TPP Agreement is ―a concrete manifestation of [the U.S.] strategy 
of rebalancing toward Asia.‖
96
 Although all 12 States signed the agreement in October 
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2015, it can only come into effect 60 days after all the original signatories have ratified 
the agreement, or when at least six States which together account for at least 85 per cent 
of the total GDP of the 12 original signatories ratify the agreement within two years 
from the date of signing.
97
 As both Republican and Democratic 2016 presidential 
candidates oppose the TPP Agreement, it is unlikely that the U.S. Senate will discuss 
agreement‘s ratification until after the November 2016 election.
98
 That the ratification 
process will be delayed in the United States, together with domestic protests over the 
agreement in some States, particularly New Zealand and Australia, indicates a degree of 
skepticism regarding the efficacy of the TPP.
99
 If the TPP cannot enter into force, the 
strategy of rebalancing toward Asia as well as the U.S. leadership role in the region will 
be compromised. 
To reaffirm navigational rights in the South China Sea, Secretary Carter has 
declared that ―[t]he United States will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law 
allows, as we do around the world, and the South China Sea is not and will not be an 
exception.‖
100
 The United States has conducted a number of operational assertions in 
the South China Sea under the Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program to challenge 
China‘s excessive maritime claims. Examples of this include: the USS Fort Worth 
patrolling the maritime area near the Spratly Islands on 11 May 2015; a U.S. P8-A 
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Poseidon surveillance aircraft conducting overflights over China‘s artificial islands in 
the Spratly Islands on 20 May 2015; the USS Lassen conducting a patrol within 12 
nautical miles of the artificial island built by China on Subi Reef in the Spratly Islands; 
and the USS Curtis Wilbur exercising innocent passage within 12 nautical miles of 
Triton Island.
101
 Even though FON operations cannot address the root causes of 
tensions, they may help challenge China‘s excessive claims in the South China Sea. 
The United States has also affirmed its ―respect and support for ASEAN 
Centrality and ASEAN – led mechanisms in the evolving regional architecture of the 
Asia-Pacific.‖
102
 The United States certainly encourages ASEAN States to support the 
rule of law and the principle of freedom of navigation under international law. At the 
Special U.S.-ASEAN Leaders Summit held in February 2016, the United States and 
ASEAN declared their ―commitment to maintain peace, security and stability in the 
region, ensuring maritime security and safety, including the rights of freedom of 
navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the seas.‖
103
 
In summary, the United States remains focused on maintaining the freedoms of 
navigation and overflight in the South China Sea, as well as preserving regional stability 
through abiding respect for international law rules and norms. On the one hand, the 
United States insists that all claimant States should resolve their disputes peacefully and 
in accordance with international law. In this regard, the United States shows deference 
to the central role of ASEAN in regional affairs. On the other hand, the United States 
has affirmed its navigational rights in the South China Sea by conducting FON 
operations. Although the United States tacitly challenges China‘s excessive maritime 
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claims, it also seeks to avoid any direct conflict. A key component of the U.S. strategy 
has been to strengthen its strategic and political relations with its regional allies and 
friends, but it has also (and rather unexpectedly) tried to positively engage with China to 
resolve regional and global problems. As the South China Sea is not only a central 
strategic issue in the relationship between China and the United States, it is to be 
expected that the United States will: (i) continue to assert the freedoms of navigation 
and overflight in the South China Sea; (ii) strengthen its security relations with regional 
States; and (iii) eschew any display of open aggression against China which would 
escalate existing regional tensions and/or lead to direct conflict. 
3.3.2 Japan 
With more than 90 per cent of Japan‘s oil imports transiting through the South 
China Sea, ensuring the freedom of navigation and the safety and security of SLOCs in 
the region is a main priority for Japan. In light of China‘s increasing military presence 
in the Paracel Islands, its extensive artificial island-building program in the Spratly 
Islands and potential artificial-island building program in Scarborough Shoal, Japan‘s 
fear of China one day controlling the South China Sea is well founded. If China did 
exercise control over the region, this would undoubtedly have a significant strategic 
impact on Japan. 
China‘s increasingly aggressive posture in the South China Sea also has the 
potential to weaken the rule of law at both the national and international level. If this 
were to occur, Japan‘s position in its maritime disputes with China in the East China 
Sea would be undermined.
104
 Therefore, maintaining stable security in the region and 
adherence to international law rules and norms is in Japan‘s national interest. Moreover, 
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as Japan and the United States are treaty allies, if armed conflict involving the United 
States were to break out in the South China Sea, Japan would be required to provide 
logistical support to U.S. forces at the very least. 
In light of the above concerns, Japan has tried to strengthen ASEAN solidarity, 
calling for the implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South 
China Sea (DOC), as well as the negotiation of a Code of Conduct in the South China 
Sea (COC).
105
 Not only has Japan supported the efforts of Vietnam and the Philippines 
in strengthening their maritime law enforcement capabilities, it has also assisted the 
United States in its rebalancing policy towards the Asia-Pacific.
106
 In 2015, Japan 
provided six second-hand patrol ships to the Vietnamese Coast Guard as part of a US$4 
million aid program, and there are plans for Japan to provide Vietnam with brand new 
ships to help it strengthen its maritime security responses.
107
 Last year Japan provided 
the Philippines with a low-cost interest loan of US$150 million to buy ten patrol vessels 
from Japan to enhance the capability of the Philippine Coast Guard.
108
 Japan has also 
encouraged other maritime powers including the United States, India and Australia to 
cooperate in safeguarding maritime interests and rule-based order in the region.
109
  
Over the past few years, Japan‘s security policy has undergone major changes, 
leading to improved engagement with regional security matters. In April 2014, Japan 
lifted its ban on arms exports, paving the way for greater cooperation with its partners, 
including ASEAN States, in weapons‘ procurement and development. In July 2014, 
Japan revised its interpretation of Article 9 of its Constitution, with the result that the 
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country‘s defence forces are now permitted to engage with other States and exercise the 
right of collective self-defence without geographical limitation.
110
 Moreover, in 
September 2015, Japan passed new security legislation explicitly setting out this revised 
interpretation of Article 9. Under the new legislation, Japan may invoke the right to 
collective self-defence when responding to an armed attack against itself or a foreign 
country which threatens Japan‘s survival, or in circumstances where there exists no 
other appropriate means to repel the attack.
111
 According to Yoji Koda, with the passage 
of this new security legislation, ―the possibility of JSDF (Japan Self-Defence Force) 
military operations in the South China Sea...will become greater than before.‖
112
 Japan 
is involved in maritime disputes with China in the East China Sea, particularly over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. If a conflict transpired in this area, Japan has the right to 
intervene without changing its defence policy and without having to reinterpret its 
Constitution. The situation in the South China Sea, however, is another story altogether 
insofar as Japan is concerned. Lionel P. Fatton has commented that ―[n]owhere are the 
impacts of the revamp of the Japanese security architecture more evident than in the 
South China Sea.‖
113
 
In summary, Japan has a stake in the South China Sea, but not as a South China 
Sea claimant State. To date, Japan has only played a modest role in pursuing stable 
security in the region. However, if China continues to assert its maritime claims, 
ramping up its militarisation in the South China Sea and ignoring international law rules 
and norms, it is likely that Japan‘s involvement in the South China Sea will escalate. 
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3.3.3 India 
India‘s interests in the South China Sea centre on the State‘s burgeoning trade 
and economic engagement with ASEAN and Northeast Asia, as well as its growing 
strategic interests in the region.
114
 With the value of its trade with East Asia expected to 
reach US$100 billion by 2016, India is strengthening its economic engagement with the 
region. Indeed, this is one of the principal goals laid down in India‘s ―Look East‖ 
Policy.
115
 During the 2014 India-ASEAN Summit in Myanmar, Indian Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi stated that his government had transformed the long standing ―Look 
East‖ Policy into an ―Act East‖ policy. According to Subhash Kapila, while the ―Look 
East‖ policy was driven by India‘s economic and political imperatives, the ―Act East‖ 
policy is propelled by its strategic significance in Southeast Asia.
116
 Approximately 25 
per cent of India‘s sea borne trade passes through the South China Sea. Thus 
maintaining security and freedom of navigation in the region is critical to India.
117
 On 
12 July 2016, the day the arbitral tribunal issued its award in the South China Sea 
arbitration, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs made a statement indicating that 
―India supports freedom of navigation and over-flight, and unimpeded commerce, based 
on the principles of international law, as reflected notably in the UNCLOS.‖
118
 India‘s 
oil and gas exploration in the South China Sea also contributes to the region‘s economic 
prosperity and may assist to reduce India‘s energy deficit. Therefore, any maritime 
conflict in the South China Sea would negatively impact India‘s economic and national 
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interests. In October 2011, India signed an oil exploration agreement with Vietnam 
despite objections from China. All these actions could be viewed as India supporting 
not only the freedom of navigation but also access rights to natural resources in the 
South China Sea in accordance with international law.
119
 In 2012, India‘s Union 
Minister Ashwani Kumar expressed the view that the ―South China Sea is the property 
of the world. Nobody has a unilateral control over it and India is capable enough of 
safeguarding its interests.‖
120
 To balance China‘s growing ambitions in the South China 
Sea, India has adopted a proactive approach to the region. Indeed, India has improved 
its military and security relations with Southeast Asian States, particularly Vietnam, 
Malaysia and the Philippines. This has been achieved by increasing its naval presence in 
the region, and particularly by conducting naval visits to Southeast Asian States. India 
has also engaged with the United States, Japan and Australia in a way which David 
Lang has described as ―a coalition of like-minded democracies that stands for the 
established regional order and against unilateral attempts to change the status quo by 
force.‖
121
 
It is clear that India has several interests in the South China Sea. However, due to 
budgetary constraints, India has focused its resources on the Indian Ocean, where it has 
vital strategic interests. Although India supports the freedoms of navigation and 
overflight, it is important to note that it shares the same view as China regarding foreign 
military activities in the EEZ of coastal States – a view which is inconsistent with the 
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LOSC.
122
 Moreover, China is India‘s largest trading partner, and with bilateral trade 
between the two States reaching US$70.25 billion in 2014,
123
 it is unlikely that India 
and China will oppose each other‘s interests directly, particularly in the South China 
Sea. Thus far, India‘s policy in the region could best be described as ―incremental 
balancing‖, a term which David Scott has coined.
124
 However, as the South China Sea is 
critical for India‘s trade ties with Southeast Asian States, as well as with Japan and 
South Korea, if China‘s pattern of aggressive behaviour persists, it is possible that India 
will join the United States, Japan and Australia in preserving the freedom of navigation 
in the region. 
3.3.4 Australia 
As a heavily trade-dependent State, maritime security and the freedom of 
navigation are vitally important to Australia‘s national interests. With approximately 54 
per cent of its trade passing through the South China Sea, Australia has a definite stake 
in this maritime region.
125
 China is Australia‘s largest trading partner, with a two-way 
trade value of AUD$152.5 billion in 2014. ASEAN trade ranks second to China, with a 
two-way trade value of AUD$101.6 billion in the same financial year.
126
 Although 
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Australia avoids offending China, it actively supports ASEAN in advocating for a Code 
of Conduct in the South China Sea. Therefore, it appears Australia has a keen desire to 
keep ASEAN countries on side.
127
 In addition, Australia and the United States are treaty 
allies by virtue of the ANZUS Treaty.
128
 As Chris Rahman has commented: ―The 
ANZUS alliance is the unalterable cornerstone of Australia‘s defence and foreign 
policies.‖
129
 Even though the United States professes not to take sides in sovereignty 
disputes in the South China Sea, clashes over the freedom of navigation (especially 
military activities in the South China Sea), together with its commitment to the 
Philippines under the Security Treaty, could draw the United States into a conflict. If 
the United States became involved in a maritime conflict in the South China Sea, it is 
likely that Australia would follow through with its alliance obligations.
130
 Moreover, 
Australia‘s security partnerships with Malaysia and Indonesia, and its participation in 
the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) also involving Singapore, the United 
Kingdom, Malaysia and New Zealand, would require Australia to provide diplomatic 
support at the very least in the event of a conflict in the region involving one of its 
FPDA partners.
131
 
Moreover, like the United States, maintaining the freedoms of navigation and 
overflight in the South China Sea is important to Australia. The Australia-United States 
Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) 2015 Joint Statement ―emphasized the importance 
of the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea enjoyed by all states to fly, sail, and 
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operate in accordance with international law.‖
132
 The Australian Defence White Paper 
2013 highlighted that:  
Australia has interests in the peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes 
including in the South China Sea in accordance with international law, the prevention of 
aggression within Southeast Asia, and freedom of navigation and maritime security in 
the region‘s sea lanes.
133
 
These sentiments were echoed in the Australian Defence White Paper 2016, which 
stated that ―Australia has a strong interest in the maintenance of peace and stability, 
respect for international law, unimpeded trade and freedom of navigation and 
overflight.‖
134
  
Lastly, as many regional States rely heavily on seafood, the collapse of marine 
ecosystems in the South China Sea due to accelerated land reclamations and overfishing 
could make Australian waters the new target for regional fishing fleets, negatively 
impacting Australian fish stocks and the State‘s fisheries stakeholders. 
While the United States ―will continue to be Australia‘s most important strategic 
partner‖, Australia is also engaging China, though with an acknowledgment that the 
strategic interests of the two States ―may differ in relation to some regional and global 
security issues.‖
135
 Australia does not take sides in the South China Sea disputes, 
although it ―opposes the use of artificial structures in the South China Sea for military 
purposes‖
136
, supports international rule-based orders, and supports the ASEAN-led 
regional security architecture. 
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3.4 The Arbitral Tribunal’s ruling and strategic implications for the South 
China Sea  
One of the most important findings of the arbitral tribunal in the Philippines-
China arbitration is that China has no legal basis to claim historic rights to resources 
within the nine-dash line.
137
 Indeed, despite being unenforceable, the arbitral tribunal‘s 
ruling is legally binding on all parties involved in the proceedings.
138
 The second key 
ruling of the arbitral tribunal is that none of the land features in the Spratly Islands, 
individually or collectively, are entitled to claim an EEZ or a continental shelf.
139
 These 
two rulings, when taken together, clearly reduce the maritime zones which can be 
claimed by South China Sea claimant States. Moreover, as none of the land features in 
the Spratly Islands can generate an EEZ or continental shelf, it could be argued that 
none of the land features in the Paracel Islands (which are remarkably similar to those in 
the Spratly Islands), are capable of generating the relevant maritime zones. In addition, 
by dangerously operating law enforcement vessels and creating a serious risk of 
collision at sea, the arbitral tribunal ruled that China had violated the navigational safety 
provisions of the LOSC and other treaty provisions on maritime safety, particularly the 
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs).
140
 As many 
incidents in the South China Sea have involved Chinese law enforcement vessels, this 
ruling represents a stern warning to China regarding its increasingly dangerous and 
aggressive behaviour. The arbitral tribunal‘s ruling also has the effect of undermining 
China‘s posture of strategic ambiguity in the South China Sea, with the decision 
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unequivocally concluding that China can only claim maritime zones in accordance with 
the LOSC, not ―relevant waters‖ based on so-called ―historic rights‖. 
As a result of the arbitral tribunal‘s award, China must choose whether it will 
respect the ruling and change its South China Sea policy, or whether it will continue to 
assert its maritime claims in contravention of the ruling, thus risking damage to its 
international reputation. On 13 July 2016, one day after the arbitral tribunal‘s award, 
China released a White Paper titled China Adheres to the Position of Settling Through 
Negotiation the Relevant Disputes Between China and the Philippines in the South 
China Sea. This document states that ―China‘s territorial sovereignty and maritime 
rights and interests in the South China Sea shall under no circumstances be affected by 
those awards. China does not accept or recognize those awards. China opposes and will 
never accept any claim or action based on those awards.‖
141
 In light of these perfervid 
comments, it is highly unlikely that China will show any respect for the arbitral 
tribunal‘s decision. Clive Schofield has expressed the view that China may respond to 
the award with ―an intensification of [its] island-building campaign in new locations 
and an increase in enforcement actions within the nine-dash line.‖
142
 If this is the case, 
then the number of maritime incidents in the South China Sea is likely to increase. 
For ASEAN, the arbitral tribunal‘s decision has implications for the unity of the 
organisation. ASEAN has always called for the resolution of South China Sea disputes 
by peaceful means and in accordance with international law, particularly the LOSC. 
This suggests that ASEAN should respect the arbitral tribunal‘s decision. However, as 
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mentioned above, at this year‘s ASEAN Foreign Ministerial Meeting in Laos, ASEAN 
failed to refer to the South China Sea diplomatic and legal processes in its joint 
statement due to an objection from Cambodia. Indeed, ASEAN‘s consensus policy 
means that one member can block the decision of the whole organisation. For this 
reason, ASEAN may need to reconsider its voting process or risk losing its credibility 
when dealing with regional security issues. 
The arbitral tribunal‘s ruling has also opened up opportunities for maritime user 
States to intensify freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea. The United 
States, Japan, India and Australia have all expressed their support for the ruling.
143
 But 
who has power to enforce this ruling? It is clear that the United States cannot enforce 
the ruling, but an international coalition could play an important role in managing 
China‘s behaviour. Now that the arbitral award has been handed down, it is quite 
possible that more operational assertions will be conducted in the South China Sea by 
like-minded States including the United States, Australia, India and Japan.
144
 Smaller 
littoral States including Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines will 
continue to strengthen their maritime capabilities while forging security and strategic 
partnerships with major external players to challenge China‘s authority in the region. 
With the nine-dash line being legally defunct, Indonesia is likely to be more assertive in 
protecting its maritime resources within its EEZ, especially around Natuna Island.
145
 
Meanwhile, Vietnam may consider mounting a legal challenge if China continues to 
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violate its claimed EEZ in the South China Sea.
146
 So although the arbitral tribunal went 
to considerable lengths to consider the arguments before issuing its landmark ruling, its 
award will not necessarily assist in reducing tensions in the South China Sea. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Due to the long-standing maritime disputes, tensions continue to rise with no 
signs of abatement. As the asymmetrical military balance between China and smaller 
littoral States continues to grow, so too does the involvement of external players, adding 
further complexity to the region‘s strategic context. If the arbitral tribunal‘s ruling in the 
Philippines-China arbitration is respected, the number of disputed maritime areas in the 
South China Sea would be reduced. However, to date, there have been no signs that 
China is willing to enter into any sort of compromise arrangement with regard to its 
maritime claims in the region. Accordingly, the risk of maritime incidents in the South 
China Sea, especially between military and law enforcement vessels and aircraft of the 
parties involved, will continue to grow. Unfortunately, the ultimate result of this 
situation is that navigating the shoals of the South China Sea will become increasingly 
precarious for sovereign immune vessels and aircraft. 
 
                                                 
146
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4 INTERNATIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE PASSAGE 
OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNE VESSELS AND AIRCRAFT 
4.1 Introduction 
 Navigation rights and maritime safety have been key areas of discussion 
throughout the development of the international law of the sea. While coastal States 
have sought greater control of waters along their coastlines, the priority of maritime 
States has been to maintain the status of water spaces within which the freedom of 
navigation can be exercised. Since the 17
th
 century, these conflicting interests have been 
debated by many scholars, among them Hugo Grotius and John Selden. In April 1609, 
Grotius published Mare Liberum and proclaimed the freedom of the seas doctrine, 
thereby allowing the Dutch to utilise international sea lanes for trade in the East Indies.
1
 
By that time, the freedom of the seas doctrine posed a threat to Great Britain, which 
sought to control the seas around its territory. In 1635 the English author Selden wrote 
Mare Clausum, rejecting Grotius‘s claim and asserting that the seas adjacent to the 
British coasts were under British control.
2
 To balance the competing interests of coastal 
States and maritime States, a number of international discussions took place during the 
20
th
 Century, the most significant being the three United Nations Conferences on the 
Law of the Sea conducted in 1958, 1960 and 1973. As a result, the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) was finally adopted in 1982 and entered into 
force in 1994. The LOSC establishes a legal framework which governs all uses of the 
oceans. In addition to the LOSC, several other international conventions governing 
navigation and overflight at sea have been established. These include the Convention on 
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972, the International 
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Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974, as well as The Convention on 
International Civil Aviation 1944. All of these conventions have provisions governing 
the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft. 
 This chapter introduces the concept of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft 
under international law. It also analyses international law principles applicable to the 
passage of vessels and aircraft of this type in various maritime jurisdictional zones 
designated by the LOSC. 
4.2 The concept of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft under international 
law 
4.2.1 Principle of sovereign immunity 
Sovereign immunity has long been accepted as a principle of customary 
international law. In essence, the principle holds that one sovereign State cannot be 
subject to the jurisdiction of another State. Under article 2(1) of the Charter of the 
United Nations, all states enjoy sovereign equality.
3
 The principle of sovereign equality 
recognises that the official representatives of one State should not be subject to the 
jurisdiction of another State.
4
 Although sovereign immunity is an internationally 
recognised doctrine, States have different views regarding the circumstances in which 
such immunity can be invoked. Currently, there are two divergent approaches to the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity: the absolute immunity doctrine and the restrictive 
immunity doctrine. Under the absolutist approach, foreign States enjoy absolute 
immunity from suit; by contrast, under the restrictive approach, foreign States are 
                                                 
3
 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations 
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granted immunity for their governmental acts but not their commercial activities.
5
 In 
2004, the United Nations enacted the Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States 
and their Property, with an effort to provide a comprehensive approach to the issue of 
sovereign immunity. However, the Convention has not yet entered into force due to a 
lack of ratification.
6
 As a result, the doctrine of sovereign immunity continues to derive 
from customary international law.  
4.2.2 The concept of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft under international law 
 There is no particular treaty definition for sovereign immune vessels and 
aircraft. However, international law has provisions regarding the passage of sovereign 
immune vessels and aircraft in different maritime jurisdictional zones. These provisions 
are chiefly found in the LOSC
7
 and The Convention on International Civil Aviation 
(Chicago Convention).
8
  
Article 29 of the LOSC defines a warship as: 
...a ship belonging to the armed forces of a State bearing the external marks 
distinguishing such ship of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly 
commissioned by the government of the State and whose name appears in the 
appropriate service list or its equivalent, and manned by a crew which is under regular 
armed forces discipline.
9
  
                                                 
5
 James E Berger and Charlene Sun, 'Sovereign Immunity: A Venerable Concept in Transition?' (2011) 
27(2) International Litigation Quarterly 11,1.  
6
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7
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982 (entered into 
force 16 November 1994) (hereafter LOSC). 
8
 Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed 7 December 1944 (entered into force 4 April 1947) 
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Article 32 states that ―…nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of 
warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes.‖
10
 LOSC 
articles 95 states that ―Warships on the high seas have complete immunity from the 
jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State.‖
11
 Meanwhile, Article 96 makes it 
clear that: 
Ships owned or operated by a State and used only on government non-commercial 
service shall, on the high seas, have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any 
State other than the flag State.
12
 
 Regarding environmental protection, LOSC article 236 states that: 
 The provisions of this Convention regarding the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment do not apply to any warship, naval auxiliary, other vessels or 
aircraft owned or operated by a State and used, for the time being, only on government 
non-commercial service.
13 
Article 3 of the 1944 Chicago Convention classifies aircraft used in military, 
customs and police services as state aircraft and therefore not subject to the provisions 
of the Convention.
14
 
For the purpose of this research, sovereign immune vessels and aircraft are all 
vessels and aircraft owned or operated by a State and used, for the time being, only on 
government non-commercial service. 
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4.3 International law principles applicable to the passage of sovereign immune 
vessels and aircraft at sea 
4.3.1 The Law of the Sea Convention  
Throughout the development of the international law of the sea, navigational 
issues have featured prominently in discussions. Apart from the new regime of deep 
seabed mining and the protection and preservation of the marine environment, most of 
the provisions of the LOSC directly or indirectly address the issue of freedom of 
navigation and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to navigation.
15
. 
Although the LOSC is widely regarded as the ―Constitution for the Oceans‖, the 
passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft is not clearly addressed in the 
document. Indeed, there have been divergent interpretations among State Parties to the 
LOSC regarding the passage of these types of vessels and aircraft through different 
areas of ocean space. The following section will analyse the provisions of the LOSC 
applicable to the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in various maritime 
jurisdictional zones. 
4.3.1.1 Internal Waters 
Internal waters are those waters which lie landward of the baseline from which 
the territorial sea and other maritime zones are measured.
16
 There are two systems of 
baseline - the normal baseline, which is the low-water line along the coast of the coastal 
State, and the straight baseline, which is determined in accordance with articles 7, 9 and 
10 of the LOSC.
17
 Coastal States enjoy sovereignty over their internal waters as well as 
the airspace above and the seabed and subsoil below.
18
 It has long been internationally 
                                                 
15
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accepted that coastal States are, in principle, free to regulate activities in their internal 
waters as they are with regard to activities on their land territory.
19
 Internal waters, 
therefore, have not been the subject of detailed regulation under international law.
20
 
During the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), 
Indonesia and the Philippines claimed that all waters which fell within the limits of 
archipelagic baselines were internal waters.
21
 Pursuant to these claims, which had no 
precedent in international law, vast areas of waters would have become internal waters. 
Indeed, this issue became the subject of a compromise arrangement during UNCLOS 
III, with the recognition of a regime of archipelagic waters within the archipelagic 
baselines of archipelagic States. Within their archipelagic waters, archipelagic States 
(including Indonesia and the Philippines) may draw closing lines across river mouths, 
bays and harbours on individual islands for the delimitation of internal waters in 
accordance with the normal rules on baselines, particularly articles 9, 10 and 11 of the 
LOSC.
22
  
Geographically, there are two types of internal waters: internal waters bound by 
the territorial sea of a coastal State, and internal waters bound by the archipelagic waters 
of an archipelagic State. Generally, a state may exercise complete and absolute 
sovereignty over its internal waters. However, there is one exception to this principle 
under LOSC article 8. According to this article, where the establishment of a straight 
baseline has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas not previously considered as 
such, the right of innocent passage still exists in those waters.
23
 So, for the purposes of 
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navigational regimes, there are two categories of internal waters. The first category is 
internal waters in which the coastal State enjoys absolute sovereignty, and the second 
category is internal waters in which foreign ships have the right of innocent passage to 
the same extent as in the territorial sea. 
By entering the internal waters of a coastal State, ships put themselves under the 
territorial jurisdiction of that State.
24
 Therefore, foreign ships within the internal waters 
of a coastal State are subject to the criminal and civil laws and regulations of that State. 
However, warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes 
(hereafter sovereign immune vessels), enjoy sovereign immunity, and thus the laws of 
the coastal State may not be directly enforced against these vessels when they are in the 
internal waters of a particular coastal State.
25
 It is important to note, however, that as 
sovereign immune vessels require permission from coastal States to enter their internal 
waters, such vessels normally comply with the conditions imposed by the coastal State 
granting admittance.
26
 If, however, sovereign immune vessels violate the law and 
regulations of the coastal State resulting in loss or damage to the coastal state, the flag 
States of those vessels will bear international responsibility.
27
 
4.3.1.2 Territorial Sea 
Under the LOSC, every coastal State has the right to establish its territorial sea 
up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles measured from its baselines.
28
 Coastal 
States exercise sovereignty over their territorial sea subject to the exercise of innocent 
passage by foreign vessels. Article 17 of the LOSC states that: ―…ships of all States, 
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whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the 
territorial sea.‖
29
 Two key terms – ―passage‖ and ―innocent‖ – are fundamental to the 
definition of innocent passage. Article 18 of the LOSC defines the regime of passage as: 
1. ...navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose of: 
a. Traversing that sea without entering internal waters or calling at a roadstead 
or port facility outside internal waters; or 
b. Proceeding to or from internal waters or a call at such roadstead or port 
facility. 
2. Passage shall be continuous and expeditious. However, passage includes 
stopping and anchoring, but only in so far as the same are incidental to ordinary 
navigation or are rendered necessary by force majeure or distress or for the purpose of 
rendering assistance to persons, ships or aircraft in danger or distress.
30
 
Article 19(1) defines passage to be innocent ―... so long as it is not prejudicial to 
the peace, good order or security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in 
conformity with this Convention and with other rules of international law.‖
31
 Article 
19(2) lists activities which, if engaged in by a vessel in the territorial sea, would be 
considered non-innocent. These include: 
(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of the coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of the 
principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations; 
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind; 
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or 
security of the coastal State; 
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(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of the coastal 
State; 
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft; 
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device; 
(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to the 
customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State; 
(h) any act of wilful and serious pollution contrary to this Convention; 
(i) any fishing activities; 
(j) the carrying out of research or survey activities; 
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any other 
facilities or installations of the coastal State; 
(l) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage.
32
 
 Article 21 gives coastal States the right to enact laws and regulations relating to 
innocent passage, provided such laws and regulations shall not apply to the design, 
construction, manning or equipment of foreign ships ―unless they are giving effect to 
generally accepted international rules or standards.‖
33
 Articles 24(1a) and 211(4) of the 
LOSC prevent coastal States from adopting regulations that have the effect of denying 
or impairing the innocent passage of foreign ships through the territorial sea.
34
 For the 
safety of navigation, coastal States may designate sea lanes and traffic separation 
schemes for foreign ships engaging in innocent passage through their territorial sea.
35
 
For reasons essential for the protection of their security, coastal States may suspend 
temporarily the innocent passage of foreign vessels in specified areas of their territorial 
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sea after duly publishing the suspension.
36
 Article 25 of the LOSC states that: ―The 
coastal State may take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which 
is not innocent.‖
37
 However, if a foreign vessel does not comply with the coastal State‘s 
laws and regulations during passage, it is unclear whether or not such passage 
immediately becomes non-innocent, thus allowing the coastal State to invoke the 
protective rights under article 25.
38
 It is also unclear how the coastal State may deal with 
vessels exercising non-innocent passage in its territorial sea. In practice, issuing a verbal 
warning, preventing vessels from proceeding, firing warning shots, boarding vessels or 
―bumping off‖ are commonly used methods.
39
 
The LOSC contains no specific provision regarding the innocent passage of 
warships. With regard to modes of navigation, article 20 stipulates that ―submarine and 
other underwater vehicles are required to navigate on the surface and show their 
flags.‖
40
 Article 30 states that if a foreign warship passing through the territorial sea 
does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State, then the coastal State 
may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately.
41
 There are no provisions in the 
LOSC requiring foreign warships exercising the right of innocent passage in the 
territorial sea to give prior notification to, or seek prior authorisation from, the coastal 
state. Indeed, UNCLOS III attempted to settle these issues, with a particular focus on 
whether warships enjoy the doctrine of innocent passage or require prior notification or 
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38
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authorisation from the coastal State.
42
 However, due to the disagreement between 
coastal States and maritime powers at UNCLOS III, the final text of the LOSC does not 
address this issue.
43
 
Three different interpretations have emerged regarding the innocent passage of 
warships. The first interpretation is that ―warships enjoy a right of innocent passage 
which may be exercised in the same manner as merchant ships.‖
44
 This interpretation is 
based on the text of LOSC article 17 which states that ―Ships of all States, whether 
coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.‖
45
 
Article 17, which appears under the heading ―Rules applicable to all ships‖, could be 
read as implying that warships are entitled to exercise the right of innocent passage. 
This interpretation is also supported by the decision of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) in the Corfu Channel Case, which involved the passage of four British warships 
through the Corfu Channel in 1946.
46
 In this case, the ICJ ruled that: 
It is...generally recognized and in accordance with international custom that States in 
time of peace have a right to send their warships through straits used for international 
navigation between two parts of the high seas without the previous authorization of a 
coastal State, provided that the passage is innocent. Unless otherwise prescribed in an 
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international convention, there is no right for a coastal State to prohibit such passage 
through straits in time of peace.
47
 
Even though the Corfu Channel is a strait which overlaps with Albania‘s 
territorial sea (rather than merely constituting territorial waters), and the case itself 
precedes the LOSC, the ICJ decision provides support for the right of innocent passage 
of warships.
48
 In 1989 the United States and the former Soviet Union – the two major 
maritime powers at the time – reached an agreement titled Uniform Interpretation of 
Norms of International Law Governing Innocent Passage. The Joint-Statement provides 
that: 
All ships, including warships, regardless of cargo, armament or means of propulsion, 
enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea in accordance with 
international law, for which neither prior notification nor authorization is required.
49
 
This view is supported by other maritime powers including Germany, Italy and 
the Netherlands.
50
 The U.S. Navy has also been exercising the right of innocent passage 
of warships as part of its freedom of navigation program since 1979.
51
 
The second interpretation is that in the light of the provisions of LOSC articles 
19 and 25 (which concern the ―Meaning of Innocent Passage‖ and the ―Rights of 
Protection of the Coastal State‖ respectively), coastal States have the right to take 
measures to safeguard their security interests, including requiring foreign warships to 
obtain prior authorisation when seeking to exercise the right of innocent passage 
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through their territorial sea.
52
 Some authors support this view by differentiating the 
terms used in the relevant articles of the LOSC. They suggest that in article 38 (Right of 
Transit Passage) and article 53 (Right of Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage), the term 
used is ―all ships‖, while in article 17 (Right of Innocent Passage), the term used is 
―ships‖.
53
 This has led Jin to assert that: ―If the former term is intended to cover ships of 
all types, the latter can only mean vessels other than warships.‖
54
 According to some 
scholars, there are at least 40 States which have made the passage of foreign warships in 
their territorial seas contingent on certain requirements being met - such as the need for 
prior authorisation or notification in accordance with their national laws and 
regulations.
55
 
The third interpretation is that since the LOSC has no provisions specifically 
regarding the innocent passage of warships, the question should be governed by 
customary law as affirmed in the Preamble to the LOSC. Indeed, the Preamble 
explicitly states that ―...matters not regulated by this Convention continue to be 
governed by the rules and principles of general international law.‖
56
 However, the 
doctrine of innocent passage for warships has long been one of the most contentious and 
controversial issues in international law. Not a single written agreement exists on the 
issue, and there has been a lack of uniformity in State practice over the past 100 years.
57
 
Of the 23 States involved in addressing this issue at the 1930 Hague Codification 
Conference, four favoured the requirement of prior notification or authorisation, 15 
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were prepared to allow the innocent passage of warships without special formalities, 
and one State considered the issue to be controversial in light of existing international 
law.
58
 Due to the different views expressed on this topic, the conference failed to 
produce a convention on the territorial sea (among other issues). When the International 
Law Commission of the United Nation (ILC) was asked to prepare a draft for the Law 
of the Sea Convention by UN member States, Article 26 of its 1954 draft provided that: 
―Save exceptional circumstances, warships shall have the right of innocent passage 
through the territorial sea without previous authorization or notification.‖
59
 However, 
two years later, in its commentary on the articles concerning the Law of the Sea, the 
ILC stated that: 
The coastal State may make the passage of warships through the territorial sea subject 
to previous authorization or notification. Normally it shall grant innocent passage 
subject to the observance of the provisions of articles 17 and 18.
60
 
This provision was not adopted at the first United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I). Indeed, as States have adopted different positions on the 
question of innocent passage of warships, their practices have been far from uniform.
61
 
Moreover, the divergence of opinion between maritime powers and developing States 
on this topic continued to UNCLOS III. Ultimately, however, the failure of states to 
reach consensus on this issue led to the LOSC being silent on the innocent passage of 
warships.  
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More concerning, however, is that the divergence of state practice in the area, 
coupled with a lack of judicial decisions, makes the formation of a universal customary 
law rule on the innocent passage of warships extremely unlikely.  
In summary, there exists three different interpretations of the regime of innocent 
passage for warships. However, the second interpretation is rather weak because, in 
general, the use of the term ―ships‖ instead of ―all ships‖ does not have the effect of 
excluding warships. In addition, as the right of innocent passage was established with 
the intention of balancing the interests of coastal States and maritime States, if the 
coastal States restrict the innocent passage of warships through their territorial seas, the 
notion of balancing competing interests becomes somewhat obsolete. The third 
interpretation is quite neutral, and thus does little to resolve the issue. Moreover, this 
interpretation could result in States implementing the right of innocent passage 
differently – a consequence which militates against the very intention of the LOSC. The 
first interpretation is widely supported by a majority of States and by the text of the 
Convention itself. It is also worth noting that, at the final session of the meeting of 
UNCLOS III in December 1982, Professor Tommy Koh, the president of UNCLOS III, 
made the following pronouncement: 
I think the convention is quite clear on this point. Warships do, like other  ships, have a 
right of innocent passage through the territorial sea, and there is no need for warships to 
acquire the prior consent or even notification of the coastal State.
62
 
Even so, this statement is hardly authoritative, being only the personal view of 
the president of UNCLOS III at a discrete point in time. 
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In summary, the territorial sea is subject to the sovereignty of coastal States. 
Ships of other States have the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea. 
However, the passage of warships through the territorial sea of a coastal State has long 
been a controversial issue - both in legal doctrine and as a matter of state practice. The 
LOSC does not contain any provision expressly prohibiting or allowing warships the 
right of innocent passage. In addition, State practice has failed to elucidate the issue, 
with no uniform approach existing among States. This divergence of state practice, 
combined with a lack of judicial decisions on the matter, makes the formation of 
universal customary law rule on the innocent passage of warships very unlikely. What is 
clear is that the right of innocent passage does not apply to foreign aircraft. Indeed, this 
principle has international appeal, and is expressly recognised in the Chicago 
Convention. 
4.3.1.3 Straits used for International Navigation 
The term ―strait‖ has never been defined in any international convention, including 
the LOSC. The International Hydrographic Organization defines a ―strait‖ as ―a passage 
connecting two larger bodies of water.‖
63
 The LOSC devotes considerable attention to 
the legal regime of waters constituting a strait rather than the definition of a strait as 
such.
64
 Under the LOSC, there are different legal regimes applying to each category of 
strait. These include: (i) straits through which there is a high seas route or a route 
through an EEZ of similar convenience with respect to navigational and hydrographical 
characteristics;
65
 (ii) straits formed by an island of a State bordering the strait and its 
mainland where there exists seaward of the island a route of similar convenience with 
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respect to its navigational and hydrographical characteristics;
66
 (iii) straits connecting a 
part of the high seas or an EEZ with the territorial sea of a foreign State;
67
 (iv) straits 
governed by long-standing special conventions;
68
and (v) straits connecting one part of 
the high seas or an EEZ and another part of the high seas or an EEZ.
69
 
In the case of a strait through which there is a high seas route or a route through an 
EEZ of similar convenience with respect to its navigational and hydrographical 
characteristics, the regime of innocent passage will apply to those parts of the strait 
which lie within the territorial sea limits of States bordering the strait. Conversely, the 
regime of freedom of navigation will apply on the high seas and in the EEZ to those 
waters outside the territorial seas of bordering States.
70
 Theoretically, this type of strait 
should be broader than 24 nautical miles. The Strait of Florida between the United 
States and Cuba is one such example.
71
 
Within straits formed by an island of a State bordering the strait and its mainland, 
and where there exists seaward of the island a route of similar convenience with respect 
to its navigational and hydrographical characteristics, ships of all States enjoy the right 
of innocent passage without suspension and there is no right of innocent passage for 
aircraft.
72
 The Strait of Messina (Italy), the Pemba Channel (Tanzania), and Hainan 
Strait (China) are examples of these types of straits.
73
 
In the case of those straits which connect a part of the high seas or an EEZ with the 
territorial sea of a foreign State, the regime of non-suspendable innocent passage will 
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apply.
74
 The Strait of Tiran which connects the Red Sea with the territorial sea of Jordan 
and Israel is one such example.
75
 
For those straits which are regulated in whole or in part by long–standing special 
conventions referred to in LOSC article 35, the provisions of those conventions will 
apply. For instance, passage through the Turkish Straits (which comprise the 
Dardanelles connecting the Aegean Sea with the Sea of Marmara), as well as the 
Bosphorus (which connects the Sea of Marmara with the Black Sea), would be 
regulated by the Montreux Convention of 1936.
76
  
The last category comprises those Straits connecting one part of the high seas or an 
EEZ and another part of the high seas or an EEZ. Passage through this category of strait 
is regulated by the LOSC, under the regime of ―Transit Passage.‖
77
 The LOSC states 
that the transit passage regime applies to Straits which are used for international 
navigation between one part of the high seas or an EEZ and another part of the high seas 
or an EEZ.
78
  
Article 38 of the LOSC states that ―all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit 
passage…‖
79
 The LOSC also defines transit passage as: 
...the exercise in accordance with this Part of the freedom of navigation and overflight 
solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the strait between one part 
of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an 
exclusive economic zone…
80
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During transit passage, ships and aircraft shall ―refrain from any threat or use of 
force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of States 
bordering the strait‖, ―refrain from any activities other than those incident to their 
normal modes of continuous and expeditious transit‖, as well as comply with 
international safety regulations, procedures and practices such as the International 
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS), the International Convention 
for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the Rules of the International Civil Aviation 
Organization.
81
 The words ―normal modes‖ are significant for the transit of military 
vessels and aircraft. In the view of the United States, this term means that ―submarines 
may pass through straits submerged, naval task forces may conduct formation steaming, 
aircraft carriers may engage in flight operations and military aircraft may transit 
unannounced and unchallenged.‖
82
 This view, which is held by not only the United 
States but also other naval powers, has not been controversial in the Asia - Pacific 
region, and is consistent with the travaux prèparatoires of UNCLOS III.
83
 
States bordering the strait may ―designate sea lanes and prescribe traffic separation 
schemes‖, as well as adopt laws and regulations relating to the safety of navigation, the 
prevention, reduction and control of pollution, the prevention of fishing, and other 
measures related to customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary matters.
84
 However, such 
laws and regulations shall not have the practical effect of denying, hampering or 
impairing the right of transit passage.
85
 While a coastal State may temporarily suspend 
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innocent passage, transit passage cannot be suspended by the strait State.
86
 Marine 
scientific research and hydrographic survey activities during the transit passage of 
foreign ships are subject to the prior authorisation of those States bordering the strait.
87
 
 According to LOSC article 38, warships and other sovereign immune vessels and 
aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage.
88
 However, if a sovereign immune vessel or 
aircraft violates laws and regulations of States bordering the strait, then the flag State of 
the vessel or the State of registry of the aircraft shall bear international responsibility for 
any loss or damage to States bordering the strait.
89
  
4.3.1.4 Archipelagic Waters  
The concept of archipelagic waters is relatively new in international law. The 
LOSC defines an archipelagic State as ―a State constituted wholly by one or more 
archipelagos and may include other islands.‖
90
 An archipelago is defined as: 
A group of islands, including parts of islands, interconnecting waters and other natural 
features which are so closely interrelated that such islands, waters and other natural 
features form an intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity, or which historically 
have been regarded as such.
91
 
An archipelagic State may, in accordance with the provisions of the LOSC, draw 
straight archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and 
drying reefs of the archipelago to proclaim the enclosed waters landward of these 
baselines as archipelagic waters.
92
 The sovereignty of an archipelagic State over its 
archipelagic waters extends to the air space above as well as the seabed and subsoil and 
                                                 
86
 LOSC, art 44. 
87
 LOSC, art 40. 
88
 LOSC, art 38. 
89
 LOSC, art 42. 
90
 LOSC, art 46. 
91
 LOSC, art 46. 
92
 LOSC, arts 47&48. 
 
127 
 
the resources contained therein.
93
 It should be noted that only archipelagic States can 
draw straight archipelagic baselines. Thus, archipelagic baselines cannot be drawn 
around a group of islands belonging to a non-archipelagic coastal State. 
Throughout archipelagic waters, ships of all States enjoy the right of innocent 
passage similar to the right of innocent passage in the territorial sea.
94
 However, the 
LOSC also provides a more liberal passage right within designated archipelagic sea 
lanes in archipelagic waters. Article 53 of the LOSC defines archipelagic sea lanes 
passage as: 
...the exercise in accordance with this Convention of the right of navigation and overflight 
in the normal mode solely for the purpose of continuous, expeditious and unobstructed 
transit between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of 
the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.
95
 
The phrase ―normal mode‖ can be interpreted as including all activities which are 
incidental to the ordinary navigation of vessels and aircraft exercising the passage. For 
instance, submarines are permitted to navigate underwater as their normal mode of 
navigation, while aircraft carriers may be used to launch and recover aircraft.
96
 Unlike 
the regime of innocent passage, archipelagic sea lanes passage shall be continuous and 
expeditious, excluding calling at a port of an archipelagic State.
97
 This means that if a 
vessel seeks to call at a port within the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State, then 
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the innocent passage regime will apply to the passage of that vessel on its way to the 
port.
98
 
An archipelagic State may designate sea lanes within and air routes above these 
archipelagic sea lanes. However, ―such sea lanes and air routes shall include all normal 
passage routes used as routes for international navigation or overflight through or over 
archipelagic waters.‖
99
 Where an archipelagic State does not designate sea lanes or air 
routes, ships and aircraft may exercise the right of archipelagic passage through the 
routes normally used for international navigation.
100
 Aircraft only enjoy the right of 
archipelagic sea lane passage through the air routes above the sea lanes.
101
 Within 
archipelagic waters but outside the sea lanes, the innocent passage regime applies; 
hence, there is no passage right for aircraft over other parts of archipelagic waters 
without the consent of the archipelagic state. The new regime of archipelagic sea lanes 
passage is significant mainly for military aircraft, as civil aircraft normally use routes 
designated by the International Civil Aviation Organization rather than routes over 
archipelagic sea lanes. 
Under LOSC article 53(5) the width of a designated sea lane may not be more than 
50 nautical miles, and ships and aircraft are not permitted to navigate closer to the coast 
than ten per cent of the distance between the nearest points on islands bordering the sea 
lanes.
102
 In addition to the designation of archipelagic sea lanes, the archipelagic State 
may also prescribe traffic separation schemes for the safe passage of ships through 
narrow channels in the sea lanes.
103
 An archipelagic State may adopt laws and 
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regulations relating to the safety of navigation, the prevention, reduction and control of 
pollution, the prevention of fishing, as well as other measures related to customs, fiscal, 
immigration or sanitary matters. However, such laws and regulations shall not have the 
practical effect of denying, hampering or impairing the right of archipelagic sea lanes 
passage.
104
 Although these sea lanes can be substituted in consultation with the relevant 
competent international organisation, the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage cannot 
be suspended.
105
 
All ships and aircraft, including sovereign immune vessels and aircraft, enjoy the 
right of archipelagic sea lanes passage.
106
 Article 54 of the LOSC makes it clear that 
ships and aircraft exercising the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage are required to: 
(i) refrain from any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or 
political independence of the archipelagic State; and (ii) comply with generally accepted 
international regulations regarding safety at sea, marine environmental protection 
provisions and the Rules of Air established by the International Civil Aviation 
Organization. Maritime scientific research and hydrographic survey activities in the 
archipelagic sea lanes may only be conducted with the consent of the archipelagic 
State.
107
 The regimes of archipelagic sea lanes passage and transit passage demonstrate 
similarities, as both represent continuous and expeditious forms of transit. However, 
differences do exist between the two regimes. Firstly, in exercising the right of 
archipelagic sea lanes passage, ships must stay within the designated sea lanes and not 
deviate more than 25 nautical miles on either side of the axis line and observe the ten 
per cent rule. By contrast, ships in transit passage are not required to stay within specific 
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boundaries.
108
 Secondly, a ship in transit passage may visit ports along the strait and 
still remain in transit passage. However, if a ship is seeking to call at a port of an 
archipelagic State, then the innocent passage regime rather than the archipelagic sea 
lanes passage regime will apply to the passage of that vessel on its way to port.  In 
addition, the text of the LOSC uses the term ―freedom of navigation‖ for the transit 
passage regime, while the phrase ―right of navigation‖ is used in relation to the 
archipelagic sea lanes passage regime. Hasjim Djalal, an Indonesian author, views the 
different wording as a matter of principle. Indeed, Djalal has asserted that: ―We have no 
difficulty in giving the right of navigation to people for traversing Indonesia sea lanes, 
but we would not be able to recognize that right as freedom of navigation.‖
109
 Thus, the 
regime of archipelagic sea lane passage is deemed to be more restrictive than the regime 
of transit passage.
110
 
In summary, archipelagic sea lanes passage is a relatively new navigational legal 
regime introduced in the LOSC. It represents a compromise between the regime of 
innocent passage advocated by the archipelagic States and the regime of freedom of 
navigation advocated by maritime user States.
111
 
4.3.1.5 Exclusive Economic Zone  
Like the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage, the exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ) is one of the newer concepts to be introduced into the LOSC. Until the LOSC 
was adopted in 1982, all waters beyond the territorial seas of the coastal States were 
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treated as high seas - an area where all States enjoyed the freedoms of navigation and 
overflight. However, before the LOSC, States could not reach an agreement on the 
breadth of the territorial sea. Some States claimed a breadth of 3 nautical miles (nm), 
others claimed 12 nm, and some Latin American and African States claimed territorial 
seas up to 200 nm.
112
 The concept of the EEZ was first proposed by Kenya to the Asian-
African Legal Consultative Committee in 1971, and to the United Nations Seabed 
Committee in 1972.
113
 This new concept of the EEZ was largely supported by most 
developing States and reflected the desire of such States to gain greater control over 
economic resources off their coasts.
114
 The concept of the EEZ also attracted the support 
of major maritime States, as it was a jurisdictional zone in which the high seas freedoms 
of navigation and overflight would be reserved (rather than being a sovereignty 
zone).
115
 During negotiations at UNCLOS III, there was considerable debate between 
developing States and maritime States over the legal regime of the EEZ. Developing 
States considered the EEZ to be a simple extension of national jurisdiction within which 
coastal States would enjoy sovereignty subject to certain limitations. Meanwhile, other 
maritime States viewed the EEZ as part of the high seas – an area where coastal States 
would have some rights over resources.
116
 The concept of the EEZ finally adopted at the 
LOSC represented a compromise between the varying positions.
117
 The EEZ zone is 
widely regarded as an innovation in the Law of the Sea. It is a separate functional zone 
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of a sui generis character, with neither residual territorial sea characteristics nor residual 
high seas characteristics.
118
 
Article 55 of the LOSC states that: 
The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, 
subject to a specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights and 
jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States are governed 
by the relevant provisions of this Convention.
119
 
The LOSC gives coastal States sovereign rights over living and non-living 
resources of the waters superjacent to the sea-bed and of the sea-bed and its subsoil, as 
well as over activities related to economic exploration and exploitation of the zone, such 
as the production of energy from the water, current and wind.
120
 The term ―sovereign 
rights‖ was used instead of ―sovereignty‖ in article 56 as the latter term could imply that 
the coastal State‘s rights over the EEZ are exclusive, not preferential.
121
 Article 56 also 
makes it clear that coastal States have jurisdiction, as provided for in the relevant 
provisions of the Convention, with regard to the establishment and use of artificial 
islands, installations and structures, marine scientific research, as well as the protection 
and preservation of the marine environment.
122
 This means that in the EEZ, the coastal 
State‘s jurisdiction is limited to that ―provided for in the relevant provisions‖ of the 
LOSC. In other respects, the regime of the high seas will apply. Moreover, in exercising 
its rights and performing its duties in the EEZ, the coastal State ―shall have due regard 
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to the rights and duties of other States and shall act in a manner compatible with the 
provisions of [the] Convention.‖
123
 
Article 58 of the LOSC gives all ships and aircraft the freedoms of navigation 
and overflight, as well as the freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines referred to 
in Article 87 and ―other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, 
such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft [etc].‖
124
 However, in the 
exercise of their rights, user States ―shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the 
coastal State and shall comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal 
State in accordance with the provisions of [the] Convention and other rules of 
international law.‖
125
 
The requirement that coastal and maritime States respect each other‘s rights and 
duties is encompassed in the term ―due regard‖ in Articles 56 and 58 of the LOSC. 
However, no definition exists for the term ―due regard‖. The text of the LOSC makes it 
clear that coastal States and maritime States shall have due regard to the rights and 
duties of each other, but there is no obligation on such States to have due regard to each 
other‘s interests.
126
 Therefore, other States are not expressly required to give due regard 
to, for example, the security interests of coastal States in the EEZ.
127
 
Article 59 provides a basis resolving conflicts regarding unattributed rights and 
jurisdiction in the EEZ. The article provides that: 
In cases where this Convention does not attribute rights or jurisdiction to the coastal 
State or to other States within the exclusive economic zone, and a conflict arises 
between the interests of the coastal State and any other State or States, the conflict 
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should be resolved on the basis of equity and in the light of all the relevant 
circumstances, taking into account the respective importance of the interests involved to 
the parties as well as the international community as a whole.
128
 
This means that, in cases where the LOSC does not explicitly grant rights to 
coastal States or other States, there should be no presumption in favour of one over the 
other.
129
 Article 59 also makes it clear that in determining each case of conflict, the 
―relevant circumstances‖ have to be taken into account. 
In its attempt to balance the divergent interests of littoral States and extra-
regional players in the EEZ, the LOSC is not free from ambiguity, especially with 
regard to military activities in the EEZ. The LOSC does not expressly state which types 
of military activities are permissible or prohibited in the EEZ of a foreign State. Coastal 
States have not been granted any specific authority to regulate foreign military activities 
in their EEZ, while no particular right has been granted to maritime user States 
regarding military activities. Some States took the step of making declarations upon 
their signature, ratification or accession to the LOSC requiring their consent regarding 
foreign military activities in their EEZ. These States include Brazil, Bangladesh, 
Malaysia, India, Pakistan and Cape Verde.
130
 Other maritime States made declarations 
opposing these interpretations, among them the Netherlands, Germany and Italy.
131
 The 
LOSC allows States to make declarations or statements when signing, ratifying or 
acceding to the Convention; nevertheless, it does not permit reservations.
132
 Currently, 
this issue remains ambiguous and controversial with regard to state practice. Between 
2002 and 2005, a group of second track participants from the Asia - Pacific region 
                                                 
128
 LOSC, art 59. 
129
 Beckman and Davenport, above n 121, 12. 
130
 See Declarations by Brazil (1988), Bangladesh (2001), Malaysia (1996), India (1995), Pakistan (1997) 
at above n 50. 
131
 Ibid; Sea Declarations by the Netherlands (1996), Germany (1994) and Italy (1995).  
132
 LOSC, arts 309 & 310. 
 
135 
 
participated in a series of meetings sponsored by the Ocean Policy Research Foundation 
(OPRF). These meetings focussed on the development of guidelines for navigation and 
overflight in the EEZ. EEZ Group 21 agreed that the LOSC is unclear and ambiguous 
regarding the regime of military activities in the EEZ.
133
 In 2005, EEZ Group 21 
proposed Guidelines for Navigation and Overflight in the Exclusive Economic Zone, 
which sought to ―assist in balancing and clarifying the rights and duties of both coastal 
States and maritime user States, as well as certain terminology with regard to the 
activities that might be undertaken in an EEZ by foreign ships and aircraft.‖
134
 
However, The Guidelines were not widely supported as they restrict unduly the 
freedoms of navigation and overflight available in an EEZ.
135
 In 2013, OPRF reviewed 
and revised the Guidelines, and in doing so renamed them ―Principles for Building 
Confidence and Security in the Exclusive Economic Zones of the Asia-Pacific.‖
136
 Even 
so, the Principles have not garnered sufficient attention from regional States. 
The controversy over military activities in the EEZ arises from different 
interpretations of LOSC provisions, particularly articles 58, 88, 300 and 301. It is 
unclear whether or not military activities are included in the freedoms of navigation and 
overflight and ―other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, 
such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft [etc]‖ set out in article 58. 
For instance, the United States view is that in a foreign EEZ, warships and military 
aircraft enjoy the high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight and other 
internationally lawful uses of the sea related to those freedoms. Therefore, ―the 
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existence of an exclusive economic zone in an area of naval operations need not, of 
itself, be of operational concern to the naval commander.‖
137
 By contrast, Brazil issued 
a declaration upon its signature to the LOSC on December 1982 which states that: ―The 
Brazilian government understands that the provisions of the Convention do not 
authorize other States to carry out in the exclusive economic zone military exercises or 
manoeuvres, in particular those that imply the use of weapons or explosives, without the 
consent of the coastal State‖.
138
 Article 88 of the LOSC states that ―the high seas shall 
be reserved for peaceful purposes,‖ and this statement also applies to the EEZ under 
article 58.
139
 Some States argue that under the ―peaceful purposes‖ provisions of the 
LOSC, at least some types of military activities in the EEZ may not be permitted.
140
 
Indeed, article 300 of the LOSC requires that:  
States Parties shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under this Convention 
and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in this Convention in 
a manner which would not constitute an abuse of right.
141
 
There are different views on whether certain types of military activities in the 
EEZ are a lawful exercise of the freedoms of navigation and overflight or an abuse of 
the rights of navigation and overflight.
142
 Article 301 of the LOSC reinforces the 
―peaceful purposes‖ of article 88 by requiring States to ―refrain from any threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State‖.
143
 
However, the term ―peaceful purposes‖ used in the LOSC does not preclude all military 
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activities.
144
 It is also worth noting that the sovereign rights of coastal States in their 
EEZ, as specified in article 56 of the LOSC, are limited to the ―waters superjacent to the 
seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil‖, thereby excluding the airspace above the 
EEZ.
145
 Indeed, nothing in LOSC ―provides [a] legal basis for regulating military 
activities in the airspace above the EEZ.‖
146
 As airspace over the EEZ is not part of the 
EEZ, it has been proposed by some commentators that ―all aircraft have freedom of 
overflight and, therefore, the right to conduct military operations.‖
147
 
Under the LOSC, coastal States have jurisdiction over marine scientific research 
in their EEZ.
148
 However, the LOSC has neither definitions nor provisions regarding 
hydrographic surveys, military surveys or surveillance activities in the EEZ. The United 
States defines ―hydrographic survey‖ as: 
...the obtaining of information in coastal or relatively shallow areas for the purpose of 
making navigational charts and similar products to support safety of navigation. A 
hydrographic survey may include measurements of the depth of water, configuration 
and nature of the natural bottom, direction and force of currents, heights and times of 
tides and water stages, and hazards to navigation.
149
 
A ―military survey‖ has been defined by the United States as: 
...the collecting of marine data for military purposes and, whether classified or not... 
generally not made publicly available. A military survey may include collection of 
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oceanographic, hydrographic, marine geological, geophysical, chemical, biological, 
acoustic, and related data.
150
 
According to the United States, ―the primary difference between marine 
scientific research and hydrographic surveys and military surveys is how the data is 
used once it is collected.‖
151
 Thus, the United States affirms that marine scientific 
research in the EEZ is subject to the coastal State‘s consent; however, ―the coastal 
nation cannot regulate hydrographic surveys or military surveys conducted beyond its 
territorial sea, nor can it require notification of such activities.‖
152
 By contrast, China 
enacted its Surveying and Mapping Law in 2002, defining surveying and mapping as 
―the surveying, collection and presentation of shape, size, spatial location and properties 
of the natural geographic factors or the man-made facilities on the surface, as well as the 
activities for processing and providing the obtained data, information and 
achievements.‖
153
 Moreover, Article 7 of this statute stipulates that surveying and 
mapping activities taking place ―in the domain of the People's Republic of China and 
other sea areas under the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China‖ must be subject 
to the approval of the People's Republic of China.
154
 With this very broad definition, the 
statute purports to regulate hydrographic surveys, military surveys, as well as 
surveillance activities in the EEZ.
155
 According to Zou Keyuan, ―it is hard to understand 
the logic of the argument that while marine scientific research in the EEZ is subject to 
consent of the coastal State, military activities can be conducted freely without any 
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check by the coastal State.‖
156
 However, according to a fundamental legal principle, 
Zou Keyuan agrees that ―nothing is illegal if there is no law to make it so.‖
157
  
During the Cold War, military activities (such as intelligence gathering and 
surveillance assessments), were freely conducted outside the national waters and 
airspaces of coastal States by vessels and aircraft of both Western alliance countries and 
Soviet bloc States without any legal protests.
158
 China has consistently protested U.S. 
military activities in China‘s EEZ; however, China itself has conducted military 
intelligence collection in the EEZs of other States.
159
 Therefore, it is hard to prohibit 
these activities based on international law or the practice of States. 
The LOSC is totally silent on the issue of weapons testing and military exercises 
in the EEZ. The question is whether weapons testing and military exercises can be 
categorised as ―internationally lawful uses of the sea‖ that are ―associated with the 
operation of ships, aircraft [etc]‖ as permitted in article 58(1) of the LOSC, or whether 
these activities violate the ―peaceful purpose‖ provisions of article 88 or constitute an 
abuse of rights under article 300 of the LOSC. Another issue to be determined is 
whether coastal States should be notified of such military activities, thereby ensuring 
that their economic activities in the EEZ will not be disrupted. Some authors argue that 
it is reasonable to notify the coastal State for certain types of military activities, such as 
those involving live firing exercises, but that such notification may not be reasonable 
for other activities, such as military reconnaissance.
160
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Article 56 of the LOSC provides coastal States with jurisdiction in the EEZ with 
regard to the protection and preservation of the marine environment. However, article 
236 makes it clear that provisions concerning this issue ―do not apply to any warship, 
naval auxiliary, other vessels or aircraft owned or operated by a State and used, for the 
time being, only on government non-commercial service.‖
161
 This means that sovereign 
immune vessels and aircraft, whether in the EEZ or elsewhere, are not legally bound by 
LOSC provisions regarding the protection and preservation of the marine environment 
as implemented in internationally accepted rules and regulations, such as those 
contained in the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL).
162
 However, they shall ―act in a manner consistent, so far as is reasonable 
and practicable‖, with the environmental provisions of the LOSC.
163
 
4.3.1.6 High Seas 
The LOSC defines the high seas as ―all parts of the sea that are not included in 
the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or 
in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State.‖
164
 Under the LOSC, the high seas 
are open to all States and no State may validly purport to subject any part of the high 
seas to its sovereignty.
165
 All ships and aircraft enjoy the freedoms of navigation and 
overflight on the high seas, provided due regard is shown for the interests of other 
States and for the rights conferred by the LOSC with respect to activities in the Area.
166
 
Article 92 makes it clear that a flag State has exclusive jurisdiction over vessels flying 
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its flag on the high seas.
167
 There are, however, some exceptions to this rule, such as 
piracy, slave trading, drug trafficking, unauthorised broadcasting and Stateless ships. In 
these cases, warships and authorised government vessels have some rights of 
interdiction over foreign flag vessels on the high seas.
168
 Warships and other 
government vessels operated for non-commercial purposes have complete sovereign 
immunity on the high seas.
169
 Article 88 requires that the high seas be reserved for 
peaceful purposes.
170
 Article 301 of the LOSC, entitled ―peaceful uses of the seas‖, 
makes it clear that ―States Parties shall refrain from any threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the 
United Nations.‖
171
 Some authors have suggested that the principle of peaceful use of 
the high seas ―presupposes certain military activity, but any aggressive activities are 
prohibited.‖
172
 Tsarev lists certain military activities that are considered illegal actions 
on the high seas, including: 
…tests of nuclear weaponry; establishing naval and aircraft proving grounds, combat 
training areas within close proximity of the shore of foreign states or navigation routes 
of significant importance to international navigation; missile, torpedo, artillery and 
other shooting, in particular, in areas allocated by international programmes for 
scientific research and requiring the permanent presence of scientific research vessels 
for certain periods of time; and the installation of autonomous buoy stations.
173
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Van Dyke has argued that military activities on the high seas can only be 
deemed legitimate ―if they do not impede navigation, interfere with fishing activities, 
cause any significant harm to the environment or threaten human settlements.‖
174
 
Nevertheless, the official text of the LOSC does not contain any provisions expressly 
prohibiting or permitting certain types of military activities on the high seas. 
4.3.2 Other international laws related to the navigation of sovereign immune vessels 
and aircraft at sea 
4.3.2.1 International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 
 Apart from the LOSC, another international legal instrument applicable to 
sovereign immune vessels in a maritime context is the International Regulations for 
Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs). COLREGs was adopted by the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) on 20 October 1972 and entered into force on 15 July 
1977. All littoral States of the South China Sea as well as the United States are parties 
to this Convention. COLREGs defines a vessel as ―every description of water craft, 
including non-displacement craft and seaplanes, used or capable of being used as a 
means of transportation on water.‖
175
 With the ―[desire] to maintain a high level of 
safety at sea‖, COLREGs‘ rules ―apply to all vessels upon the high seas and in all 
waters connected therewith navigable by seagoing vessels‖.
176
 Accordingly, sovereign 
immune vessels (with the exception of submarines) are subject to COLREGs. Even 
though COLREGs entered into force before the LOSC, the application of COLREGs to 
all navigable waters connected to the high seas clearly includes the territorial sea and 
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the new EEZ regime under the LOSC.
177
 LOSC article 94 stipulates that every State 
shall take necessary measures to ensure ships flying its flag observe the applicable 
international regulations relating to the prevention of collisions at sea.
178
 Rule 2 of the 
COLREGs makes it clear that the ship‘s commander has to strictly comply with 
COLREGs and ―the ordinary practice of seamen‖ to avoid collision.
179
 Meanwhile rule 
8 requires that any action to avoid collision be ―made in ample time and with due regard 
to the observance of good seamanship.‖
180
 The regulations set out in COLREGs are 
widely known as the international maritime ―Rules of the Road.‖ Despite nations having 
conflicting views on maritime boundaries and competing claims for jurisdiction over 
certain maritime zones, their vessels and mariners are all bound by the rules set out in 
COLREGs.
181
 
4.3.2.2 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) was 
adopted on 1 November 1974 and entered into force on 25 May 1980. The SOLAS 
Convention is ―generally regarded as the most important of all international treaties 
concerning the safety of merchant ships.‖
182
 Even though SOLAS does not apply to 
warships, naval auxiliaries or other ships owned or operated by a Contracting 
Government and used only on government non-commercial service, regulation 1 of 
chapter V of SOLAS (regarding the safety of navigation), clearly states that these types 
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of ships are ―encouraged to act in a manner consistent, so far as reasonable and 
practicable, with this chapter.‖
183
 Regulation 14 of chapter V of SOLAS requires 
contracting governments to adopt measures to ensure that ―all ships shall be sufficiently 
and effectively manned‖ - a reference to the Principles of Safe Manning adopted by the 
IMO by resolution A.890(21).
184
 Resolution A.890(21) requires all ships to maintain 
safe navigational watches and comply with COLREGs at all times.
185
 Many navies have 
applied similar SOLAS standards to their naval ships, with one widely accepted 
example being the Naval Ship Code adopted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO). This Code requires that in order to ensure the safety of life at sea, all ships 
shall be sufficiently and efficiently manned, and personnel in charge of a navigational 
watch are to have attained the appropriate standards of The International Convention on 
Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW).
186
 
4.3.2.3 Convention on International Civil Aviation 
The Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention) was signed on 7 
December 1944 and entered into force on 4 April 1947.
187
 Importantly, the Chicago 
Convention applies to civil aircraft only; thus State aircraft, including aircraft used in 
military, customs and police services (sovereign immune aircraft), are not subject to the 
Convention‘s regulations.
188
 However, the Chicago Convention does prohibit state 
aircraft from flying over the territory of another State without prior authorisation.
189
 The 
term ―territory‖ is defined in article 2 of the Chicago Convention as including ―land 
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areas and territorial waters.‖
190
 The LOSC article 2 clarifies the meaning of the term 
―territorial waters‖, and does not provide the right of innocent passage over territorial 
waters for foreign aircraft.
191
 The Chicago Convention does not contain any provisions 
regarding the flight of state aircraft beyond the land areas and territorial waters of 
coastal States. However, new obligations have been added for state aircraft in the 
LOSC. Article 39 of the LOSC stipulates that in exercising transit passage through a 
strait used for international navigation, state aircraft ―will normally comply‖ with the 
safety measures of the Rules of the Air established by the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) as they apply to civil aircraft, as well as ―operating with due 
regard for the safety of navigation‖ at all times.
192
 This requirement applies mutatis 
mutandis to archipelagic sea lanes of archipelagic States.
193
 During UNCLOS III, Spain 
proposed to delete the word ―normally‖ from article 39 of the Convention, with the 
effect that state aircraft would not need to comply with the Rules of the Air at all times. 
However, this proposal was defeated.
194
 Thus, under the LOSC, state aircraft are 
expected to comply with the Rules of the Air established by ICAO when exercising the 
rights of transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage. 
 As the Chicago Convention was adopted before the LOSC, the world‘s airspace 
(as reflected in the Chicago Convention) broadly consisted of national airspace above 
the land areas and territorial waters of a State, as well as international airspace above the 
high seas but beyond national airspace. National airspace is subject to exclusive 
sovereignty of the State, while international airspace is subject to the Rules of Air 
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adopted by ICAO.
195
 After the LOSC was opened for signature, ICAO conducted a 
study on the impact of the LOSC EEZ regime on the application of the Chicago 
Convention. The result of this study, which was published in 1987, was that all States 
enjoy full freedom of navigation and overflight in the EEZ and that the EEZ ―is deemed 
to have the same legal status as the high seas.‖
196
 Therefore, the international airspace 
referred to in ICAO rules includes the airspace above the EEZ. Therefore, ICAO 
considers the EEZ to be the same as the high seas with regard to the freedom of 
overflight. ICAO‘s position on this issue lends support to the view that the freedom of 
overflight of military aircraft on the high seas could be applied to the airspace above the 
EEZ.
197
 
 In summary, the Chicago Convention and the LOSC both require States to 
ensure that their state aircraft operate with ―due regard for the safety of navigation of 
civil aircraft.‖
198
 The Chicago Convention does not address the interaction between state 
aircraft in international airspace. 
4.4 Conclusion 
 There are a number of international legal instruments applicable to the passage 
of sovereign immune vessels and the overflight of aircraft at sea. In addition to the 
LOSC, international instruments such as the Chicago Convention, SOLAS and 
COLREGs contain provisions regarding navigation and/or overflight. The LOSC 
provides detailed navigation regimes in different maritime jurisdictional zones. Indeed, 
                                                 
195
 Chicago Convention, Rules of the Air, Annex 2. 
196
 Consideration of the Report of the Rapporteur on ―United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea—Implications, If Any, for the Application of the Chicago Convention, Its Annexes and Other 
International Air Law Instruments,‖ ICAO Doc. No. LC/26/WP/5-1, 4 February 1987, 260. 
197
 Andrew S Williams, 'Aerial Reconnaissance by Military Aircraft in the Exclusive Economic Zone' in 
Peter Dutton (ed), Military Activities in the EEZ:A U.S.-China Dialogue on Security and International 
Law in the Maritime Commons (U.S. Naval War College, 2010) 53. 
198
 Chicago Convention, art 3. 
 
147 
 
there are four broad passage regimes applicable to sovereign immune vessels and 
aircraft. These include: (i) innocent passage through the territorial sea of coastal States 
(a regime which only applies to ships, not aircraft); (ii) transit passage through straits 
used for international navigation; (iii) archipelagic sea lanes passage through 
archipelagic sea lanes; and (iv) the freedom of navigation and overflight in the EEZ and 
on the high seas. In exercising these rights of passage, ships and aircraft shall comply 
with the provisions of the LOSC with regard to each zone. However, as the aim of the 
LOSC is to create a normative framework rather than deal with all issues of ocean 
governance comprehensively
199
, there are a number of issues on which the LOSC 
remains silent. States have different interpretations and conflicting views over many 
provisions in the LOSC related to the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft, 
particularly the right of innocent passage of warships and military activities in the EEZ. 
Coastal States continually seek to extend their control over their maritime zones, while 
maritime user States continue to assert their navigational rights in different maritime 
zones. It is unlikely that the international community will reach a uniform legal stance 
regarding the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft. That being so, and in 
order to avoid unwanted incidents at sea, it is imperative that States exercise their rights 
and duties in good faith, and while taking into account the interests of specific 
stakeholders and the international community as a whole. 
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5 COASTAL STATE PRACTICE IN IMPLEMENTING THE INNOCENT 
PASSAGE REGIME 
5.1 Introduction 
 Since its inception, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(LOSC) has set out the navigational rights of vessels and aircraft in various maritime 
jurisdictional zones. Indeed, the Convention establishes four different navigation 
regimes, including innocent passage, transit passage, archipelagic sea lanes passage, as 
well as the freedom of navigation. Despite the widespread ratification of, or accession 
to, the LOSC, State practice is still divergent with regard to the passage of sovereign 
immune vessels and aircraft under each passage regime. Within the geographical limits 
of the South China Sea, innocent passage and the freedom of navigation are the two 
relevant passage regimes which will be discussed in this chapter and the next 
respectively.  
The most controversial issue under the innocent passage regime is the right of 
innocent passage for foreign warships. As discussed in the previous chapter, the LOSC 
is silent on the passage of warships through the territorial sea of coastal States. Absent 
any guidance from the LOSC, several States surrounding the South China Sea have 
enacted laws and regulations restricting the innocent passage of warships and 
government vessels in their territorial waters. The inconsistencies which exist between 
the domestic laws of coastal States, international law, and State practice on this issue 
have created confusion and controversies for sovereign immune vessels exercising the 
right of innocent passage in this maritime region. To elucidate these challenges, this 
chapter will examine the practice of South China Sea littoral States in implementing the 
LOSC innocent passage regime, as well as a number of political and strategic factors 
affecting contemporary trends in State practice. 
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5.2 Domestic legislation and the practice of coastal States regarding the innocent 
passage regime 
5.2.1 China 
 The doctrine of innocent passage was first codified in treaty form at the first 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 1958 (UNCLOS I) in the Geneva 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.
1
 At that time, the Republic of 
China (Taiwan) still occupied China‘s seat in the United Nations, and thus the People‘s 
Republic of China (China) was unable to attend.
2
 
 Despite China‘s absence from UNCLOS I, the resulting Conventions were 
incorporated into China‘s domestic legislation. On 4 September 1958 China issued the 
Declaration on China‘s Territorial Sea (the 1958 Declaration), which is considered to be 
China‘s first legal instrument on the territorial sea.
3
 This Declaration states that the 
breadth of China‘s territorial sea is 12 nautical miles. With regard to the innocent 
passage regime, the Declaration provides that: 
No foreign vessels for military use and no foreign aircraft may enter China's territorial 
sea and the air space above it without the permission of the Government of the People's 
Republic of China. While navigating in the Chinese territorial sea, every foreign vessel 
must observe the relevant laws and regulations laid down by the Government of the 
People‘s Republic of China
4 
The Declaration does not mention foreign merchant ships; however, it can be 
understood from the text of the Declaration that foreign merchant ships enjoy the right 
of innocent passage through China‘s territorial sea (provided they observe relevant 
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Chinese laws and regulations).
5
 According to Zou Keyuan, the rationale for this 
Declaration was to ―deter U.S. warships, which supported logistically the Nationalist 
Chinese in Taiwan, from approaching the coast of the main land of China.‖
6
 In his 1959 
article titled ―Questions Relating to the Territorial Sea of Our Country‖, Fu Zhu 
asserted that: 
First, since international law recognizes that the sovereignty of a State extends to its 
territorial sea and the air space over the territorial sea, the coastal State, for purposes of 
its security, naturally has the indisputable right to prescribe that all foreign aircraft and 
military vessels cannot enter its territorial sea without prior authorization…Second, in 
State practice quite a few States have provisions in their national laws similar to that 
included in China‘s Declaration on the Territorial Sea.
7
 
A contrary position was subsequently taken by Zhou Genshen, a leading 
Chinese legal commentator. According to Zhou, the Geneva Convention grants ships of 
all States, regardless of their status as warships or merchant vessels, the right of 
innocent passage. Even so, he has conceded that ―this definitely cannot represent the 
general State practice and is not a rule acceptable to all States…according to generally 
recognized rules of international law States have nevertheless the right to prescribe that 
for the passage of foreign warships advance authorization must be obtained.‖
8
 
At the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), 
the delegation from China argued that the innocent passage regime should apply to 
merchant ships but not military vessels, and that foreign military vessels needed to 
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tender prior notification or obtain prior authorisation from coastal States before 
exercising the right of innocent passage through a coastal State‘s territorial sea.
9
 Due to 
objections from the majority of participating States, the final text of the LOSC does not 
contain any provisions specifically regulating the innocent passage of warships. On 9 
December 1982, at the final session of UNCLOS III, the head of the Chinese delegation 
Mr Han Xu stated that: 
The Convention is not entirely satisfactory to us. At the previous sessions of the 
Conference we repeatedly pointed out that in the articles of the Convention relating to 
innocent passage through the territorial sea there were no clear provisions regarding the 
regime of the passage of foreign warships through the territorial sea. A considerable 
number of States, including China, time and again submitted an amendment in this 
regard. To respond to the call of the President of the Conference, those sponsors of the 
amendment did not insist on a vote at the session held last April so that the draft 
convention on the law of the sea could be adopted by consensus. The statement made by 
the President of the Conference at that session showed clearly that this would not affect 
the principled position of the sponsors demanding that their security be ensured.
10
  
On 9 February 1983 China enacted the Maritime Traffic Safety Law, which 
entered into force on 1 January 1984. This law reaffirmed the stance taken by the 1958 
Declaration in that it prohibited ―military vessels of foreign nationality...[from] 
enter[ing] the territorial sea of the People‘s Republic of China without being authorized 
by the Government thereof.‖
11
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More importantly, in 1992 China promulgated the Law on the Territorial Sea 
and the Contiguous Zone (China‘s Territorial Sea Law), in which ―non-military foreign 
ships enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea of the People's 
Republic of China according to law.‖ In relation to foreign military ships, the statute 
provides that such vessels ―must obtain permission from the Government of the People's 
Republic of China.‖
12
 By virtue of this enactment, China expressly granted innocent 
passage for foreign merchant vessels for the first time – a position consistent with the 
LOSC.
13
 However, the prior authorisation requirement for the passage of foreign 
warships in its territorial sea was protested by many maritime States, including the 
United States.
14
 
China‘s Territorial Sea Law also states that foreign submarines and other 
underwater vehicles must navigate on the surface of the sea and show their flags when 
passing through the State‘s territorial sea.
15
 If a foreign warship or foreign government 
ship operated for non-commercial purposes violates these laws and regulations, the 
relevant responsible organs of the People's Republic of China shall have the right to 
order it to leave the territorial sea immediately. Moreover, any ―losses or damage 
caused shall be borne by the nations whose flag is being flown by the ship in 
question.‖
16
  
                                                 
12
 See Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 
1992 (effective 25 February 1992), art 6 
 < http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/CHN_1992_Law.pdf>. 
13
 Keyuan, above n 2, 65. 
14
 The US protested the 1992 prior permission requirement and conducted operational assertions in 1992, 
1993, 1994, and 1996; see China, People's Republic of (April 2013) 
<http://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/documents/mcrm/China2013.pdf>. 
15
 Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 1992 
(effective 25 February 1992), art 7. 
16
 Ibid art 10. 
 
154 
 
Apart from the passage of warships, China‘s Territorial Sea Law is generally 
consistent with the provisions of the LOSC. However, with regard to the contiguous 
zone, this Law states that: 
The People's Republic of China has the authority to exercise powers within its 
contiguous zone for the purpose of preventing or punishing infringement of its security, 
customs, fiscal, sanitary laws and regulations or entry-exit control within its land 
territories, internal waters or territorial sea.
17
 
Article 33 of the LOSC makes it clear that in the contiguous zone, the coastal 
State may exercise powers to ―prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration 
or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea.‖
18
 The inclusion of 
the word ―security‖ in China‘s Territorial Sea Law is inconsistent with article 33,
19
 and 
has the effect of restricting the passage of foreign sovereign immune vessels and aircraft 
in China‘s contiguous zone. 
When China ratified the LOSC in 1996, it made the following statement 
regarding the innocent passage regime: 
The People's Republic of China reaffirms that the provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea concerning innocent passage through the territorial 
sea shall not prejudice the right of a coastal State to request, in accordance with its laws 
and regulations, a foreign State to obtain advance approval from or give prior 
notification to the coastal State for the passage of its warships through the territorial sea 
of the coastal State.
20
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According to the LOSC, ―no reservations or exceptions may be made to the 
Convention unless expressly permitted by other articles of this Convention.‖
21
 
Therefore, China may not make a reservation regarding the innocent passage of 
warships in its territorial sea. Moreover, it is internationally recognised that a State 
cannot invoke the provisions of its domestic law as justification for its failure to 
perform its treaty obligations.
22
 Another problem with the above statement is that it is 
inconsistent with the text of China‘s own Territorial Sea Law. Indeed, while the 
statement above prescribes two alternative requirements for warships (i.e., advance 
approval or prior notification), the State‘s Territorial Sea Law requires only prior 
authorisation, not prior notification. According to Zou Keyuan, it is unclear whether the 
intention behind the statement was to change the existing text of China‘s Territorial Sea 
Law, and if so, it would be difficult for China‘s competent authorities to enforce two 
alternative requirements.
23
 It is also unclear whether the two alternative requirements 
apply to different types of warships or warships from different States.
24
 
In practice, there have been a number of incidents involving Chinese military 
vessels in the territorial sea. On 25 April 2001, three Australian warships were 
challenged by a Chinese warship while sailing through China‘s territorial sea within the 
Taiwan Strait. The Chinese warship requested Australia‘s warships to change their 
course; however, the three Australian warships continued to sail through the strait 
ignoring the radio request from the Chinese warship.
25
 China complained that the 
passage of these three warships through its territorial sea had occurred without prior 
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authorisation, and thus Australia had violated Chinese law. Australia, however, argued 
that its ships had exercised the right of innocent passage recognised under international 
law.
26
  
Another incident took place on 10 November 2004, when a Japanese anti-
submarine patrol aircraft detected a Chinese nuclear-powered submarine passing 
submerged through Japan‘s territorial sea near Sakishima-Gunto.
27
 Japan lodged a 
protest in relation to the incident, and China responded by stating that the incursion into 
Japan‘s territorial waters was a mistake brought about by a ―technical cause‖ during its 
normal training course.
28
  
Article 20 of the LOSC makes it clear that ―in the territorial sea, submarines and 
other underwater vehicles are required to navigate on the surface and to show their 
flag.‖
29
 Therefore, the submerged passage of the Chinese submarine through Japan‘s 
territorial sea is contrary to international law. Even so, China did not go as far as to 
apologise for the incursion, but simply expressed regret over the incident.
30
 Miyoshi 
Masahiro has argued that ―China failed to carry out its responsibility for its incursion, if 
unintended, into another country‘s territorial waters in a manner contrary to 
international law.‖
31
 As China requires foreign submarines and other underwater 
vehicles to navigate on the surface and to show their flags while passing through its 
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territorial sea, the incident casts doubt on whether China would behave in a reciprocal 
fashion regarding the innocent passage of foreign submarines. 
On 30 January 2016, the U.S. Navy sent a guided missile destroyer, the USS 
Curtis Wilbur, within 12 nautical miles of Triton Island in the Paracel Islands, claimed 
by China, Vietnam and Taiwan, and without giving prior notice to any of these 
claimants. Following the incident, China‘s Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Hua 
Chunying commented that ―the U.S. warship violated Chinese law and entered China‘s 
territorial sea without authorization. The Chinese side conducted surveillance and vocal 
warnings to the U.S. warship.‖
32
 However, it is worth noting that in September 2015, 
five Chinese warships transited through U.S. territorial waters, within 12 nautical miles 
of the Aleutian Islands, in an exercise of innocent passage without prior notification to 
the United States.
33
 
 In summary, China‘s domestic legislation requires prior authorisation for the 
innocent passage of foreign warships through its territorial sea. However, in its 
statement on the ratification of the LOSC, China stated that it requires prior notification 
or prior authorisation. This reveals a startling inconsistency with regard to China‘s 
policy on this issue. China‘s domestic legal framework on the regime of the contiguous 
zone is inconsistent with the provisions of the LOSC. Moreover, China‘s practice 
regarding the innocent passage of warships is incongruent with both its domestic 
legislation and the LOSC.
34
 According to the international legal principle of pacta sunt 
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servanda, China is obliged to abide by the LOSC. Therefore, China should amend its 
domestic legislation to reflect the provisions of the LOSC.
35
 
5.2.2 Taiwan 
 Taiwan's membership in the United Nations was terminated in 1971 by United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI) of 25 October 1971.
36
 According 
to this Resolution, the representatives of the People‘s Republic of China are the only 
legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations.
37
 As a result, Taiwan was not 
able to participate in UNCLOS III or become a party to the LOSC. The Chinese 
Government has claimed Taiwan as part of China; however, the Taiwanese government 
currently has territorial jurisdiction over Taiwan. In 1992, China and Taiwan reached a 
verbal consensus on a ―one China, respective interpretations‖ concept (1992 
Consensus), in which:  
Both sides of the Taiwan Strait agree that there is only one China. However, the two 
sides of the Strait have different opinions as to the meaning of ―one China.‖ To Peking, 
―one China‖ means the ―People‘s Republic of China (PRC),‖ with Taiwan to become a 
―Special Administration Region‖ after unification. Taipei, on the other hand, considers 
―one China‖ to mean the Republic of China (ROC), founded in 1911 and with de jure 
sovereignty over all of China. The ROC, however, currently has jurisdiction only over 
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. Taiwan is part of China, and the Chinese 
mainland is part of China as well.
38
 
                                                 
35
 Keyuan, above n 34, 86. 
36
 See United Nations Resolution 2578(XXVI) 
 <http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/327/74/IMG/NR032774.pdf?OpenElement>. 
37
 Ibid. 
38
 Text published in: Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, Republic of China, ―Consensus Formed 
at the National Development Conference on Cross-Strait Relations,‖ February 1997, Quoted in Shirley A. 
Kan, 'China/Taiwan: Evolution of the ―One China‖ Policy—Key Statements from Washington,Beijing, 
and Taipei' (CRS Report for Congress, 26 August 2013), 46. 
 
159 
 
Like China, Taiwan has adopted laws and regulations with regard to its maritime 
zones. It is interesting to note that as China and Taiwan have each claimed governance 
over the whole of China, their maritime claims are identical.
39
 However, the laws and 
regulations that apply to these claimed areas are different. In practice, China and 
Taiwan have only publicised the baselines for measuring the territorial sea for actual 
areas under their jurisdiction, and ―the laws of both sides only apply to the respective 
territorial sea areas within the exercise of their actual jurisdiction.‖
40
 
 In 1980, Taiwan issued Regulations on the Control of Foreign Military Vessels 
Entering into ROC Territorial Waters and Harbours. Under these Regulations, foreign 
military vessels seeking to enter Taiwan‘s territorial waters or harbours were required to 
obtain prior approval from Taiwan‘s Ministry of Foreign Affairs at least ten days prior 
to passage.
41
 However, these Regulations were suspended after the promulgation of the 
Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the Republic of China in 1998 
(Taiwan‘s Territorial Sea Law). Regarding the innocent passage regime, article 7 of 
Taiwan‘s Territorial Sea Law states that: 
Foreign civil vessels may, under the reciprocity principle, enjoy the right of innocent 
passage through the territorial sea of the Republic of China as long as the passage is not 
prejudicial to the peace, good order and security of the Republic of China… 
Foreign military or government vessels shall give prior notice to the authorities 
concerned before their passage through the territorial sea of the Republic of China….
42
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According to this article, the innocent passage of civil vessels requires 
reciprocity. This requirement is inconsistent with the provisions of the LOSC, which do 
not require such reciprocity. In comparison with China‘s Territorial Sea Law, the 
requirement of prior notification for the passage of foreign military vessels is ―softer‖ 
than prior authorisation. However, it is still inconsistent with the LOSC. Moreover, the 
requirement of prior notification applies not only to military vessels but also other 
government vessels. This is an untenable position as the innocent passage of 
government vessels (other than military vessels) is hardly a controversial issue in 
international law.  
Article 10 of Taiwan‘s Territorial Sea Law states that: 
For protecting national security and national interests, the Government of the Republic 
of China may suspend temporarily in specified areas of its territorial sea the innocent 
passage of foreign vessels.
43
 
The inclusion of ―national interests‖ in this article is inconsistent with the 
LOSC. Indeed, article 25 of the LOSC only allows a coastal State to suspend 
temporarily the innocent passage of foreign ships ―if such suspension is essential for the 
protection of its security, including weapons exercises‖, not for the protection of the 
coastal State‘s interests in general.
44
 
Although Taiwan is not a party to the LOSC, the territorial sea provisions of the 
LOSC reflect customary international law which is binding on all States. For this 
reason, Taiwan‘s Territorial Sea Law should reflect the relevant provisions of the 
LOSC.  
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5.2.3 Vietnam 
 Vietnam made its first law of the sea-related declaration on 12 May 1977, 
known as the Statement on the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, the Exclusive 
Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf (1977 Statement). In this Statement, Vietnam 
claimed a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles and a contiguous zone extending 12 
nautical miles beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea.
45
 Vietnam declared that it 
―exercises full and complete sovereignty over its territorial sea as well as the 
superjacent airspace and the bed and subsoil of the territorial sea.‖
46
 This Statement was 
generally in conformity with the wording of the Negotiation Text of the fourth 
UNCLOS session, 1976.
47
 However, regarding the contiguous zone, the 1977 Statement 
provides that: 
The Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam exercises the necessary control in 
its contiguous zone in order to see its security and custom and fiscal interests and to 
ensure respect for its sanitary, emigration and immigration regulations within the 
Vietnamese territory or territorial sea.
48
 
 As with China, Vietnam‘s Statement contains an express reference to security 
control in the contiguous zone. Indeed, by that time a total of 14 States had included a 
reference to security purposes in connection with their 12 nautical mile contiguous 
zone.
49
 Nevertheless, the 1977 Statement was made before the LOSC was opened for 
signature. Furthermore, paragraph 6 of the 1977 Statement made it clear that all 
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questions relating to Vietnamese maritime zones would be dealt with in detail in further 
regulations and ―in keeping with international law and practices.‖
50
  
The 1977 Statement did not mention the right of innocent passage of foreign 
ships in the Vietnamese territorial sea. Vietnam‘s first official statement regarding the 
innocent passage regime was the Regulation for Foreign Vessels to Operate on Sea 
Areas of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam dated January 29, 1980 (Decree No.30-CP). 
According to article 3 of the decree, foreign military vessels, including warships and 
auxiliary vessels seeking to enter the contiguous zone and the territorial sea of Vietnam, 
must apply for permission from the Vietnamese Government through diplomatic 
channels at least 30 days prior to passage. Once permission has been granted, a 48 hour 
pre-entry notification to the Vietnamese Ministry of Communications and Transport is 
required before passing through the State‘s contiguous zone.
51
 Foreign submarines are 
required to navigate on the surface and show their flags if permitted to enter the 
contiguous zone. In addition, foreign submarines must observe the regulations 
pertaining to foreign surface ships operating in Vietnam‘s maritime zones.
52
 These 
requirements are inconsistent with the provisions of the LOSC because: (i) the 
contiguous zone is a special part of the EEZ in which States can exercise only limited 
policing powers; and (ii) the contiguous zone is subject to the freedom of navigation 
regime. Moreover, article 5 of Decree No.30-CP states that: 
Unless otherwise authorized by the Government of the SRVN, not more than three 
warships of the same nationality may be present simultaneously in the territorial sea or 
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internal waters of Vietnam and the maximum stay of all or any of such ships must not 
exceed one week.
53
 
Article 5 is also at variance with the LOSC because the right of innocent passage 
is not conditional on the number of ships in the territorial sea at any one time. As 
Decree No.30-CP was issued before the LOSC opened for signature, and after 
longstanding struggles for the unification of the country, the Decree is very much a 
product of Vietnam‘s political milieu at that time. Indeed, Vietnam was more concerned 
with sovereignty matters than its international obligations. Upon signing the LOSC on 
December 10, 1982, Vietnam made no declarations or statements. However, a statement 
was made when Vietnam ratified the LOSC on 25 July 1994. The statement provides 
that: 
The National Assembly authorizes the National Assembly's Standing Committee and 
the Government to review all relevant national legislation to consider necessary 
amendments in conformity with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, and to safeguard the interests of Viet Nam.
54
 
The effect of this Statement is that after becoming a party to the LOSC, Vietnam 
would consider amending its domestic legislation to make it consistent with the 
provisions of the LOSC. In 2012 the Law of the Sea of Vietnam was enacted, with the 
statute providing that: 
1. The provisions of this Law shall prevail in case there are differences between the 
provisions of this Law and those of other laws in relation to the sovereignty and 
legal status of Vietnam‘s maritime zones. 
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2. In case there are differences between the provisions of this Law and those of an 
International treaty to which the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is a contracting 
party, the provisions of the international treaty shall prevail.
55
 
It is clear that after entering into force on 1 January 2013, the Law of the Sea of 
Vietnam replaced all previous regulations in relation to the sovereignty and legal status 
of Vietnam‘s maritime zones. It is also clear that Vietnam will not invoke provisions of 
its Law of the Sea as justification for its failure to perform its treaty obligations. This is 
because under the State‘s new law, the international treaty prevails to the extent of any 
inconsistency. Regarding the innocent passage regime, article 12 of the Law of the Sea 
of Vietnam states that: 
Vessels of all States enjoy the right of innocent passage through Vietnam‘s territorial 
sea. Foreign military vessels exercising the right of innocent passage through Vietnam‘s 
territorial sea shall give prior notice to competent Vietnamese authorities.
56
 
According to Vietnam‘s new Law of the Sea, foreign military vessels seeking 
passage through the State‘s territorial sea are only required to give prior notification, 
with no particular timeframe being set for such notification and no limitation on the 
number of vessels seeking passage at any one time. Article 26 of the Law of the Sea of 
Vietnam states that the Government of Vietnam may suspend or restrict the exercise of 
innocent passage in its territorial sea for the purposes of ―safeguarding the sovereignty, 
national defence, security and interests or security of navigation, protecting marine 
resources and the marine ecology, combating pollution, tackling maritime accidents or 
marine environmental disasters, [and] preventing the spread of epidemics.‖
57
 The prior 
notice requirement, as well as the very broad conditions for suspension or restriction of 
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innocent passage in Vietnam‘s territorial sea, are inconsistent with the LOSC. Indeed, 
compared to Decree No. 30 CP, Vietnam has attempted to bring its domestic law into 
alignment with the LOSC with this new enactment. 
Regarding the contiguous zone, the Law of the Sea of Vietnam states that: 
1. The State exercises sovereign rights, jurisdiction and other rights stipulated in 
Article 16 of this Law over the contiguous zone. 
2. The State exercises control within the contiguous zone to prevent and punish acts of 
infringement of the law on customs, tariff, health or immigration committed in the 
territory or the territorial sea of Vietnam.
58
 
Considering that article 16 of this law focuses on the legal status of the EEZ, 
Vietnam recognises the contiguous zone as a special part of the EEZ subject to coastal 
State control over matters of customs, tariff, health and immigration. This is generally 
consistent with the provisions of the LOSC. 
In summary, apart from the requirement for prior notification for the passage of 
foreign warships, and the application of broad conditions for the suspension or 
restriction of innocent passage, the Law of the Sea of Vietnam is generally consistent 
with the LOSC. Indeed, there have been no incidents regarding the passage of foreign 
warships through the territorial sea of Vietnam since the Law of the Sea of Vietnam 
came into force. 
5.2.4 Indonesia 
 Indonesia is an archipelagic State bordering the South China Sea. It is the largest 
archipelago in the world, comprising 17,508 islands and encompassing in excess of 7.9 
million square kilometres of sea area.
59
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the LOSC 
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allows an archipelagic State to draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the 
outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs form archipelagic waters 
enclosed by archipelagic baselines.
60
 From the archipelagic baselines, an archipelagic 
State has the right to establish the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the EEZ and the 
continental shelf in accordance with the provisions of the LOSC.
61
 Regarding 
navigation, there are three different passage regimes through Indonesia‘s maritime 
zones, including archipelagic sea lanes passage, innocent passage and the freedom of 
navigation. However, within the geographical limits of the South China Sea as set out in 
this thesis, only innocent passage through Indonesia‘s territorial sea will be analysed. 
 Indonesia has issued a number of laws and regulations regarding the innocent 
passage regime, including Act No.4 of 18 February 1960 on Indonesian Waters (Act 
No.4/1960),
62
 Act No.6 of 8 August 1996 regarding Indonesian Waters (Act No. 6/ 
1996),
63
 and Government Regulation Number 36 of 2002 on Rights and Responsibilities 
of Foreign Ships Exercising Innocent Passage through Indonesian Waters (Government 
Regulation No.36/2002).
64
 According to Act No.4/1960, ―Indonesian waters consist of 
the territorial sea and the internal waters of Indonesia‖.
65
 As ―archipelagic waters‖ was a 
new concept at the time, it was not included in Act No.4/1960. All waters enclosed by 
Indonesia‘s baselines have been classified as Indonesian internal waters, and ―innocent 
passage through the internal waters of Indonesia is open to foreign vessels.‖
66
 For the 
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implementation of Act No.4/1960, Indonesia issued Government Decree No.8 of 1962 - 
Foreign Ships - Innocent Passage in the Indonesian Waters, which states that: 
Before beginning their peaceful passage through the Indonesian waters or Indonesian 
internal waters, the foreign warships and foreign government ships which are not 
commercial ships are obliged to inform the Minister-Chief of Navy Staff, except that 
they sail in shipping lanes fixed by the Minister-Chief of Navy Staff.
67
 
In 1971 the President of Indonesia enacted Presidential Decree No.16 of 1971 
titled Authority of Issuing Sailing Permits for Activities of Foreign Vessels in 
Indonesian Waters. According to this statute, foreign warships passing through 
Indonesian waters were required to obtain security clearance from the Minister of 
Defence and Security.
68
 However, after Indonesia ratified the LOSC in 1985, it enacted 
Act No.6/1996 to implement the LOSC, thereby replacing Act No.4/1960 which was 
considered ―not suitable anymore.‖
69
 As Act No.4/1960 was terminated, it could be 
argued that all laws and regulations which were passed to support and implement Act 
(including the Presidential Decree No.16 of 1971) are should be no longer valid. Article 
11(1) of Act No.6/1996 states that: ―Vessels of all countries, coastal as well as non-
coastal countries, enjoy peaceful crossing rights through the territorial sea and waters of 
the Indonesian archipelago.‖
70
 Article 11(2) defines ―crossing‖ and ―peaceful crossing‖ 
in a similar way to the LOSC.
71
 Article 13(1) of Act No.6/1996 states that: 
The Government of Indonesia can temporarily postpone the peaceful crossing of all 
kinds of foreign ships in certain regions of the territorial sea or the archipelagic waters 
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if such postponement is necessary for the protection of its security, including the 
purpose of arms/weapons training.
72
 
Regarding the passage of foreign warships and government vessels, article 17 of 
Act No.6/1996 states that: 
The further provisions concerning the rights and obligations of foreign merchant ships, 
warships and Government vessels operated for commercial and non-commercial 
purposes in conducting a peaceful crossing right through the Indonesian waters, shall be 
regulated by Government Regulation.
73
 
For the implementation of Act No.6/1996, Indonesia promulgated Government 
Regulation No.36/2002. However, there is no provision in this Regulation regarding the 
passage of warships and government vessels. Therefore, as both the Act and the 
Regulation are silent on the passage of warships through Indonesia‘s territorial waters, it 
would appear that neither prior notification nor prior authorisation is required for the 
passage of warships and government vessels in Indonesian waters. 
In 1992 and prior to the enactment of the above laws, Indonesia suspended the 
right of innocent passage through its territorial sea of the Lusitania Expresso - a 
Portuguese-registered car ferry which was carrying peace activists from Australia to 
East Timor. The suspension was made on grounds of public order and security.
74
 
However, the question which arose was whether such suspension was consistent with 
the provisions of the LOSC. Article 19(1) of the LOSC states that: ―Passage is innocent 
so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State.‖
75
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In a letter from the Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations to the 
UN Secretary General, Indonesia argued that: 
Far from being a voyage of peace and of respect for human rights, it was politically 
motivated from the start, aimed at instigating confrontation, aggravating tension, 
including divisiveness and inciting disturbances in East Timor. For these reasons, the 
voyage was prejudicial to the peace, good order and security of Indonesia, and thus 
contrary to the established notions of innocent passage.
76
 
Regarding the suspension of the right of innocent passage, article 25(3) of the 
LOSC makes it clear that: 
The coastal State may, without discrimination in form or in fact among foreign ships, 
suspend temporarily in specified areas of its territorial sea the innocent passage of 
foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the protection of its security, including 
weapons exercises. Such suspension shall take effect only after having been duly 
published.
77
 
The question is whether the suspension of the right of innocent passage of a 
single vessel is discrimination within the context of article 25(3) of LOSC. Rothwell 
argues that even if ―the intended voyage of the Lusitania Expresso could...be considered 
to constitute a threat to Indonesia‘s internal security, how is it possible for Indonesia to 
justify suspension of innocent passage for a single vessel?‘
78
 In response to this 
suspension, Portugal issued a diplomatic statement which asserted that Indonesia has 
used force to deny the right of innocent passage of the Lusitania Expresso.
79
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Nevertheless, Indonesia did suspend the passage of the Portuguese vessel and there 
were no further disputes lodged in relation to this case. 
In conclusion, as both Act No.6/1996 and Government Regulation No.36/2002 
are silent on the issue of innocent passage of foreign warships, it can be assumed that 
neither prior notification nor prior authorisation is required. Thus, Indonesia‘s domestic 
legislation is generally consistent with the provisions of the LOSC with regard to the 
innocent passage of foreign warships. 
5.2.5 The Philippines 
 The Philippines is also an archipelagic State bordering the South China Sea. 
Indeed, it is entirely surrounded by sea and consists of 7,107 islands.
80
 The Philippines 
is the world‘s second largest archipelagic State after Indonesia. In 1898, Spain ceded the 
Philippines to the United States by the Treaty of Paris of 10 December 1898, and doing 
so set the boundary limits for the Philippine Islands.
81
 These boundary limits were then 
supplemented by the Treaty between the Kingdom of Spain and the United States of 
America for Cession of Outlying Islands of the Philippines 1900
82
, and by the 
Convention between the United States and Great Britain Delimiting the Boundary 
between the Philippine Archipelago and the State of North Borneo 1930.
83
 These 
instruments provide that the Philippine Archipelago ―comprehends the Philippine 
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Islands described as the archipelago in Article III of the Treaty of Paris, with the 
addition of the islands included by the two companion treaties referred to above.‖
84
 In 
1961 the Philippines enacted The Philippine Baselines Law, known as Republic Act No. 
3046 of 17 June 1961(Act No. 3046). It states that ―the baselines from which the 
territorial sea of the Philippines is determined consist of straight lines joining 
appropriate points of the outermost islands of the archipelago‖
85
, and ―all waters within 
the baselines provided for in Section one hereof are considered inland or internal waters 
of the Philippines.‖
86
 Act No. 3046 also affirmed that ―all the waters beyond the 
outermost islands of the archipelago but within the limits of the boundaries set forth in 
the aforementioned treaties comprise the territorial sea of the Philippines.‖
87
 The 
boundaries set forth in these treaties (international treaty limits) encompass a huge 
maritime area measuring 600 miles in width and 1200 miles in length - far more than 
the 12 nautical mile territorial sea limit specified in the LOSC.
88
 After the passing of 
Act No.3046 a number of States, including the United States, the United Kingdom and 
Australia, made formal protests to the Philippine Government regarding (among other 
matters) the passage of foreign warships through the territorial sea claimed by the 
Philippines.
89
 
The current 1987 Constitution of the Philippines defines the national territory as: 
The Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all 
other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of 
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its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the 
subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, 
and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and 
dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.
90
 
 The Philippine archipelago referred to in this Constitution includes all islands in 
the above mentioned treaties. As a result, all waters ―around, between, and connecting 
the islands of the archipelago‖ are considered internal waters.   
During UNCLOS III, the Philippine delegation were at pains to emphasise the 
unique nature of the State‘s international treaty limits and pleaded for recognition of its 
territorial sea on the basis of historic and legal title. Even so, the Philippine proposal 
was not included in the draft of the negotiating texts.
91
 On 10 December 1982, at the 
final session of UNCLOS III, the head of Philippine delegation Mr Tolentino stated 
that: ―we would really have some problem with the 12-mile limit on breadth of the 
territorial sea provided in this Convention. My Government has studied the problem; it 
is a very difficult one for us.‖
92
 He then went on to add that ―when we sign the 
Convention we shall submit also a declaration in exercise of the right granted under 
article 310.‖
93
 
Upon signing the LOSC on 10 December 1982, and in accordance with its 
earlier pronouncement, The Philippines made the following Statement: 
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1. The signing of the Convention by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines 
shall not in any manner impair or prejudice the sovereign rights of the Republic of the 
Philippines under and arising from the Constitution of the Philippines. 
2. Such signing shall not in any manner affect the sovereign rights of the Republic of 
the Philippines as successor of the United States of America, under and arising out of 
the Treaty of Paris between Spain and the United States of America of 10 December 
1898, and the Treaty of Washington between the United States of America and Great 
Britain of 2 January 1930.
94
 
The purpose of this Statement was to make it clear that, following ratification of 
the LOSC, the Philippines had no intention of harmonising its domestic legislation with 
the provisions of the LOSC. The Philippines also declared that: 
The concept of archipelagic waters is similar to the concept of internal waters under the 
Constitution of the Philippines, and removes straits connecting these waters with the 
economic zone or high seas from the rights of foreign vessels to transit passage for 
international navigation.
95
 
With this statement, the Philippines refused to make a distinction between 
archipelagic waters and internal waters, effectively removing the rights of transit 
passage and archipelagic passage provided for in the LOSC.
96
 
Thus, for the Philippines, all waters landward of its baselines are internal waters, 
and all waters seaward of its baselines to the outermost boundaries of the 
aforementioned treaties constitute the territorial sea (sea figure 5.1). With the 
contradictions that exist between the LOSC, the State‘s constitutional documents, as 
well as its domestic legislation, the Philippines has faced difficulties in implementing 
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the LOSC after becoming a party to the Convention. In 2009, the Philippines passed the 
Baselines Law (Act No. 9522) - ―an Act to amend Certain Provisions of Republic Act 
No. 3046, as amended by Republic Act No. 5446, to define the Archipelagic Baselines 
of the Philippines, and for Other Purposes.‖ However, this new Baselines Law ―is a 
mere clinical and technical adjustment of the base points under the old Baselines Law‖ , 
and does not change the character of the waters under Act No. 3046/ Act No. 5446.
97
 
Figure 5.1 Boundary of the Philippine Treaty Limits 
 
Source: Lowell B. Bautista, ‗Philippine Territorial Boundaries: International 
Tensions, Colonial Baggage, Ambivalent Conformity‘ (2011) 16 (December) Journal of 
Southeast Asian Studies  
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Regarding the passage of foreign warships in the territorial sea, there have been 
no domestic laws or regulations directly addressing this issue. However, in practice, the 
Philippines requires prior notification or authorisation for the passage of foreign 
warships through its territorial sea.
98
 In 1965, Australia and the Philippines reached an 
agreement whereby the Australian Defence Attaché would inform the Philippines Navy 
―at low level‖ of the passage of its naval vessels through the territorial sea of the 
Philippines.
99
 Three years later, and in response to the passage of combined units of 
British and Australian naval vessels through the territorial sea claimed by the 
Philippines, the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines stated that: 
…the…combined units of British and Australian armed public vessels, or any other 
armed foreign public vessel for that matter, cannot assert or exercise the so-called right 
of innocent passage through the Philippine territorial sea without the permission of the 
Philippine Government.
100
 
The Philippines also restricts the passage of nuclear cargo vessels through its 
territorial sea.
101
 According to the Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Wastes 
Control Act of 1990 (Act No.6969 of 1990), the Philippines ―prohibit the entry, even in 
transit, of hazardous and nuclear wastes and their disposal into the Philippine territorial 
limits for whatever purpose.‖
102
 This requirement is inconsistent with the provisions of 
the LOSC, which state that nuclear cargo ships have the right of innocent passage 
through the territorial sea of a foreign state provided they ―carry documents and observe 
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special precautionary measures established for such ships by international 
agreement.‖
103
 
In summary, the current domestic laws and regulations of the Philippines are 
inconsistent with the LOSC insofar as the territorial sea and innocent passage regime 
are concerned. As a party to the LOSC, the Philippines should seek to harmonise its 
domestic legislation by bringing it into conformity with the provisions of the LOSC. 
5.2.6 Malaysia 
 Malaysia signed the LOSC on 10 December 1982, with ratification of the 
Convention taking place on 14 October 1996.
104
 One of the State‘s earlier territorial sea-
related instruments was the Emergency Ordinance No.7/1969. According to this 
Ordinance, the breadth of Malaysia‘s territorial waters was 12 nautical miles. However, 
the Ordinance did not mention the baselines from which the territorial sea was to be 
measured.
105
 In 1984, Malaysia claimed an exclusive economic zone by virtue of the 
Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1984 (Act No. 311), which entered into force on 1 May 
1985. This Act defined the territorial sea as ―the territorial waters of Malaysia 
determined in accordance with the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance 
No.7/1969‖
106
, and affirmed that Malaysia‘s EEZ extends to a distance of 200 nautical 
miles from the baselines from which the breath of the territorial sea is measured.
107
 
Again, Malaysia did not formally declare its baselines. On 1 May 2007, Malaysia 
enacted the Baselines of Maritime Zones Act 2006, formally declaring that the baselines 
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used for determining the State‘s maritime zones include normal baselines and straight 
baselines.
108
 However, this Act provides no geographical coordinates of base points, 
instead stating that: ―[The] Yang di-Pertuan Agong, on the recommendation of the 
Minister may, by order published in the Gazette, declares the geographical coordinates 
of base points from which the baselines of Malaysia may be determined.‖
109
 It may be 
assumed from this statute that Malaysia prefers to preserve the status quo, without 
declaring coordinates for its baselines.
110
 It is interesting to note that on the maps 
appended to the Executive Summary of the 2009 Malaysia-Vietnam Joint Submission to 
the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, it can be seen 
that Malaysia employs straight baselines for the purpose of this joint submission. 
However, no official list of coordinates for these baselines has been submitted to the 
United Nations.
111
 The Emergency Ordinance No.7/1969 ceased to have effect in 2012, 
and Malaysia enacted the Territorial Sea Act 2012 on 22 June 2012 to replace it. The 
object of this Act is ―to provide for the territorial sea of Malaysia and for connected 
matters.‖
112
 It reaffirms the breadth of the territorial sea, which is 12 nautical miles from 
the baselines established in accordance with the Baselines of Maritime Zones Act 2006. 
However, this Act again does not provide geographical coordinates of base points. 
Malaysia‘s domestic laws do not mention the passage of foreign warships in its 
territorial sea. The only article of the Territorial Sea Act 2012 referring to Malaysia‘s 
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sovereignty in respect of the territorial sea is article 4, which states that: ―The 
sovereignty in respect of the territorial sea, and in respect of its bed and subsoil, is 
vested in and exercisable by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong in right of Malaysia.‖
113
 
However, upon ratification of the LOSC, Malaysia made a declaration regarding 
innocent passage: 
In view of the inherent danger entailed in the passage of nuclear-powered vessels or 
vessels carrying nuclear material or other material of a similar nature and in view of the 
provision of article 22, paragraph 2, of the Convention on the Law of the Sea 
concerning the right of the coastal State to confine the passage of such vessels to sea 
lanes designated by the State within its territorial sea, as well as that of article 23 of the 
Convention, which requires such vessels to carry documents and observe special 
precautionary measures as specified by international agreements, the Malaysian 
Government, with all of the above in mind, requires the aforesaid vessels to obtain prior 
authorization of passage before entering the territorial sea of Malaysia until such time as 
the international agreements referred to in article 23 are concluded and Malaysia 
becomes a party thereto…
114
  
             This statement is inconsistent with Article 23 of the LOSC. Indeed, while 
Article 23 requires foreign nuclear-powered ships and other ships with inherently 
dangerous or noxious cargo to carry documents and observe special precautionary 
measures, it does not require such vessels to obtain prior authorisation from the coastal 
State.
115
 Given that most nuclear-powered vessels are sovereign immune vessels, this 
statement, if fully enforced, would affect the innocent passage of foreign sovereign 
immune vessels in Malaysia‘s territorial sea. However, as there are no provisions on the 
innocent passage of foreign sovereign immune vessels in Malaysia‘s domestic 
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legislation, this statement alone might not be of sufficient legal force to exclude the 
innocent passage of foreign nuclear-powered vessels in Malaysia‘s territorial sea. 
 In summary, there are also no provisions in Malaysia‘s domestic legislation that 
clearly address the innocent passage of foreign vessels in the State‘s territorial sea. In 
order to implement the LOSC fully, Malaysia needs to establish its baseline system and 
promulgate, through domestic laws and regulations, detailed provisions regarding the 
innocent passage regime in its territorial sea. 
5.2.7 Brunei 
 Brunei has a coastline length of only 161km.
116
 It gained full independence on 1 
January 1984, having been a British protected State since 1888.
117
 Brunei signed the 
LOSC on 5 December 1984 and ratified it on 5 November 1996.
118
 It made no 
declaration on either signature or ratification to the LOSC. In the Territorial Waters of 
Brunei Act 1982, Brunei declared the breadth of its territorial waters as 12 nautical 
miles; however, as with Malaysia, it has not provided the baseline system from which 
its territorial sea can be measured.
119
 None of the State‘s domestic laws or regulations 
mention innocent passage. There have been no incidents regarding innocent passage of 
foreign vessels in Brunei‘s territorial sea. Thus, it could be argued that Brunei‘s practice 
has been consistent with the LOSC.  
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5.3 Political security and strategic factors that have influenced State practice 
 It can be seen from the above discussion that political security and strategic 
factors have heavily influenced the development of domestic legislation of South China 
Sea littoral States on the innocent passage regime. 
 Since the 19
th
 century, China has been ―invaded‖ by Western powers and Japan 
on a number of occasions, with most of these invasions having come from the sea.
120
 
After the founding of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, there have 
allegedly been many foreign ―intrusions‖ into China‘s territorial waters which were 
condemned by China as violations of the State‘s territorial integrity and sovereignty.
121
 
According to Zou Keyuan, the requirement of prior authorisation for the passage of 
foreign warship through China‘s territorial sea was ―triggered by the frequent intrusions 
by American warships.‖
122
 Hungdah Chiu has highlighted that in the 1963 alone China 
issued 15 ―serious warnings‖ to the United States for alleged intrusions of its warships 
into China‘s territorial sea.
123
 As China‘s maritime defence capabilities were weak at 
the time, security concerns were perhaps the driving force behind China instituting the 
prior authorisation requirement for the passage of foreign warships in its 1958 
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Declaration. Another political factor at play was that, as a socialist State, China chose to 
support the Soviet Union and other socialist States which, at that time, required prior 
authorisation for the passage of foreign warships through their territorial sea.
124
 During 
and after UNCLOS III, China‘s position on the innocent passage of foreign warships 
was essentially the same as in its 1958 Declaration, while the Soviet Union‘s views on 
the innocent passage of foreign warships were in transition, with a change occurring in 
1989 following the signing of a joint statement with the United States titled Uniform 
Interpretation of the Rules of International Law Governing Innocent Passage.
125
 As 
Zou Keyuan has observed, the traditionally sensitive security concerns of China (and 
particularly the State‘s painful history of having been repeatedly attacked from the sea), 
made China reluctant to grant foreign warships the right of innocent passage in its 
territorial sea without prior authorisation.
126
 When China ratified the LOSC in 1996, it 
made a statement to the effect that foreign warships must ―obtain advance approval 
from or give prior notification‖ for their passage through China‘s territorial sea.
127
 The 
additional alternative requirement of ―prior notification‖ to the original position of 
―prior authorisation‖ reflects a change in China‘s attitude towards the innocent passage 
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of warships.
128
 Throughout history, the United States and the former Soviet Union have 
both altered their positions on the innocent passage of warships. This has occurred in 
response to a changing security landscape as well as the enhancement of the maritime 
defence capabilities of these two powers.
129
 With the rapid growth of China‘s naval 
power, Chinese naval ships will undoubtedly need to sail through the territorial seas of 
other States. For the benefit of its navy, therefore, China may need to change its 
position on the innocent passage of foreign warships through the territorial sea. Sienho 
Yee has argued that if China chooses not to abide by international law rules, in the 
future ―China may find itself in a straightjacket that it has helped to make but from 
which it cannot free itself.‖
130
 According to Zou Keyuan, although China is in a position 
to bring its domestic law into line with the LOSC, such action will certainly take some 
time.
131
 
Taiwan, on the other hand, was not allowed to participate in UNCLOS III and 
thus could not become a party to the LOSC. As previously mentioned, Taiwan is a small 
island which China has claimed as its province. As a result, maritime security has 
always been an significant concern for Taiwan, especially with the rise of China as a 
formidable maritime power. In order to provide its navy with full access to the blue 
waters of the Pacific Ocean, China is attempting to encircle and control Taiwan.
132
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Taiwan is not bound by the LOSC, and with its fear of being invaded by China, it is 
unlikely that Taiwan will change its position regarding the innocent passage of foreign 
warships and government vessels through its territorial sea. 
Security concerns have also featured prominently in Vietnam‘s approach to the 
innocent passage regime. During UNCLOS III, Vietnam was enjoying its status as a 
newly independent State, having long struggled for unification. The importance of 
security for Vietnam was reflected in its 1977 Statement in which it claimed ―security‖ 
as a function of the contiguous zone.
133
 By using the straight baseline system and 
claiming the contiguous zone for security purposes, Vietnam has created a maritime 
security buffer zone that, in some areas, extends to more than 100 nautical miles from 
its coast.
134
 Like other socialist States at the time, particularly the Soviet Union and 
China, Vietnam did not recognise the innocent passage of foreign warships in its 
territorial sea. In 1980, Vietnam issued Decree No.30-CP which requires foreign 
warships to obtain prior authorisation before entering Vietnam‘s contiguous zone.
135
 
Throughout UNCLOS III the Soviet Union, as a major ally of Vietnam, shifted its 
position to support the innocent passage of warships, while China –which at that time 
was perceived by Vietnam as a potential aggressor, supported a restrictive doctrine that 
required foreign warships to obtain prior authorisation from coastal States before 
passing through their territorial sea. Vietnam found itself in a difficult political situation 
that ultimately resulted in its decision to remain silent on this issue.
136
 On 10 December 
1982, at the final session of UNCLOS III, the head of the Vietnamese delegation Mr 
Kim Chung stated that: ―Although we are not entirely satisfied with certain provisions 
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of the Convention, my delegation willingly subscribes to the global compromise and the 
method for the overall settlement of all law-of-the-sea problems.‖
137
 Unfortunately, Mr 
Chung did not clarify which of these ―certain provisions‖ he was referring to. 
With the changing security environment in the South China Sea, especially 
―China‘s new wave of aggressive assertiveness in the [region]‖
138
, Vietnam enacted the 
Law of the Sea of Vietnam in 2012 in an attempt to bring its domestic legislation in line 
with the provisions of the LOSC. As Duong Danh Huy has observed, ―the more this 
Vietnam Maritime Law complies with the provisions of UNCLOS, the more convenient 
the international support for Vietnam will be.‖
139
 However, regarding the innocent 
passage regime, Vietnam still requires prior notification for the passage of foreign 
warships in its territorial sea – a stance inconsistent with the LOSC. It took Vietnam 
more than 20 years (from 1980 to 2012) to change its position from prior authorisation 
to prior notification for the innocent passage of foreign warships; therefore, it is hard to 
predict whether Vietnam will modify its Law of the Sea 2012. However, Vietnam‘s 
response to the USS Curtis Wilbur incident may hint at the State‘s future direction on 
this point. As previously mentioned, the USS Curtis Wilbur was a U.S. Navy destroyer 
which, in January 2016, exercised innocent passage within 12 nautical miles of Triton 
Island claimed by China, Vietnam and Taiwan without giving prior notice to any of 
these claimant States. In responding to the incident, Vietnamese Foreign Ministry 
spokesman Le Hai Binh proclaimed that: ―Vietnam respects the right of innocent 
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passage through its territory in accordance with international law, particularly Article 17 
of the Law of the Sea Convention.‖
140
 
For Indonesia, a State comprising thousands of islands with various ethnic 
groups, coupled with the State‘s vast maritime estate and tumultuous colonial past, it is 
axiomatic that national security and political stability were at the fore of Indonesia‘s 
agenda at UNCLOS III.
141
 Indeed, the Indonesian delegate to UNCLOS III expressed 
the view that: 
Any Law of the Sea Conference must recognize the need for, and ensure the 
achievements of national unity, political stability, economic and social development, as 
well as the safeguard of national defence and security of an archipelagic state like 
Indonesia.
142
 
Decree No.16 of 1971, which required foreign warships passing through 
Indonesian waters to obtain security clearance from the Minister of Defence and 
Security, reflected the State‘s deep concern over maritime security at the time. 
However, after becoming a party to the LOSC in 1985, Indonesia‘s domestic legislation 
remained silent on the innocent passage of foreign warships in its territorial sea and 
archipelagic waters. Perhaps the new concept of the archipelagic State (which had 
finally been incorporated in the LOSC) took into account Indonesia‘s national interests, 
and therefore Indonesia was predominantly satisfied with the LOSC. In a statement 
made on behalf of the Indonesian delegation at the final session of UNCLOS III, Mr 
Kusumaatmadja asserted that: ―We believe that the present text is the maximum that 
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could be achieved by the whole community. Each and every one of us has made 
concessions to achieve a universally acceptable Convention.‖
143
 
Unlike Indonesia, the Philippines faced difficulty in attempting to harmonise its 
Constitution with LOSC provisions on the limits of the territorial sea. Indeed, such 
difficulty was encountered despite the Philippines being content with the new concept 
of the archipelagic State. As a result, the Philippines made statements both on its 
signature to, and ratification of, the LOSC, and which were earlier found to be 
inconsistent with the Convention. The seeming contradictions that exist between the 
State‘s domestic legislation and the LOSC have been a major obstacle for the 
Philippines in implementing the LOSC. In 2009, the Philippines enacted its new 
Baselines Law, which represented an attempt to harmonise its domestic law with the 
LOSC. However, this law created controversy between the Government and Philippines 
petitioners on the basis that it violated the Philippine Constitution. Based on the view 
that the 2009 Baselines Law is only a statutory mechanism for the Philippines to delimit 
its maritime zone, and plays no role in the acquisition or loss of territory, the Supreme 
Court of the Philippines has already declared that the 2009 Baselines Law is 
constitutional.
144
 As the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the law in the Philippines 
legislative hierarchy, it is clear that the 2009 Baselines Law will be enforced. The 
Supreme Court also commented that: 
Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like the 
Philippines will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the 
breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. This is a recipe for a 
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two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely 
enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our 
archipelago; and second, it weakens the country‘s case in any international dispute over 
Philippine maritime space.
145
  
In light of the above pronouncement, it is clear that the 2009 Baselines Law is 
intended to garner international support for the State‘s national security, as well as its 
interest in the escalating territorial disputes with neighbouring States in the South China 
Sea. 
In the case of Malaysia and Brunei, the domestic regulations of both States are 
silent on the passage of foreign warships. As discussed above, these States have 
declared a 12 nautical mile territorial sea; however, neither Malaysia nor Brunei has 
publicised the baselines from which their territorial seas are measured. Compared to 
other South China Sea littoral States, maritime disputes are a less urgent concern for 
these two States, as no incidents have occurred in relation to the innocent passage of 
foreign sovereign immune vessels in their territorial seas. For this reason, it is unclear 
when Malaysia or Brunei will pass domestic regulations on the innocent passage 
regime. 
5.4 Conclusion 
 The text of the LOSC makes it clear that ―ships of all States, whether coastal or 
land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.‖
146
 After the 
entry into force of the LOSC, the littoral States of the South China Sea enacted 
domestic legislation in order to implement the provisions of the LOSC. However, when 
it comes to the passage of sovereign immune vessels in the territorial sea of coastal 
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States, the practice of South China Sea littoral States remains divergent and inconsistent 
with the LOSC. The table below summarises the domestic regulations and practices of 
South China Sea littoral States regarding the innocent passage of foreign warships in 
their territorial seas. 
Table 5.1 Innocent Passage of Foreign Warships: the Practice of South China Sea 
littoral States 
States Domestic regulations 
Brunei Current domestic regulations do not refer to the innocent 
passage of foreign military vessels. 
China Foreign warships are required to obtain prior authorisation. 
Indonesia Current domestic regulations do not refer to the innocent 
passage of foreign military vessels. 
Malaysia Current domestic regulations do not refer to the innocent 
passage of foreign military vessels. 
The Philippines No domestic regulations in place, but in practice foreign 
warships are required to give prior notification or obtain prior 
authorisation. 
Taiwan Foreign military and government vessels are required to give 
prior notification. 
Vietnam Foreign military vessels are required to give prior notification. 
 
 The provisions of the LOSC dealing with maritime zones and navigation 
regimes are widely recognised as reflecting customary international law, and are thus 
binding on all states.
147
 Indeed, the text of the LOSC clearly provides that ships of all 
States enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea. Therefore, the 
passage of warships should not represent an exception. As parties to the LOSC, South 
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China Sea littoral States should harmonise their domestic legislation with the provisions 
of the LOSC in accordance with the international legal principle of pacta sunt 
servanda,
148
 as codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
149
 As 
discussed above, political security and strategic factors have heavily influenced the 
practice of South China Sea States. The degree to which these factors have impacted 
policy decisions will, of course, vary from State to State. In the interest of political 
stability and safe navigation in the South China Sea, some States may choose to adjust 
their domestic laws and regulations to ensure consistency with the LOSC. However, this 
will inevitably take some time and will be subject to changes in the security 
environment.
150
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6 COASTAL STATE PRACTICE IN IMPLEMENTING NAVIGATIONAL 
REGIMES IN THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE 
6.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter Four, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) was one of 
the newer concepts to be introduced in the LOSC. Indeed, it is considered a compromise 
between the divergent interests of coastal States on the one hand and major maritime 
States on the other. The LOSC defines the EEZ as a separate functional zone of a sui 
generis character, with neither residual territorial sea characteristics nor residual high 
seas characteristics.
1
 Coastal States have sovereign rights over living and non-living 
resources of the waters superjacent to the sea-bed and of the sea-bed and its subsoil, as 
well as other economic activities related to economic exploration and exploitation of the 
zone (such as the production of energy from water, current and wind).
2
 Article 56 of the 
LOSC also makes it clear that within the EEZ, coastal States have jurisdiction with 
regard to the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures, 
marine scientific research, and the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment.
3
 In addition to the jurisdictional rights mentioned above, the regime of the 
high seas also applies. In this regard, all States enjoy the freedoms of navigation and 
overflight, as well as the freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines referred to in 
Article 87 and ―other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, 
such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft [etc].‖
4
  
However, in practice, States have different interpretations of the provisions of 
the LOSC regarding the EEZ regime. One of the most controversial issues in 
implementing the EEZ regime has been the legality of foreign military activities in the 
                                                 
1
 R R Churchill and A V Lowe, The Law of the Sea (Manchester University Press, 1999) 165. 
2
 LOSC, art 56. 
3
 LOSC, art 56. 
4
 LOSC, arts 58 & 87. 
 
192 
 
zone. South China Sea coastal States tend to regulate (and sometimes even restrict) 
activities of foreign military vessels and aircraft in their EEZ, while maritime user 
States consider military activities to be included in the freedoms of navigation and 
overflight granted by article 87 of the LOSC.  
As discussed in Chapters Two and Three, the South China Sea is not only 
important for merchant shipping, but also for military transits and operations. Indeed, 
maintaining the safety and freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea 
are key strategic interests for many States. Given that the majority of waters in the 
South China Sea are within EEZs claimed by coastal States, the different interpretations 
of the EEZ regime, together with the prevailing uncertainty over EEZ boundaries, have 
resulted in a number of maritime disputes and confrontations in the area. Against this 
backdrop, the objectives of this chapter are to: (i) analyse the practice of littoral States 
in implementing the navigational regime of the LOSC in the EEZ; (ii) outline the 
ambiguous nature of EEZ maritime claims in the South China Sea; and (iii) discuss 
future prospects for the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in this 
maritime region. 
6.2 The practice of coastal States  
6.2.1 China 
Although China signed the LOSC in 1982, it was not until 1996 (and upon 
ratification of the Convention), that China made its first statement on the EEZ. 
According to this statement, China ―shall enjoy sovereign rights and jurisdiction over an 
exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles and the continental shelf.‖
5
 Two years 
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later, on 26 June 1998, China enacted the Law of the People's Republic of China on the 
Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf (China‘s EEZ Law). This law 
stipulates that China‘s EEZ extends 200 nautical miles from its baselines.
6
 Article 11 of 
China‘s EEZ Law states that:  
All countries, provided observing the international law and laws and regulations of the 
People's Republic of China, enjoy the freedom of navigating in and flying over the 
exclusive economic zone of the People's Republic of China, enjoy the freedom of laying 
down submarine cables and piping in the exclusive economic zone and the continental 
shelf of the People's Republic of China, and enjoy other conveniences related to the 
freedom above-mentioned for legal use of ocean. The route of laying down submarine 
cables and piping must be subject to the consent of the competent authorities of the 
People's Republic of China.
7
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
 It can be understood from this article that foreign vessels and aircraft seeking to 
exercise the freedoms of navigation and overflight in China‘s EEZ must comply not 
only with international law rules but also China‘s relevant domestic legislation. Article 
58(3) of the LOSC makes it clear that in exercising their rights and performing their 
duties in the EEZ, States ―shall comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the 
coastal State in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.‖
8
 If China‘s 
domestic laws and regulations are not in keeping with the provisions of the LOSC, then 
China‘s requirement that other States comply with such laws and regulations is also 
inconsistent with this position. Moreover, article 14 of China‘s EEZ Law states that: 
―[T]he provisions of this Act shall not affect the historical rights of the People's 
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Republic of China.‖
9
 It is unclear precisely what China means by ―historical rights‖, as 
well as the geographic areas to which such rights may apply. According to Zou Keyuan, 
this provision indicates that China‘s maritime claims in the South China Sea are based 
on the controversial ―nine-dash line‖ – a  claim which encompasses about 80 per cent of 
the ocean space in the South China Sea.
10
 However, Zou has also asserted that ―[as] 
China has refused to recognise the Gulf of Tonkin as historic waters...how [can] the 
entire South China Sea become historic waters?‖
11
 According to Clive Symmons, a 
claim of ―historic rights‖ must meet the general requirements of having formal claim, 
continuous and effective exercise of jurisdiction, as well as international acquiescence.
12
 
A leading Vietnamese author has argued that ―[a] long time ago, regional countries 
pursued their normal activities in the East Sea (South China Sea) without encountering 
any Chinese impediment and they have never recognized historical rights of China 
there.‖
13
 Indeed, Vietnam has officially lodged a protest against China‘s EEZ Law, 
claiming that Vietnam: 
[s]hall not recognize any so–called ―historical interests‖ which are not consistent with 
international law and violate the sovereignty and sovereign rights of Viet Nam and Viet 
Nam‘s legitimate interests in its maritime zones and continental shelf in the Eastern Sea 
as mentioned in article 14.
14
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 The original nine-dash line consisted of eleven interrupted lines and was first 
published in 1947 by the Government of the Republic of China (presently Taiwan), and 
before the founding of the People‘s Republic of China (China).
15
 The map was then 
adopted by China with the deletion of two lines in the Gulf of Tonkin, thus becoming 
the nine-dash line map.
16
 However, China has not yet clarified what areas it claims 
within this nine-dash line. According to two commentators, given that the nine-dash 
map was poorly drawn ―in the most inaccurate possible way‖ and without any 
geographical coordinates, it is ―highly unlikely that any international court or tribunal 
charged with assessing the Chinese claim would attribute any substantial value to the 
map.‖
17
 It is also worth noting that in 1993, Taiwan, the original author of the nine-dash 
map, claimed as historic waters areas within the nine-dash line.
18
 However, it can be 
seen from the 1998 Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the Republic 
of China that Taiwan has dropped its original position on historic waters.
19
 Moreover, 
on 12 July 2016, the arbitral tribunal ruled that ―China‘s claims to historic rights, or 
other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, with respect to the maritime areas of the South 
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China Sea encompassed by the relevant part of the ―nine-dash line‖ are contrary to the 
[LOSC] and without lawful effect.‖
20
 
As the LOSC does not contain any provisions which directly address the issue of 
foreign military activities in the EEZ of coastal States, a number of States made 
declarations or statements upon signature and ratification of the Convention, restricting 
the freedoms of navigation and overflight of foreign military vessels and aircraft in their 
EEZs. Interestingly, China made no such statement.
21
 However, it can be deduced from 
a number of interpretative statements made by Chinese officials that the freedoms of 
navigation and overflight in the EEZ have certain restrictions, and should not include 
the freedom to conduct military activities in and over the EEZ.
22
 Some Chinese authors 
have also argued that the phrase ―other internationally lawful uses of the sea‖ in the 
LOSC does not include the freedom to conduct military activities in the coastal State‘s 
EEZ, and that foreign military activities in EEZ ―encroach or infringe on the national 
security interests of the coastal State, and can be considered a use of force or threat to 
use force against that State.‖
23
 In a statement concerning joint naval exercises between 
the United States and South Korea in 2010, China‘s Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong 
Lei proclaimed: ―We hold a consistent and clear-cut stance on the issue. We oppose any 
party to take any military acts in our exclusive economic zone without permission.‖
24
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One of the controversial issues regarding military activities in the EEZ is 
military surveys and hydrographic surveys. In relation to marine scientific research 
(MSR), Art 9 of China‘s EEZ Law states that: 
Any international organization, foreign organization or individual engaging in marine 
scientific research in the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the People's 
Republic of China must have the approval of the competent authorities of the People's 
Republic of China and shall comply with the laws and regulations of the People's 
Republic of China.
25
  
This position is generally consistent with the LOSC.
26
 However, the LOSC does 
not define the terms ―marine scientific research‖ or ―military surveys.‖ The silence of 
the LOSC on this issue has led to different interpretations being advanced by States. 
According to one Chinese author, ―the so-called military survey activities are 
completely subsumed under the category of study called marine scientific research.‖
27
 
Zhang Haiwen, the Deputy Director-General of China‘s Institute for Marine Affairs, has 
argued that any kind of marine data collecting activities in the EEZ ―could be 
categorized as marine scientific research which is subject to the jurisdiction of the 
coastal State.‖
28
 Similarly, Zou Keyuan has expressed the view that ―it is hard to 
understand the logic of the argument that while marine scientific research in the EEZ is 
subject to consent of the coastal State, military activities can be conducted freely 
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without any check by the coastal State.‖
29
 Professor Xue Guifang has even suggested 
that ―hydrographic and military surveys in the EEZ should be under the jurisdiction of 
the coastal state.‖
30
 However, Ian Townsend–Gault and Clive Schofield have opined 
that ―any activity such as hydrographic surveying, which is not expressly declared to be 
within the jurisdiction of the coastal State, remains one of the freedom [sic] of the 
seas.‖
31
 For Pedrozo, hydrographic surveys and military surveys are different from 
marine scientific research.
32
 He explains that as military marine data collection is used 
for military, not scientific purposes, these activities are not subject to approval by the 
coastal State.
33
 Indeed, Sam Bateman concurs with Pedrozo on this point, with the 
former asserting that ―military activities are among the ―other internationally lawful 
uses of the sea‖ related to the freedoms of navigation and overflight in an EEZ‖. 
Nevertheless, Bateman has conceded that ―there is very little difference between how 
MSR data and hydrographic data are used after the data are collected.‖
34
 
In 1992, China enacted the Surveying and Mapping Law of the People‘s 
Republic of China (1992 Surveying and Mapping Law) which stated that: 
Surveying and mapping to be conducted in the territorial air, land and waters, as well as 
other sea areas under the jurisdiction of the People‘s Republic of China by a foreign 
organization or individual alone or in cooperation with the relevant department or unit 
of the People‘s Republic of China shall be subject to the approval by the Government of 
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the People‘s Republic of China or by the department authorized by it. A foreign 
organization or individual that with due approval conducts surveying and mapping in 
the territorial air, land and waters, as well as other sea areas under the jurisdiction of the 
People‘s Republic of China either alone or in cooperation with the relevant department 
or unit of the People‘s Republic of China, must comply with relevant laws and 
administrative rules and regulations of the People‘s Republic of China…
35
 
The 1992 Surveying and Mapping Law, however, did not define the term 
―surveying and mapping.‖ In 2002 China replaced this law with a new Survey and 
Mapping Law (the 2002 Survey and Mapping Law), which entered into force on 1 
December 2002.  This new law defines survey and mapping activities as: ―the activities 
conducted to determine, collect and formulate the key elements of physical geography 
or the shapes, sizes, space positions, attributes, etc. of man-made surface installations, 
as well as to process and provide the data, information and results gained therefrom.‖
36
 
According to this law, foreign organisations or individuals can only conduct surveying 
and mapping within areas under Chinese jurisdiction with the approval of the People‘s 
Republic of China.
37
 Article 7 of this law also states that: 
Foreign organizations or individuals that wish to conduct surveying and mapping in the 
territorial air, land or waters of the People's Republic of China shall, as required by law, 
join hands with the relevant departments or units of the People's Republic of China in 
the form of Chinese-foreign equity joint venture or Chinese-foreign contractual joint 
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venture and such surveying and mapping may not involve State secrets or endanger 
State security.
38
 
It can be seen from the 2002 Survey and Mapping Law that, due to security 
concerns, surveying and mapping activities conducted by foreign organizations or 
individuals within areas under Chinese jurisdiction must now take the form of 
cooperative partnerships with Chinese governmental agencies or private sector actors. 
According to Pedrozo, the effect of the above law is that China is seeking to regulate all 
activities in its EEZ – including hydrographic surveys, military oceanographic surveys 
and surveillance activities. Such action, however, is inconsistent with customary 
international law and the LOSC.
39
  
In practice, there have been a number of incidents involving the passage of 
sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in China‘s EEZ. In 2001, the USNS Bowditch 
was conducting hydrographic surveys in the Yellow Sea (and within China‘s claimed 
EEZ) when it was confronted by a Chinese warship and ordered to leave the area.
40
 On 
1 April 2001, a Chinese naval F-8II fighter jet collided with a U.S. Navy EP-3 
reconnaissance plane in the airspace above China‘s claimed EEZ, approximately 70 
nautical miles south-east of Hainan Island.
41
 This collision resulted in the death of a 
Chinese pilot and forced an emergency landing of the EP-3 on Hainan.
42
 China argued 
that the surveillance activity in China‘s EEZ violated the principle of ―overflight 
freedom‖ as stipulated in the LOSC and amounted to an abuse of right, damaging 
                                                 
38
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China‘s security interests.
43
 However, according to the United States, the EP-3 was 
enjoying the freedom of overflight in international airspace, which includes airspace 
over the EEZ.
44
 Eight years later, on 9 March 2009, another incident occurred within 
China‘s EEZ. This one involved a U.S. Navy ocean surveillance vessel, the USNS 
Impeccable, and a number of Chinese civilian and law enforcement ships approximately 
75 nautical miles south of Hainan Island.
45
 The United States lodged a formal protest in 
relation to the standoff, asserting that China‘s actions were ―illegal, unprofessional and 
dangerous.‖
46
 In response, China claimed that the USNS Impeccable had violated 
international law and threatened China‘s national security. China also ―demand[ed] that 
the United States put an immediate stop to related activities and take effective measures 
to prevent similar acts from happening.‖
47
 On 19 August 2014, a Chinese fighter jet 
intercepted a U.S. Navy P-8 Poseidon aircraft in international airspace, approximately 
135 miles east of Hainan Island and in a manner which U.S. Department of Defence 
spokesperson Admiral John Kirby described as ―unprofessional...unsafe...and...certainly 
not in keeping with the kind of military-to-military relations that we‘d like to have with 
China.‖
48
 In response, Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman Yang Yujun stated that: 
―[I]f the United States really hopes to avoid impacting bilateral relations, the best course 
of action is to reduce or halt close surveillance of China.‖
49
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It is interesting to note that Chinese military vessels have conducted a number of 
military activities within the EEZs of other States without providing advance 
notification. According to the U.S. Department of Defence, there have been several 
instances of Chinese naval activities in the EEZs around Guam and Hawaii.
50
 At the 
Maritime Security Session of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on 1 June 2013, 
Senior Colonel Zhou Bo of the Foreign Affairs Office of China‘s Ministry of National 
Defence stated that China had ―sort of reciprocated America‘s reconnaissance in our 
EEZ by sending our ships to America‘s EEZ for reconnaissance a few times.‖
51
 In May 
2014, China installed an oil rig in the EEZ and on the Continental Shelf claimed by 
Vietnam, and also sent its military and maritime law enforcement forces to protect the 
operation of the rig.
52
 This action created a high degree of tension and led to several 
crashes between sovereign immune vessels of the two countries. In July 2014, a Chinese 
Dongdiao-class auxiliary general intelligence ship was detected while collecting 
military intelligence in the EEZ of the United States, off the coast of Hawaii, during the 
Rim of the Pacific Exercise.
53
 Commenting on this situation, Admiral Sam Locklear, 
Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, stated that ―this is within the law and it‘s 
their right to do it.‖
54
 In response, China‘s Defense Ministry stated that: ―[T]he People‘s 
Liberation Army naval ships‘ operation in waters outside the territorial seas of other 
                                                 
50
 See U.S. Department of Defense, 'Annual Report to Congress on China‘s Military Power, Military and 
Security Developments Involving the People‘s Republic of China 2013 ' (2013), 39. 
51
 See Kimberly Hsu and Craig Murray, 'China‘s Expanding Military Operations in Foreign Exclusive 
Economic Zones' (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2013); see also Rory 
Medcalf, Is China 'reciprocating' US maritime surveillance? (1 June 2013) The Interpreter 
<http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2013/06/01/Is-China-reciprocating-US-maritime-
surveillance.aspx>. 
52
 See chapter 7 of this thesis for further discussion on this point. 
53
 Zachary Keck, China Is Spying on RIMPAC (20 July 2014) The Diplomat 
<http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/china-is-spying-on-rimpac/>. 
54
 Jon Harper, PACOM chief: China spying on RIMPAC brings 'good news' (29 July 2014) Stars and 
Strips <http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/pacom-chief-china-spying-on-rimpac-brings-good-news-
1.295829>. 
 
203 
 
countries is in line with international law and international practice.‖
55
 Therefore, the 
United States accepts foreign military activities in its EEZ. Meanwhile, China, though 
prohibiting foreign military activities in its own EEZ, considers it has the right to 
conduct military activities in EEZs of other States. 
In summary, as a party to the LOSC, China has enacted a number of domestic 
laws and regulations to implement the LOSC regarding the EEZ. The inclusion of so–
called ―historic waters‖ in China‘s EEZ Law has created controversies and led to 
protests by other States. Moreover, it is inconsistent with the LOSC for China to impose 
conditions on foreign vessels and aircraft exercising the freedoms of navigation and 
overflight or to restrict foreign military activities in China‘s EEZ. Indeed, that China 
conducts military activities in the EEZs of other States while restricting such activities 
in its own EEZ reveals a startling inconsistency in its policy. As Raul Pedrozo has 
correctly highlighted: ―It therefore appears that China is applying a double standard.‖
56
 
6.2.2 Taiwan 
Taiwan declared an EEZ of 200 nautical miles in 1979 by Presidential Decree 
No. 5046.
57
 In 1998 it promulgated the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the 
Continental Shelf of the Republic of China (Taiwan‘s EEZ Law).
58
 This law reaffirms 
Taiwan‘s EEZ as being 200 nautical miles measured from the baselines of the territorial 
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sea.
59
 It is interesting to note that only article 11 of Taiwan‘s EEZ Law mentions the 
navigation regime, stating that: 
For any vessel navigating in the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of China 
which commits a discharge violation causing marine environmental pollution, the 
Republic of China may request that vessel to give information regarding its identity, its 
port of registry, its last and its next port of call and other relevant information required 
to establish whether a violation has occurred.
60
 
As sovereign immune vessels and aircraft are not subject to the provisions of the 
LOSC regarding the protection and preservation of the marine environment, they are not 
required to observe coastal State law on the prevention of marine pollution. It is worth 
noting that article 11 of Taiwan‘s EEZ Law is silent on the overflight of foreign aircraft 
and foreign military activities in the State‘s EEZ. Regarding its claim to ―historic 
waters‖, Taiwan‘s 1993 Policy Guidelines for the South China Sea maintained that 
―[t]he South China Sea area within the historic water limit is the maritime area under 
the jurisdiction of the Republic of China, in which the Republic of China processes all 
rights and interests.‖
61
 In 1995, Taiwan‘s Minister of Foreign Affairs reaffirmed this 
position, proclaiming that ―our government has sovereignty over the historic U-shaped 
territory.‖
62
 However, unlike China‘s EEZ Law, Taiwan‘s EEZ Law does not contain 
any provision regarding historic waters, and there have been no official statements made 
by Taiwan on its ―historic waters‖ claim since the passage of this particular law.
63
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Generally, Taiwan‘s EEZ Law is consistent with the LOSC.
64
 However, in relation to 
marine scientific research, article 9(5) of this law states that the undertaking of maritime 
scientific research in the EEZ or on the continental shelf of Taiwan shall ―not prejudice 
the security and benefits of the Republic of China in using such research data.‖ This 
provision is inconsistent with the LOSC as Part XIII of the Convention does not contain 
any provision which imposes security conditions on marine scientific research.
65
  
As China claims Taiwan as its province, theoretically China also claims the EEZ 
claimed by Taiwan. However, in reality, Taiwan‘s EEZ law applies to waters under 
Taiwan‘s jurisdiction. Between 1995 and 1996 China conducted a number of missile 
tests and military exercises near Taiwan‘s coastline and within the EEZ claimed by 
Taiwan.
66
 According to Yann-huei Song, Taiwan is a ―de facto State, satisfying all the 
generally accepted criteria for statehood‖ as well having full diplomatic relations with 
28 States.
67
 Given that China does not recognise foreign military activities in its EEZ, 
the question which arises is whether it is justifiable for China to conduct military 
activities in Taiwan‘s EEZ. 
In summary, even though Taiwan is not a party of the LOSC, it has enacted laws 
and regulations to implement the EEZ regime, notably Taiwan‘s EEZ Law. However, 
this law is silent on the freedoms of navigation and overflight in the State‘s EEZ. As 
China claims Taiwan as a province, and all coastal States in the South China Sea 
recognise ―one China‖ policy, the practical implementation of Taiwan‘s EEZ law is 
fraught with difficulty. 
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6.2.3 Vietnam 
 Vietnam officially declared its EEZ in 1977 with its Statement on the Territorial 
Sea, the Contiguous Zone, the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf.
68
 In 
this Statement, Vietnam declared an EEZ to extend 200 nautical miles from the baseline 
used to measure the breadth of its territorial sea.
69
 However, this statement did not 
contain any provisions regarding the navigation and overflight of foreign vessels and 
aircraft.  Rather, Vietnam‘s first official statement relating to the issue of navigation in 
its EEZ was Decree No. 30-CP, 1980 on Regulations for Foreign Ships Operating in 
Vietnamese Maritime Zones (Decree No.30-CP). According this Decree, foreign ships 
operating in the contiguous zone, the territorial sea or the internal waters of Vietnam are 
not permitted to ―conduct military exercises, use force or the threat of force to threaten 
the security, or disturb the good order of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.‖
70
 
Unfortunately the Decree only mentions the operation of foreign ships and aircraft 
outside the contiguous zone, but not within Vietnam‘s EEZ. As discussed above, the 
treatment of the contiguous zone as a security zone in the Decree is inconsistent with 
the LOSC. Article 2 of Decree No.30-CP states that all foreign ships operating in 
Vietnamese maritime zones ―must respect the sovereignty of the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam over each maritime zone.‖
71
 This means that, at that time, Vietnam used the 
term ‗sovereignty‘ in respect of all its maritime zones, without distinguishing between 
sovereignty and sovereign rights. Article 13 of the decree also made it clear that foreign 
ships operating in Vietnamese maritime zones must not ―conduct acts prejudicial to the 
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defence of the peace, security or good order of the SRVN, or carry out propaganda 
against the SRVN.‖
72
 With the entering into force of the Law of the Sea of Vietnam in 
2013, Vietnam‘s position on the contiguous zone has changed to be consistent with the 
provisions of the LOSC.
73
 Regarding the navigation regime in the EEZ, the Law of the 
Sea of Vietnam states that: 
The State of Vietnam respects freedom of navigation and overflight, the right to lay 
submarine cables and pipelines and lawful uses of the sea by other States in Vietnam‘s 
exclusive economic zone in accordance with this Law and treaties to which the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam is a contracting party, provided that those operations are not 
detrimental to the sovereign rights, jurisdiction and national maritime interests of 
Vietnam.
74
 
 As the LOSC grants the coastal States with specific rights and jurisdiction 
within their EEZs, the addition of ―national maritime interests‖ in this article is 
considered inconsistent with the LOSC EEZ provisions. There is no article specifically 
addressing military activities in Vietnam‘s EEZ. Therefore, it would appear that as long 
as these activities are considered to be ―lawful uses of the sea‖, they are permitted. In 
practice, there have been no incidents regarding foreign military activities in Vietnam‘s 
EEZ. However, during the maritime standoff between China and Vietnam in 2014 in 
relation to the drilling of a Chinese oil rig in Vietnam‘s claimed EEZ, many 
confrontations occurred between sovereign immune vessels and aircraft of the two 
States.
75
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6.2.4 Indonesia 
 On 21 March 1980, Indonesia issued the Declaration by the Government of 
Indonesia concerning the Exclusive Economic Zone of Indonesia (1980 Declaration), 
which stated that the breadth of Indonesia‘s EEZ extends 200 nautical miles from the 
baselines from which its territorial sea is measured.
76
 Article 4 of this Declaration 
provides that: 
In the Exclusive Economic Zone of Indonesia, the freedoms of navigation and 
overflight and of the laying of sub-marine cables and pipelines will continue to be 
recognized in accordance with the principles of the new international law of the sea.
77
 
 After the LOSC was opened for signature in December 1982, Indonesia passed 
Act No. 5 of 1983 on the Indonesian exclusive economic zone of 18 October 1983(Act 
No. 5) in order ―to provide a solid basis for the exercise of the sovereign right, other 
rights, jurisdiction and duties within the exclusive economic zone.‖
78
 This Act 
reaffirmed that the breadth of the State‘s EEZ is 200 nautical miles measured from its 
baselines.
79
 Regarding the navigation regime, article 4(3) states that: 
Within the Indonesian exclusive economic zone, the freedom of international navigation 
and overflight, as well as the freedom of laying submarine cables and pipelines, shall be 
respected in accordance with the principles of the international law of the sea.
80
 
This article repeats verbatim article 4 of the 1980 Declaration. Not a single 
provision of the act mentions the passage of warships or aircraft in Indonesia‘s EEZ. 
However, in 2007, at a meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Manila, 
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Indonesia, together with Malaysia, objected to an ARF-proposed military exercise in the 
EEZs of the two States.
81
 
In relation to foreign marine scientific research in the EEZ, Indonesia requests 
prior consent and imposes conditions.
82
 Act No. 5 also embraces a very broad definition 
of ―scientific research.‖ Article 1(c) defines ―scientific research‖ as ―any activity in 
connection with the research on any maritime aspects on the water surface, in the water 
column, on the seabed and in the subsoil thereof the sea floor in the Indonesia exclusive 
economic zone.‖
83
 
It is unclear whether Indonesia intends on including military activities (such as 
hydrographic surveys and military surveys) within the scope of ―scientific research.‖ 
However, in practice, there have been no incidents involving the passage of military 
vessels and aircraft in Indonesia‘s exclusive economic zone. 
6.2.5 The Philippines 
 The Philippines established an exclusive economic zone by virtue of Presidential 
Decree No. 1599 of 11 June 1978 (Decree No. 1599), declaring that the State‘s EEZ 
―shall extend to a distance of two hundred nautical miles beyond and from the baseline 
from which the territorial sea is measured.‖
84
 Section 4 of the Decree states that: 
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Other States shall enjoy in the exclusive economic zone freedoms with respect to 
navigation and overflight, the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other 
internationally lawful uses of the sea relating to navigation and communications.
85
 
It is clear that the Philippines respects the freedoms of navigation and overflight 
and ―other internationally lawful uses of the sea‖ granted by the LOSC. However, as 
mentioned previously, a vast portion of the Philippine EEZ overlaps with the 
rectangular area established by the Treaty of Paris (and in respect of which the 
Philippines has claimed ―historic territorial waters‖).
86
 Indeed, in some areas, the 
historic territorial sea of the Philippines extends further than its EEZ.
87
 Section 2 of the 
Decree affirms that the rights exercisable by the State in its EEZ shall not 
―prejudice...the rights of the Republic of the Philippines over its territorial sea‖.
88
 In 
2009 the Philippines passed a new baselines law in an attempt to bring its maritime 
claims into close conformity with the provisions of the LOSC. However, it has neither 
amended its Constitution nor formally abandoned its historic maritime claim.
89
 As a 
result, the freedoms of navigation and overflight and ―other internationally lawful uses 
of the sea‖ may only apply to a small portion of the EEZ outside the limits established 
by the Treaty of Paris.
90
 
Regarding research activities, section 3 of Decree No. 1599 states that ―any 
research‖ conducted in the Philippine EEZ shall be approved under authority by the 
                                                 
85
 Ibid section 4. 
86
 See also Lowell Bautista, 'Philippine boundaries: internal tensions, colonial baggage, ambivalent 
conformity' (2011) 16(December) Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 35, 42. 
87
 See Figure 4.1: Boundary of the Philippine Treaty Limits in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
88
 See above n 84, section 2. 
89
 See Robert C. Beckman and Clive H. Schofield, 'Defining EEZ Claims from Islands: A Potential South 
China Sea Change' (2014) 29(2) The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 193, 197. 
90
 As the rectangular area defined by the Treaty of Paris extends 600 miles in width and 1200 miles in 
length, the area of the Philippines‘ EEZ outside this rectangular area is very small; see also Merlin M. 
Magallona, 'A Framework for the Study of National Territory: A Statement of the Problem' (2008) 33(2) 
IBP Journal 1, 12; Lowell Bautista, 'The Philippine Treaty Limits and Territorial Water Claim in 
International Law' (2009) 5(1/2) Social Science Diliman 107, 109. 
 
211 
 
Republic of the Philippines.
91
 However, there is no definition for the term ―research‖ in 
this Decree. Therefore, it is not clear whether military activities such as hydrographic 
surveys and military surveys fall within the ambit of the term ―research.‖ Upon 
signature and ratification to the LOSC, the Philippines made no statement regarding 
military activities in its EEZ. And although there are no provisions in the national 
legislation of the Philippines restricting foreign military activities in its EEZ, there have 
been a number of occasions where the Philippines has opposed foreign military 
activities in its EEZ.
92
 However, in practice, there have been no incidents directly 
involving the Philippines regarding the passage of sovereign immune vessels and 
aircraft in the Philippine EEZ. 
6.2.6 Malaysia 
In 1984 Malaysia passed the Exclusive Economic Zone Act (Act No. 311), 
declaring an EEZ extending 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the 
breath of the territorial sea is measured.
93
 Act No. 311 does not mention the freedoms of 
navigation and overflight in Malaysia‘s EEZ. Regarding research activities in its EEZ, 
Malaysia requires its consent for the carrying out of any search, excavation, drilling 
operations or marine scientific research.
94
 There is no provision in Act No. 311 dealing 
with foreign military activities. However, upon ratification of the LOSC on 14 October 
1996, Malaysia made a declaration stating that: 
The Malaysian Government also understands that the provisions of the Convention do 
not authorize other States to carry out military exercises or manoeuvres, in particular 
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those involving the use of weapons or explosives in the exclusive economic zone 
without the consent of the coastal State.
95
 
With this statement, Malaysia made it clear that it does not permit foreign 
military activities in its EEZ. As discussed above, the LOSC allows States to make 
declarations or statements upon signature, ratification or accession to the Convention, 
provided such declarations or statements ―do not purport to exclude or to modify the 
legal effect of the provisions of [the] Convention.‖
96
 Similarly, article 309 of the LOSC 
prevents States from making any reservations or exceptions to the Convention ―unless 
expressly permitted by other articles of [the] Convention.‖
97
 According to Hamzah, 
―Malaysia views foreign military activities in its EEZ as not only undermining and 
threatening its security; it goes against the concept of peaceful uses of the sea, which it 
unconditionally supports.‖
98
 Although the LOSC uses the terms ―peaceful uses‖ and 
―peaceful purposes‖, the Convention eschews any definition of these terms. Many 
commentators agree that the concept of peaceful uses/purposes used in the LOSC do not 
prohibit all military activities, only those which are inconsistent with the UN Charter.
99
 
It is also worth noting that, in relation to the peaceful use of the seas, a 1985 report of 
the United Nations Secretary-General on the naval arms race stated that:   
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[M]ilitary activities which are consistent with the principles of international law 
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, in particular with Article 2, paragraph 4, 
and Article 51, are not prohibited by the Convention on the Law of the Sea.
100
 
Among the littoral States of the South China Sea, only Malaysia has made a 
statement regarding military activities in the EEZ. However, Malaysia has not enacted 
any domestic legislation to enforce this statement.
101
 In 2013, when China sent a flotilla 
to patrol the area near James Shoal, a reef claimed by Malaysia and located well inside 
its mainland claimed EEZ, Malaysia responded only diplomatically, with restraint, to 
this incident.
102
  
6.2.7 Brunei 
With the passage of the Brunei Darussalam Fishery Limits Act in 1983, Brunei 
claimed a fishery limit to 200 miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea is measured.
103
 As Brunei has not yet established its EEZ, there are no 
laws or regulations in place concerning the passage of sovereign immune vessels and 
aircraft in the EEZ. 
6.3 The uncertain EEZ boundary 
 As discussed above, all littoral States of the South China Sea have claimed an 
EEZ extending to 200 nautical miles from the baselines (Brunei has claimed fishery 
limits rather than an EEZ). However, the outer limits of the EEZs in this maritime 
region remain unclear.
104
 According to Clive Schofield and Robert Beckman, ―none of 
the States bordering the South China Sea have issued official charts or lists of 
                                                 
100
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101
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102
 See Trefor Moss and Rob Taylor, Chinese Naval Patrol Prompts Conflicting Regional Response The 
Wall Street Journal 
<http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304914204579392720879214320> 
103
 See Brunei Darussalam Fishery Limits Act, commenced on 1st January 1983, art 3(1). 
104
 Beckman, above n 15. 
 
214 
 
geographic coordinates showing the outer limit lines of their EEZ.‖
105
 Indeed, there are 
a number of factors which make the delimitation of EEZ boundaries in the South China 
Sea a difficult task. 
 Firstly, the straight baselines declared by a number of coastal States have been 
criticised and protested against by other States, while some coastal States have not 
defined the baselines from which their other maritime zones are measured. The straight 
baselines declared by Vietnam, China and Taiwan have been protested against by the 
United States.
106
 In particular, the straight baselines defined by China around the 
Paracel Islands were objected to by Vietnam, the United States and Taiwan.
107
 The 
archipelagic baselines defined by Indonesia and the Philippines (pursuant to their 2009 
baselines law) are considered to be generally consistent with the LOSC,
108
 while 
Malaysia and Brunei have not officially published their baselines. However, it can be 
seen from the map contained in the Joint Submission by Malaysia and Vietnam to the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) in 2009 that straight 
baselines have been used by Malaysia.
109
 (See on the Malaysia-Vietnam CLCS 
submission, figure 6.1.) 
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106
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Figure 6.1 Vietnam-Malaysia Joint Submission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf-
2009 
 
Source: Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
Secondly, mid-ocean island maritime zones in the South China Sea remain 
unresolved. China has employed straight baselines around the Paracel archipelago, but 
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no maritime zones have been generated from these baselines. Meanwhile, ―Vietnam has 
not indicated whether it is claiming an EEZ or continental shelf from the Paracel 
Islands.‖
110
 China, Taiwan and the Philippines have all claimed sovereignty over 
Scarborough Shoal, but none of them have established baselines around this Shoal.
111
 In 
the north-eastern part of the South China Sea, China and Taiwan have both claimed 
sovereignty over the Pratas Islands, despite Taiwan exercising full control over this 
feature. Taiwan claims an EEZ around its main island and also an EEZ around the 
group, with the latter extending 200 nautical miles from the baselines.
112
 The EEZ 
claimed by Taiwan overlaps with the EEZ claimed by the Philippines in the area of the 
Luzon Strait.
113
 However, as the Philippines officially recognises a ―one China‖ policy, 
it is highly unlikely that an EEZ boundary delimitation will be reached between Taiwan 
and the Philippines in this maritime area.
114
 Unlike the Paracels, no baselines have been 
defined around the Spratlys. Littoral States have different views on whether some 
features of the Spratlys can be classified as islands which can generate their own EEZs 
in accordance with article 121 of the LOSC.
115
 In 2009, Vietnam and Malaysia made a 
joint submission to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf, but neither State claimed an EEZ from any of the Spratly Islands.
116
 However, in 
a Note Verbale submitted to the UN Secretary-General on 14 April 2011, China stated 
that the Spratly Islands ―are fully entitled to a territorial sea, exclusive economic zone 
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and continental shelf.‖
117
 According to Clive Schofield, if the 200 nautical mile limit of 
the EEZ is constructed from straight baselines and archipelagic baselines of littoral 
States, then there exists a small high seas pocket in the centre part of the South China 
Sea. However, if the disputed islands of the South China Sea can generate their own 
EEZs, then no high seas pocket will exist in this maritime region.
118
 It is worth noting 
that the arbitral tribunal, in its final award in the South China Sea Arbitration, held that 
all the high-tide features in the Spratly Islands ―do not generate entitlements to an 
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.‖
119
  
Thirdly, the so–called ―nine-dash line‖ map claimed by China has created 
ambiguity and confusion when identifying maritime boundaries in the South China Sea. 
As discussed above, China has not officially declared what it claims within the nine-
dash line (which encompasses about 80 percent of the ocean space in the South China 
Sea). According to Beckman, ―it is not possible to identify the overlapping claim areas 
in the South China Sea‖ until China clarifies its claim.
120
 If China claims sovereignty 
over all offshore features within the nine-dash line, as well as the associated maritime 
zones which can be generated from these features under the LOSC, then, putting to one 
side disputed sovereignty claims with other littoral States over these offshore features, 
its claim would appear to be consistent with international law. However, if China claims 
sovereignty or sovereign rights over all waters and offshore features within the nine-
dash line, then a feasible solution to maritime boundary delimitation in the South China 
                                                 
117
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Sea would be almost impossible.
121
 Fortunately, as discussed above, the arbitral tribunal 
has already ruled that the nine-dash line claimed by China has no legal basis. As the 
arbitral tribunal‘s award is legally binding (despite China‘s rejection of it), the nine-
dash line claimed by China should be ignored in any future negotiation regarding 
maritime delimitation in the South China Sea where China is a party. However, ignoring 
the nine-dash line, many offshore features of the South China Sea have been claimed 
and occupied by other States. As sovereignty disputes over these features are unlikely to 
be resolved, maritime delimitation involving these features is unlikely to be achieved 
anytime soon. 
 In summary, the remaining disputes over sovereignty claims to offshore islands 
between coastal States together with the different perspectives between China and other 
littoral States over maritime zones that may be generated from these offshore islands 
will remain and are unlikely to be resolved. If China respects international law and the 
arbitral tribunal‘s rulings, then the disputed maritime areas in the South China Sea will 
be narrowed down. However, it has appeared that this might not be the case. The 
uncertain nature of the remaining EEZ boundary, together with the variations which 
exist in the implementation of the LOSC‘s EEZ regime by coastal States, renders 
jurisdictional rights over this maritime zone even more ambiguous. 
6.4 Future prospects 
It is clear that maritime boundaries in the South China Sea remain uncertain and 
difficult to resolve. While other littoral States have sought to bring their maritime 
claims into conformity with the LOSC, China continues to claim its maritime zones 
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based not just upon the LOSC but also upon historical grounds.
122
 Some authors have 
argued that as each of the coastal States in the region claim areas that are immediately 
contiguous to their territorial seas, their conflicting claims could be harmonized. 
However, as ―China claims the entirety of the South China Sea...there is no possibility 
of compromise with [its] position, since it is all or nothing.‖
123
 The LOSC makes it clear 
that all disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the provisions of the 
LOSC shall be submitted to the court or tribunal having jurisdiction under Section 2, 
Part XV of the Convention.
124
 According to article 287 of the LOSC, when signing, 
ratifying or acceding to this Convention, States are free to choose one or more of four 
methods for the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the 
Convention, including adjudication before the International Court of Justice (ICJ); 
adjudication before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS); 
arbitration under an arbitral tribunal in accordance with Annex VII of the LOSC; or 
arbitration under a special arbitral tribunal in accordance with Annex VIII of the 
LOSC.
125
 However, none of the claimant States in the South China Sea have made a 
selection pursuant to article 287 of the LOSC.
126
 Moreover, upon ratification of the 
LOSC in 1996, China made the following Declaration under article 298 of the 
Convention: ―The Government of the People's Republic of China does not accept any of 
the procedures provided for in Section 2 of Part XV of the Convention with respect to 
all the categories of disputes referred to in paragraph 1(a)(b) and (c) of Article 298 of 
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the Convention.‖
127
 This means that China has opted out of the compulsory dispute 
settlement regime of the LOSC concerning maritime boundary delimitation; historic 
bays or titles; military activities and law enforcement activities; and disputes in respect 
of which the Security Council of the United Nations is exercising the functions assigned 
to it.
128
  
The issue of the EEZ regime is separate from the issue of maritime boundary 
delimitation. This is because even if all the territorial disputes in the South China Sea 
were resolved, States could continue to implement the EEZ regime of the LOSC 
differently, especially with regard to foreign military activities.
129
  
As at 23 September 2016, 168 States and entities have ratified or acceded to the 
LOSC, and only a minority of States (30 in total) continue to exercise some form of 
extra-sovereign control over their EEZs which might infringe foreign military 
activities.
130
 Within the South China Sea region, only Malaysia has made a formal 
statement restricting foreign military activities in its EEZ. Even so, it has not enacted 
any domestic legislation on this issue. As discussed above, China grants foreign States 
the freedoms of navigation and overflight in its EEZ, but this does not include ―the 
freedoms to conduct military and reconnaissance activities, to perform military 
deterrence or battlefield preparation or intelligence gathering.‖
131
 China is the only 
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littoral State to have challenged foreign military activities in its EEZ, particularly those 
activities conducted by the United States. As China transitions to become a significant 
naval power, its naval vessels and aircraft will transit across the oceans. Therefore, for 
the security and safety of navigation, China will need to conduct military activities of 
some kind in the EEZ of other States. Indeed, the Chinese navy recently conducted a 
number of intelligence collection activities in foreign EEZs.
132
 Some legal 
commentators are of the opinion that China might change its position on foreign 
military activities in the EEZ of other States.
133
 However, based on recent incidents 
between the United States and China in the South China Sea, it seems that even if China 
increases its military operations in foreign EEZs, it will continue to try to restrict 
foreign military activities in its own EEZ.
134
 Other littoral States have actively sought to 
bring their domestic legislation into close conformity with the LOSC. Nevertheless, 
none of them have officially supported or restricted foreign military activities in their 
EEZ.  
6.5 Conclusion 
 All littoral States of the South China Sea have enacted laws and regulations to 
implement the LOSC EEZ regime. However, in practice, these States have different 
interpretations, particularly those pertaining to the freedoms of navigation and 
overflight of foreign military vessels and aircraft. The table below summarises the 
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practice of South China Sea littoral States in relation to foreign military activities in the 
EEZ. 
Table 6.1 The Practice of South China Sea Littoral States in relation to Foreign Military 
Activities in the EEZ 
Name of State State Practice 
Brunei Current domestic regulations do not mention foreign military 
activities in its EEZ. 
China Restricts foreign military activities in its EEZ.  
Indonesia Current domestic regulations do not restrict foreign military 
activities in the EEZ, but on a few occasions Indonesia has 
objected to foreign military activities in this zone. 
Malaysia Consent required for foreign military activities in the EEZ. 
The Philippines Current domestic regulations do not restrict foreign military 
activities in the EEZ, but on a few occasions the Philippines 
has objected to foreign military activities in this zone. 
Taiwan Current domestic regulations do not mention foreign military 
activities in its EEZ. 
Vietnam Current domestic regulations do not mention foreign military 
activities in its EEZ. 
  
 In order to promote stable, secure and safe navigation in the South China Sea, 
States should seek to not only respect international law, harmonise their domestic laws 
and regulations with international law provisions (and particularly those of the LOSC), 
but also cooperate with each other regarding the freedoms of navigation and overflight 
in this region. However, as States have interpreted the LOSC differently, the domestic 
legislation and practices of individual States are far from uniform. As a result, and due 
to strategic tensions outlined in Chapters Two and Three, there have been a number of 
incidents involving a variety of dangerous manoeuvres of sovereign immune vessels 
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and aircraft at sea, within the EEZs claimed by coastal States. The next chapter will 
analyse incidents in and over the South China Sea in greater depth.  
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7 INCIDENTS INVOLVING SOUTH CHINA SEA LITTORAL STATES  
7.1 Introduction 
Throughout the development of the international law of the sea, the freedom of 
navigation enjoyed by foreign States, and the jurisdiction of coastal States in maritime 
areas adjacent to their coastlines, have been the subject of international negotiations and 
debate.
1
 After centuries of evaluation, compromises were made to balance the divergent 
interests of States, with these compromises being codified in the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (LOSC).
2
 However, as discussed in previous 
chapters, States have implemented the provisions of the LOSC differently, particularly 
those provisions regarding the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in and 
over the territorial seas and the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of coastal States. 
Indeed, such inconsistencies have marred other international law instruments, including 
the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs)
3
 and the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention)
4
. As a result, there 
have been a number of incidents at sea involving vessels and aircraft of South China 
Sea littoral States. This chapter will analyse selected incidents, as well as provide a table 
of all well-known incidents which have occurred in the territorial seas and claimed 
EEZs of South China Sea littoral States in recent years. By analysing incidents which 
have occurred both within the South China Sea and outside the South China Sea but 
involving South China Sea littoral States, this chapter will explore the difficulties in 
implementing the navigational regime of the LOSC, as well as the lack of uniformity in 
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the way States observe other international laws and regulations regarding the navigation 
and overflight of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft.  
7.2 Incidents involving the passage of sovereign immune vessels in the territorial 
sea  
As discussed in Chapter five, incidents involving the passage of foreign vessels 
in the territorial sea of coastal States have become commonplace due to the divergence 
in State practice. Since the entry into force of the LOSC, there has been a dearth of case 
law involving the innocent passage of warships. However, there have been a number of 
incidents reflecting the practice of South China Sea littoral States that are critically 
analysed in this section. 
7.2.1 The ―ANZAC Day incident‖ 
On 17 April 2001, a flotilla of three Australian warships, including two frigates 
and a supply ship, were traversing through the Taiwan Strait when it was challenged by 
a Chinese warship.
5
 The Chinese captain radioed to request the flotilla leave the Taiwan 
Strait because it was breaching Chinese laws and intruding into China's territorial sea 
without prior authorisation.
6
 However, the flotilla ignored the warning and continued to 
sail through the strait without changing course.
7
 China then raised an official protest 
with the Australian Embassy in Beijing over the incident.
8
 In response, a spokesman 
from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade stated: ―Our position is 
[that] our ships were exercising their rights under the international law of the sea which 
provides that foreign vessels can pass through another country's territorial waters, under 
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the right of innocent passage, as it's described.‖
9
 Australia‘s Prime Minister at the time, 
John Howard, asserted that there had been a ―long-standing difference‖ between China 
and other States on the interpretation of the right of innocent passage. However, he 
noted that the passage of Australian warships on this occasion was legal and entirely in 
accordance with international law.
10
 The incident did not pose a serious problem for the 
bilateral relationship between China and Australia, as any residual tension was diffused 
through constructive dialogue.
11
 However, it appears that differences in State practice 
between China and Australia regarding the innocent passage of warships continue to 
exist. 
Indeed, this incident raises the question of whether foreign warships have the 
right of innocent passage in the Chinese territorial sea, and particularly in the Taiwan 
Strait.
12
 To address this question, the status of the Taiwan Strait and the right of 
innocent passage as it applies to warships will be analysed. 
The Taiwan Strait is a vital international shipping route connecting the East 
China Sea and the South China Sea. More than 170 nautical miles long, the Strait varies 
in width from 93 nautical miles to 116 nautical miles, with an average depth of around 
of 60 metres.
13
 The LOSC defines a ―strait used for international navigation‖ as a strait 
which is ―used for international navigation between one part of the high seas or an 
exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic 
zone.‖
14
 However, ―if there exists through the strait a route through the high seas or 
through an exclusive economic zone of similar convenience with respect to navigational 
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and hydrographical characteristics‖, then the provisions of the LOSC applicable to a 
―strait used for international navigation‖ do not apply to the strait.
15
 The Taiwan Strait 
falls within this exception as there is an existing EEZ corridor within the strait.
16
 As a 
result, the LOSC transit passage regime does not apply to the Taiwan Strait.
17
 In this 
case, ships and aircraft transiting through the EEZ corridor of the Taiwan Strait enjoy 
the freedoms of navigation and overflight. However, within the bordering territorial seas 
of China and Taiwan, ships enjoy only the right of innocent passage, while aircraft have 
no such right.
18
 
With regard to the Anzac Day incident, as the three Australian warships were 
passing through China‘s territorial sea within the Taiwan Strait, the innocent passage 
regime of the LOSC applied to them. The LOSC stipulates that ―ships of all States, 
whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the 
territorial sea.‖
19
 However, as discussed in Chapter Five, States interpret this provision 
differently. While Australia applies a ―rigid application of what LOSC expressly 
includes‖, a number of States (including China) require prior authorisation for the 
                                                 
15
 LOSC, art 36. 
16
 See Keyuan, above n 13, 266. Vessels can transit through the route outside the territorial seas of China 
and Taiwan while remaining within the Taiwan Strait. This situation is different from the Torres Strait. 
The Torres Strait is wider than 24 nautical miles and there are EEZ areas within the Strait. However, 
according to Stuart Kaye, as the only navigable route is within the territorial sea, the regime of transit 
passage applies to the Torres Strait. See Stuart B Kaye, 'Regulation of Navigation in the Torres Strait: 
Law of the Sea Issue' in Donald R Rothwell and Sam Bateman (eds), Navigational Rights and Freedoms 
and the New Law of The Sea (Martinus Nijhoff, 2000) .   
17
 Under article 38, all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage through a strait used for 
international navigation. Transit passage means the exercise of the freedoms of navigation and overflight 
solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the strait between one part of the high seas 
or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone. 
However, transit passage may include passage through a strait for the purpose of entering, leaving or 
returning from a State bordering the strait, subject to the conditions of entry of the particular State. 
18
 See James Kraska and Raul Pedrozo, International Maritime Security Law (Koninklijke Brill NV, 
2013), 224. 
19
 LOSC, art 17. 
 
229 
 
passage of foreign warships through their territorial seas.
20
 The Law of the People‘s 
Republic of China Concerning the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 1992 
(China‘s Territorial Sea Law) states that in order to enter the territorial sea of the 
People's Republic of China, ―foreign military ships must obtain permission from the 
Government of the People's Republic of China.‖
21
 Although this prior approval 
requirement is inconsistent with the LOSC, China‘s domestic legislation nonetheless 
prescribes it.
22
 Currently, there is no evidence suggesting that China intends on revising 
its domestic law regarding the innocent passage of foreign warships in its territorial sea.  
As the LOSC does not contain any provisions directly addressing the passage of 
warships in the territorial sea of coastal States, and is silent on the requirement for prior 
notification or authorisation, it is understandable that States will adopt conflicting 
interpretations in accordance with their own strategic objectives. 
The Anzac Day incident occurred just two weeks after the EP-3 incident which 
involved a collision between a Chinese naval F-8II fighter jet and a U.S. Navy EP-3 
reconnaissance plane in the airspace above China‘s claimed EEZ. The collision resulted 
in the death of a Chinese pilot and forced the EP-3 to make an emergency landing on 
Hainan Island. For Zou Keyuan, the timing of the Anzac Day incident clearly indicated 
that ―Australia...support[ed]...its American ally by sending altogether three of its 
warships through China‘s territorial sea.‖
23
 Keyuan has also expressed the view that 
good intentions are an important factor when exercising the right of innocent passage, 
adding that ―the timing and number of warships was provocative and showed no good 
                                                 
20
 Thomas Windsor, 'Innocent passage of warships in East Asian territorial seas' (2011) 3(3) Australian 
Journal of Maritime and Oceans Affairs 73, 76. 
21
 See Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 
1992 (effective 25 February 1992), art 6. 
22
 See Keyuan, above n 13, 254. 
23
 Keyuan, above n 8, 474. 
 
230 
 
intentions from the Australian side.‖
24
 This suggests that China‘s protest over the 
incident was ―inherently political rather than simply legal.‖
25
 Fortunately, the incident 
was handled peacefully through diplomatic representations and discussions. Sam Blay 
has observed that this incident highlights ―the unique relationship between politics and 
law in international discourse.‖
26
 Even though China and Australia have different legal 
positions on innocent passage, the bilateral relationship between the two States ―appears 
well insulated.‖
27
 However, Blay has conceded that ―one can hardly overlook the 
potential for such disagreements to degenerate into major incidents and conflicts.‖
28
  
The Anzac Day incident highlights the uncertainties which still exist in the 
LOSC regarding the innocent passage of warships. As discussed in Chapter Four, 
warships are included in the term ―ships of all states‖ under Article 17, and therefore 
have the right of innocent passage in the territorial sea of a coastal State. As the 
provisions relating to innocent passage in China‘s Territorial Sea Law impose 
restrictions on the passage of warships – restrictions which do not conform to the LOSC 
– incidents involving such vessels will likely continue to take place in the future. 
7.2.2 The ―Han incident‖ 2004 
In the early morning of November 10, 2004, a Chinese Han-class nuclear-
powered submarine, on its return to Meigezhuang Naval Base from its operating area in 
the Philippine Sea, passed submerged through the territorial sea of Japan in the Ishigaki 
Strait for almost two hours before leaving the Strait.
29
 The Japanese Maritime Self-
Defence Force (JMSDF) had passively tracked the submarine well before it entered 
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Japanese waters, but when the submarine crossed into Japan‘s territorial sea, a Japanese 
aircraft began using active sonar to track the submarine, expressly warning the 
submarine that it was being tracked.
30
 However, the submarine ignored the warning and 
continued submerged through the strait.
31
 As a result of this intrusion, the JMSDF was 
put on alert under a special (high-level) security order by Defense Agency Director 
General Yoshinori Ono for only the second time since the end of World War II.
32
 The 
JMSDF continued tracking the submarine until it was well beyond the Japanese 
coastline.
33
 Japan then confirmed the submarine was a Chinese nuclear-powered 
submarine and lodged a protest, demanding an official apology from China. Six days 
later, China formally responded to the incident, confirming that the submarine was a 
Chinese Han-class nuclear-powered submarine. China did not apologise for the 
intrusion, but rather expressed regret that the submarine had entered Japan‘s Ishigaki 
Channel for ―technical reasons‖.
34
 Japan quickly interpreted this as an apology from 
China in order to diffuse political tensions.
35
 
The incident highlights a number of international legal implications regarding 
the passage of foreign submarines in the territorial sea of coastal States, as well as the 
diverging interpretations of the LOSC adopted by coastal and maritime States. 
The Ishigaki Strait lies between Japan‘s Ishigaki and Tarama Islands. It has a 
breath of approximately 18 nautical miles and connects two parts of Japan‘s EEZ.
36
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Under the LOSC, foreign submarines exercising innocent passage in the territorial sea 
are required to navigate on the surface and show their flag.
37
 However, if there exists a 
strait used for international navigation between one part of the high seas or an EEZ and 
another part of the high seas or an EEZ, and that strait overlaps with the territorial sea of 
a coastal State (the breadth of this type of strait is usually less than 24 nautical miles), 
then all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage.
38
 Under the transit passage 
regime of the LOSC, ships and aircraft may transit in their ―normal modes‖, which 
means that submarines may pass through the strait submerged.
39
 According to Japan‘s 
Territorial Sea Law, ―the territorial sea of Japan comprises the areas of the sea 
extending from the baseline to the line 12 nautical miles seaward thereof‖, but excludes 
the five key straits of the Sya Kaikyo, the Tugaru Kaiky, the Tusima Kaiky Higasi Suid, 
the Tusima Kaiky Nisi Suid and the Osumi Kaiky.
40
 In these five straits, Japan only 
claims a 3 nautical mile territorial sea limit, thereby leaving a sea corridor in each strait. 
Indeed, this suggests that Japan considers the five straits to be straits ―used for 
international navigation‖, and thus straits to which the transit passage regime applies. 
However, by leaving a sea corridor in each strait, Japan avoids granting transit passage 
rights to foreign ships and aircraft under the LOSC. 
Major maritime powers, particularly the United States, do not accept Japan‘s 
claim that there are only five straits ―used for international navigation‖ through 
Japanese waters. According to the United States, the transit passage regime applies to 
every strait that encloses the territorial sea and is capable of navigation between two 
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parts of the high seas freedoms.
41
 China, on the other hand, has a restrictive view on 
transit passage rights. During the Third International Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS III), China expressed its support for strait States enforcing their control over 
straits used for international navigation.
42
 In 1973, China submitted its Working Paper 
on Sea Area within the Limits of National Jurisdiction to the UN Seabed Sub-
Committee, stating that ―[a] strait lying within the territorial sea, whether or not it is 
frequently used for international navigation, forms an inseparable part of the territorial 
sea of the coastal State.‖
43
 This suggests that China ―favoured a regime of innocent 
passage for straits used for international navigation.‖
44
 When the LOSC was adopted, 
China made no statements or declarations. However, upon ratification of the LOSC, 
China made a Statement to the effect that it reserves the right to request foreign 
warships passing through its territorial sea to obtain advance authorisation or give prior 
notification.
45
 Interestingly, the Statement does not mention the regime of transit 
passage. According to Zou Keyuan, the reason for this is that there is no ―strait used for 
international navigation‖ in China‘s territorial sea.‖
46
 Nevertheless, China, like Japan, 
has adopted a restrictive approach when defining the phrase ―straits used for 
international navigation.‖ Indeed, an official People‘s Liberation Army (PLA) 
publication on international law expresses the view that transit passage rights only apply 
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to straits which ―straddle important international sea lanes‖ and which have ―important 
implications for the national interests of certain countries.‖
47
 
Japan claims a 12 nautical mile territorial sea in the Ishigaki Strait, but does not 
categorise this strait as a ―strait used for international navigation.‖ As a result, Japan 
applies the innocent passage regime in the Ishigaki Strait. Therefore, according to 
Japan, the submerged passage of a Chinese Han-class submarine through the Ishigaki 
Strait violated Japan‘s sovereignty. As a result of this intrusion, the JMSDF used 
destroyers and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft to track the submarine for more 
than two hours, with the surveillance continuing until the submarine was well beyond 
the Japanese coastline.
48
 As China did not argue that its submarine transited submerged 
through the Ishigaki Strait in ―normal mode‖, it may be assumed that China has the 
same view as Japan – that is, that the Ishigaki Strait is not a ―strait used for international 
navigation‖, and thus not a strait to which transit passage rights apply. Only if the 
Ishigaki Strait is not a ―strait used for international navigation‖, would the submerged 
passage of the Chinese submarine through the territorial sea of Japan be clearly 
inconsistent with article 20 of the LOSC. For Miyoshi Masahiro, China‘s unwillingness 
to issue a formal apology for the intrusion means that it failed to carry out its State 
responsibility under international law.
49
 
Another implication of China only expressing regret over the Han incident is 
that it demonstrates that China is resisting a wide interpretation of ―straits used for 
international navigation‖. Indeed, even though China may be transitioning to a maritime 
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power with a blue water navy, it still adheres to a restrictive view on the passage of 
foreign warships through its coastal waters.
50
 
As China did not use the Han incident to embrace a more expansive 
interpretation of transit passage rights, what did it seek to accomplish by sending a 
submerged submarine through Japan‘s territorial sea? This question is particularly 
pertinent if one considers that Han-class submarines are fairly noisy and easily detected. 
China explained that the incident occurred due to technical reasons, and Japan officially 
accepted this explanation. However, after examining the waters of the Ishigaki Strait, as 
well as the actual voyage of the submarine through the Ishigaki Strait, Peter Dutton has 
opined that China‘s explanation for the intrusion was just ―a face-saving cover.‖
51
 
Indeed, Dutton has suggested several possible reasons for the intrusion, including a 
covert mapping exercise, a demonstration of China‘s sea power, or perhaps even an 
opportunity to test the anti-submarine warfare capability of the JMSDF.
52
 Whatever the 
reason(s), the submerged passage of a Chinese submarine through Japan‘s territorial sea 
undercuts China‘s restrictive and long-held position on the passage of foreign warships 
in the waters adjacent to coastal States.
53
 Japan, on the other hand, acted quickly to 
demand an official apology from China, thereby strengthening its restrictive definition 
of ―straits used for international navigation‖, as well as to demonstrate its willingness to 
use military power to protect its national security and interests.
54
 
Suffice to say, the incident spurred mutual distrust between the two States. The 
Japane Defense Agency expressed the view that the ―intrusion of a Chinese submarine 
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into Japan‘s territorial waters was a highly provocative act by the Chinese Navy.‖
55
 
Even though the incident did not lead to military confrontation, it did increase Japan‘s 
growing suspicion of China‘s intentions and objectives in the region, and led to Japan 
adopting a tougher political stance against China.
56
  
The 2004 ―Han-incident‖ reveals the divergent interpretations of international 
law which States often adopt, as well as the communication difficulties experienced by 
States when discussing security incidents. The incident also highlights that the covert 
nature of submarine operations, hence, some States would prefer their submarines to 
transit submerged (provided navigational conditions allow for this). However, as 
unidentified submarines detected in the territorial sea could be considered a security 
threat by coastal States, serious consequences could stem from situations which are not 
well-managed. Therefore, better communication, including military exchanges and 
dialogue among armed forces operating in sensitive areas, is necessary in order to avoid 
small incidents triggering a crisis.
57
  
7.3 Incidents involving the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in 
the EEZ 
As discussed in previous chapters, within the EEZ all vessels and aircraft enjoy 
the freedoms of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and 
pipelines, and ―other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, 
such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft [etc].‖
58
 However, in 
practice, States have different interpretations of the LOSC EEZ regime. One of the more 
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controversial issues is foreign military activities in the EEZ. Some coastal States want 
to restrict activities of foreign military vessels and aircraft in their EEZ, while maritime 
user States consider military activities to be part of the freedoms of navigation and 
overflight granted by the LOSC. Apart from disputes over military activities in the EEZ, 
the disregard of international instruments such as COLREGs and the Chicago 
Convention by sovereign immune vessels and aircraft has resulted in incidents 
involving South China Sea littoral States. This section will analyse a number of 
incidents which have occurred in the EEZs of coastal States in order to highlight 
uncertainties and gaps in international law concerning the passage rights of sovereign 
immune vessels and aircraft in the EEZ. 
7.3.1 The EP-3 incident 
On 1 April 2001, a Chinese F-8 fighter jet collided with a U.S. Navy EP-3 
surveillance aircraft in the South China Sea.
59
 The incident occurred approximately 70 
nautical miles off the coast of China‘s Hainan Island, in the airspace above China‘s 
claimed EEZ.
60
 The incident resulted in the Chinese F-8 fighter jet crashing into the sea, 
killing the pilot on board.
61
 The EP-3 was seriously damaged and was forced to make an 
emergency landing on Hainan Island.
62
 Upon landing, all 24 crew members were taken 
into custody and the EP-3 was examined by the Chinese.
63
 A ―solemn representation 
and protest‖ was lodged by China‘s Foreign Ministry against the United States 
government on April 1 in relation to the collision, and a further protest was lodged on 
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April 2 alleging infringement by the United States of China's sovereignty and airspace.
64
 
China‘s Foreign Ministry Spokesman at the time, Zhu Bangzao, argued that the 
surveillance flight went far beyond the scope of EEZ overflight permitted under 
international law, amounting to an abuse of the principle of overflight freedom.
65
 
Bangzao added that the U.S. plane had violated international flight rules causing the 
crash, and thus the United States should bear full responsibility for the incident. He 
further asserted that by entering China's territorial airspace and landing at a Chinese 
airport without China's approval, the EP-3 had violated both international law and 
Chinese domestic laws, forfeiting the sovereign immunity which may otherwise have 
attached to the military aircraft.
66
 Following the incident, China‘s then-President, Jiang 
Zemin, made a public statement demanding the United States accept full responsibility 
for the collision, apologise for the incident, and cease its reconnaissance flights in the 
airspace close to China‘s coast.
67
 In response to China‘s demands and protests, the 
United States contended that the crash was caused by the F-8 pilot flying in a risky 
manner. Even so, the United States said that it was sorry for the loss of the Chinese pilot 
and aircraft, and for the EP-3 entering China‘s airspace and landing on Hainan Island 
without verbal clearance.
68
 However, the United States also asserted that the EP-3 
aircraft made an ―emergency landing after following international emergency 
procedures.‖
69
 Despite the United States saying ―sorry‖, it is clear they did not accept 
legal responsibility for the incident. On a CBS talk show on April 8, 2001, U.S. 
Secretary of State Colin Powell declared that ―we‘ve expressed sorrow for it, and we‘re 
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sorry that that happened, but it can‘t be seen as an apology, accepting responsibility.‖
70
 
He also added that ―our reconnaissance flights, when we fly them, how we will fly them 
in international air space over international waters will be something that the United 
States government will decide.‖
71
  
After 11 days of exchanging views through diplomatic and political channels, all 
crew members aboard the EP-3 aircraft were released. However, it took three months 
for the disassembled EP-3 to be returned to the United States.
72
 China requested $1 
million for costs associated with the incident, but the U.S. Department of Defense 
offered a ―non—negotiable‖ amount of  $34,567.00 as a ―fair figure for services 
rendered and assistance in taking care of the aircrew and some of the materials and 
contracts, and what not, to remove the EP-3 itself.‖
73
 
As China and the United States blamed each other for the violation of 
international law, no negotiated agreement was reached. The incident was not brought 
before any court or tribunal, nor did it lead to further deterioration in the bilateral 
relationship between the two States.  
The incident reveals a number of uncertainties in international law, including: (i) 
the types of military activities that can be carried out by sovereign immune aircraft 
above the EEZ of a coastal State; (ii) the rules of the air applicable to military aircraft; 
and (iii) the sovereign immune status of military aircraft in cases which call for an 
emergency landing on foreign State territory. 
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Under the LOSC, all foreign aircraft, whether civilian or military, enjoy the 
freedoms of overflight and of laying of submarine cables and pipelines, ―and other 
internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms‖ over the EEZ of a 
coastal State.
74
 According to Andrew Williams, this implies that ―the right of overflight 
is not limited to mere transit over the EEZ but that aircraft may perform operations 
previously permitted under international law.‖
75
 However, in exercising their rights and 
performing their duties, foreign military aircraft shall have ―due regard‖ to the rights 
and duties of the coastal State.
76
 Moreover, the LOSC makes it clear that: 
In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention, State 
Parties shall refrain from any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.
77
 
The United States is yet to ratify the Convention. However, as the EEZ now 
forms part of customary international law, the LOSC EEZ regime undoubtedly applies 
to the United States.
78
 Indeed, with the exception of deep seabed mining provisions, the 
United States Ocean Policy respects LOSC provisions precisely because the Convention 
accurately reflects customary international law.
79
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With regard to the EP-3 incident, China argued that the EP-3‘s reconnaissance 
acts went far beyond the scope of ―overflight‖, thus abusing the freedom of overflight 
and causing a serious threat to China's security interests.
80
 The United States 
acknowledged the ―due regard‖ requirement but argued that military surveillance flights 
over the EEZ of coastal States are lawful acts under international law.
81
 China‘s 
restrictive view on military activities in the EEZ has been supported by a number of 
coastal States, including Brazil, India, Bangladesh, Malaysia and Pakistan.
82
 However, 
other maritime States hold the same view as the United States, including Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
83
 
As the LOSC does not contain any provisions directly addressing military 
activities in the EEZ, it is to be expected that China and the United States will adopt 
interpretations which suit their own interests. However, it is important to note that the 
sovereign rights of coastal States in the EEZ (as specified in article 56 of the LOSC), 
are limited to the ―waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil‖, 
and this does not include the airspace above the EEZ.
84
 Many authors have argued that 
as the airspace above the EEZ is not part of the EEZ, and the LOSC provides no 
provisions regarding military activities in this particular zone, all aircraft enjoy the 
freedom of overflight (and thus the ability to conduct military aviation activities).
85
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Moreover, as China has been conducting a number of surveillance activities in the EEZs 
of other States, including the U.S. EEZs around Guam and Hawaii, it is doubtful 
whether China‘s practice is consistent with its restrictive views on foreign military 
activities in its own EEZ.
86
 
Regarding the collision, China and the United States agreed that China has the 
right to monitor the operations of aircraft over its EEZ, but they blamed each other for 
the risky manoeuvres of each other‘s pilots. According to China, ―the United States 
plane suddenly veered at a wide angle toward the Chinese plane‖, and ―by veering and 
ramming the Chinese jet at a wide angle, against flight rules, the U.S. surveillance plane 
caused the crash of the Chinese jet.‖
87
 The U.S. countered this accusation by saying that 
the EP-3 ―was on auto-pilot, and did not deviate from a straight and level path until it 
had been hit by the Chinese fighter aircraft.‖
88
 In addition, the United States contended 
that the F-8 made two aggressive passes within three to five feet of the EP-3, and that it 
was on the third pass that the F-8 approached ―too fast and closed on the EP-3‖, thus 
causing the collision.
89
  
Given the differing accounts of the collision and the lack of an impartial 
observer, it is impossible to definitively conclude which State was at fault.
90
 However, 
it is important to note that all aircraft must operate with ―due regard‖ for the safety of 
other aircraft. The Chicago Convention, which has been signed and ratified by both the 
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United States and China, prescribes that ―[an] aircraft shall not be operated in such 
proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.‖
91
 Unfortunately, the Chicago 
Convention contains no provisions regarding the operation of State aircraft, including 
military aircraft, beyond the land areas and territorial waters of a coastal State. And 
although the Convention requires States to ensure their state aircraft operate with due 
regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft, there are no provisions addressing 
the interaction between state aircraft in international airspace.
92
 The collision thus 
reveals a startling gap in international law regarding the rules of the air applicable to 
military aircraft in international airspace in times of peace. 
In relation to the landing of the EP-3 on Hainan Island, China contended that ―it 
was illegal for the U.S. military spy plane to enter China's territorial space and to land at 
a Chinese airport without China‘s approval.‖
93
 Therefore, this act ―constituted an 
infringement upon China‘s sovereignty and territorial space.‖
94
 It is clear that the EP-3 
landed on Chinese territory without verbal clearance. However, the United States 
explained that the EP-3 aircraft made an ―emergency landing after following 
international emergency procedures.‖
95
 U.S. Secretary of Defense at the time, Donald 
Rumsfeld, noted that the EP-3 had made approximately 25 attempts to broadcast 
Mayday and distress signals to alert the world and Hainan Island of the collision, but 
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that it was unclear whether or not these distress signals had been acknowledged by 
China.
96
  
Whether a military aircraft in distress may land on a foreign State‘s territory 
without prior authorisation is unclear. Article 3 of the Chicago Convention provides that 
―[n]o State aircraft of a contracting State shall fly over the territory of another State, or 
land thereon without authorization by special agreement or otherwise, and in accordance 
with the terms thereof.‖
97
 In cases of distress, civil aircraft may land on a foreign state‘s 
territory without prior authorisation; however, the Chicago Convention contains no 
provisions regarding distressed military aircraft.
98
 There is no international treaty that 
grants military aircraft in distress the right to enter the territory of a foreign State 
without prior approval. Under the LOSC, all ships in distress, including warships, have 
the right to enter a foreign State‘s port for the purpose of rendering assistance without 
losing their sovereign immunity.
99
 Some authors argue that by analogy, military aircraft 
should have the right to land on foreign territory when necessitated by distress.
100
 
However, other authors take the view that military aircraft do not have the right to make 
emergency landings in a foreign State without permission.
101
 State practice regarding 
this issue appears to support the United States perspective. The United States authorises 
emergency landings by foreign military or state aircraft without a clearance procedure 
―if, in the opinion of the installation commander, denial of a landing request could 
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endanger the safety of the aircraft or its crew.‖
102
 In 1974, a Soviet AN-24 
reconnaissance aircraft made an emergency landing at Gambell Airfield in Alaska. The 
United States allowed the aircraft to be refuelled the next day and to depart without the 
aircraft or its crewmembers being detained.
103
 Similarly, in 2015, a Pakistan Air Force 
aircraft carrying five military personnel was allowed to make an emergency landing at 
Chowdhury Charan Singh airport in India for the purpose of refuelling.
104
 
As the EP-3 incident was resolved without any negotiated agreement and 
without the matter being brought before any court or tribunal, it is hard to draw any 
conclusion regarding the legal responsibilities and liabilities of each side. However, it is 
clear that China and the United States will continue to interpret international law in 
ways which suit their own strategic interests. China will continue to apply its restrictive 
view on foreign military activities in the EEZ, while the United States will continue to 
conduct military activities in other State‘s EEZs by asserting the freedoms of navigation 
and overflight granted by customary international law and the LOSC.
105
  
With the inherent ambiguities of the LOSC, as well as the existing international 
law gaps regarding the rules of the air applicable to sovereign immune aircraft, similar 
incidents to the EP-3 collision may occur in the future. In order to avoid such incidents, 
States should work together to produce an agreement on the interpretation of the LOSC 
in this area, as well as devise pragmatic measures for the safe overflight of sovereign 
immune aircraft at sea.  
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7.3.2 The Impeccable incident 
 On 8 March, 2009, a U.S. ocean surveillance ship, the USNS Impeccable, was 
conducting routine operations in the South China Sea when it was surrounded and 
harassed by a collective of five Chinese vessels, including a naval vessel, an 
oceanographic patrol vessel, a government fisheries surveillance vessel, and two fishing 
trawlers.
106
 According to the United States, only a day earlier a Chinese naval ship had 
―challenged Impeccable via bridge-to-bridge radio broadcast, calling the U.S. vessel‘s 
operations illegal and directing it to leave the area or ‗suffer the consequences.‘‖
107
 On 
8 March 2009, two Chinese ships manoeuvred within 25 feet of Impeccable and then 
intentionally stopped ―directly ahead of [the vessel], forcing Impeccable to conduct an 
emergency ―all stop‖ in order to avoid collision.‖
108
 The incident occurred 
approximately 75 nautical miles from the coast of Hainan Island, in China‘s claimed 
EEZ. Following the incident, the American Embassy in Beijing lodged an official 
protest with the Chinese government, and a Pentagon spokesman made a statement 
characterizing China‘s actions as ―unprofessional‖, ―dangerous‖ and as constituting a 
―violation(s) under international law to operate with due regard for the rights and safety 
of other lawful users of the ocean.‖
109
 In response to the protest from the United States, 
a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, Ma Zhaoxa, propounded that Impeccable had 
―conducted activities in China‘s special economic zone in the South China Sea without 
China‘s permission‖, describing the claims of the United States as ―gravely in 
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contravention of the facts and confus[ing] black and white...they are totally 
unacceptable to China.‖
110
 Ma also added that ―[we] demand that the United States put 
an immediate stop to related activities and take effective measures to prevent similar 
acts from happening.‖
111
 
 On 9 March 2009, White House spokesman Robert Gibbs confirmed that U.S. 
Navy ships would ―continue to operate in those international waters, and we expect the 
Chinese to observe international law around that.‖
112
 Indeed, Impeccable returned to the 
area the next day to continue its survey work – this time with the escort of a guided 
missile destroyer, the USS Chung-Hoon.
113
 
The Impeccable incident led to increased tensions between the United States and 
China, with the two States accusing each other of violating international law.
114
 The 
incident brings to the fore not only the legal question of whether States may conduct 
military activities in a foreign State‘s EEZ, but also the safety of maritime navigation 
under international law. 
 The Impeccable is an ocean surveillance ship which directly supports the U.S. 
Navy to detect and track undersea threats using both passive and active sonar.
115
 After 
the incident, the Pentagon protested to China, stating that: 
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We believe firmly that what that naval ship was doing in those international waters is 
not only fully consistent with international law, it is common practice. And we hope 
that the Chinese would behave in a similar way, that is, according to international 
law.
116
 
According to the United States, military activities are part of those 
internationally lawful uses of the sea associated with the freedom of navigation under 
Article 58 of the LOSC. Therefore, ―[c]oastal States do not have a right under 
international law to regulate foreign military activities in the EEZ.‖
117
 China, on the 
other hand, argued that the activities of the Impeccable in China‘s EEZ took place 
―without [their] permission‖ and ―have broken international laws as well as China‘s 
laws and regulations.‖
118
 On 10 March 2009, a press conference was held to elucidate 
the specific international and Chinese laws that had been contravened by the Impeccable 
incident. Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Ma Zhaoxu, stated that: 
While answering the questions, I mentioned three laws: UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, Law of the People‘s Republic of China on the Exclusive Economic Zone and 
the Continental Shelf, and Regulations of the People‘s Republic of China on the 
Management of Foreign-related Marine Scientific Research.
119
 
Both China and the United States agreed that the incident occurred in China‘s 
claimed EEZ; however, as the United States is not a party to the LOSC, its statement 
used the term ―international waters‖ rather than EEZ. The United States also substituted 
the terms ―international law‖ and ―common practice‖ for ―the LOSC‖. However, as 
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discussed above, since the EEZ now forms part of customary international law, it is 
clear that the EEZ provisions in the LOSC would apply to the United States.
120
 
 According to some authors, military uses of the sea are lawful pursuant to 
customary international law, and the LOSC affirms this by confining such activities to 
the territorial seas, archipelagic waters, and straits used for international navigation, but 
not in the EEZ.
121
 The United States view is that: 
Military activities, such as anchoring, launching and landing of aircraft, operating 
military devices, intelligence collection, exercises, ship and aircraft operations and 
conducting surveys, are recognized high seas uses that are preserved by Article 58.
122
 
 Therefore, the United States was firmly of the view that the activities of the 
Impeccable were fully consistent with international law. China, on the other hand, did 
not officially refer to any specific provisions of the LOSC to support its position 
regarding the Impeccable incident. However, some Chinese scholars have proffered an 
explanation for China‘s position based on certain provisions of the LOSC. Ji Guoxing 
proposed that the military survey activities conducted by the Impeccable in China‘s 
EEZ ―violated the fundamental principle‖ of the LOSC on ―peaceful uses of the sea.‖
123
 
Ji added that the Impeccable was involved in collecting military information, and that 
such conduct constituted a threat against China‘s territorial integrity and political 
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independence, thus breaching the ―peaceful purposes‖ provision of the LOSC.
124
 As the 
LOSC provides neither a definition nor any criteria for ―peaceful purposes‖, this 
argument is hardly convincing. According to Rahman and Tsamenyi, ―no sound 
argument can be made in the context of the LOS Convention, or any other international 
legal instrument, that peacetime surveillance activities in the EEZ threaten either the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any coastal state.‖
125
 According to Sam 
Bateman, as the Impeccable is classified as an ―ocean surveillance vessel‖ and is used 
for collecting information for purely military purposes (and thus not marine scientific 
research), its activities were not under coastal State jurisdiction but rather formed part of 
the freedom of navigation on the high seas – a freedom which under the LOSC extends 
to an EEZ.
126
 Bateman also has expressed the view that ―military uses of the seas are a 
recognized right under international law, and it would be difficult for China to sustain 
an argument that the activities of these ships posed a direct threat to its national 
security.‖
127
 In support of this view, Stuart Kaye has pointed to the San Remo Manual 
on the Law of Armed Conflict at Sea – a document which reflects customary 
international law and confirms that armed conflict can take place in the EEZ of a neutral 
State. Therefore, it is difficult to assert that military surveillance activities in a foreign 
state‘s EEZ are contrary to international law.
128
 
 Another viewpoint which supports China‘s position on the Impeccable incident 
is that ―military survey activities are completely subsumed under the category of study 
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called marine scientific research.‖
129
 Under the LOSC, marine scientific research in the 
EEZ and on the Continental Shelf ―shall be conducted with the consent of the coastal 
State.‖
130
 However, the LOSC does not define the term ―marine scientific research.‖ 
Zhang Haiwen has argued that there is almost no difference between the scientific 
instruments and equipment on board U.S. naval data collection vessels, and those on 
board normal marine scientific research vessels, making it is difficult to identify the real 
purposes and uses of the collected data.
131
 Indeed, this has led Zhang to assert that 
―marine data collecting activities conducted in the EEZ could be categorized as marine 
scientific research which is subject to the jurisdiction of the coastal State.‖
132
 However, 
the United States distinguishes between marine scientific research (which requires 
coastal State consent), and hydrographic and military surveys (which come under the 
freedom of navigation and do not require the consent of coastal states).
133
 Other authors 
support the U.S. view by arguing that ―if the whole incident arose from China‘s desire 
to keep its 200 nautical mile limit clear of foreign warships, then it was acting beyond 
its rights at international law.‖
134
 
 Apart from the legal debate over the activities conducted by the Impeccable in 
China‘s claimed EEZ, the incident raises concerns over the safety of navigation at sea. 
Article 94 of the LOSC stipulates that every State shall take necessary measures to 
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ensure that ships flying its flag observe the applicable international regulations relating 
to the prevention of collisions at sea.
135
 All sea going vessels, except submarines, are 
bound by the rules set out in COLREGs. These Regulations, which are commonly 
known as ―the rules of the road‖ or navigation rules, make it clear that the ship‘s 
commander must strictly comply with COLREGs and ―the ordinary practice of seamen‖ 
to avoid a collision.
136
 In regard to the Impeccable incident, Admiral Timothy Keating 
stated that ―[t]he Impeccable incident is certainly a troubling indicator that China, 
particularly in the South China Sea, is behaving in an aggressive, troublesome manner 
and [is] not willing to abide by acceptable standards of behavior or ‗rules of the 
road.‘‖
137
 The United States became a party to COLREGs on 15 July 1977, while China 
became a party on 7 January 1980.
138
 The COLREGs‘ rules apply to all vessels, 
including sovereign immune vessels, ―upon the high seas and in all waters connected 
therewith navigable by seagoing vessels.‖
139
 The COLREGs entered into force before 
the LOSC; however, as noted in Chapter Four, the reference to ―all navigable waters 
connected to the high seas‖ in COLREGs would clearly include the new EEZ regime.
140
 
With regard to the Impeccable incident, Odom has contended that two of the Chinese 
vessels ―unilaterally created a risk of collision with the Impeccable by failing to ‗keep 
out of the way‘ and crossing its bow, even though the circumstances gave them ample 
opportunity to avoid doing so.‖
141
 Odom has further proposed that if a collision had 
occurred, the Chinese vessels would have been solely responsible, as they had created a 
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risk-of-collision situation themselves.
142
 In the aftermath of the incident, the United 
States released photos and video footage showing the two Chinese vessels intentionally 
stopping ahead of Impeccable. However, China refuted the U.S. accusation, stating that 
―[t]he U.S. assertion is flatly inaccurate and unacceptable to China.‖
143
 The incident, 
however, raises significant concerns about the safety of maritime navigation, 
particularly the extent to which sovereign immune vessels observe the ―rules of the 
road‖. The incident also reveals that flag States may be unwilling to enforce the 
provisions of COLREGs when an incident involves their own sovereign immune 
vessels. The incident also involved China‘s fishing vessels. However, as this type of 
―irregular‖ fishing vessels were used to support China‘s maritime claims, it is unlikely 
that China will enforce the COLREGs provisions on them. 
 Unlike the EP-3 incident, the Impeccable incident resulted in neither a collision 
nor the loss of life. However, the incident was considered a ―trigger point‖ for the most 
serious confrontation between the United States and China since the EP-3 incident in 
2001.
144
 Thankfully the incident did not escalate into a full scale international crisis, but 
in the absence of any ruling by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or any other 
tribunal, it is difficult to derive from the incident any broadly accepted principle on 
military activities in a foreign state‘s EEZ. 
 With the Impeccable incident taking place eight years after the EP-3 incident, it 
is clear that neither the United States nor China intend to change their stance regarding 
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military activities in EEZs. Indeed, this ambiguity in international law allows States to 
continue adopting conflicting interpretations which suit their own strategic interests. To 
avoid similar incidents from occurring in the future, coastal and maritime States should 
strive for an international agreement on military activities in the EEZ of foreign States, 
as well as ensuring that their vessels respect internationally accepted standards on the 
safety of navigation. 
7.3.3 Haiyang Shiyou-981 Oil Rig Crisis 2014 
On 2 May 2014, the state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC) placed the Haiyang Shiyou 981 (HYSY 981) oil rig at 15
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E on 27 May 2014.
145
 Both of these locations lie well within the EEZ and 
continental shelf claimed by Vietnam, approximately 130-150 nautical miles off the 
Vietnamese coast.
146
 To support the operation of the rig, China deployed approximately 
80 escort vessels to the area, including seven military ships and a number of military 
aircraft.
147
 In response, Vietnam dispatched approximately 30 law enforcement vessels, 
including patrol vessels of the Vietnamese Coast Guard and surveillance vessels of the 
Fisheries Bureau, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. These vessels issued 
warnings to the Chinese contingent and demanded that the rig be removed from 
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Vietnam‘s EEZ and continental shelf.
148
 Vietnam also sent Notes Verbales and 
communicated with Chinese authorities at various levels more than 30 times with regard 
to China‘s provocative placement of the oil rig and its deployment of escort vessels 
within Vietnam‘s claimed EEZ. Indeed, Vietnam contended that these actions infringed 
Vietnam‘s sovereign rights and jurisdiction, and were in violation of international 
law.
149
 China argued that the oil rig was placed 17 nautical miles from Triton Island 
(Đảo Tri Tôn in Vietnamese and Zhongjian Island in Chinese), in the Paracel Island 
group (Quần đảo Hoàng Sa in Vietnamese and Xisha Islands in Chinese) and over 
which China claims ―indisputable‖ sovereignty.
150
  
As discussed in Chapter Two, the Paracel Islands have been controlled by China 
since 1974.
151
 As China, Taiwan and Vietnam all claim sovereignty over all the Paracel 
Islands, one can state with confidence that there is a sovereignty dispute over this 
maritime area, thus refuting China‘s claim of ―indisputable‖ sovereignty. 
On 5 May 2014, vessels from China‘s Maritime Safety Administration (MSAC) 
established a three nautical mile exclusion zone around HYSY 981.
152
 During this 
maritime standoff, Vietnam accused China‘s coast guard ships of aggressively firing 
high-powered water cannons at, and intentionally ramming, Vietnamese ships while 
Chinese aircraft circled above Vietnamese law enforcement vessels.
153
 Vietnam later 
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released photos and video footage showing the Chinese vessels engaging in such 
conduct – conduct which ultimately injured many law enforcement officers and led to 
several Vietnamese vessels sustaining damage. As Tuoitrenews reported, by 27 June 
2014, the attack had caused damage to 29 Vietnamese marine law enforcement vessels, 
seven Vietnamese fishing boats, and resulted in 17 Vietnamese fisheries surveillance 
officers sustaining injuries.
154
 In particular, on 1 June, 2014, China Coast Guard vessel 
No. 46105 fired water cannons at, and rammed, Vietnamese Coast Guard vessel 
No.2016 12 nautical miles from the oil rig, breaking four holes in the starboard side of 
the Vietnamese vessel 40-50 cm above its waterline.
155
 On 23 June 2014, Vietnamese 
fisheries surveillance vessel KN-951 was operating in an area approximately 11 nautical 
miles from the rig when it was surrounded by seven Chinese ships, including Chinese 
marine surveillance vessels and tug boats. One of the Chinese tug boats, named Bin Hai 
285, intentionally rammed the KN-951, causing serious damage to the ship and injuring 
two fisheries surveillance officers.
156
 In the most serious attack, which took place on 26 
May 2014, Vietnam state television broadcast a video showing Chinese vessel No. 
11209 ramming and sinking a Vietnamese fishing boat DNa 90152, which was 
conducting normal fishing activity in Vietnam‘s claimed EEZ, approximately 17 
nautical miles from the oil rig. The broadcast accused China of not only violating the 
prohibition against the use of force under international law, but also of inhumane 
                                                                                                                                               
(07 May 2014) Thanhnien News <http://www.thanhniennews.com/politics/chinese-ships-ram-
vietnamese-vessels-in-latest-oil-rig-row-officials-26069.html>. 
154
 See Chinese vessels hit Vietnam's ship twice, injuring 2 officers (24 June 2014) Tuoitrenews 
<http://tuoitrenews.vn/society/20552/chinese-vessels-hit-vietnamese-ship-twice-injuring-2-officers>. 
155
 See Vietnam International press conference on East Sea developments (5 June 2014) Vietnam law 
guide <http://vietlaw4u.com/vietnam-international-press-conference-east-sea-developments/>. 
156
 See Chinese ships damage Vietnamese fisheries surveillance vessel (23 June 2014) Vietnam Breaking 
News <http://www.vietnambreakingnews.com/2014/06/chinese-ships-damage-vietnamese-fisheries-
surveillance-vessel/>; see also Press release of MFA Vietnam on June 26th 2014 (27 June 2014) 
Consulate of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in New York <http://vietnamconsulate-
ny.org/news/2014/06/press-release-mfa-viet-nam-june-26th-2014>. 
 
257 
 
actions against seafarers.
157
 China, on the other hand, accused Vietnamese vessels of 
deliberately ramming Chinese government ships more than 1400 times.
158
 However, 
unlike Vietnam, China provided neither photos nor video footage to support its 
accusation.  
The 75-day maritime standoff ended on 16 July 2014, when China decided to 
withdraw the drilling rig from the contested area a month ahead of its scheduled move 
on 15 August. According to China National Petroleum Corporation, the rig was 
removed as it had completed its work earlier than scheduled.
159
  
In a letter from the Permanent Representative of Vietnam to the UN Secretary-
General dated 7 May 2014, Vietnam reaffirmed that: 
[t]he area where the oil rig HYSY 981 and other Chinese protection vessels are 
operating lies entirely within the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of 
Vietnam; and the operation of the oil rig HYSY 981 and other Chinese protection 
vessels seriously infringes upon Vietnam‘s sovereignty, sovereign rights and 
jurisdiction as enshrined under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 
1982, [and] violates the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea of 
2002...
160
 
In response, on 9 June 2014, in a letter from the Permanent Mission of China to 
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the UN Secretary-General, China argued that oil rig HYSY 981 was located 17 nautical 
miles from Zhongjian island (Triton island) of the Xisha Islands (Paracel Islands) which 
are ―an inherent part of China‘s territory, over which there is no dispute.‖
161
 China also 
urged Vietnam to ―respect China‘s sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction, 
immediately stop all forms of disruption of the Chinese operation and withdraw all 
vessels and personnel from the site.‖
162
  
To properly assess this incident, there are three main legal questions that need to 
be answered. Firstly, was the oil rig located in disputed waters? Secondly, if so, did 
China violate international law and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the 
South China Sea of 2002 (DOC) by placing the oil rig in such waters? And lastly, did 
the activities of the Chinese vessels contravene international law? 
In relation to the first question, it is clear that both Vietnam and China provided 
evidence (by way of letters to the UN Secretary-General) to support their sovereignty 
claims over the Paracel Islands. While Vietnam conceded that the area has long been the 
subject of a sovereignty dispute, China maintained that no such dispute exists. The 
purpose of this section is not to determine which country has the stronger legal 
argument regarding sovereignty claims over the Paracel Islands. Indeed, it suffices to 
say that many governments, academics and legal experts accept that these islands are 
the subject of overlapping claims.
163
 China‘s claim that the oil rig was placed 17 
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nautical miles from Triton Island in the Paracels (i.e., within the contiguous zone 
generated from Triton Island) is also questionable. Triton Island is 1.2 km
2
 of sand and 
coral cay and cannot ―sustain human habitation or [an] economic life‖ of its own.
164
 
Accordingly, it could be classified as a ―rock‖, in which case it is only entitled to a 12 
nautical mile territorial sea under the LOSC.
165
 Under this classification, Triton Island 
cannot have a contiguous zone of its own. Moreover, under the LOSC, a coastal state‘s 
sovereign rights over its natural resources, including exploration drilling, falls under the 
regime of the EEZ, not the contiguous zone.
166
 Most importantly, the oil rig was placed 
approximately 130 nautical miles from the coastline of Vietnam, well inside the EEZ 
claimed by Vietnam in accordance with the LOSC. In summary, as both China and 
Vietnam claim sovereignty over the Paracel Islands, any maritime zone generated from 
this archipelago is still in dispute. Even if one assumes that Triton Island belongs to 
China, it cannot have an EEZ of its own. From any perspective, the weight of evidence 
points to the conclusion that oil rig HYSY 981 was located in disputed waters. 
Turning to the second question, as the HYSY 981 was in a disputed area, it is 
clear that China violated international law, particularly the LOSC. Articles 74(3) and 
83(3) of the LOSC stipulate that if no agreement can be reached for the delimitation of 
the EEZ and continental shelf, ―the States concerned, in a spirit of understanding and 
cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical 
nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of 
                                                 
164
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the final agreement.‖
167
 In the 2007 Guyana v Suriname case, which was brought under 
LOSC Annex XV, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled that unilateral drilling in an 
area of overlapping claims is a violation of articles 74(3) and 83(3) of the LOSC.
168
 
Bower and Poling have argued that as HYSY 981 was clearly in a disputed area, China 
violated the LOSC by unilaterally engaging in drilling operations.
169
 Carlyle Thayer has 
also asserted that ―China‘s decision to deploy a mega oil rig in waters forming part of 
the Vietnamese Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) was unexpected, provocative and, in 
my professional opinion, illegal, although there is substantial international dispute over 
this issue.‖
170
 In summary, by unilaterally placing the oil rig in a disputed area, it is 
clear that China acted in violation of international law.  
On the question of whether the DOC was contravened by China‘s actions, as the 
DOC is a political statement and not a legal binding document, it cannot be used as a 
reference for settling legal disputes. However, in the Position Paper of the Government 
of the People‘s Republic of China on the matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea 
Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippine, China stated that: 
China wishes to emphasize that the DOC is an important instrument, adopted by China 
and the ASEAN member States…Under the DOC, the parties concerned undertake to 
resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes through friendly consultations and 
negotiations…reaffirm their respect for and commitment to the freedom of navigation in 
and overflight above, the South China Sea as provided for by universally principles of 
international law…and undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities 
                                                 
167
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that would complicate or escalate disputes…
171
  
 As China urges Parties to the DOC to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of 
activities in disputed areas, China‘s contradictory tactic of placing the HYSY 981 oil rig 
in disputed waters clearly violated not only the spirit of the DOC but also the principle 
of good faith in international law. 
On the third question, it is clear that the Chinese vessels violated a number of 
international law instruments, particularly the LOSC and COLREGs. Firstly, under the 
LOSC, a coastal State may establish reasonable safety zones around artificial islands, 
installations and structures, but these safety zones must not exceed a distance of 500 
metres.
172
 Therefore, the U.S. Senate resolved that the establishment of an exclusion 
zone with a radius of 3 nautical miles round the oil rig, and the aggressive patrols 
conducted by Chinese vessels in this area, ―undermines maritime safety in the area and 
is in violation of universally recognized principles of international law.‖
173
 Secondly, 
under the COLREGs, a ship‘s commander must strictly comply with the COLREGs and 
―the ordinary practice of seamen‖ to avoid collision.
174
 As Jonathan G. Odom has 
commented, States may have conflicting views on maritime boundaries and 
jurisdictions; however, their vessels and mariners are all bound by the rules set out in 
the COLREGs.
175
 The act of Chinese vessels aggressively patrolling and intentionally 
ramming Vietnamese law enforcement vessels in Vietnam‘s claimed EEZ is clearly a 
violation of the COLREGs.
176
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7.4 Other incidents in the South China Sea involving sovereign immune vessels 
and aircraft 
In addition to the incidents discussed above, there have been other clashes in the 
South China Sea involving sovereign immune vessels and aircraft. These incidents 
reveal the need for more careful management of such vessels and aircraft in the region. 
On 11 June 2009, a Chinese navy submarine hit the towed array sonar of the 
destroyer USS John McCain near Subic Bay, approximately 144 miles off the coast of 
the Philippines.
177
 The submarine and the destroyer did not collide; however, the array 
was damaged.
178
 Although neither side made an official statement, the general 
consensus was that the collision was not intentional.
179
 According to Jonathan G. Odom, 
however, at the time of the collision China ―was apparently conducting military 
surveillance operations in the exclusive economic zone of another nation – in this case 
the Philippines.‖
180
 This incident demonstrates again that China‘s practice is 
inconsistent with its restrictive views on foreign military activities in its own EEZ. 
In June 2010, an Indonesian patrol boat captured a Chinese fishing vessel fishing 
illegally in the Indonesian South China Sea EEZ claimed from Natuna Island. In 
response, a Chinese maritime law enforcement vessel, the Yuzheng 311, pointed its 
large-calibre machine gun at the Indonesian boat to force the release of the captured 
vessel.
181
 In March 2013, an Indonesian law enforcement vessel boarded a Chinese 
fishing boat operating in Indonesia‘s claimed EEZ, arresting nine fishermen. A Chinese 
law enforcement vessel, the Yuzheng 310, arrived on the scene and threatened and 
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harassed the Indonesian vessel, forcing it to release the Chinese prisoners.
182
 Most 
recently, in March 2016, an Indonesian law enforcement vessel captured a Chinese 
fishing boat operating in the same general area, arresting all nine crew members. As the 
Indonesian vessel began towing the Chinese boat to Natuna Island, a China Coast Guard 
vessel arrived and rammed the fishing boat, freeing it from Indonesian authorities.
183
 
Indonesia lodged a formal protest with China‘s Embassy in Jakarta, but China insisted 
that the area where the incident took place was ―traditional Chinese fishing grounds.‖
184
 
It is clear that under the LOSC coastal States enjoy sovereign rights over natural 
resources in their EEZs. Therefore, China‘s assertion of ―traditional Chinese fishing 
grounds‖ in another State‘s EEZ clearly contravenes the LOSC.  
On 26 May 2011, three ships from China Marine Surveillance (numbered 12, 17 
and 84) intentionally cut a cable towing seismic equipment by a Vietnamese seismic 
survey vessel, the Binh Minh 02, at a coordinate of 12
0
18
‘
25
‘‘ 
latitude North; 111
0
26
‘
48
‘‘
 
longitude East, approximately 120 nautical miles from the Vietnamese coastline and 
well within Vietnam‘s claimed EEZ.
185
 The following day, Vietnam lodged a 
diplomatic protest with China‘s Ambassador, claiming that the actions of the three 
China Marine Surveillance ships violated Vietnamese sovereign rights in its EEZ and 
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on its continental shelf, as well as violating the LOSC and the spirit of the DOC.
186
 In 
response, Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Jiang Yu stated: ―What relevant Chinese 
departments did was completely normal marine law-enforcement and surveillance 
activities in China‘s jurisdictional sea area.‖
187
 However, China did not clarify the legal 
basis for this water area being ―[within] China‘s jurisdictional sea area.‖ By contrast, 
Vietnam‘s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Nguyen Phuong Nga, made it clear on 29 
May 2011 that: 
[t]he area where Vietnam conducted explorations is entirely within the 200-nautical 
mile exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of Vietnam as stipulated by the 
1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. This is neither a disputed area nor an area 
"managed by China." China is intentionally misleading the public opinion into thinking 
it is a disputed area.
188
 
Unfortunately China did not clarify what it meant by ―China‘s jurisdictional sea area‖, 
but it could have been a veiled reference to the area within the nine-dash line. In this 
context, it is important to note that on 12 July 2016, the Arbitral Tribunal in the 
Philippine case ruled that ―China‘s claims to historic rights, or other sovereign rights or 
jurisdiction…..encompassed by the relevant part of the ‗nine-dash line‘ are contrary to 
the Convention [LOSC] and without lawful effect.‖
189
 
Putting to one side the dispute over waters claimed by China and Vietnam, it is 
clear that the three Chinese marine surveillance ships violated COLREGs. Under 
COLREGs, the Binh Minh 02 was a vessel with restricted-manoeuvre status, while the 
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Chinese ships were ―power driven vessels.‖ Therefore, according to article 18 of the 
COLREGs, the Chinese vessels were required to keep clear of the the Binh Minh 02.
190
 
In fact, the Chinese ships deliberately cut the towing cable of the Binh Minh 02, 
ignoring the warning signal from the Vietnamese captain.
191
 China claimed that the 
conduct of their law enforcement ships ―was completely normal marine law-
enforcement and surveillance activities.‖
192
 This suggests that China refuses to take any 
responsibility for the unsafe conduct of its government-operated vessels – conduct 
which is contrary to international regulations, and perhaps even instruct them to take 
such action.  
One of the most recent incidents involving sovereign immune vessels occurred 
on 9 July 2016, when two China Coast Guard vessels (46102 and 56103), were accused 
of ramming and sinking a Vietnamese fishing boat in the vicinity of the Paracel 
Islands.
193
 Moreover, after sinking the Vietnamese fishing boat, the two Chinese vessels 
allegedly prevented another Vietnamese fishing vessel from rescuing the fishermen 
from the sunken vessel.
194
 Such action by Chinese law enforcement vessels, if indeed it 
occurred as reported, not only violates rules of safe navigation under international law, 
particularly the LOSC, the COLREGs and the SOLAS, but also constitutes 
unacceptable behaviour in maritime practice.  
 In 2012, China and the Philippines were involved in a two-month standoff at 
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Scarborough Shoal, over which both countries claim sovereignty. The incident was 
prompted by two Chinese marine surveillance vessels preventing a Philippine warship, 
the BRP Gregorio del Pilar, from arresting eight Chinese fishing vessels engaged in 
alleged illegal fishing at the shoal.
195
 The following day, and having realised the 
inherent risk of using a warship during a standoff with China, the Philippines withdrew 
the Gregorio del Pilar, replacing it with a small coast guard vessel.
196
 By contrast, 
China dispatched one of its largest and most advanced fishery patrol vessels, the 
Yuzheng 310, to reinforce its presence.
197
 During the standoff, three Chinese law 
enforcement ships surrounded a small Philippine coast guard vessel. According to 
Rahman, China‘s vessels also conducted a number of dangerous manoeuvres that 
threatened the safety of the Philippine vessel and crew.
198
 In mid-June 2012, while 
consultations between China and the Philippines were on foot, the two States decided to 
withdraw their vessels from the area due to a seasonal typhoon.
199
 However, after the 
typhoon, China sent its vessels back to the shoal, with these vessels having maintained a 
permanent presence, and hence securing effective control, ever since.
200
 On 27 January 
2014, a Chinese coast guard vessel fired a water cannon at Philippine fishing boats near 
the shoal to drive them away from the area.
201
 In February 2015, the Philippines lodged 
a protest with China after a Chinese coast guard ship deliberately rammed and damaged 
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three Philippine fishing vessels in the shoal.
202
 In April 2015, the Philippines accused 
China‘s coast guard of firing water cannons at, and damaging, a number of Philippine 
fishing vessels in the shoal.
203
 China defended the actions of its coast guard, asserting 
that ―official Chinese vessels in waters near the Huangyan island (Scarborough Shoal) 
carried out their duties and managed the relevant waters according to law.‖
204
 Setting 
aside sovereign disputes over the shoal, it is clear that firing water cannons at fishing 
vessels in disputed waters is not only provocative behaviour but also inhumane, as it has 
the capacity to endanger the lives of fishermen. 
 The Philippine submission to the arbitral tribunal in the South China Sea 
arbitration shed further light on the dangerous operation of Chinese law enforcement 
vessels. On 28 April 2012, while the Philippine Coast Guard Ship BRP Pampanga was 
stationary in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal, a China Fisheries and Law Enforcement 
vessel, the FLEC 310, approached it ―from port to almost dead ahead at a distance of 
about 600 yards with speed of 20.3 knots.‖
205
 Another incident occurred on 26 May 
2012, when MCS 3008, a vessel of the Philippine Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic 
Resources, approached Scarborough Shoal. A Chinese marine surveillance vessel, CMS 
71, increased its speed and attempted to cross MCS 3008 from its port bow at a distance 
less than 100 yards, forcing the MCS 3008 to increase its speed to 20 knots and to alter 
its course to starboard ―to evade a possible impact.‖
206
 Following this incident, three 
other Chinese vessels, including FLEC 303, CMS 84 and FLEC 306, joined CMS 71 to 
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manoeuvre dangerously around MCS 3008.
207
 In response to the incident, the 
Philippines requested that the arbitral tribunal declare that ―China...breached its 
obligations under the Convention (LOSC) by operating its law enforcement vessels in a 
dangerous manner causing serious risk of collision to Philippine vessels navigating in 
the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal.‖
208
 In its award, the arbitral tribunal ruled that: 
 …the conduct of Chinese law enforcement vessels in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal, 
created serious risk of collision and danger to Philippine vessels and personnel. The 
Tribunal finds China to have violated Rules 2, 6, 7,15, and 16 of the COREGS and, as a 
consequence, to be in breach of Article 94 of the Convention (LOSC).
209
  
On 5 December 2013, a U.S. guided missile cruiser, the USS Cowpens, was 
shouldered by a Chinese amphibious ship while monitoring the Chinese aircraft carrier 
Liaoning in the South China Sea. According to the United States, during this interaction 
the Chinese vessel suddenly crossed the bow of the USS Cowpens at a distance of less 
than 100 yards, forcing it to take evasive action to avoid a collision.
210
 At the time of the 
incident, the Cowpens was operating approximately 32 nautical miles southeast of 
Hainan Island, and therefore the United States asserted that its ship was conducting 
lawful activities consistent with customary international law as reflected in the 
LOSC.
211
 At a press briefing on 19 December 2013, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Chuck 
Hagel, categorically stated that ―that action by the Chinese, cutting in front of [our] 
ship, 100 yards out in front of the Cowpens, was not a responsible action. It was 
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unhelpful. It was irresponsible (emphasis added).‖
212
 The U.S. Pacific Fleet also issued 
a statement that ―this incident underscores the need to ensure the highest standards of 
professional seamanship, including communications between vessels, to mitigate the 
risk of an unintended incident or mishap.‖
213
 China, however, did not provide any 
official comment in relation to the incident. According to Bateman, ―COLREGs can be 
twisted to one‘s advantage‖, without all the details of the incident being available, it is 
impossible to know which version of events is correct.
214
 Nevertheless, Bateman 
warned that the incident has led to strategic mistrust between the two countries.
215
 
Another analyst, Ian Storey, has also forecast a dire view of the region, suggesting that 
―if China continues to challenge the presence of foreign naval ships in the South China 
Sea, it is only a question of time before a serious and potentially deadly incident 
occurs.‖
216
 
 On 19 August 2014, a Chinese Shenyang J-11B fighter jet intercepted a U.S. 
Navy P-8 patrol aircraft over the South China Sea. The incident occurred in 
international airspace approximately 135 miles east of Hainan Island.
217
 According to 
Pentagon spokesman Real Admiral John Kirby, the interception was ―very close, very 
dangerous...pretty aggressive and very unprofessional.‖
218
 However, China‘s Defense 
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Ministry spokesman Colonel Yang Yujun countered this accusation by stating that ―the 
operation by the Chinese pilot was professional and maintained a safe distance with the 
U.S. plane.‖
219
 It is unclear which State has the stronger argument due to a lack of 
evidence and impartial observers. However, what is clear is that close interceptions such 
as this one will continue to occur as long as China and the U.S. advance divergent 
interpretations of international law – interpretations which accord with their own 
strategic interests. 
 On 20 May 2015, another U.S. Navy P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft 
conducted a flight over the artificial island built by China on Fiery Cross Reef in the 
Spratlys. The Chinese navy issued eight warnings to the U.S. aircraft, requesting it to 
leave in order to avoid misunderstanding.
220
 On 27 October 2015, a U.S. guided-missile 
destroyer, the USS Lassen, conducted a patrol within 12 nautical miles of the artificial 
island built by China on Subi Reef in the Spratly Islands under a freedom of navigation 
exercise. However, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Lu Kang said that the U.S. ship 
had ―illegally entered‖ the waters near the islands ―without receiving permission from 
the Chinese government.‖
221
 China did not clarify what it meant by ―waters near the 
islands‖; however, it is worth noting that in its final award issued on 12 July 2016, the 
arbitral tribunal ruled that Subi Reef is a low-tide elevation.
222
 Accordingly, this reef 
cannot generate a territorial sea. 
                                                 
219
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August 2014) The Wall Street Journal <http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-denies-fighter-flew-
dangerously-close-to-u-s-patrol-plane-1408810331>. 
220
 US to press on with surveillance flights amid tensions in the South China Sea (22 May 2015) South 
China Morning Post <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1806818/us-pledges-
press-surveillance-flights-amid-tensions>. 
221
 Quoted in South China Sea: China slams US over warship sailing near artificial islands; US 
ambassador 'summoned' (28 October 2015) ABC News <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-10-28/china-
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 Taking into account all the incidents discussed above, it is clear that China‘s 
sovereign immune vessels and aircraft, in an effort to bolster China‘s maritime claims in 
the South China Sea, have operated both dangerously and in a manner inconsistent with 
international safety standards, causing serious risk of damage and injury to vessels, 
aircraft and crew of other States. Unfortunately, there are no signs indicating that China 
will compromise its maritime claims in the region, or that it will respect any 
international legal process regarding such claims or the operations of its sovereign 
immune vessels and aircraft. 
 The table below lists all well-known incidents involving sovereign immune 
vessels and aircraft in the South China Sea. Incidents are differentiated by the root 
causes in order to provide a clear picture of the existing challenges for the navigation 
and overflight of these types of vessels and aircraft in this region. 
Table 7.1 Maritime incidents involving South China Sea littoral States 
Incident/Date Root Cause 
U.S. Navy EP-3 
(2001) 
Different perspectives over foreign military activities in the 
EEZ. 
USS Impeccable 
(3/2009) 
Different perspectives over foreign military activities in the 
EEZ. 
USS John McCain 
(6/2009) 
It is believed that this incident was unintentional. 
Indonesia-China 
standoff (6/2010) 
China claims its fishing vessels were operating legally in 
what it considers ―traditional Chinese fishing grounds.‖ 
However, the fishing vessels were fishing in the EEZ claimed 
by Indonesia. Therefore, this incident could be classified as a 
dispute over jurisdiction/access to resources. 
Binh Minh 02 
(5/2011) 
Incident occurred in the EEZ claimed by Vietnam, but also 
within the nine-dash line claimed by China. Thus, it could be 
classified as a dispute over jurisdiction/access to resources. 
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Incident/Date Root Cause 
Scarborough Shoal 
standoff (4-6/2012) 
Sovereignty dispute over the Scarborough Shoal.  
Indonesia-China 
standoff (3/2013) 
China claims its fishing vessels were operating legally in 
what it considers ―traditional Chinese fishing grounds.‖ 
However, the fishing vessel was fishing in the EEZ claimed 
by Indonesia. Accordingly, it could be classified as a dispute 
over jurisdiction/access to resources. 
USS Cowpens 
(12/2013) 
Dispute over military activities in the EEZ. 
China-Philippines 
standoff (1/2014) 
Dispute over jurisdiction and access to resources. 
Haiyang Shiyou-
981 oil rig incident 
(5-7/2014) 
Disputes concerning sovereignty claims over the Paracel 
Islands, and also over maritime boundaries and access to 
resources. 
U.S. Navy P-8 
(8/2014) 
Dispute over military activities in the EEZ. 
U.S. Navy P-8A 
(5/2015) 
Disputes over freedom of navigation and overflight rights, 
and over maritime zones supposedly generated from artificial 
islands. 
USS Lassen 
(10/2015) 
Dispute over freedom of navigation and overflight rights, and 
over maritime zones supposedly generated from artificial 
islands. 
Indonesia-China 
Standoff (3/2016) 
 
China claims its fishing vessels were operating legally in 
what it considers ―traditional Chinese fishing grounds.‖ 
However, the fishing vessel was fishing in the EEZ claimed 
by Indonesia. Therefore, it could be classified as a dispute 
over jurisdiction/access to resources. 
  
7.5 Conclusion 
The rules and principles governing the operation of sovereign immune vessels and 
aircraft at sea are chiefly found in the LOSC, COLREGs and the Chicago Convention. 
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However, gaps still exist in the regulatory framework, coupled with ambiguities in 
existing international law provisions. Indeed, these ambiguities have created room for 
States to adopt conflicting interpretations of pertinent provisions – interpretations which 
advance the strategic and national interests of individual States. As sovereign immune 
vessels and aircraft are used to protect State interests, intentional and unintentional 
incidents between these vessels and aircraft are difficult to avoid, especially in the South 
China Sea where the geostrategic situation is quite complex.  
By analysing the selected incidents in this chapter, it is clear that: (i) it will be 
difficult for States in the region to reach a uniform interpretation of international law 
provisions regarding the navigation and overflight of sovereign immune vessels and 
aircraft at sea; (ii)  legal loopholes exist at the international level regarding the 
interaction between sovereign immune aircraft in international airspace; (iii) China will 
continue making maritime claims in the South China Sea based on a nationalistic view 
of ―historic rights.‖ China will also keep interpreting international law provisions 
narrowly (or completely disregarding them) to suit its own interests and with no regard 
for formal legal processes; (iv) China‘s pattern of aggressive behaviour in the South 
China Sea will likely escalate, resulting in more maritime incidents, both intentional and 
unintentional. These incidents will be difficult to avoid, leading to further tension in the 
region; and (v) navigation and overflight in the South China Sea by sovereign immune 
vessels and aircraft will continue to be a contentious issue in the future. 
It is important to highlight that, by virtue of concerted diplomatic efforts, none of 
these incidents escalated into a major conflict. However, the incidents have added to the 
strategic mistrust between the States concerned. In order to avoid similar incidents from 
occurring in the future, States in the region should respect internationally accepted legal 
instruments, strive to cooperate with each other (particularly with regard to existing 
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international law gaps), enhance maritime confidence building measures, as well as 
build better communication channels for the promotion of maritime safety and security 
for the region as a whole. The next chapter addresses regional efforts to build 
confidence and navigational safety. 
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8 REGIONAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE PASSAGE OF SOVEREIGN 
IMMUNE VESSELS AND AIRCRAFT 
8.1 Introduction 
In order to fill the gaps in international law and policy regarding the passage of 
sovereign immune vessels and aircraft at sea, a number of regional initiatives have been 
developed for the South China Sea region. These include: (i) conflict management 
mechanisms initiated by regional institutions, including the 2002 ASEAN Declaration 
on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC); (ii) the Code for Unplanned 
Encounters at Sea (CUES) adopted at the Western Pacific Naval Symposium in 2014; 
(iii) existing bilateral maritime cooperation and confidence building measures involving 
South China Sea littoral States; (iv) Track II level regional workshops (notably the EEZ 
Group 21 sponsored by the Ocean Policy Research Foundation); and (v) the unilateral 
policies of individual maritime States which seek to preserve the navigational rights of 
vessels and aircraft, particularly the U.S. Freedom of Navigation Program. This chapter 
will critically analyse and evaluate these existing regional efforts.  
8.2 Regional efforts to develop guidelines for the passage of sovereign immune 
vessels and aircraft 
8.2.1 ASEAN and the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea 
(DOC) 
8.2.1.1 Background to the DOC  
One of ASEAN‘s chief objectives of is to ―promote regional peace and stability 
through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among 
countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter.‖
1
 
Five of the ten member States of ASEAN are actively involved in South China Sea 
                                                 
1
 Overview (13 March 2015) Association of Southeast Asian Nations <http://www.asean.org/asean/about-
asean/overview>. 
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disputes, namely Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia. The 
inclusion of Indonesia is due to its involvement in overlapping maritime jurisdictional 
claims with China‘s ―nine-dash line.‖ The first ASEAN statement on the South China 
Sea was in the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea signed in Manila 22 July 
1992. This Declaration emphasised ―the necessity to resolve all sovereignty and 
jurisdictional issues pertaining to the South China Sea by peaceful means, without resort 
to force.‖
2
 The Declaration urged ―all parties concerned to exercise restraint with the 
view to creating a positive climate for the eventual resolution of all disputes.‖
3
 In March 
1995, and in response to the Mischief Reef incident
4
, ASEAN Foreign Ministers issued 
their second statement, expressing their ―serious concern‖ and ―call[ing] upon all parties 
to refrain from taking actions that destabilize the region and further threaten the peace 
and security of the South China Sea.‖
5
 In 1995, at the second ASEAN Regional Forum 
held in Brunei, the Philippines proposed the adoption of a Code of Conduct for the 
South China Sea that would, in the words of Carlyle Thayer, ―constrain China from 
further encroachment.‖
6
 The idea of concluding a regional code of conduct which would 
―lay the foundation for long term stability in the area and foster understanding among 
claimant countries,‖ was endorsed by ASEAN foreign ministers at the 29th ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting held in Jakarta in July 1996.
7
 In 1999 ASEAN member States 
                                                 
2
 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea (22 July 1992) Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations <http://www.asean.org/1196.htm> 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Mischief Reef is part of the Spratly Islands and located in the Philippines‘ claimed EEZ. On 8 February 
1995, the Philippines discovered that China had built structures on the reef. The Philippines made a 
protest against China‘s actions; however, the Chinese government rejected the protest and said that the 
structures constituted shelter for fishermen. 
5
 Statement by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers on the Recent Developments in the South China Sea (18 
March 1995) Association of Southeast Asian Nations <http://www.asensec.org/2089.htm>. 
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 Carlyle A Thayer, 'ASEAN, China and the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea' (2013) 33(2) SAIS 
Review of International Affair 75, 76. 
7
 Joint Communique of The 29th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) (21 July 1996) Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations <http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-political-security-
 
277 
 
agreed on a draft Code of Conduct, and by that time China had prepared its own draft 
Code of Conduct.
8
  In 2000 ASEAN member countries and China exchanged their 
respective drafts in order to reach a final agreement on a regional Code of Conduct 
(COC).
9
 However, an agreement could not be reached due to four major areas of 
difference: the geographic scope of the COC, issues relating to construction on occupied 
and unoccupied features, military activities in disputed waters, and the treatment of 
fishermen in disputed waters.
10
  On 4 November 2002, and after several years of 
negotiations, China and ASEAN member States agreed, as a compromise, to sign a non-
binding political statement known as the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South 
China Sea (DOC). The objective of the document was ―to enhance favorable conditions 
for a peaceful and durable solution of differences and disputes among countries 
concerned.‖
11
 This declaration contained four measures to build trust and confidence 
between the parties, as well as five areas of cooperative engagement.
12
 Regarding 
navigational issues, all parties ―reaffirm[ed] their respect for and commitment to the 
freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea as provided for by 
the universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea‖
13
. The spirit of the DOC encourages all parties to 
undertake cooperative activities regarding the safety of navigation and communication 
                                                                                                                                               
community/item/joint-communique-of-the-29th-asean-ministerial-meeting-amm-jakarta-20-21-july-
1996>. 
8
 Thayer, above n 6, 76. 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Ibid 77; Yann Huei Song, 'The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties and a Code of Conduct in the 
South China Sea: Recent Actions Taken by ASEAN' in Seokwoo Lee and Hee Eun Lee (eds), Northeast 
Asian Perspectives on International Law: Contemporary Issues and Challenges (Martinus Nijhoff, 2013) 
41. 
11
 See Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (4 November 2002) Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations, <http://www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/china/item/declaration-on-the-
conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea>. 
12
 Ibid; Thayer, above n 6, 77. 
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at sea.
14
 Most importantly, all parties reaffirmed their intention to work towards the 
adoption of a legally binding Code of Conduct in the South China Sea on the basis of 
consensus.
15
  
The DOC was perceived by China and ASEAN ―as a milestone document which 
embodies the collective commitment of ASEAN member States and China to promote 
peace, stability and mutual trust in the South China Sea.‖
16
 However, it was not until 
nine years later, in July 2011, that ASEAN and China reached an agreement on 
guidelines for the implementation of the DOC.
17
 It is important to note, however, that 
these guidelines do not contain provisions on the conduct of vessels or aircraft towards 
one another, or any guidance on communication channels for contending vessels and 
aircraft in the event of such contact.
18
 In January 2012 ASEAN and China agreed to 
establish four expert committees for the implementation of the guidelines. These expert 
committees span the areas of maritime scientific research, environmental protection, 
search and rescue, as well as transnational crime. However, no expert committee was 
charged with the responsibility for the safety of navigation and communication at sea.
19
 
And although discussions between the parties have continued, no projects have thus far 
been implemented. In 2012, ASEAN drafted its own draft Code of Conduct, known as 
ASEAN Proposed Elements of a Regional Code of Conduct. Indonesia then proposed a 
                                                 
14
 Ibid point 6(c). 
15
 Ibid point 10. 
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 Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC (July 2011) 
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―Zero Draft‖ Code of Conduct for the South China Sea on the sidelines of the UN 
General Assembly session in September 2012. Importantly, this version contained 
―additional elements to make it more prescriptive and operational.‖
20
 For Carlyle 
Thayer, the most significant contribution of this ―Zero Draft‖ Code of Conduct is that it 
contains ―suggested rules, norms and procedures for carrying out confidence building 
measures‖ and ―detailed provisions for preventing incidents and collisions at sea.‖
21
 
However, according to Mark Valencia, the ―Zero Draft‖ contains ―bold language‖ that 
makes it unlikely to be agreed upon by ASEAN members and China.
22
 For instance, it 
contains provisions which require contracting parties to refrain from: 
[c]onducting military exercise, military surveillance, or other provocative actions in the 
South China Sea; occupying or erecting new structures on the islands, and land features 
presently occupied or not; inhabiting the presently uninhabited islands and other land 
features; and conducting activities that threaten navigational safety and/or polluting the 
environment.
23
 
Given that China is currently engaged in an extensive artificial island building 
program in the Spratlys, it is unlikely that China would readily accept provisions that 
prohibit parties from occupying and inhabiting islands and land features. Regarding 
military exercises and military surveillance, while China and two other ASEAN States 
(namely Malaysia and Thailand), have restrictive views on foreign military activities in 
the EEZ, other ASEAN States have not officially expressed their views on this issue. 
Even if China and ASEAN members were to agree with the proposed provisions in the 
                                                 
20
 Ibid, 79; see also Mark J Valencia, 'What the 'Zero Draft' Code of Conduct for the South China Sea 
Says (and Doesn't Say)' (2013) 8(1) Global Asia 73, 73-74; Carlyle A Thayer, 'ASEAN‘S Code of 
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Journal 1, 2. 
21
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22
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Indonesian ―Zero Draft‖ it is unlikely that other maritime States, particularly the United 
States, would accept the provisions. It is also arguable that the provisions of the ―Zero 
Draft,‖ which seek to restrict military activities in the South China Sea are contrary to 
the LOSC. As the security and stability of the South China Sea is a priority for many 
States, not only for littoral States, a Code of Conduct for the region should be set out in 
such a way as to encourage outside maritime powers to accede to it, or at the very least, 
respect it. 
While ASEAN wishes to expedite the conclusion of a Code of Conduct, China, 
on the other hand, wants to see the implementation of the DOC first, viewing a Code of 
Conduct for the South China Sea as a long term objective.
24
 In 2013, during his visit to 
ASEAN States, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that all parties should have 
―realistic expectations‖ and should take ―a gradual approach‖ to a proposed Code.
25
 In 
August 2016, China and the ASEAN agreed to reach a framework for a code of conduct 
for the South China Sea by the middle of 2017.
26
  
8.2.1.2 The limitations of the DOC  
 After signing the DOC, China‘s Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that the 
DOC would ―send a clear signal to the outside that countries in the region can fully 
handle differences between each other through dialogue and jointly maintain peace and 
                                                 
24
 Ralf Emmers, 'ASEAN's Search for Neutrality in the South China Sea' (2014) 2(1) Asian Journal of 
Peacebuilding 61, 73. 
25
 Joanna Chiu, Beijing tells Asean to be realistic in hopes for South China Sea code of conduct (6 August 
2013) South China Morning Post <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1294453/foreign-minister-
wang-yi-says-china-no-hurry-sign-south-china-sea-accord>. 
26
 Blanchard, Ben and Clarence Fernandez, China, ASEAN aim to complete framework of South China 
Sea rules next year (17 August 2016) Reuters <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-china-
idUSKCN10S0DQ> 
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stability in the South China Sea region through cooperation.‖
27
 Some Chinese scholars 
have expressed the optimistic view that ―from now on, ASEAN and China are joining 
hands together to establish common security and to gain common prosperity.‖
28
 
However, other commentators have opined that as the DOC is only a political statement, 
not a legally binding document, it is unrealistic to expect it to prevent parties from 
undertaking activities that complicate the situation.
29
 In fact, tensions have continued to 
rise in the South China Sea following the signing of the DOC, with the parties involved 
continuing to accuse one another of violating the DOC. There have also been several 
incidents involving sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in the South China Sea which 
have violated the spirit of the DOC which are noted below. On 2 March 2011, two 
Chinese patrol vessels aggressively harassed the MV Veritas Voyager, a seismic survey 
ship charted by Forum Energy, a UK-based oil and gas company. The Philippine 
government had awarded Forum Energy a contract to conduct the seismic survey in the 
Reed Bank area.
30
 The incident occurred approximately 80 nautical miles from Palawan 
Island, within the Philippine claimed EEZ.
31
 The May 2011 Chinese harassment of a 
Vietnamese seismic survey vessel, including intentionally cutting a cable towing 
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Journal of International Law 311, 319. 
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Perspective 2002-2007' in Sam Bateman and Ralf Emmers (eds), Security and International Politics in 
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31
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seismic equipment,
32
 led to Vietnam lodging a formal diplomatic protest, claiming that 
China‘s actions violated international law and the spirit of the DOC.
33
 Following the  
2012 standoff between China and the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal,
34
 and the 
subsequent January 2013 Philippines submission of a Notification and Statement of 
Claim (Notification) against China before the Arbitral Tribunal established under 
Annex VII of the LOSC.
35
 China rejected the Notification on the ground that ―the note 
and related notice not only violate the consensus enshrined in the Declaration on the 
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), but are also factually flawed and 
contain false accusations.‖
36
 In its Position Paper on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the 
South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines, China claimed 
that the Philippines had agreed, through the DOC, to settle their disputes through 
negotiation. Therefore, according to China, the decision of the Philippines to 
unilaterally initiate arbitration proceedings had violated international law.
37
 And the 75 
day standoff on the Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig in May 2014,
38
 Vietnam accused China 
of ―seriously infring[ing]…Vietnam‘s sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction as 
                                                 
32
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Political Dimensions (Chandos Publishing, 2013) , 32; Tàu Trung Quốc ngang ngược xâm phạm vùng 
đặc quyền kinh tế Việt Nam (27 May 2011) VNExpress (in Vietnamese) <http://vnexpress.net/tin-
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Diplomat <http://thediplomat.com/2012/11/chinas-island-strategy-redefine-the-status-quo/>. 
35
 See Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines, Notification and Statement of Claim, 
Manila 22 January 2013. 
36
 Quoted in China rejects Philippines' arbitral request: FM (19 February 2013) Xinhua.net 
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-02/19/c_132178817.htm>. 
37
 See Position Paper of the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction 
in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines (12 July 2014) Ministry of 
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enshrined under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, and 
violat[ing] the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea of 2002.‖
39
  
The DOC urges all parties to ―refrain from action of inhabiting on the presently 
uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their 
differences in a constructive manner.‖
40
 However, since 2013, China has been 
constructing artificial islands on a number of submerged features in the Spratlys and 
ignoring protests from other ASEAN States.
41
 While other claimants of the Spratlys 
have erected structures on existing land features, ―China is changing the size, structure 
and physical attributes of land features themselves.‖
42
 At the 14
th
 Shangri-La Dialogue 
held in Singapore in May 2015, U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter expressed serious 
concern over China‘s massive ―land reclamations‖ in the Spratly islands, adding that 
―China has reclaimed over 2,000 acres, more than all other claimants combined – and 
more than in the entire history of the region. And China did so in only the last 18 
months. It is unclear how much farther China will go.‖
43
 Carter further asserted that 
―with its actions in the South China Sea, China is out of step with both the international 
rules and norms.‖
44
 Greg Poling, an analyst from the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, has also expressed the view that China‘s action ―certainly violates 
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the spirit of the 2002 Declaration of Conduct (DOC) between China and ASEAN, and is 
at best on shaky legal grounds.‖
45
 When asked about China's maritime moves in the 
South China Sea, Philippine President Benigno Aquino even made a veiled comparison 
between China's activities in the region and Nazi Germany's expansionism before World 
War II.
46
 
 It is clear that the DOC has been referred to by China and ASEAN States in their 
statements regarding disputes and incidents in the South China Sea. However, its major 
limitation of the DOC is that it is only a political statement with no legally binding 
force. Indeed, concerned States in the region refer to the DOC as an important 
agreement for conflict management in the South China Sea only because there is no 
other viable alternative. Another major limitation is that it does not set out its 
geographic scope, as those States which are party to it could not agree on which areas 
were under dispute or indisputable. As a result, DOC signatory States can argue that 
their actions are conducted in their own undisputed waters. Taking into account the 
existing sovereignty disputes over offshore features in the South China Sea, China‘s 
infamous and ambiguous nine-dash line claim as well as its rejection to the arbitral 
tribunal ruling, it is highly unlikely that China and ASEAN will reach an agreement on 
the identification of disputed areas in this maritime region in the near future.  
Regarding the safety of maritime navigation and communication, neither the 
DOC nor its Implementation Guidelines address the conduct of sovereign immune 
vessels and aircraft of signatory States when they encounter each another at sea. 
Furthermore, there exists no joint understanding or joint interpretation of the provisions 
                                                 
45
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of the LOSC regarding navigation issues in various maritime jurisdictional zones 
between China and ASEAN, either in the DOC or elsewhere.  
As the above discussion has highlighted, disputes over sovereignty and maritime 
boundaries in the region remain unresolved. China claims almost all of the South China 
Sea and appears to be more aggressively asserting its claims while ignoring the 
tribunal‘s ruling against it. The above-mentioned incidents would seem to indicate that 
the hostile behaviour of Chinese vessels and aircraft in the South China Sea will 
continue. Therefore, the need for binding ―rules of the road‖ and ―rules of the air‖ in a 
COC between China and ASEAN members has never been more pressing. As 
previously indicated, although China and ASEAN intend on keeping the DOC on foot, 
it is unlikely there will be a legally binding Code of Conduct for the South China Sea in 
the near future. Moreover, Taiwan is a party to the South China Sea dispute, but it is 
neither a member of the DOC nor any official regional agreement. Therefore, any 
disputes in the South China Sea involving Taiwan could pose a real challenge. Indeed, 
the three-hour-standoff between a Philippines Coast Guard vessel and a Taiwanese 
Coast Guard vessel in the South China Sea on 25 May 2015 illustrates this point.
47
 The 
confrontation was the result of different views on the scope of maritime patrols in the 
overlapping EEZs of the Philippines and Taiwan.  Hence, the need to include Taiwan in 
regional initiatives regarding navigation and overflight in the South China Sea is a 
considerable unresolved issue. 
                                                 
47
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8.2.2 Western Pacific Naval Symposium and the Code for Unplanned Encounters at 
Sea  
8.2.2.1 The development of the Code 
 In addition to ASEAN, the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) has 
developed a Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES). The WPNS is a series of 
biennial meetings where leaders of regional navies whose countries border the Pacific 
Ocean region to discuss naval matters. Currently the WPNS consists of 21 members, 
among others, including China, the United States, India, Japan, Australia and eight 
ASEAN States (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand and Vietnam). In 1999, the Chief of the Royal Australian Navy initially 
promulgated a Code for Unalerted Encounters at Sea (CUES). The Code was based on 
international legal and navigation principles and sought to promote the safe conduct of 
navy ships and aircraft when they encounter each other at sea. The first draft of the 
Code was released in 1999, but it has gone through various revisions since that time. 
The purpose of the Code is to offer ―a means by which navies may safeguard and 
advance their rights, duties, freedoms and responsibilities, develop mutually rewarding 
international cooperation and transparency and provide leadership and broad-based 
involvement in establishing international standards in relation to the use of the sea.‖
48
 In 
2003 the Code was again reviewed and supplemented with ―safety measures and a 
means to limit mutual interference and uncertainty and facilitate communication when 
naval and public ships, submarines or aircraft make contact.‖
49
 At the WPNS held in 
Malaysia in 2012, China was the only State that rejected the updated Code for Unalerted 
Encounters at Sea (CUES 2003). According to Vice Admiral Ding – deputy commander 
                                                 
48
 'Code for unalerted encounters at sea' (2012) 4(4) Australian Journal of Maritime and Oceans Affairs 
126. 
49
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of the People‘s Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy), China felt that certain parts of the 
document needed to be further discussed, and that the word ―code‖ implied a legally 
binding agreement.
50
 Vice Admiral Ding also added that ―the CUES is not applicable to 
the PLA Navy as the document is in English.‖
51
 At the Western Pacific Naval 
Symposium Workshop held in Bangkok in 2013, China took issue with many of the 
provisions of CUES 2003. China argued that the territorial sea should be deleted from 
the applicable scope of the Code, as foreign warships entering China‘s territorial sea 
need to seek prior authorisation from China‘s Government (and therefore there would 
be no unalerted encounters between Chinese and foreign warships).
52
 China also argued 
that the WPNS ―is not authorized to formulate a Code for Un-alerted Encounters at Sea 
for public vessels and state aircraft.‖
53
 Therefore, it recommended that a Code for 
Unalerted Encounters at Sea should only apply to naval warships and naval aircraft.
54
 
Following the WPNS, CUES 2003 underwent a further review and was circulated to all 
WPNS members in late 2013, with the document finally being adopted at the WPNS 
held in China in April 2014.  
 The name of the adopted Code was changed from Code for Unalerted 
Encounters at Sea to Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES 2014).
55
 Like 
CUES 2003, CUES 2014 uses definitions which, where applicable, correlate with those 
found in the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs) and 
under international law generally.
56
 CUES 2003 defines an ―Encounter at Sea‖ as: 
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An encounter...when warships, submarines, public vessels or naval aircraft of one State 
meet casually or unexpectedly with warships, submarines, public vessels or naval 
aircraft of another State on the high seas, territorial waters, contiguous zones, exclusive 
economic zone, and archipelagic waters of an archipelagic state.
57
 
 CUES 2014 defines ―Unplanned Encounters at Sea‖ as ―naval ships or naval 
aircraft of one State meet[ing] casually or unexpectedly with a naval ship or naval 
aircraft of another State.‖
58
 According to CUES 2014, a naval ship is ―a descriptor that 
is assumed to include warships, naval auxiliaries, and submarines‖, while a naval 
aircraft ―is to include helicopters, fixed wing aircraft and unmanned aerial systems or 
vehicles.‖
59
 The objective of CUES 2014 is to offer ―safety procedures, a basic 
communications plan and basic manoeuvring instructions for naval ships and naval 
aircraft during unplanned encounters at sea.‖
60
 This means that many vessels and 
aircraft, including coast guard patrol vessels, marine surveillance ships and aircraft, as 
well as vessels belonging to fisheries agencies, are excluded from CUES 2014. Whereas 
CUES 2003 was expressed as applying on the high seas, territorial waters, contiguous 
zones, exclusive economic zones, and in the archipelagic waters of archipelagic states, 
CUES 2014 does not specify the maritime zones in which it operates. Even so, it is 
noteworthy that CUES 2014 uses definitions found in COLREGs. The term ―at sea‖ (as 
used in COLREGs) indicates the high seas and ―all waters connected therewith 
navigable by seagoing vessels.‖
61
 Even though COLREGs entered into force before the 
LOSC, it is clear that all navigable waters connected to the high seas (as expressed in 
                                                 
57
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COLREGs) include the EEZ.
62
 Therefore, it is possible that CUES 2014 only applies on 
the high seas and in EEZs.
63
 CUES 2003 contains one article which provides standard 
safety procedures for ships engaged in surveillance. The article states that: 
Ships engaged in surveillance should remain clear of platforms under surveillance so as 
to avoid the risk of collision. They should also employ the practice of good seamanship 
so as to avoid carrying out any manoeuvres that could endanger the object of 
surveillance or cause it to deviate from intended course and/or speed.
64
 
 This article is similar to those contained in a number of incidents at sea 
agreements, such as those between the United States and the former Soviet Union
65
, 
Russia and the Republic of Korea
66
, and between Malaysia and Indonesia
67
. At the 2013 
WPNS Workshop held in Bangkok, China did not agree with this article and proposed 
an amended version in the following form: 
Ships engaged in surveillance and those of surveillance should mutually employ the 
practice of good seamanship so as to avoid carrying out any manoeuvres that could 
endanger the navigation safety and the risk of collision.
68
  
 Due to disagreement between the parties, the article regarding surveillance 
activities was deleted from CUES 2014. As many incidents at sea (and particularly 
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those in the South China Sea), involve surveillance activities of naval vessels and 
aircraft, the omission of this article has created a significant loophole in CUES 2014. 
 The adoption of CUES 2014 was described by Admiral Wu Shengli, the head of 
the Chinese navy, as a milestone document that is ―highly significant to navies in the 
region in promoting communication and reducing misjudgment and 
misunderstanding.‖
69
 The U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, 
also emphasised the significance of CUES 2014, stating that: ―We've agreed to increase 
the standards that we will set at sea. We've agreed to establish proficiency in 
communications. We've agreed to establish common behaviour at sea. We've agreed to 
prevent misunderstanding and miscalculations.‖
70
 However, CUES 2014 appears to 
suffer from a number of limitations in preventing tense encounters, particularly in the 
South China Sea. As Christian Le Mière has opined, ―it is, in truth, very weak.‖
71
 These 
limitations will now be explored in greater detail. 
8.2.2.2 The limitations of CUES 2014 
 Firstly, CUES 2014 is a document which WPNS navies choose to adopt on a 
voluntary and non-binding basis. Accordingly, there is no arbitration mechanism in the 
agreement for disputes arising from incidents between naval ships or naval aircraft.
72
 
Indeed, a U.S. Navy Pacific Fleet official has postulated that CUES 2014 is unlikely to 
curb the risk of vessels colliding at sea.
73
 He added that: ―[I]f your intent is to cause 
                                                 
69
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trouble, you're going to cause trouble no matter what.‖
74
 Moreover, CUES 2014 focuses 
mainly on safety procedures of naval ships rather than naval aircraft. As noted in 
Chapter Seven, on 19 August 2014, four months after CUES 2014 was approved, a 
Chinese fighter jet, the Shenyang J-11B, intercepted a U.S. Navy P-8 marine patrol and 
surveillance aircraft in international airspace in a dangerous manoeuvre
75
 However, 
CUES 2014 was not invoked by either party in relation to this incident. 
 Secondly, CUES 2014 only applies to naval vessels and naval aircraft. However, 
as discussed in Chapter Seven, the majority of incidents in the South China Sea have 
involved non-naval maritime law enforcement vessels. In addition, China has the largest 
coast guard fleet in the world, and has been using its fishing vessels as government 
proxies and maritime militia to strengthen its maritime claims. As CUES 2014 does not 
cover civilian vessels, foreign naval vessels cannot expect civilian ships to abide by the 
agreement. Indeed, with the increasing role of maritime law enforcement agencies in the 
region, a potential clash between naval and maritime law enforcement vessels and 
aircraft is highly likely. Therefore, the need for some mechanism to regulate the 
activities of law enforcement vessels other than naval ships in the region is paramount. 
Some key stakeholders in the region are taking note of this issue. At the 12
th
 Maritime 
Security and Coastal Surveillance Summit held in Malaysia in December 2015, the 
Chief of the Royal Malaysian Navy, Admiral Kamarulzaman Ahmad Badaruddin, 
called for an expansion of CUES 2014 to cover ―other maritime agencies, especially the 
                                                 
74
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coast guards.‖
76
 Singapore‘s Foreign Affairs Minister, Vivian Balakrishnan, has also 
suggested expanding CUES 2104 to cover both naval and coast guards vessels and 
aircraft.
77
 Another important consideration is that CUES 2014 only applies when naval 
ships and aircraft of different States meet ―casually or unexpectedly.‖ In practice, 
however, most incidents at sea arise when naval vessels or aircraft of one State 
deliberately act in a way that poses a potential threat to the safety of naval vessels or 
aircraft of another State.
78
 Thus, the reality is that in order to protect sovereignty and 
maritime claims over disputed areas, vessels and aircraft of concerned States usually 
shoulder or harass one another deliberately, not unexpectedly. CUES 2014, however, 
does not ban certain acts of military intimidation. For example, the U.S.-Soviet 
INCSEA 1972 Agreement prohibits ships of the Parties from ―simulat[ing] attacks by 
aiming guns, missile launchers, torpedo tubes, and other weapons in the direction of a 
passing ship of the other Party.‖
79
 CUES 2014 only suggests that acts including the 
―simulation of attacks by aiming guns, missiles, fire control radars, torpedo tubes or 
other weapons in the direction of vessels or aircraft encountered...might generally [be] 
avoided (emphasis added).‖
80
 This means that ship commanders need to determine how 
they will implement CUES 2014 in certain circumstances. Furthermore, while INCSEA 
1972 requires parties to notify one another ―not less than 3 to 5 days in advance‖ in 
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respect of actions which ―represent a danger to navigation or to aircraft in flight‖
81
, 
CUES 2014 only encourages parties to provide ―warnings‖ of dangerous activities, 
eschewing any timeframe for when these warnings should be issued.
82
 
 Thirdly, the geographic scope of CUES 2014 is unclear. After the Code was 
approved, U.S. naval officials were hopeful that all WPNS members would observe the 
code in all places.
83
 However, Senior Captain Ren Xiaofeng, head of the Chinese navy's 
Maritime Security and Safety Policy Research Division, made it clear that ―[w]e're just 
talking about the rules. Whether or where or when these rules will apply – [CUES 2014] 
it leaves that open, leaves it to bilateral [talks].‖
84
 Many commentators believe that 
CUES 2014 only applies in the EEZ and on the high seas, but not in the territorial 
waters.
85
 According to Xu Hongmeng, Vice Admiral of the Chinese Navy, CUES 2014 
would have no impact on the conduct of State parties in the disputed waters of the East 
China Sea and the South China Sea.
86
 Vice Admiral Xu added: ―You can‘t say that 
[CUES 2014 is] related to the issues in the South and East China Sea – this is about the 
navies of many countries… this will not influence those issues.‖
87
 When Japanese 
Defence Minister Itsunori Onodera stated at the WPNS press conference that CUES 
2014 would ban dangerous actions such as radar-locking on ships and aircraft of other 
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countries at sea,
88
 Chinese Defence Ministry spokesman Yang Yujun expressed the 
view that ―sides concerned should not misinterpret deliberately the CUES, which is a 
technical regulation under the multi-lateral framework, and make [a] selective reading 
of it to make a fuss.‖
89
   This means that different interpretations of CUES 2014 could 
be a challenging issue.  
 Fourthly, CUES 2014 does not contain any provisions for the safe conduct of 
submarine operations. With the proliferation of submarines in the region and the 
unresolved maritime disputes in the South China Sea, the risk of submarine accidents 
and incidents will surely increase.
90
 According to Sam Bateman, ―the detection of a 
submarine in disputed waters, unless carefully managed, could readily lead to a serious 
deterioration in relations between the parties involved, increased tensions in the region, 
and even conflict.‖
91
 However, due to the covert nature of submarines, it is difficult to 
have an agreement in place governing standard operational procedures for such vessels. 
And despite interest from Russia in having an international agreement on the safety of 
submarine navigation, the United States has expressed reluctance to be bound by such 
an agreement.
92
  
 Fifthly, CUES 2014 does not provide any guidelines for contracting parties 
regarding annual training and exercises. For many regional navies, and particularly 
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those of Southeast Asian States, language barriers and financial limitations are the main 
factors hampering the effectiveness of training and the general implementation of CUES 
2014. The WPNS should therefore consider reaching an agreement to provide language 
training for naval officers from small regional navies, as well as providing financial 
support to assist smaller navies conduct CUES training at sea. 
 Lastly, there is no timeframe for the implementation of CUES 2014. At the 2014 
WPNS in Qingdao, (and after CUES 2014 was approved), Rear Admiral Anne Cullerre, 
Commander of French Maritime Forces in the Pacific, stated: ―I do hope that all of us 
will use the CUES in a very short time frame, but I also realize that some navies might 
need more time to get accustomed to these procedures than others.‖
93
 As this comment 
highlights, a precise timeframe for the implementation of CUES 2014 remains elusive. 
Indeed, since the adoption of CUES 2014, there have been only a few combined 
military exercises involving South China Sea littoral States. In June 2014, the Chinese 
navy conducted its first combined exercise with the Indonesian navy focussing on the 
practice of CUES 2014 procedures
94
. In April 2015, Vietnamese and U.S. navies 
engaged in a coordinated military exercise in the coastal waters of Vietnam,  practising 
CUES 2014 procedures as well as search and rescue related activities.
95
 In May 2015, 
the Philippine Navy held a combined exercise with the Japanese navy in the South 
China Sea to run through CUES 2014 practices and procedures.
96
 China also has 
conducted a number of CUES exercises with the United States, Australia and 
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Singapore. However, combined exercises for CUES practice between East and South 
China Sea littoral States are still limited. 
 In summary, CUES 2014 is an important step towards improving confidence 
between navies. However, as a non-legally binding document with unclear geographical 
scope, CUES 2014 appears rather weak. As CUES 2014 only applies to naval vessels 
and aircraft that meet ―casually or unexpectedly‖ at sea, it cannot prevent deliberate 
brinksmanship.
97
 Moreover, it is unclear when, where and to what extent States will 
implement CUES 2014. As many incidents between sovereign immune vessels and 
aircraft in the South China Sea do not involve naval ships or aircraft, CUES 2014 will 
have little impact on preventing such problems.  
8.2.3 Bilateral agreements for confidence building measures  
8.2.3.1 Incidents at sea agreements 
 Apart from regional initiatives, there has been a number of bilateral maritime 
confidence building measures between extra-regional States addressing the passage of 
sovereign immune vessels and aircraft at sea. The most notable is the Agreement 
between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the 
High Seas (INCSEA 1972), which entered into force 25 May, 1972.
98
 INCSEA 1972 
aims to ―assure the safety of navigation of the ships of their respective armed forces on 
the high seas and flight of their military aircraft over the high seas, and guided by the 
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principles and rules of international law.‖
99
 In May 1973, at the first annual review of 
INCSEA 1972, the two sides added a Protocol to include non-military ships.
100
 Article 2 
of the Protocol makes it clear that: 
Ships and aircraft of the Parties shall not make simulated attacks by aiming guns, 
missile launchers, torpedo tubes and other weapons at non-military ships of the other 
Party, nor launch nor drop any objects near non-military ships of the other Party in such 
a manner as to be hazardous to these ships or to constitute a hazard to Navigation.
101
 
INCSEA 1972 was considered successful in reducing the number of incidents 
between the two parties. For example, the number of serious incidents at sea between 
the United States and the Soviet Union reduced from about 100 per year in the late 
1960s to approximately 40 per year in the early 1980s.
102
 With more than 150 U.S. and 
Soviet Union warships presenting in the Mediterranean during 1973 when war broke 
out in the Middle East, the two sides appeared to comply with INCSEA 1972.
103
 
Furthermore, as the Russian Federation was prepared to take over the rights and 
obligations of the Soviet Union in relation to this agreement, it remains in place 
today.
104
 Unlike CUES 2014, INCSEA 1972 not only established communication 
regulations between vessels and aircraft of State parties in close proximity to one 
another at sea, but also requires vessels and aircraft of all sides to avoid executing 
manoeuvres which embarrass or endanger the ships under surveillance, and to avoid 
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aiming weapons in the direction of a passing ship or aircraft of the other party.
105
 There 
have been a number of incidents at sea agreements modelled on INCSEA 1972. These 
include the agreements between Russia and the Republic of Korea (1994)
106
; Japan and 
Russia (1993); the UK and Soviet Union (1986); as well as between the Soviet Union 
and Germany, Canada, France, and Italy respectively (1988 and 1989)
107
. 
 Within the South China Sea region, the navies of Indonesia and Malaysia 
reached an agreement known as the MALINDO Prevention of Sea Incidents 
Cooperative Guidelines in January 2001. These Guidelines provide standard safety and 
communication procedures which apply to naval ships and aircraft of the two States 
during encounters at sea.
108
 This bilateral agreement emphasizes that: 
While no compromise should be made on matters concerning a nation‘s integrity and 
sovereignty, incidents at sea could still be prevented by regulating and conditioning the 
behaviour and actions of Commanding Officers of warships and military aircraft, 
especially those assigned to frontline operations.
109
 
The agreement came into force on the date of signing by both parties and applies 
to all maritime regimes relevant to the LOSC, including disputed maritime territories.
110
 
This means that the agreement will apply when naval vessels and aircraft of Indonesian 
and Malaysian navies encounter each other in the South China Sea. However, the 
agreement does not prevent third parties from taking provocative action in disputed 
areas, particularly the South China Sea. Moreover, the agreement applies purely to 
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naval units of the two navies; it does not apply to civilian law enforcement vessels or 
aircraft.  
8.2.3.2 China-United States bilateral agreements 
In 1998 China and the United States agreed to establish a Military Maritime 
Consultative Agreement (MMCA) which aims to avoid misunderstandings and 
miscalculations between the naval and air forces of the two parties when they operate 
near one another. However, the Agreement does not set out any standard safety 
procedures, such as how the naval ships and aircraft of the two States should behave 
when they encounter each other at sea.
111
 According to David Griffiths, the MMCA 
―was much more diplomatic in nature and tone than the classic INCSEA model, 
minimizing the role of operational experts and containing no provision for real-time 
tactical communication.‖
112
 The numerous incidents which have occurred between U.S. 
and Chinese vessels and aircraft, the most notable being the EP-3 Hainan incident in 
2001,
113
 clearly indicates that the MMCA has been ineffective. Some authors have even 
expressed the view that the biggest achievement of the MMCA ―has been that the two 
countries are actually holding meetings.‖
114
 With the increasing number of incidents at 
sea between China and the United States, however, there have been calls for an 
INCSEA agreement between the two States. However, according to Sam Bateman, 
China and the United States may not be interested in having such an agreement in 
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place.
115
 Admiral Gary Roughead, then U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, indicated in 
2011 that an INCSEA agreement with China is unnecessary as it would result in a 
separate and exclusive agreement which could imply a strained relationship between the 
two navies.
116
 Former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Randy Schriver has also 
pointed out that China is not interested in a ―rules-based, operator-to-operator approach 
to safety on the high seas.‖
117
 Another dissenting voice on the issue is Shirley Kan, who 
has asserted that tensions between the United States and China ―have been based on 
different national interests rather than any misperception or misunderstanding.‖
118
 
Nonetheless, in November 2014, China and the United States signed two 
important agreements – a Memorandum of Understanding on Rules of Behaviour for 
Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters (Rules of Behaviour MoU),
119
 and a 
Memorandum of Understanding on Notification of Major Military Activities 
Confidence-Building Measures Mechanism (Notification MoU).
120
 The Rules of 
Behaviour MoU provides standard safety procedures for military vessels and aircraft 
when they encounter each other at sea or in the air. The Annex to the Rules of 
Behaviour MoU providing for the safety of ship-to-ship encounters was completed and 
signed in November 2014, while the Annex providing for air-to-air encounters was 
signed in September 2015. The Rules of Behaviour MoU essentially relies on existing 
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multilateral agreements, particularly COLREGs and CUES 2014. Meanwhile, the 
Notification MoU aims to encourage the parties to exchange information about their 
respective country‘s security policies, strategies and related legal information, and to 
allow for reciprocal observation of military exercises and activities.
121
 These two major 
confidence building agreements are expected to lessen the frequency of naval incidents 
between China and the United States near China‘s coast, including in the South China 
Sea. However, as the MoUs are not legally binding, it is difficult to know to what extent 
each side will implement them (if at all). As James Kraska and Raul Pedrozo have 
observed, China does not tend to comply with legally binding requirements, and thus it 
is doubtful whether China would adhere to these (non-binding) MoUs.
122
 China‘s 
rejection of the arbitral tribunal award in the South China Sea arbitration is one example 
of the State rejecting a legally binding decision. The Rules of Behaviour MoU makes it 
clear that ―this memorandum is made without prejudice to either Side‘s policy 
perspective on military activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone.‖
123
 Given that 
almost all incidents at sea involving China and the United States have occurred due to 
different perspectives on foreign military activities in the EEZ, it is doubtful whether 
the Rules of Behaviour MoU will help prevent such incidents. Moreover, unlike other 
bilateral confidence building agreements, the two MoUs affirm that notifications 
between parties is voluntary, and that neither side should disclose to third parties the 
content of such notifications without the written consent of the other side. Some 
scholars have expressed the view that ―these two features make it especially difficult for 
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interested observers to know if the agreements are, in fact, being implemented.‖
124
 
Indeed, the MoUs specify that the U.S. Department of Defense and China‘s Ministry of 
National Defence are the only two agencies authorised to implement the MoUs. Thus, in 
light of the confidential nature of the MOUs, ―it seems that other agencies within each 
government may not receive detailed assessments of progress unless the other side 
authorizes interagency information sharing.‖
125
  
8.2.3.3 Bilateral agreements between littoral States 
Other bilateral confidence building agreements between South China Sea littoral 
States appear to be very limited. In October 2010, Vietnam and the Philippines signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Defence Cooperation, and in October 2011 
the two navies adopted a MoU on Enhancement of Mutual Cooperation and Information 
Sharing.
126
 In March 2012, the two navies signed an agreement on Standard Operating 
Procedures on Personnel Interaction in the Vicinity of Southeast Cay Island and 
Northeast Cay Island (in the Spratly Archipelago), with both sides agreeing to conduct 
coordinated maritime patrols in these overlapping waters.
127
 Vietnam and the 
Philippines also agreed to establish a ―hotline‖ between their coast guards for 
information sharing on maritime incidents. In practice, however, there have been no 
combined maritime patrols or exercises between the navies or coast guards of the two 
States. According to Carlyle Thayer, defence cooperation between Vietnam and the 
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Philippines ―is progressing but at a rudimentary level.‖
128
 Although Vietnam and 
Malaysia signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Bilateral Defense Cooperation in 
August 2008,
129
 cooperation between the two navies appears to be very limited. China 
and Vietnam signed a bilateral Agreement on Basic Principles Guiding the Settlement 
of Maritime Issues in 2011, with the Agreement leading to the establishment of a 
―hotline‖ in 2013 to deal with fisheries incidents in the South China Sea.
130
 However, 
no guidelines have been developed for the safe conduct of their vessels and aircraft 
when they encounter each other at sea. Indeed, the sheer number of incidents between 
China and Vietnam in the South China Sea in recent years have proved that such 
mechanisms are not very successful.  
In summary, there have been a number of bilateral maritime confidence building 
agreements involving the South China Sea littoral States. However, they appear to be 
weak and play very limited roles in preventing incidents at sea. Moreover, as maritime 
disputes in the South China Sea involve many countries, bilateral agreements are 
incapable of preventing third parties from taking provocative action. 
8.2.4 Track II level efforts 
 A number of Track II level workshops have been organised to address prevailing 
issues in the South China Sea. These include: (i) the Workshop Process on Managing 
Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea (SCS Workshop Process) initiated by 
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Indonesia in 1989; (ii) the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific 
(CSCAP), established in 1993; (iii) EEZ Group 21.
131
  
 The SCS Workshop Process was initiated by Indonesia‘s Ambassador Hasjim 
Djalal and Professor Ian Townsend-Gault of the University of British Columbia with 
financial support from the Canadian International Development Agency.
132
 The SCS 
Workshop Process is an informal workshop process, with all participants taking part in 
their personal capacities (i.e., without representing governmental positions). It aims to 
achieve three objectives: managing potential conflicts by seeking out areas of 
cooperation; developing confidence building measures and processes; and exchanging 
views through dialogue on certain issues.
133
 To date, there have been 25 Workshops and 
a number of Technical Working Groups (TWG) and Group of Experts (GE) 
meetings.
134
 In 2001, Canada decided to stop funding the workshop process because of 
a ―lack of concrete results.‖
135
 However, as participants originally agreed to take part in 
their personal capacities, thereby bypassing government bureaucracy, the SCS 
Workshop Process has continued. Even so, there have been different assessments on the 
success and failures of the SCS Workshop Process. In 1998, Townsend-Gault stated that 
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―bringing together participants from the entire region was something of an 
accomplishment.‖
136
 In this regard, it is important to note that the SCS Workshop 
Process is the only regional forum focussing on the management of potential conflicts in 
the South China Sea in which both Taiwan and China regularly participate. At the 16
th 
SCS Workshop held in Bali in 2006, Indonesian Ambassador Djalal commented that if 
potential conflicts in the South China Sea have not become a reality, or have not 
developed into conflict, the SCS Workshop Process will have been successful, and the 
moment the potential conflicts become a reality, it may be considered a failure.
137
 
However, other authors have expressed the view that the workshop processes have 
―failed to get the claimant countries to work together meaningfully‖
138
, with participants 
having had ―little influence on their respective governments for the most part.‖
139
 
Indeed, there is some force in that assessment, because although discussions continue 
even today, no outcome has been reached. 
 CSCAP is a non-governmental process for dialogue on security issues in the 
Asia Pacific. The purpose of the CSCAP is to provide ―a structured process for regional 
confidence building and security cooperation among countries and territories in the Asia 
Pacific region.‖
140
 CSCAP currently has 21 full members representing all major States 
in the Asia Pacific region. CSCAP activities are guided by a Steering Committee which 
is co-chaired by a member from an ASEAN Member Committee and a member from a 
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non-ASEAN Member Committee. There have been a number of Study Groups 
established by the Steering Committee for the purpose of producing memoranda that 
outline ―practical policy-oriented responses for consideration at Track One (official) 
level.‖
141
 To date, 27 CSCAP Memoranda addressing a variety of issues have been 
published and circulated to regional decision and policy makers. Regarding navigation 
and communication at sea, these Memoranda include Guidelines for Regional Maritime 
Cooperation; a Memorandum on Cooperation for Law and Order at Sea; Guidelines for 
Maritime Cooperation in Enclosed and Semi-enclosed Seas and Similar Sea Areas of 
the Asia Pacific; and a Memorandum on Maritime CBMs, Trust and Managing 
Incidents at Sea.
142
 It is important to note, however, that CSCAP does not provide 
detailed guidelines or proposals for the safety of navigation and communication at sea, 
or for present purposes, the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft. 
Unlike the SCS Workshop Process and the CSCAP, however, EEZ Group 21 
does focus on the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft, particularly in the 
EEZs of coastal States. EEZ Group 21 was a group of senior officials, legal experts and 
maritime specialists primarily from Asia-Pacific States who participated in a series of 
meeting held from 2002-2005, sponsored by Japanese Ocean Policy Research 
Foundation. The aim of Group 21 was to produce ―a set of non-binding, voluntary 
principles, which could provide the basis for a common understanding and approach to 
issues arising from the implementation of the EEZ regime.‖
143
 In September 2005, 
Group 21 reached an agreement named Guidelines for Navigation and Overflight in the 
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Exclusive Economic Zone (Guidelines).
144
 These Guidelines are based primarily on the 
LOSC, the practice of States, as well as emerging ―soft‖ law,
145
 and are designed to 
―ensure the safety and security of navigation in the EEZ‖ and to ―promote 
understanding of the rights and duties of States conducting military and intelligence 
gathering activities in the EEZ of another State, and thus contribute to peace, good 
order, and security at sea.‖
146
 
 Significantly, the Guidelines provide definitions for certain activities in the EEZ 
which are absent from the LOSC, among them ―hydrographic surveys‖, ―maritime 
scientific research‖, ―maritime surveillance‖, and ―military activities‖. In addition to 
these definitions, the Guidelines contain substantive provisions covering the above 
activities. However, the Guidelines have failed to garner support from concerned States, 
and regional organisations have refused to discuss them on the basis that they are ―too 
ambitious in their scope by covering more activities and in greater detail than [is] 
acceptable to some stakeholders in regional maritime security.‖
147
 For example, article 
XI of the Guidelines (which addresses military activities in the EEZ), contains 8 sub-
paragraphs covering military activities in such detail that that the freedoms of 
navigation and overflight in the EEZ are somewhat restricted.
148
 Article IX of the 
Guidelines (regarding hydrographic surveys), states that ―[h]ydrographic surveying 
should only be conducted in the EEZ of another State with the consent of the Coastal 
State.‖
149
 As the LOSC does not contain any provisions regarding hydrographic surveys 
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in foreign EEZs, this particular article has not been accepted by some States, including 
the United States. Indeed, in this regard Mark Valencia has asserted that the United 
States has rejected ―any and all such guidelines as unacceptable.‖
150
 According to Raul 
Pedrozo, ―such guidelines are clearly coastal State-oriented and are aimed at restricting 
high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight set forth in UNCLOS and other 
international instruments.‖
151
 Pedrozo has proffered the view that the Guidelines ―are 
simply an effort to renegotiate the EEZ provisions of UNCLOS that were widely 
accepted by the majority of the delegations at UNCLOS III.‖
152
  
In 2012 and 2013, the Ocean Policy Research Foundation organised two 
meetings in Hakone and Tokyo to review the Guidelines and make them more widely 
accepted.
153
 One of the outcomes of these meetings was a change in the name of the 
Guidelines to the Principles for Building Confidence and Security in the Exclusive 
Economic Zone of the Asia-Pacific (Principles). The main focus points of the Principles 
are ―the central issues of misunderstanding and ambiguity with regard to rights and 
duties in the EEZ.‖
154
 The Principles still reflect the chief objectives of the Guidelines; 
however, they are less detailed in order to ―avoid restricting activities in the EEZ more 
than necessary.‖
155
  
Another outcome of the two meetings was the deletion of articles II and III from 
the Guidelines. The rights and duties of coastal and other States are now found in 
articles IV and V of the Principles, and cover maritime surveillance and military 
activities. Article VII of the Guidelines, which dealt with the suppression of piracy and 
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other unlawful activities, has also been deleted ―with the recognition that international 
antipiracy activities have now become quite common.‖
156
 Two new provisions – article 
III on ―Due Regard in the EEZ‖ and article VIII on ―Provisional Arrangements‖ have 
been added to the Principles. However, the Principles do not define the term ―due 
regard‖, and therefore article III of the Principles essentially repeats what is already 
mentioned in the LOSC. Article VIII of the Principles attempts to clarify LOSC article 
74 with regard to provisional arrangements where boundaries between adjacent EEZs 
have not been agreed upon. This article states that: ―Such arrangements include standard 
operating procedures, information-sharing, and prior notification of military activities in 
areas of overlapping claims…‖
157
 However, assuming concerned coastal States agree 
with this provision, how are the activities of third parties in these overlapping EEZs to 
be treated? As the LOSC does not require foreign States to give prior notice to coastal 
States for the carrying out of military activities in the EEZ, article VIII of the Principles 
seems to be inconsistent with the LOSC. Article IX of the Guidelines regarding 
hydrographic surveying was also deleted, with the issue of hydrographic surveys being 
subsumed under the broader category of ―Maritime Scientific Research‖ in article VII of 
the Principles. Article VII (4) of the Principles states that ―[h]ydrographic surveying in 
the EEZ requires consent of the coastal State when the data collected affects the 
exclusive rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State.‖
158
 However, this article is quite 
difficult to implement, as there are no objective means to assess whether and to what 
extent the data collected affects the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State. 
Table 8.1 shows the differences between the Guidelines and the Principles. 
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Table 8.1 Contents of the Guidelines and the Principles 
Guidelines Principles 
I. Definitions I. Introduction 
II. Rights and Duties of the Coastal State II. Definitions 
III. Rights and Duties of Other States III. Due Regard in the EEZ 
IV. Maritime Surveillance IV. Maritime Surveillance 
V. Military Activities V. Military Activities 
VI. Non-interference with Electronic 
Systems 
VI. Non-interference with Electronic 
Systems 
VII. Suppression of Piracy and Other 
Unlawful Activities 
VII. Maritime Scientific Research 
VIII. Maritime Scientific Research VIII. Provisional Arrangements 
IX. Hydrographic Surveying IX. Transparency of Legislation 
X. Transparency of Legislation  
 
Source: Kazumine Akimoto, Introduction to the Principles for Building 
Confidence and Security in the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Asia-Pacific 
 
In summary, the Guidelines and Principles are laudable Track II level efforts in 
building confidence and security in the EEZ. However, as they contain a number of 
provisions that are not accepted by maritime States (including the United States), it is 
unlikely that the Guidelines or the Principles will be discussed at any official regional 
forum. 
8.2.5 The U.S. Freedom of Navigation Program 
  In response to excessive maritime claims by numerous States, in 1979 the U.S. 
government (under the Carter Administration) established a formal program known as 
the U.S. Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program to challenge excessive claims by ―a 
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peaceful exercise of the rights and freedoms of navigation and overflight recognized 
under international law.‖
159
 The FON program is a presidential-national level program 
jointly administered by the Department of Defense and the Department of State, and 
based on the legal regime of the LOSC.
160
 Put simply, the Department of State responds 
to excessive maritime claims through diplomatic protests or consultations with the 
States concerned, while the Department of Defense responds through operational 
assertions carried out by the Navy. According to J. Ashley Roach and Robert W. Smith, 
―the necessity for diplomatic communications and operational assertions to maintain the 
balance of interests reflected in the LOS Convention as law is often not well 
understood.‖
161
 More than 30 years after the entry into force of the LOSC, the United 
States remains outside of the Convention. However, the FON program has been 
continued as a means to ―exercise and assert [U.S.] navigation and overflight rights and 
freedoms on a worldwide basis in a manner that is consistent with the balance of 
interests reflected in the [Law of the Sea] convention.‖
162
 Since the FON Program 
began, more than 110 diplomatic protests have been filed and over 300 operational 
assertions have been conducted.
163
 According to Roach and Smith, the FON Program 
has been successful in reducing excessive maritime claims and persuading States to 
bring their domestic legislation into close conformity with the LOSC.
164
 Moreover, the 
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FON Program has had somewhat of a deterrent effect, with a number of States 
eschewing excessive maritime claims for fear of being challenged by the United 
States
165
 One example of the FON Program preserving navigational rights and freedoms 
can be seen in the 1988 Black Sea ―bumping‖ incident between U.S. and former Soviet 
warships. Indeed, this FON operation led to an agreement between the two maritime 
powers over the interpretation of LOSC provisions on the innocent passage of warships 
in the territorial sea.
166
 There have also been a number of operational assertions under 
the FON Program to challenge excessive maritime claims made by South China Sea 
littoral States, including China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and 
Vietnam.
167
 During the period of 1 October 2013 to 30 September 2014, the FON 
Program carried out 19 State challenges in order to preserve the rights, freedoms, and 
uses of the sea and airspace guaranteed to all States under the LOSC.
168
 Indeed, for 
several years the United States has challenged China‘s excessive maritime boundary 
claims, as well as the State‘s imposed restrictions on foreign military activities in its 
EEZ and claims to security jurisdiction outside of its territorial sea.
169
 Recently the FON 
Program has challenged China‘s restriction on foreign aircraft flying through an Air 
Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) where there is no intent to enter China‘s national 
airspace, as well as to China‘s domestic law criminalising survey activities by foreign 
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166
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entities in its EEZ.
170
 There have also been a number of incidents between U.S. and 
Chinese vessels and aircraft in the South China Sea.
171
 In response to China‘s massive 
―land reclamations‖ in the Spratlys, the United States sent its Freedom-class littoral 
combat ship, the USS Fort Worth, to patrol the maritime area near China‘s artificial 
islands in the Spratlys on 11 May 2015. During the patrol, the USS Fort Worth came 
across multiple Chinese warships, but as Commander Matt Kawas of the Fort Worth 
confirmed, the interactions between the warships of the two States was professional and 
in accordance with CUES 2014.
172
 Indeed, this interaction represents a positive sign for 
the implementation of CUES 2014. Even so, CUES 2014 will be tested if the United 
States continues to patrol this maritime area. And in light of several recent incidents in 
the area, it would appear that the U.S. Navy has no plans to cease its close monitoring 
of the region. On 20 May 2015, when a U.S. P8-A Poseidon surveillance aircraft 
conducted overflights over China‘s artificial islands in the Spratlys, it was warned by 
the Chinese navy that it was approaching ―a military alert zone‖ and that it should leave 
the area ―to avoid misjudgement.‖
173
 However, the U.S. pilot replied that the aircraft 
was conducting lawful military activities outside national airspace.
174
 In October 2015, 
a U.S. guided-missile destroyer, the USS Lassen, conducted a freedom of navigation 
patrol within 12 nautical miles of an artificial island built by China on the Subi Reef in 
the Spratlys
175
. In January 2016, the USS Curtis Wilbur, exercised innocent passage 
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within 12 nautical miles of Triton Island claimed by China, Vietnam and Taiwan 
without giving prior notice to any of these claimant States.
176
 And in May 2016 the USS 
William P. Lawrence, exercised innocent passage within 12 nautical miles of Fiery 
Cross Reef in the Spratly Islands, which the arbitral tribunal classifies as a ―rock‖ under 
the LOSC.
177
 At the 2015 Shangri-La Dialogue, U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton 
Carter asserted that artificial islands do not confer sovereign rights.
178
 Carter also 
stressed that ―there should be no mistake: The United States will fly, sail and operate 
wherever international law allows, as we do all around the world.‖
179
 Likewise, 
Australia has asserted that it will continue to conduct patrols over the disputed islands in 
the South China Sea. In an interview with the Wall Street Journal, then Australian 
Defence Minister Kevin Andrews stated that ―we‘ve been doing it for decades, we‘re 
doing it currently...and we‘ll continue to do it into the future.‖
180
 On 23 June 2015, in an 
exercise with the Philippine military, a Japanese P3-C Orion surveillance plane circled 
over disputed waters near the Spratlys for the first time.
181
 In an interview with the Wall 
Street Journal, Admiral Katsutoshi Kawano, Chief of Joint Staff of Japan‘s Self-
Defence Forces, proposed that ―we don‘t have any plans to conduct surveillance in the 
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South China Sea currently but depending on the situation, I think there is a chance we 
could consider doing so.‖
182
 After the ruling of the arbitral tribunal, it is possible that 
Japan will soon join the United States to patrol the South China Sea. 
China has certainly adopted an aggressive stance in claiming sovereignty and 
sovereign rights in the South China Sea. In addition, China has refused to take part in 
international arbitration proceedings to settle disputes arising from the application of 
LOSC provisions, proudly proclaiming that ―China views the law as a malleable tool to 
be trumpeted when it supports Chinese claims and ignored when it stands in their 
way.‖
183
 As China does not abide by the LOSC, other South China Sea littoral States 
(and the international community as a whole), may be justified in supporting initiatives 
similar to the FON Program to ensure the LOSC is respected and that the freedoms of 
navigation and overflight are safeguarded.  
8.3 Conclusion 
A number of regional initiatives have been devised to fill the gaps in the 
international law regime on the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft at sea. 
These initiatives include regional agreements; bilateral agreements between States 
concerned; Track II level regional workshops; and unilateral State efforts. However, it 
appears that such efforts have not been very successful in preventing contentious 
incidents in the South China Sea. The geopolitical complexity of the South China Sea, 
coupled with the existing conflicts between regional States over LOSC provisions, have 
made this maritime area vulnerable to conflict. Indeed, incidents involving the passage 
of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft show no signs of abating. With increasing 
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tensions between States over sovereignty disputes and the freedom of navigation in the 
South China Sea, and particularly China‘s aggressive pattern of behaviour, the need for 
regional cooperation in terms of conflict management and conflict avoidance is 
arguably more pressing than ever before. 
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9 CHALLENGES AND THE WAY FORWARD 
9.1 Introduction 
Ensuring the safety and freedom of navigation at sea has been a critical State issue 
for centuries. Indeed, this issue constitutes a fundamental element of the international 
law of the sea and the law of the air. However, as international agreements are 
invariably the product of compromise, there are often gaps and ambiguities in their 
provisions. These gaps and ambiguities can be intentional or unintentional, and arise 
due to a lack of agreement between State Parties.
1
 As a result, States tend to adopt 
conflicting interpretations of international law provisions – interpretations which accord 
with their own vested interests. The passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft at 
sea is a prime example of an issue on which States have adopted divergent opinions. 
Multiple incidents have occurred in the South China Sea region due to differing 
interpretations of international law provisions by coastal States and maritime user 
States. In order to fill the gaps and ambiguities in international maritime and aviation 
law, and to promote the safety and freedom of navigation and overflight, a number of 
regional initiatives have been devised. However, as demonstrated in Chapter Eight, such 
efforts have had limited success. This chapter will illustrate the remaining challenges 
regarding the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft at sea, in the South 
China Sea. The discussion will also provide a number of legal and policy 
recommendations for addressing these challenges, while highlighting the implications 
for the future security, safety and freedom of navigation and overflight in the region. 
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9.2 Uncertain issues in international law  
 The first uncertain issue in the international law of the sea concerns the 
provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) – 
specifically the innocent passage of warships in the territorial sea of coastal States. As 
discussed in Chapter Four, the issue of whether warships enjoy the right of innocent 
passage, or whether coastal States require prior notification or authorisation in order for 
such a right to be exercised, was an area of disagreement between coastal States and 
maritime user States.
2
 As a product of compromise, the LOSC does not contain any 
provisions directly addressing the innocent passage of warships. The LOSC affirms that 
―matters not regulated by this Convention continue to be governed by the rules and 
principles of general international law.‖
3
 However, as States have adopted different 
views on the question of the innocent passage of warships, their practices are far from 
uniform.
4
 This divergence of state practice, as well as the lack of judicial decisions 
regarding the innocent passage of warships, makes the formation of a universal 
customary rule on the topic very unlikely. Although more than 30 years have passed 
since the entry into force of the LOSC, at least 40 States still assert some form of 
requirement, either prior authorisation or notification, in their national laws and 
regulations for the passage of foreign warships through their territorial seas.
5
 In the 
South China Sea region, China requires prior authorisation, Taiwan, Vietnam and the 
Philippines all require prior notification for the passage of foreign warships through 
                                                 
2
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their territorial seas, while the current domestic regulations of Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Brunei are silent on the issue altogether.
6
  
The second uncertain issue concerns foreign military activities in the EEZ. 
Indeed, the LOSC does not prescribe what types of military activities are permissible or 
prohibited in the EEZ of a foreign State. Coastal states have not been granted any right 
to regulate foreign military activities in their EEZ, while no express right regarding 
military activities has been granted to maritime user states. Commenting on this during 
UNCLOS III, the President of the Conference, Tommy T.B. Koh, stated that ―nowhere 
is it clearly stated whether a third state may or may not conduct military activities in the 
exclusive economic zone of a coastal state. But, it was the general understanding that 
the text we negotiated and agreed upon would permit such activities to be conducted.‖
7
 
Unfortunately this issue remains uncertain until today, and is arguably one of the most 
controversial issues to be debated in the international law of the sea. Some South China 
Sea coastal States, particularly China and Malaysia, have restrictive views on foreign 
military activities in their EEZs, while other maritime user States consider such 
activities to be part of the freedoms of navigation and overflight granted by the LOSC.  
The third uncertain issue centres on the regime of islands under the LOSC. 
Article 121 of the LOSC defines an island as ―a naturally formed area of land, 
surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.‖
8
 Under this article, an island 
may be entitled to a territorial sea, a contiguous zone, an exclusive economic zone and a 
continental shelf.
9
 However, ―[rocks] which cannot sustain human habitation or 
                                                 
6
 See Chapter four for a more detailed discussion of this issue. 
7
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8
 LOSC, art 121 (1). 
9
 LOSC, art 121 (2). 
 
320 
 
economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental 
shelf.‖
10
 In its final award issued on 12 July 2016, the arbitral tribunal in the 
Philippines-China arbitration ruled that ―none of the high-tide features in the Spratly 
Islands are capable of sustaining human habitation or an economic life of their own 
within the meaning of those terms in Article 121(3) of the [LOSC].‖
11
 Clive Schofield 
has commented that by clarifying the status of various offshore features in the South 
China Sea for the purpose of article 121, the tribunal‘s decision ―is hugely significant 
for the Law of the Sea‘s development and international law generally.‖
12
 However, it is 
important to note that the arbitral tribunal‘s award is only legally binding on the parties 
to the dispute.
13
 This raises the question: what is the position of other major powers? As 
just two examples, the United States claims an EEZ from Kingman Reef in Micronesia, 
and Japan claims an EEZ from Okinotorishima. However, according to M. Taylor 
Fravel, ―[u]nder the precedent established by the tribunal, these features may not be 
entitled to the EEZ that states claim from them.‖
14
 If the tribunal‘s award is respected by 
States, then even though the tribunal‘s decision will not directly change the navigational 
regimes of the LOSC, it would have indirect effects on navigational rights in the region 
by reducing the EEZs for which States have different views on navigational rights.  
The fourth uncertain issue is the safe navigation of sovereign immune vessels at 
sea. The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs) are 
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widely regarded as the maritime ―rules of the road‖ and ―apply to all vessels upon the 
high seas and in all waters connected therewith navigable by seagoing vessels.‖
15
 
Accordingly, sovereign immune vessels (with the exception of submerged submarines) 
are subject to COLREGs.
16
 There are a number of provisions in COLREGs that 
expressly apply to warships, including aircraft carriers, minesweepers and 
replenishment ships.
17
 However, rule 1 of the regulations makes it clear that a party to 
COLREGs shall attempt to achieve ―the closest possible compliance‖ if it has 
―determined that a vessel of special construction or purpose cannot comply fully with 
the provisions of any of these Rules.‖
18
 Due to the ―special construction or purpose‖ of 
sovereign immune vessels, especially warships, these vessels are not required to comply 
with all the rules of COLREGs. It is for this reason that a number of incidents at sea 
agreements have been struck which apply exclusively to naval vessels and which 
reinforce the spirit of COLREGs.
19
 For instance, the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement 
between the United States and the Soviet Union states that the Parties ―shall take 
measures to instruct the commanding officers of their respective ships to observe 
strictly the letter and spirit of [COLREGs].‖
20
 The Code for Unplanned Encounters at 
Sea (CUES 2014) also provides that Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) navies 
―are expected‖ to comply with COLREGs.
21
 However, as previously mentioned in 
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Chapter Eight, non-naval law enforcement vessels and aircraft are not encompassed by 
CUES. Another convention which focuses on safe navigation at sea is the International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). SOLAS is ―generally regarded as the 
most important of all international treaties concerning the safety of merchant ships.‖
22
 
Nevertheless, SOLAS does not apply to warships, naval auxiliaries or other ships 
owned or operated by a Contracting Government and used only on government non-
commercial service.  
 The fifth uncertain issue in international law relates to the interaction between 
military aircraft in international airspace. The Convention on International Civil 
Aviation (Chicago Convention) and the LOSC both require States to ensure their state 
aircraft operate with ―due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft.‖
23
 The 
Chicago Convention also requires that ―[an] aircraft shall not be operated in such 
proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.‖
24
  Unfortunately, the Chicago 
Convention does not contain any provisions regarding the operation of State aircraft, 
including military and law enforcement aircraft, beyond the land areas and territorial 
waters of coastal States. 
 Lastly, there are no international rules governing the safe manoeuvre of 
submarines at sea. The LOSC requires submarines to navigate on the surface and to 
show their flags when they transit through the territorial sea of a coastal State.
25
 
However, according to Sam Bateman, ―due to the very nature of submarine operations, 
this provision is honoured more in its breach rather than in its observation except in 
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[hereafter Chicago Convention], art 3; LOSC, arts 39, 54 & 87.  
24
 Chicago Convention, art 3. 
25
 LOSC, art 20. 
 
323 
 
circumstances when navigational conditions, particularly water depth, require that the 
submarine should travel on the surface.‖
26
  Submarines are treated as surface vessels 
when they transit above the water, and hence they are expected to comply with the 
―rules of the road‖ like other surface vessels. However, when submarines transit 
submerged there are no rules that apply to them. Indeed, it is impossible for submerged 
submarines of different States to communicate with each other as radio waves do not 
travel well underwater. Moreover, as submarines have very limited command, control 
and communication capabilities when submerged, if the commanding officers of the 
respective submarines fail to handle a tense situation in a professional way (and without 
the benefit of personnel ashore giving directions), the consequences could be very 
serious. With an increasing number of submarines in the South China Sea, the safety of 
submarine operations in the region is a challenging issue. This has led Singapore‘s 
Navy Chief, Rear Admiral Lai Chung Han, to assert that: ―[W]ith an increasing number 
of submarines operating in that congested and confined water space, it‘s perhaps no 
exaggeration to say that it is an accident waiting to happen.‖
27
 
9.3 Key drivers behind state practice 
 As the international law of the sea contains gaps and ambiguities, state practice 
in the South China Sea has been divergent. This section will outline a number of key 
drivers behind the practice of South China Sea littoral States in relation to the passage 
of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft. 
 The first key driver is preserving the sovereign rights and security interests of 
littoral States. China, Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei all have 
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overlapping sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. However, as none of these 
claimant States are willing to compromise their claims, they have all tried to strengthen 
and consolidate their sovereignty and sovereign rights through various strategies. By 
virtue of its economic and military power, China has adopted a more assertive posture 
in its disputes with other Southeast Asian claimants. Indeed, China has used navy ships, 
maritime law enforcement vessels, fishing vessels, as well as oil-exploration rigs to 
safeguard its maritime claims in the South China Sea, ignoring international law rules 
and norms. Due to the operation of U.S. vessels and aircraft in the South China Sea, 
China applies a restrictive view on the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft 
in the region, thereby allaying some of its security concerns. As a rising maritime 
power, China has become more confident in its dealings with the United States in the 
South China Sea. However, in order to avoid a major conflict, China has thus far used 
its civilian law enforcement forces and fishing vessels to confront U.S. military vessels 
operating in the area. Other Southeast Asian claimants, particularly Vietnam and the 
Philippines, have modified their domestic laws and regulations so that they conform to 
the LOSC, thereby gaining the support of the international community and maritime 
user States. Nevertheless, due to security concerns, the laws and regulations of these 
Southeast Asian States still contain some form of restriction on the passage of foreign 
military vessels and aircraft in their maritime zones, particularly in the territorial sea. 
 The second key driver is maintaining access to valuable resources in the South 
China Sea. China‘s placement of an oil rig in Vietnam‘s claimed EEZ is one example of 
a clash over resources. Furthermore, as the disputed areas of the South China Sea are 
believed to be rich in fish stocks as well as oil and gas deposits, certain States have 
strengthened their maritime law enforcement capabilities to better protect their resource 
claims. In the near future, there will undoubtedly be a heavy concentration of sovereign 
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immune vessels and aircraft deployed to the region. While China has become more 
assertive and aggressive in the South China Sea, other States have shown no signs of 
conceding anytime soon. As a result, intentional and unintentional incidents will 
continue to take place. 
 The third key driver is safeguarding the strategic interests of other concerned 
States in the South China Sea. As the security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) 
in the South China Sea is pivotal to many States, any disruption to seaborne trade would 
pose significant threats to regional economies. As a result, maintaining the safety and 
freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea is a key strategic interest 
for many States, particularly those dependent on the United States for their security. 
Indeed, by virtue of the navigation rights granted by the LOSC, the United States has 
been conducting freedom of navigation (FON) operational assertions in the South China 
Sea. By bolstering its territorial sovereignty and maritime claims in the South China 
Sea, China has attempted to push the United States from its mainland while projecting 
its power over the region. Thus, China and the United States have maintained 
contradictory views over the passage of military vessels and aircraft in their respective 
maritime zones. As a rising maritime power, China has become more assertive in 
enforcing its position. The United States, however, will continue to assert the freedom 
of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea in accordance with prevailing 
international law, as well as to maintain its power and influence in the region.  
9.4 Regional initiatives have been ineffective 
As discussed in Chapter Eight, there have been a number of regional initiatives 
at both the governmental level (Track-I) and non-governmental level (Track-II) to 
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address problems relating to the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft at 
sea. However, for reasons canvassed below, these efforts have had very limited success.  
There have been no regional or bilateral agreements at Track I level that address 
the passage of foreign warships in the territorial sea of coastal States, or the issue of 
foreign military activities in the EEZ. In addition, all regional initiatives and bilateral 
agreements discussed in Chapter Eight are non-legally binding mechanisms. As a result, 
the States concerned may not always be willing to act in conformity with these 
agreements. Furthermore, Sam Bateman has highlighted that regional agreements 
including CUES 2014 and the Rules of Behaviour for Safety of Air and Maritime 
Encounters (Rules of Behaviour MOU) operate at a tactical level rather than at an 
operational or strategic level.
28
 Therefore, according to Bateman, it is essential to have a 
regional agreement in place that focuses on operational and strategic issues such as 
―safety zones around disputed features, restrictions on particular types of operations in 
particular areas such as submarine ―no go‖ areas, hot lines, operational transparency, 
and prior notice of operations.‖
29
 
Moreover, within disputed waters of the South China Sea, littoral States operate 
different types of (non-naval) law enforcement vessels and aircraft, including coast 
guard vessels, fisheries patrol vessels, as well as maritime law surveillance vessels. 
However, no safety guidelines have been devised for the interaction between these 
vessels and aircraft, or between naval vessels and military or state aircraft at sea. As a 
result, many contentious incidents involving these types of vessels and aircraft have 
occurred in the South China Sea region as described in Chapter Seven. Incidents 
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involving coast guards and other civil maritime law enforcement services generally 
carry a lower risk of catastrophic clashes compared to warships. However, as Richard 
Bitzinger argues, ―if clashes increase or the stakes are raised, they could escalate into 
more violent action involving navies.‖
30
 Unfortunately, no guidelines or 
recommendations for the safe manoeuvre of these types of vessels and aircraft have 
been discussed thus far. 
 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) could potentially play an 
important role in maintaining stable maritime security and freedom of navigation in the 
region. However, it appears that differences between ASEAN States on South China 
Sea issues persist. As discussed in previous chapters, all ten ASEAN States have 
different strategic interests in the South China Sea. As a result, it is difficult for ASEAN 
to speak with one voice on maritime disputes in the region. In November 2015, the 
ASEAN Defence Ministers‘ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) was held in Malaysia with the 
participation of ten ASEAN defence ministers and eight of their counterparts from the 
United States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, China, Russia and 
India. However, for the first time in ASEAN‘s history, a meeting of this type failed to 
issue a joint declaration on South China Sea issues as scheduled. According to 
Malaysian Defence Minister Hishammuddin Hussein, ―the decision was made by 
ASEAN because there is no consensus, so no joint declaration [was] signed.‖
31
 Another 
problem within ASEAN is that decision-making is based on consultation and 
consensus.
32
 If one pro-Beijing member does not agree on a particular issue, ASEAN 
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cannot issue a declaration contrary to China‘s interests. The disunity within ASEAN 
over South China Sea issues surfaced again in June 2016, when ASEAN foreign 
ministers retracted a joint statement voicing ―serious concern‖ over ongoing 
developments in the South China Sea which undermine peace, security and stability in 
the region. In this instance, the joint statement was retracted only a few hours after it 
was released. For Southeast Asia specialist, Ian Storey, ―[i]t really looks not only like 
ASEAN is in disarray but also that it lacks any backbone.‖
33
 It is clear that maintaining 
security and the freedoms of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea is very 
important to the region; however, eliciting a collective, unified voice from ASEAN on 
this issue has been fraught with difficulty. 
Another issue affecting the success of regional initiatives is the Taiwan factor. 
Taiwan is one of the claimants in the South China Sea disputes. However, due to 
pressure from China, Taiwan cannot participate in any official regional security forum. 
Taiwan and China share identical maritime claims in the South China Sea, particularly 
the nine-dash line claims, with neither State clarifying whether they lay claim to all 
islands or waters within the nine-dash line. Other claimant States wish to exclude 
Taiwan from South China Sea negotiations because of their ―one-China‖ policy, but 
also due to concerns that China and Taiwan could cooperate to strengthen their identical 
maritime claims in the region.
34
 Taiwan currently occupies Itu Aba Island, the largest 
land feature in the Spratlys, and also boasts one of the largest fishing fleets in the 
region.
35
 Moreover, Taiwanese coast guard vessels regularly conduct maritime patrols 
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in this area.
36
 For this reason, any Code of Conduct or related agreement related to 
navigation and overflight in the South China Sea which does not have Taiwan‘s 
participation would not be fully effective. As the arbitral tribunal has discounted the 
nine-dash line, ASEAN could encourage Taiwan to clarify its maritime claims in the 
South China Sea in accordance with international law. Provided Taiwan‘s response 
accords with prevailing international law, ASEAN could then try to accept Taiwan as a 
party to the regional security forum, thus helping to improve the effectiveness of 
regional initiatives. As ASEAN member States have openly acknowledged the ―one 
China‖ policy, it is unlikely that they will invite Taiwan to participate in any official 
regional forum. However, inviting Taiwan to participate at Track II level initiatives 
could help overcome this obstacle. 
At Track II level, as noted in Chapter Eight, EEZ Group 21 has issued 
Guidelines and Principles documents. However, neither document has been adopted at 
any official regional forum. The reason behind the lack of uptake of either the 
Guidelines or the Principles is that both interpret the provisions of the LOSC in a 
regional but not global context. While most States around the world respect the 
freedoms of navigation and overflight in the EEZ as codified in the LOSC, some States 
in the Asia-Pacific, and particularly those in the South China Sea region, apply 
restrictive views to the issue of foreign military activities in the EEZ. Therefore, any 
attempt to reinterpret the provisions of the LOSC narrowly and with a particular 
regional focus is unlikely to be successful. Moreover, States went through many years 
of compromise, consensus-building and negotiation before the Convention was agreed. 
As a result, the LOSC contains provisions which are intentionally vague and 
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ambiguous. Attempts to clarify these intentional ambiguities at Track-II level initiatives 
and with a regional focus are unlikely to be successful.  
9.5 Maritime disputes are unlikely to be resolved 
  There are a number of reasons why the resolution of maritime disputes in the 
South China Sea is highly unlikely. Firstly, it is important to note that disputes may be 
resolved peacefully – either through negotiation between the States concerned or by 
referring the matter to an international court or tribunal. China, however, has eschewed 
submitting its territorial and maritime delimitation disputes to an independent and 
impartial body.
37
 Accordingly, the resolution of China‘s sovereignty disputes by an 
international court or tribunal is highly unlikely. Lee Kuan Yew, the late former Prime 
Minister of Singapore, has opined that ―it is naive to believe that a strong China will 
accept the conventional definition of what parts of the sea around it are under its 
jurisdiction.‖
38
 Indeed, as China‘s maritime power grows, ―it seems less willing to be 
beholden to legal norms enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea.‖
39
  
 Secondly, most of the territorial sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea are 
multilateral disputes involving more than two States, but China invariably insists on 
resolving disputes through bilateral negotiations. This strategy gives China the upper 
hand when dealing with smaller States. However, there is no logical basis for resolving 
multilateral disputes through bilateral negotiations. Perhaps China continues this 
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delaying strategy in order to strengthen its territorial sovereignty and associated 
maritime claims in the long term, rather than striving for peaceful, short-term dispute 
resolution procedures.  
 Thirdly, sovereignty claims over offshore features in the South China Sea are 
already included in the domestic laws of several littoral States. For example, the Law on 
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of China states that the territorial land of 
China ―includes the mainland and its offshore islands, Taiwan and the various affiliated 
islands including Diaoyu Island, Penghu Islands, Dongsha Islands, Xisha Islands, 
Nansha (Spratly) Islands and other islands that belong to the People's Republic of 
China.‖
40
 The Law of the Sea of Vietnam states that ―[t]his Law provides for the 
baseline, the internal waters, the territorial sea…the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos 
and other archipelagos under the sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction of Viet 
Nam.‖
41
 Similarly, the 2009 Baseline Law of the Philippines affirms that the Philippines 
exercises sovereignty over the Kalayaan Island Group (part of the Spratly Islands) and 
Bajo de Masinloc (also known as Scarborough Shoal).
42
 That these States have made 
such explicit reference to offshore features in their domestic legislation suggests they 
are unlikely to compromise their sovereignty claims in any bilateral or multilateral 
negotiation.  
 Lastly, resolving sovereignty disputes over these offshore features requires not 
only compromise but also a strong political will from the parties involved. However, 
with the rise of nationalist sentiment among claimant States, particularly China, 
Vietnam and the Philippines, it will be difficult for the respective governments to accept 
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any proposal that results in strong domestic criticism or protest. Wu Jianmin, a former 
Chinese diplomatic spokesman, has highlighted the difficulties for a Chinese leader to 
publicly speak of compromise with China‘s neighbours in the South China Sea, 
propounding that ―[y]ou would be a ‗traitor.‘‖
43
 Recent demonstrations in both China 
and the Philippines over Scarborough Shoal, and in Vietnam over the Haiyang Shiyou 
981 oil rig incident, are good illustrations of the strong sense of nationalism in these 
particular States.
44
  
9.6 Existing political and strategic mistrust between States concerned 
 Various maritime incidents in the South China Sea, together with China‘s 
extensive artificial island-building program and its pattern of aggressive behaviour in 
the region, have resulted in political and strategic mistrust between China and other 
littoral States. The involvement of external players in the South China Sea, particularly 
the United States, has also added to the strategic distrust between the United States and 
China. While smaller littoral States of the South China Sea welcome the United States 
playing a constructive role in the region, they still appear to be cautious in their policies 
towards the United States. Indeed, the historical and cultural baggage that these States 
bring to the negotiating table, as well as their different political ideologies and strategic 
national interests, are all factors that have affected their mutual trust in the United 
States. The irony, however, is that high levels of trust among the major players in the 
South China Sea, particularly the United States, China, the Philippines and Vietnam, are 
critical to the stability and security of the region. 
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9.6.1 Vietnam-China relations 
After more than a decade of hostility which began with the 1979 border conflict, 
Vietnam and China officially normalised their relationship in 1991. Since this time, the 
bilateral relationship has evolved substantially under the motto of ―friendly 
neighbourliness, comprehensive cooperation, long-term stability and looking toward the 
future‖. In 2008, the relationship between the two States solidified into a comprehensive 
strategic partnership, paving the way for future cooperative milestones.
45
 In December 
2000, China and Vietnam reached an agreement on maritime boundary delimitation in 
the Gulf of Tonkin. This agreement was the first maritime boundary agreement in the 
region to involve China. In October 2011, China and Vietnam signed an Agreement on 
Basic Principles Guiding the Settlement of Maritime-Related Issues, with the two States 
committing to dispute resolution procedures based on legal processes and principles 
defined by international law, as well as ―through friendly talks and negotiations.‖
46
 
However, numerous maritime incidents in the South China Sea between Chinese and 
Vietnamese vessels have revealed political and strategic mistrust between the two 
States. In a media interview during his visit to the Philippines in May 2014, Vietnamese 
Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung stated that ―[w]hat China is doing [with the Haiyang 
Shiyou 981 oil rig] is totally different to what China is speaking‖
47
, adding that 
―Vietnam always wants peace and friendship on the basis of independence, self-
reliance, sovereignty, [and] territorial integrity of land and sea; however, Vietnam will 
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never exchange this sacred sovereignty for some kind of unrealizable or dependent 
peace and friendship.‖
48
 Speaking with Chinese President Xi Jinping during his visit to 
Vietnam in November 2015, Vietnam‘s President Truong Tan Sang expressed his 
concern that ―the trust in the relations between the two parties, two States, among our 
people, officials, and party members has declined in recent years due to disputes and 
disagreements over maritime issues as well as the failure to fully implement a number 
of cooperative agreements between the two States.‖
49
 According to the Spring 2015 
Global Attitudes survey, only 19 per cent of Vietnamese respondents had a positive 
view on China, while 83 per cent expressed concern about Vietnam‘s territorial disputes 
with the economic and military superpower.
50
 The 1974 Paracels battle, the 1979 border 
war, and the 1988 Spratlys maritime conflict have been widely reported by Vietnamese 
media outlets as battles stemming from China‘s illegal invasions. Indeed, the perception 
of China as a threat emerged during the 2014 Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig incident. Since 
this clash the two States have tried to restore their relationship; however, it has been 
difficult for the two countries to regain the trust they first forged in 1991. Even though 
China and Vietnam share the same nominal political ideology, Vietnam‘s foreign policy 
vis-a-vis China centres on protecting its sovereignty and national interests in the South 
China Sea. However, with China‘s formidable artificial island-building program in the 
Spratly Islands, its growing assertiveness in the South China Sea, as well as social, 
political and strategic distrust, mending the strained relationship between the two States 
will be a difficult task. 
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9.6.2 Philippines-China relations  
The relationship between China and the Philippines has also undergone dramatic 
change due to maritime disputes in the South China Sea. Indeed, since China occupied 
Mischief Reef in 1995, the relationship between the two States has deteriorated 
significantly. However, when Philippine President Arroyo came into power in 2011, the 
relationship between the two States improved remarkably. To mark the 30th anniversary 
of diplomatic relations between China and the Philippines in 2005, Chinese President 
Hu Jintao paid a state visit to the Philippines, with the two States affirming that ―China-
Philippines relations have reached the golden age of partnership.‖
51
 Notably, in 2005 
three oil companies from China, Vietnam and the Philippines signed a Tripartite 
Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertakings in the Agreement Area in the South 
China Sea, with the hope of ―contribut[ing] to the transformation of the South China 
Sea into an area of peace, stability, cooperation, and development in accordance with 
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 2002 ASEAN-
China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.‖
52
 However, the 
agreement was later suspended due to a widely publicised accusation by the Philippines 
that the agreement violated its national laws.
53
 The relationship between China and the 
Philippines has certainly worsened since 2012 due to the maritime standoff over 
Scarborough Shoal. In 2013, the Philippines filed an arbitration case against China‘s 
unlawful claims in the South China Sea despite formal objections from Beijing. In 
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response, China asserted that ―what the Philippine side did seriously damaged bilateral 
relations with China.‖
54
 Although China has sought to resolve maritime disputes with 
the Philippines through bilateral negotiations, Philippine President Aquino has made it 
clear that ―we cannot agree to bilateral talks to solve the problem, because we think the 
problem is multilateral.‖
55
 The political mistrust between the two States has increased to 
such an extent that President Aquino openly expressed his misgivings over Manila‘s 
diplomatic relations with China, exclaiming that ―[a]t the end of the day, it goes from 
hot to cold, sometimes they‘re very conciliatory, sometimes they make very provocative 
statements‖.
56
 President Aquino further conceded that ―we don‘t understand some of the 
messages [we get from China] sometimes. We‘re not sure.‖
57
 Since 2012, the 
relationship between China and the Philippines has suffered significant setbacks. As 
Richard Heydarian has succinctly stated: ―China and the Philippines have the most toxic 
bilateral relationship in Asia.‖
58
 According to a 2015 survey by the Social Weather 
Stations, 60 per cent of adults in the Philippines have ―little trust‖ in China, and 51 per 
cent of Filipinos are concerned about maritime disputes with China in the South China 
Sea.
59
  
In May 2016, newly elected Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte indicated he 
wanted to cultivate friendly relations with China, and would open up direct talks with 
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Beijing over the South China Sea territorial disputes.
60
 This suggests a degree of hope 
that the two sides may be able to restore their relationship in the coming years. 
However, as the arbitral tribunal ruled in favour of the Philippines, it is unlikely that 
Manila will concede any of its maritime claims to China in order to re-establish closer 
ties. 
9.6.3 United States-China relations 
The lack of strategic trust between China and the United States has also 
deepened due to various factors. The U.S. rebalancing policy towards the Asia-Pacific 
to strengthen military, economic and diplomatic relationships with other Asian nations 
has led to China becoming increasingly suspicious of U.S. involvement in the region. 
Despite the United States going to great lengths to explain that the rebalancing policy is 
about broadening U.S. engagement with Asia-Pacific States, and not a containment 
exercise against China, many Chinese scholars have expressed the view that the U.S. 
rebalancing policy targets China.
61
 Fan Gaoyue, a Senior Colonel in the Chinese Army 
and Research Fellow at the Chinese Academy of Military Science, has expressed 
concerns over the United States expanding its air and navy bases and increasing its 
military presence in coastal regions of East Asia to monitor Chinese air and navy forces. 
Fan has also propounded that the ―Air-Sea Battle‖ concept exaggerates the ―China 
threat‖ in order to satisfy the U.S. domestic demand to contain China.
62
 Indeed, for Fan, 
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―promoting such a concept will have a negative influence on building strategic mutual 
trust between China and the US, and it will result in an escalation of tensions in the 
Asia-Pacific region.‖
63
 Some Chinese authors have also proffered the view that the U.S. 
rebalancing policy is designed to force China to accept the order and norms set by the 
United States.
64
 Regarding the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), at a meeting with 
President Obama in November 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping affirmed that ―I don't 
see any of the regional free trade agreements as targeting China. China is committed to 
open regionalism and we believe the various regional cooperation initiatives should 
positively interact with each other. That is currently the case.‖
65
 However, many 
Chinese observers have argued that the TPP is an instrument that the United States is 
using to strengthen its economic control in the region and to contain China.
66
 For 
example, Yin Chengde, a Research Fellow at the China Foundation for International 
Studies, has explained that ―[by] involving its Asian allies Japan and Vietnam, both of 
which have territorial disputes with China, in the TPP, the United States obviously 
hopes to form a united front against China.‖
67
  
In relation to the South China Sea, while the United States has asserted that it 
―will not accept restrictions on freedom of navigation and overflight, or other lawful 
uses of the sea‖
68
, China has rejected U.S. concerns over the issue. Speaking at the 
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ASEAN Regional Forum in August 2015, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi ventured 
as far as to say that ―China always maintains that countries enjoy freedom of navigation 
and overflight in the South China Sea in accordance with the international law. Up to 
now, there has not been a single case in which freedom of navigation in the South China 
Sea is impeded.‖
69
 While the United States supports the resolution of South China Sea 
disputes multilaterally, China prefers direct bilateral negotiation between the States 
concerned. The United States has repeatedly stated its support for a Code of Conduct, 
but China invariably seeks to exclude the United States from regional conversations. 
According to Shannon Tiezzi, China ―will not move forward on a code of conduct until 
the U.S. butts out.‖
70
 Speaking at the Shangri La Dialogue 2016 in Singapore, Ashton 
Carter, U.S. Secretary of Defense, expressed the view that ―in the South China Sea, 
China has taken some expansive and unprecedented actions that have generated 
concerns about China‘s strategic intentions‖, adding that ―if these actions continue, 
China could end up erecting a Great Wall of self-isolation.‖
71
 In response to Carter‘s 
comments, Admiral Sun Jianguo, Deputy Chief of General Staff of the People's 
Liberation Army, stated that ―[a]ctually I am worried that some people and countries are 
still looking at China with the Cold War mentality and prejudice. They may build a wall 
in their minds and end up isolating themselves.‖
72
 Carter and Sun have expressed 
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diametrically opposing views, their comments clearly revealing the depth of the 
strategic mistrust between the two powers. 
9.6.4 United States relations with The Philippines and Vietnam 
While the South China Sea disputes have pushed Vietnam and the Philippines 
closer to the United States, political and strategic trust between the United States and 
these two small South China Sea claimants is not always high.  
Over the past decade there has been an improvement in the relationship between 
Vietnam and the United States. However, due to historical issues and different political 
ideologies, the two States still have a lot of work to do to fully normalise their 
relationship. While human rights and democratic governance are the two major areas of 
concern for the United States in its foreign policy towards Vietnam, maintaining the 
power of the Vietnamese regime, preventing U.S.-led ―peaceful evolution‖, and creating 
breathing space between U.S.-China strategic and diplomatic manoeuvres are key 
concerns for Vietnam‘s foreign policy towards the United States.  Moreover, Vietnam is 
unlikely to forget the 1974 Paracels battle with China – a battle which, in Vietnamese 
consciousness, saw the United States give the green light to China to invade Vietnam. 
In this regard, Nguyen Manh Ha, Director of the Institute of Party History of Vietnam‘s 
Communist Party, has declared that: 
 Without the handshake between Mao Zedong and Nixon, China would have not dared 
to occupy the Paracel Islands, which was controlled by the southern government. 
America was behind the southern region but why they did not support the southern 
 
341 
 
government? It is because the US-China interests at that time were much bigger than the 
―southern government card.‖
73
 
Vietnam thus understands that national interests, rather than alliances, dictate 
State relations. Vietnam also understands that the South China Sea issue is not the 
central strategic factor in China-U.S. relations. Even though the relationship between 
Vietnam and the United States has improved dramatically in recent years, it is unlikely 
that Vietnam will seek a security alliance with the United States. 
Although the Philippines and the United States are treaty allies, the level of trust 
between these two States is not always high. Indeed, the strategic importance of the 
alliance declined after 1991, when the Philippine Government voted to put an end to 
U.S. military bases in the Philippines. The withdrawal of U.S. forces created a power 
vacuum in the region, giving China the perfect opportunity to seize Mischief Reef in 
1995. During the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff between China and the Philippines, 
the United States did show support for the Philippines by pressing China for a peaceful 
resolution. However, in the end, the Philippines lost control of the shoal to Chinese 
forces. With the growing assertiveness of China, the relationship between the United 
States and the Philippines has improved in recent years. The 2014 Philippines-U.S. 
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement is an example of strategic trust being rebuilt 
between the two States. However, as Aileen Baviera has commented, ―while most 
Filipinos welcome cooperation with the United States, many remain distrustful of 
unequal agreement that long characterized relations with the former colonizer.‖
74
 
                                                 
73
 Quoted in Why China invaded Vietnam‟s Gac Ma Reef in 1988 (17 March 2016) Vietnamnet 
<http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/special-reports/152634/why-china-invaded-vietnam-s-gac-ma-reef-in-
1988.html>. 
74
 Aileen S P Baviera, Implications of the US-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (9 
May 2014) East-West Center 
<http://www.eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/apb262.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=34570>. 
 
342 
 
9.7 Implications for the future security, safety and freedom of navigation and 
overflight 
 While most littoral States of the South China Sea have tried to enact domestic 
legislation which is consistent with the LOSC, China, on the other hand, has claimed 
almost all the waters of the South China Sea in contravention of international law. In 
addition, China has advanced the most restrictive view on the freedoms of navigation 
and overflight in various maritime zones, and assumed an aggressive posture in 
defending its excessive territorial sovereignty and maritime claims in the region. 
According to Peter Dutton, as a rising maritime power China appears to employ power-
based approaches in pursuing its maritime interests rather than law-based options.
75
 
Dutton has also noted that ―[a]t no time in the last six decades can it be said that China‘s 
preferred approach to achieving its peripheral maritime aims has been through 
international law.‖
76
  
Maintaining the security, safety and freedom of navigation and overflight in the 
South China Sea is in the interest of not only littoral States but also extra-regional 
players. Therefore, the States concerned need to cooperate with each other to diffuse 
tensions and reduce the potential for violent clashes in this strategically important 
region. With the aim of seeing the ―China Dream‖ become a reality, China has 
increased its defence spending and is fiercely protecting its territorial sovereignty and 
maritime claims in the South China Sea. In his speech to soldiers in the city of Huizhou 
in 2012, Chinese President Xi Jinping emphasised the military aspects of the ―Chinese 
Dream‖, declaring that ―[t]his dream can be said to be the dream of a strong nation; and 
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for the military, it is the dream of a strong military.‖
77
 In May 2015, the Chinese 
government released its Defence White Paper (DWP) titled ―China‘s Military Strategy.‖ 
The paper is significant in that it highlights the role of China‘s military strategy in 
securing the South China Sea domain. The DWP clearly states that ―[t]he traditional 
mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned and great importance has to be 
attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and 
interests.‖
78
 The paper also notes that the Chinese navy ―will gradually shift its focus 
from ‗offshore waters defense‘ to the combination of ‗offshore waters defense‘ with 
‗open seas protection.‘‖
79
 Regarding territorial sovereignty and maritime disputes in the 
South China Sea, the DWP asserts that some of China‘s neighbours ―take provocative 
actions and reinforce their military presence on China‘s reefs and islands that they have 
illegally occupied‖
80
, and that ―[s]ome external countries are also busy meddling in the 
South China Sea affairs.‖
81
 It is clearly evident from these comments that China will not 
compromise its territorial sovereignty and maritime claims in the South China Sea. Nor 
will it submit to any legal process or entertain the involvement of external players in 
managing South China Sea affairs.  
As China has landed a number of aircraft on disputed features in the Spratly 
Islands, it would appear that basing Chinese military aircraft on these artificial islands 
will inevitably follow.
82
 Philippine Foreign Ministry spokesman Charles Jose has 
surmised that ―[t]hat's the fear, that China will be able to take control of the South China 
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Sea and it will affect the freedom of navigation and freedom of overflight.‖
83
 According 
to Richard Fisher, it is to be expected that China will deploy surface-to-air missiles to 
islands in the Spratlys.
84
 If this occurs, then increasing its military presence in both the 
Paracels and the Spratlys could help China effectively establish an air defence 
identification zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea. In November 2013, China declared 
an ADIZ in the East China Sea, sparking concerns from regional States, including the 
United States, Japan and Australia.
85
 An ADIZ is a designated ―area of airspace over 
land or water, extending upward from the surface, within which the ready identification, 
the location, and the control of aircraft are required in the interest of national 
security.‖
86
 The ADIZ concept is not clearly addressed in international law, but many 
States in the region including the United States, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have 
established ADIZs. China‘s ADIZ in the East China Sea covers airspace over disputed 
territories, notably the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and overlaps with the ADIZs of Japan, 
South Korea and Taiwan. Moreover, unlike the ADIZs of other States, China requests 
all foreign aircraft, including civilian and military aircraft crossing its ADIZ, to identify 
themselves and to follow Chinese instructions on flight paths even though such aircraft 
are not entering Chinese airspace.
87
 If China establishes an ADIZ in the South China 
Sea, then this will definitely have a negative effect on the passage of sovereign immune 
aircraft. Moreover, if an ADIZ does transpire, then it is likely that there will be more 
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Chinese military aircraft patrolling the airspace above the South China Sea. 
Accordingly, intentional and unintentional aviation incidents will be difficult to avoid. 
On the ocean surface, China will continue to adhere to its restrictive views on 
the innocent passage of foreign warships in the territorial sea and foreign military 
activities in the EEZ. With its increasing maritime power, it is expected that China will 
be more assertive and aggressive in defending its position regarding these issues.  
In addition to increasing the presence of its military and law enforcement 
vessels, China has been operating the world‘s largest fleet of fishing vessels, with many 
of these vessels being used as maritime militia to enforce China‘s maritime claims in 
the South China Sea.
88
 Indeed, approximately 200,000 fishing vessels comprise China‘s 
maritime militia, with such vessels supporting China‘s coercive maritime claims against 
other claimant States in the South China Sea and East China Sea.89 As a number of 
Chinese fishing vessels have been trained to confront foreign vessels in disputed waters, 
incidents involving these fishing vessels and other sovereign immune vessels operating 
in the South China Sea will continue to take place. 
In light of the above discussion, China‘s military ambitions, combined with its 
increasing maritime forces and pattern of aggressive behaviour over the past few 
decades, will make the task of maintaining the security, safety and freedom of 
navigation and overflight in the South China Sea in the coming years very challenging.  
9.8 The way forward 
 In order to avoid both intentional and unintentional maritime incidents in the 
South China Sea, there are a number of recommendations that the relevant States should 
consider.  
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 Firstly, pending the resolution of their territorial sovereignty and maritime 
claims, the States concerned could maintain the current status quo in the South China 
Sea, including in disputed offshore territories. This would require the relevant States to 
not only halt island building, but also refrain from sending additional naval and law 
enforcement assets to disputed maritime areas for the purpose of asserting sovereignty 
claims. This option was mentioned in the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the 
South China Sea (DOC), and has also been suggested by many diplomatic and political 
leaders.
90
 However, China might not be interested in this option, as it views the current 
status quo as unfavourable. Nevertheless, ASEAN member States could work with 
China to implement the DOC while refraining from any action which would complicate 
or escalate existing disputes. Extra-regional powers, particularly the United States, 
Japan, India and Australia, could also play an important role in maintaining the existing 
state of affairs in the South China Sea, thus hampering China‘s plans to consolidate its 
presence and alter the status quo in the region in its favour. In order to support the role 
of extra-regional powers (particularly the United States) in maintaining the freedoms of 
navigation and overflight in the region, littoral States could issue a joint statement 
expressing their views on the innocent passage of foreign warships in the territorial sea 
and foreign military activities in the EEZ – views which are consistent with customary 
international law and the LOSC. It is worth noting that despite Vietnam‘s domestic law 
requiring prior notification for the passage of foreign warships in its territorial sea, the 
passage of the USS Curtis Wilbur within 12 nautical miles of Triton Island claimed by 
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Vietnam (among other States), without any prior notification being given prompted 
Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesman Le Hai Binh to state that: ―Vietnam respects 
the right of innocent passage through its territory in accordance with international law, 
particularly Article 17 of the Law of the Sea Convention.‖
91
 
 Secondly, a Code of Conduct (Code) for the South China Sea seems difficult to 
achieve due to the different interests of China and ASEAN States. China does not want 
to have a legally binding document with ASEAN in the South China Sea, while a 
number of ASEAN States including Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Myanmar may not 
be in a hurry to push for a Code which would impact their relationship with China. 
According to Carl Thayer, ―the geographical area of ASEAN‘s proposed CoC cannot be 
defined until China either clarifies or withdraws its nine-dash line claim to the South 
China Sea.‖
92
 Thayer has also added that ―because ASEAN and China have agreed to 
proceed with consultations on the drafting of a CoC on the basis of consensus, China 
can delay these proceedings indefinitely.‖
93
 As mentioned in Chapter eight, China and 
the ASEAN aimed to reach a framework for a code of conduct for the South China Sea 
by the middle of 2017. As ASEAN is unlikely to strike an agreement with China on 
South China Sea issues, other littoral States could strive for an incidents at sea 
agreement that sets out rules of behaviour for when their sovereign immune vessels and 
aircraft encounter each other. Such an agreement could then be opened to other 
interested States, including Indonesia, Singapore, the United States, Japan, India and 
Australia. If such an agreement were to receive wide support from the regional 
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community and extra-regional players, it would not only help avoid maritime incidents 
but also potentially reduce the aggressive behaviour of Chinese maritime forces in the 
region. Based on the arbitral tribunal‘s ruling, South China Sea claimants could strive 
for a joint understanding or joint declaration to support the ruling regarding the nine-
dash line and the status of land features in the South China Sea. If all relevant States 
showed support for the arbitral tribunal‘s decision that the nine-dash line claimed by 
China has no legal basis, and that all land features in the South China Sea are incapable 
of generating EEZs or continental shelves, this would help not only narrow down the 
disputed maritime areas in this region, but also demonstrate respect for the LOSC.  
 Thirdly, as most of the recent maritime incidents in the South China Sea have 
involved law enforcement vessels rather than naval ships and aircraft, regional States 
could establish a law enforcement forum and develop maritime safety guidelines or 
agreements between regional maritime law enforcement forces. The North Pacific Coast 
Guard Forum (NPCF) established in 2000 is a good example of this practice. The NPCF 
currently consists of six members, China, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Russia and the 
United States. The focus areas of the NPCF include maritime security, maritime domain 
awareness, illegal drug trafficking, illegal migration, fisheries enforcement, and 
combined operations.
94
 Since the forum was established, a number of bilateral and 
multilateral operations and exercises have been conducted.
95
 Also, the Heads of Asian 
Coast Guard Agencies Meeting (HACGAM) has been held almost every year since 
2004. Representatives from Asian States, including all South China Sea littoral States, 
have participated in ―active discussions on their shared challenges concerning piracy 
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and proposed a general framework of collaboration to effectively deal with this issue.‖
96
 
It is recommended that HACGAM develop mechanisms for coast guard-type maritime 
forces, including but not limited to, coast guards, fisheries enforcement agencies and 
marine police, which could then cooperate at an operational level and also establish 
guiding principles for the safe interaction of these types of maritime forces. If such 
guiding principles are established and consistently implemented by a majority of States 
in the region, they could certainly lead to the formation of customary international law 
principles which would become binding on all States over time. In addition, the Taiwan 
Coast Guard should be invited to participate in this regional law enforcement effort – 
not as a State but as an agency in a similar way to the way Taiwan participates in the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group and the Western and Central Pacific 
Fisheries Commission (WCPFC). This will help avoid sovereignty issues and improve 
the effectiveness of any regional resolution regarding the passage of coast guard-type 
maritime forces in the South China Sea. If these guiding principles are not established in 
the near future, hotlines between coast guard-type maritime forces could be set up to 
help prevent small-scale incidents from escalating into large-scale conflict. 
 Fourthly, pending the resolution of territorial sovereignty disputes and maritime 
claims, regional States could cooperate to increase maritime situational awareness, thus 
avoiding mistakes and miscalculations. Established in 2009, the Singapore-based 
Information Fusion Centre (IFC) is a Singaporean initiative which seeks to strengthen 
regional maritime security ―by building a common coherent maritime situation picture 
and acting as a maritime information hub for the region.‖
97
 The IFC shares information 
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with members of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) through the Regional 
Maritime Information Exchange (ReMIX) System.
98
 However, this centre focuses 
mainly on the exchange of information regarding maritime piracy and armed robberies. 
Even if the centre was equipped to exchange other types of information, States would 
still be reluctant to share sensitive data, such as information relating to manoeuvring 
military vessels and aircraft. The idea of combined maritime surveillance patrols in the 
South China Sea by South China Sea littoral States, or by littoral States and extra-
regional powers, could not only be used to improve maritime situational awareness but 
also strengthen regional maritime cooperation and understanding. For example, 
Vietnam and Malaysia could conduct combined maritime surveillance patrols within 
their respective EEZs, including in the overlapping areas. The United States could 
conduct maritime surveillance in conjunction with Vietnam and the Philippines within 
the EEZs of Vietnam and the Philippines. This would help build confidence between the 
parties and also place pressure on China in relation to its claimed nine-dash line. 
Importantly, all information regarding the building of artificial islands or actions which 
change the status quo could be publically broadcasted, thus allowing the relevant parties 
to take appropriate and prompt action. 
 Fifthly, even though there have been no incidents in the South China Sea 
between Chinese sovereign immune aircraft and those of smaller littoral States, the 
increasing number of military and coast guard aircraft in the region could pose a 
potential risk in the coming years. In 2015, China repeatedly warned Philippine and 
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U.S. surveillance aircraft to leave the Spratly Island area.
99
 If China continues to send 
its aircraft to accost or intercept surveillance aircraft of other States in the South China 
Sea, then potential air incidents cannot be ignored in any future regulatory regime. 
Currently, international law is silent on the interaction between sovereign immune 
aircraft outside national airspace. For this reason, South China Sea littoral States should 
devise a set of guiding principles for the passage of this type of aircraft. Indeed, such 
principles would help avoid unexpected incidents in the South China Sea, particularly in 
disputed maritime areas. 
Sixthly, South China Sea littoral States have increased their submarine forces in 
recent years. However, certain States, particularly Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia, 
have little experience in handling submarines. According to Roger Thornhill, ―it takes 
decades of submarine service to develop the tactics, techniques, procedures and 
doctrine, backed by experience, to be effective.‖
100
 Therefore, the safety of submarine 
operations in the South China Sea is a serious issue. As discussed above, the covert 
nature of submarine operations means that a regional agreement governing the 
manoeuvre of such vessels is a daunting task. NATO has a Submarine Movement 
Advisory Authority to manage water space and de-conflict undersea transits and 
operations among Allied nations and partners.
101
 However, this model cannot be 
replicated in the South China Sea as no single State is willing to let other States know 
where their submarines operate. As anti-submarine weapons can be very dangerous, this 
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often results in States adopting an ―all or nothing‖ approach.
102
 It would be advisable to 
have regional guidelines or principles in place which prevent lethal force being used 
when dealing with unidentified submarines detected in the territorial sea and disputed 
waters.
103
 Another option would be to increase regional cooperation in submarine safety 
training and submarine rescue. This would not only help reduce the risk of submarine 
accidents, but also foster trust and understanding between regional submarine forces. 
The Submarine Escape and Rescue exercise conducted in 2010 by the navies of 
Singapore, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the United States, and the Submarine 
Rescue Arrangement signed by the Singapore Navy and the Australian Navy in 2013, 
are good models for regional cooperation in submarine training and rescue.
104
 
Seventhly, as territorial sovereignty and maritime delimitation disputes in the 
South China Sea are unlikely to be resolved in the near future (or at all), concerned 
States could look for options that avoid the issues of sovereignty and maritime 
boundaries altogether. For example, for the safety of navigation and overflight in the 
region, concerned States could negotiate standard procedures for the safe interaction of 
sovereign immune vessels and aircraft at sea in general, without referring to maritime 
zones. This change of mind-set could help avoid the obstacle of sovereignty disputes 
among concerned States. 
 Lastly, maintaining safety, security and freedom of navigation and overflight in 
the South China Sea is in the interest of not only littoral States but the region as a 
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whole. Extra-regional powers can play a constructive role in preserving the freedom of 
navigation and overflight in accordance with international law, thus ensuring the peace, 
security and stability of the area. All regional States should cooperate with each other to 
promote rule-based approaches to the South China Sea disputes. As Dutton has 
proclaimed: ―Not history, not power, but international law must be the standard.‖
105
 
Apart from statements urging claimants to adhere to international law and maintain the 
status quo in the South China Sea, peaceful naval operations to assert the freedom of 
navigation and overflight should be regularly conducted. Combined maritime patrols 
and surveillance by extra-regional maritime powers in the South China Sea will also 
help demonstrate their concerns over the security and freedom of navigation in this 
strategically important region. The patrol of the USS Lassen within 12 nautical miles of 
the artificial island built by China on Subi Reef on 27 October 2015, and the passage of 
the USS Curtis Wilbur within 12 nautical miles of Triton Island in February 2016, 
represent efforts by the United States to maintain the status quo in relation to the 
freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. However, the patrol by a single State is 
not powerful enough in representing State practice, and even this would make the issue 
become the matter between the United States and China. Therefore, combined patrol by 
like-mined States should be encouraged. With the ruling of the arbitral tribunal in the 
Philippines-China arbitration, China cannot continue to assert ambiguous maritime 
claims in the South China Sea. Indeed, in the wake of this ruling, the United States, 
Japan, India and Australia  have a clear legal basis to conduct freedom of navigation 
operations in the South China Sea, and thus support a rules-based order. Extra-regional 
powers could also help smaller South China Sea States improve their knowledge and 
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skills in handling maritime assets in accordance with international law, thus helping to 
mitigate maritime incidents and accidents at sea. Moreover, the United States could 
accede to the LOSC in order to improve its credibility and bolster its efforts in 
advocating for rule-based orders, not only in the region but around the world. As U.S. 
President Barack Obama has noted: ―[We] can‘t try to resolve problems in the South 
China Sea when we have refused to make sure that the Law of the Sea Convention is 
ratified by our United States Senate.‖
106
 
9.9 Conclusion 
The international law of the sea has played an important role in maintaining maritime 
safety and security. However, due to uncertain issues in the international legal regime, 
States continue to adopt differing interpretations of pertinent provisions to suit their 
own vested interests. Given China‘s rise in economic and military power, as well as its 
pattern of aggressive behaviour, it is unlikely that it will show any respect for 
international legal provisions which it considers prejudicial to its own interests. By all 
accounts, it seems likely that China will soon declare an ADIZ in the South China 
Sea.
107
 If this transpires, managing maritime safety and the freedom of navigation and 
overflight in the region will be a critical issue for years to come. Although there have 
been a number of regional initiatives to address South China Sea issues, they have had 
limited success. Furthermore, considerable challenges remain which necessitate swift 
and decisive action. The recommendations discussed in this chapter can be combined 
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with other policies and strategies which address sovereignty disputes and maritime 
claims in order to keep the South China Sea peaceful and secure long into the future. 
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10 CONCLUSION 
10.1 Introduction 
 This thesis has shown that the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft 
at sea is not explicitly addressed in international law. Moreover, the geographical and 
geopolitical complexity of the South China Sea means that many more incidents 
involving vessels and aircraft of this type are likely to occur in the coming years.  
The research presented in the thesis has analysed navigational issues in the 
South China Sea, focusing on the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft. 
Particular attention has been given to the prevailing international law; geopolitical 
issues; territorial sovereignty disputes and associated maritime claims; the practices of 
littoral States; current regional initiatives; and the strengths and weaknesses of regional 
institutions. In doing so, the thesis has highlighted the challenges that lay ahead; the 
implications of these challenges for future maritime security, safety, and the freedom of 
navigation and overflight in the South China Sea; as well as a number of 
recommendations for more responsible navigational regimes in relation to sovereign 
immune vessels and aircraft in the region.  
 This chapter summarises the key findings of the thesis. Furthermore, based on 
these key findings, the chapter recommends a number of areas that require further 
research. 
10.2 Key findings and policy recommendations 
 The thesis has uncovered a number of problems that continue to impact the 
passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in the South China Sea. These 
problems include unresolved maritime territorial disputes and sovereignty issues; gaps 
and ambiguities in the international legal regime which lead to conflicting 
interpretations of pertinent provisions by States; limitations in the practical application 
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of regional initiatives at both the governmental level (Track I) and non-governmental 
level (Track II); differences of opinion within the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) over how to best approach the South China Sea disputes; China‘s 
growing assertiveness in relation to its excessive sovereignty and maritime claims in the 
region; and the existing political and strategic distrust among littoral States and between 
littoral States and extra-regional powers. 
The thesis has also found that the resolution of sovereignty disputes in the South 
China Sea is highly unlikely in the coming years. The main reason for this is that none 
of the claimant States are willing to relinquish or compromise their sovereignty claims 
over offshore features. Furthermore, certain claimants, such as China, have taken the 
bold step of claiming all these islands, thus casting further doubt on the possibility of a 
resolution. Moreover, China‘s ―nine-dash line‖ claim, which contravenes international 
law, has created an obstacle for any joint resource development in the region. Indeed, as 
States have not been able to agree on what areas are in dispute, they cannot agree on 
areas for joint resource development. 
The analysis in the preceding chapters has focused on a number of regional 
initiatives (at both Track I and Track II levels) to promote confidence-building and 
prevent maritime conflict. However, current efforts to manage such conflicts appear to 
have had limited success. While most of the regional initiatives and bilateral agreements 
approved at Track I level are non-legally binding, proposals at Track II level have failed 
to gain traction with concerned States, as any attempt to interpret the provisions of the 
LOSC narrowly and with a regional focus has proved unsuccessful. ASEAN could play 
a central role in maintaining stable maritime security and freedom of navigation in the 
region. However, all ten member States of ASEAN have different stakes in, and 
concerns over, South China Sea issues. As a result, ASEAN has not been able to speak 
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with one voice in relation to the South China Sea disputes. Moreover, as consultation 
and consensus are the basic principles of decision-making within ASEAN, one pro-
Beijing member can effectively block the organisation‘s decision-making process.  
In addition to the shortcomings of regional mechanisms, the thesis has revealed 
gaps and ambiguities in international law, particularly in the way the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC), the Convention on International Civil 
Aviation (Chicago Convention), and the International Regulations for Preventing 
Collisions at Sea (COLREGs) regulate the passage of sovereign immune vessels and 
aircraft at sea. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that these gaps and ambiguities will be 
resolved, as they are the inevitable product of a compromise-based international law 
system.  
A key emphasis of the thesis has been China‘s burgeoning economic and 
military prowess. Indeed, China‘s advancement in these crucial areas has allowed it to 
disregard international law, particularly the LOSC. For example, while China applies a 
restrictive view on the freedom of navigation and overflight in its own EEZ, it continues 
to disregard the sovereign rights of other South China Sea littoral States in their 
respective EEZs. Granted, the LOSC contains provisions regarding foreign military 
activities in the EEZ of coastal States which are, at best, ambiguous. And undoubtedly 
China has exploited these ambiguities to its advantage. However, no ambiguity exists in 
the LOSC in relation to the sovereign rights enjoyed by coastal States over both living 
and non-living resources in their EEZs. China‘s legally untenable ‗nine-dash line‘ 
claim, and its extensive artificial island-building program on various disputed offshore 
features in the South China Sea, have created concerns which transcend the safety and 
freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. With China‘s current pattern of 
behaviour, maintaining the safety and freedom of navigation and overflight in the South 
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China Sea, particularly for sovereign immune vessels and aircraft, will be a challenging 
issue for years to come. 
The thesis has found that other maritime user States, particularly the United 
States, Japan, India and Australia, have interests in the South China Sea. Promoting the 
freedom of navigation in accordance with international law, and maintaining stable 
security in the South China Sea, are key priorities for these States. However, the South 
China Sea is not the only factor in their relations vis-à-vis China. 
The analysis has also highlighted that as long as strategic and political distrust 
exists between China and other South China Sea claimants, any resolution of the South 
China Sea disputes will remain illusory. The strategic distrust between China and the 
United States also prevents external players from promoting the safety and freedom of 
navigation and overflight in and above the South China Sea. As a result, regional 
responses to maritime disputes in the South China Sea have taken on a distinct material 
character, with concerned States modernising their maritime forces, including navies, as 
well as coast guards and other types of civilian law enforcement agencies. The 
heightened presence of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft will increase the 
likelihood of adverse incidents. 
The thesis has provided a number of policy recommendations to maintain the 
freedoms of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea, and to prevent potentially 
adverse incidents in the region involving the passage of sovereign immune vessels and 
aircraft. These recommendations include promoting regional efforts to maintain the 
status quo; an incidents at sea agreement between South China Sea claimant States in a 
way that encourages non-claimants and extra-regional powers to accede to it; 
encouraging South China Sea claimants to revise their maritime claims in accordance 
with developments in international law (such the recent award of the arbitral tribunal); 
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encouraging Taiwan, in its capacity as a South China Sea claimant, to play a more 
constructive role in the region; advocating for regional guidelines or agreements 
regarding the interaction between coast guard-type maritime forces in the South China 
Sea; promoting a regional agreement governing the interaction between State aircraft in 
international airspace; recommending prospective measures for the safe operation of 
submarines; increasing maritime awareness; and insisting that extra-regional powers 
play constructive roles in maintaining security and the freedom of navigation and 
overflight in the area. These recommendations should be combined with other relevant 
policies and strategies, and adapted or modified (as necessary) in accordance with the 
political will of the States concerned. By doing so, it is hoped that the peace, stability 
and security of the South China Sea will be maintained for the benefit of the region as a 
whole. 
 More than 30 years have passed since the LOSC was negotiated, and with 
changes in technology and the security environment, it is timely to consider what 
revisions may be made to the document with the support of the global community. In 
this regard, provisions of the LOSC related to maritime safety and the freedoms of 
navigation and overflight should be revised for increased clarity. However, it is highly 
dubious that such a proposal would help fill the gaps and ambiguities in areas relevant 
to the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft. This is because maritime user 
States are unlikely to reach a consensus on any provision that restricts the freedom of 
navigation and overflight at sea. Therefore, rather than clarifying the existing provisions 
of the LOSC, a better approach would be to focus on how to encourage States to strictly 
adhere to the current provisions of the LOSC in good faith. 
 As there are no existing international law rules governing the interaction 
between sovereign immune aircraft outside national airspace, establishing a code of 
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conduct or set of guidelines for unplanned encounters at sea for sovereign immune 
aircraft is also critical. A number of incidents have occurred between Chinese, Japanese 
and U.S. sovereign immune aircraft in the East and South China Seas, and between 
sovereign immune aircraft of the United States and Russia in the Baltic Sea. These 
incidents have revealed a loophole in the international legal regime regarding the 
interaction between State aircraft in international airspace. 
 In recent years, there have been a number of regional and bilateral agreements 
regarding the interaction between military vessels and aircraft at sea. The Code for 
Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) was approved in 2014 by the Western Pacific 
Naval Symposium, and two Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) have been signed by 
China and the United States on sea-air interactions. However, similar agreements 
ensuring safe encounters between non-naval law enforcement vessels and aircraft are 
yet to be devised. Given that coast guards and other maritime law enforcement agencies 
are playing critical roles in protecting the sovereignty and sovereign rights of concerned 
States, especially in the East and South China Seas, the potential for clashes between 
these forces should not be ignored. As a result, encouraging regional civilian law 
enforcement agencies to have an agreement in place for the safe behaviour of their 
vessels and aircraft at sea is a critical consideration. 
10.3 Recommended areas for further research 
The thesis has exposed a number of areas that require further research for the 
continued improvement of maritime safety and the freedom of navigation and overflight 
at sea.  
 As States in the South China Sea have not been able to agree on what areas are 
in dispute, any proposal for sharing resources or for the joint development of such 
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resources in contested areas is unlikely to succeed. Moreover, apart from resources, the 
South China Sea has strategic and security importance to littoral States; therefore, 
sharing resources is not the highest priority for these particular States. An avenue for 
further research could thus be ways of maintaining the current status quo in the region. 
Indeed, this research could investigate indirect approaches to achieve this goal – 
approaches which eschew any reference to disputed areas. This could take the form of 
regional cooperative mechanisms for maintaining the safety of sea lines of 
communication and protecting the region‘s marine environment and natural resources.  
Despite the Cold War having ended 25 years ago, an increase in the number of 
Air Defence Identification Zones (ADIZs) due to sovereignty and security concerns is 
likely to continue into the future. As there are currently no international law rules 
governing the establishment of ADIZs, further research could be conducted on 
international guidelines and geostrategic factors related to ADIZs (and with the 
objective of maintaining the safety and freedom of overflight at sea). 
 In the East and South China Seas, Chinese fishing vessels have received 
specialised training and been equipped with advanced electronics and even some 
warfare capabilities. As a result, these fishing vessels have been transformed into 
maritime militia to support China‘s maritime claims in times of peace, and to bolster the 
State‘s military forces in times of armed conflict. This tactic not only poses potential 
threats to the safety and freedom of navigation of vessels of other States in the region, 
but also raises concerns over how to distinguish between civilian fishing vessels used 
for peaceful purposes, and fishing vessels which are being used to support military 
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forces in times of war.
1
 Therefore, research focusing on the legality of using ―irregular‖ 
fishing vessels to enforce maritime sovereignty claims in peacetime, and to support 
military forces in times of armed conflict at sea, could help fill this loophole in 
international law. 
 ASEAN should play a key role in maintaining regional security. However, due 
to its consensus-based decision-making process, it is hard for ASEAN to stand firm on 
regional security issues, particularly South China Sea problems. Further research on the 
limitations of the ASEAN Charter would, therefore, be useful. 
 Lastly, as unresolved maritime disputes have the potential to lead to maritime 
conflicts if not carefully managed, resolving disputes by peaceful means and with 
reference to international law rules and norms should always be a priority. Against this 
backdrop, the opportunity exists for research which critically assesses rule-based versus 
power-based approaches in resolving sovereignty and maritime disputes. Such research 
could help encourage concerned States to settle disputes through peaceful legal 
processes rather than resorting to armed conflict.  
  In order to establish a broad spectrum of potential approaches to issues in the 
South China Sea, the above-mentioned research areas should be fully investigated. It is 
fervently hoped that the proposals canvassed in this thesis, when combined with the 
results of the further research, will lead to the maintenance and promotion of maritime 
safety, stability and security – not only in the South China Sea but in all ocean spaces. 
 
                                                 
1
 See James Kraska, How China Exploits A Loophole in International Law in Pursuit of Hegemony in 
East Asia (January 2015) Foreign Policy Research Institute <http://www.fpri.org/article/2015/01/how-
china-exploits-a-loophole-in-international-law-in-pursuit-of-hegemony-in-east-asia/>. 
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